Papers
Truth in
Constructive Empiricism (2007) Constructive empiricism, the scientific anti-realism championed
by Bas van Fraassen, claims to offer an adequate reconstruction of the aim
and practice of scientific inquiry without adopting the inflationary
metaphysical excesses of scientific realism. In articulating the positions of
the realist and the empiricist, van Fraassen freely makes use of the concept
of truth. Theories of truth come in a variety of flavors, some more
metaphysically stark than others. Deflationary theories of truth, for
instance, boast of the ability to offer a full account of the nature of truth
without having to succumb to the supposed metaphysical extravagances
accompanying more substantive accounts. Constructive empiricism and
deflationism about truth seem, then, to form a natural pair. My contention is
that such a pairing is not possible—constructive empiricism requires a more
substantive account of truth than can be offered by the deflationist. |