Research
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Intuition suggests that major
powers should be more likely to pursue joint military intervention when
their preferences are most similar, but empirically, joint
interventions are least likely in these cases. The solution to this
puzzle lies in the strategic interaction between interveners. When
states agree over policy, they face a free rider problem. A state is
more willing to join an intervention as its preferences with the
initial intervener diverge because doing so allows it to affect policy
outcomes. To test the theory, a statistical model derived from the
theoretical model is used to estimate the factors that affect the
decisions of major powers to intervene in civil conflicts.
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Conventional wisdom suggests that
biased military interventions in civil conflicts should
increase the probability that the supported side will win. However,
while this is the case for rebel groups, the same is not true for
governments. The explanation for this surprising fnding becomes clear
once one considers the decision of a third party intervener. Since
interveners want to impact the outcomes of civil conflict, government-
and rebel-biased interventions will be more likely when the government
is facing a stronger rebel group. Given that government-biased third
parties intervene in the "toughest" cases, empirically they appear to
be less e®ective than rebel-biased interveners
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When deciding whether to
intervene militarily, states consider the anticipated actions of other
potential interveners. If major powers have conflicting policy
preferences, they have incentives to intervene preemptively to
eliminate the possibility of future interventions by rival
powers. Given this, major powers should be more likely to
intervene in their spheres of influence when another power provides an
external threat. An historical examination of U.S. intervention
behavior in the Caribbean Basin supports this argument.
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Power-sharing agreements can help
combatants overcome commitment problems that prevent the successful
settlement of civil wars. However, the decision to accept a
power-sharing agreement is strategic. Governments will only be willing
to make such concessions when they face stronger rebel groups. Since
rebels will be more likely to sign a peace agreement if it includes
power-sharing, civil war combatants will be more likely to successfully
reach an agreement when rebel groups are stronger. Empirical tests
provide strong support for the theory, indicating that rebel strength
increases thelikelihood of both civil war peace agreements and power-sharing pacts.
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Are unbiased third parties more
effective conflict managers than biased third parties? While
conventional wisdom holds that best intermediaries are unbiased,
scholars have not definitively concluded if and how impartiality leads
to successful negotiations. In this paper, we
investigate the management of international territorial
claims to determine the utility of unbiased third parties.
Surprisingly, we find that the nature of the intervener’s
preferences does not influence dispute management as much as the
intervention technique used. When territorial rivals undergo binding
negotiations that are the most effective in resolving disputes, they
prefer unbiased intermediaries to hand down compulsory decisions. In
this sense, impartial diplomatic intervention does not directly lead to
successful negotiations. Rather, disputants favor unbiased third
parties to broker the types of talks most likely to end international
disputes.
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