40.  Respond to Professor Armstrong’s further case for “inner sense” (April 6).

    41.  What is your opinion on the “inverted spectrum” objection to Functionalism?  Does the standard reply work?  What do you think of Shoemaker’s own reply?

    42.  Evaluate Shoemaker’s argument against “absent qualia.”

    43.  Discuss Nagel’s “bat” argument and/or Jackson’s “Knowledge argument.”  Are Dennett or Lewis and Nemirow right to nip the argument in the bud?  Do Nagel and Jackson commit the fallacy with which I and others have charged it, and does Mark’s idea of a new perspective on an old fact wreck the argument?  Or is Jackson’s step 5 true anyway, even if it should not have been inferred from 3?  Does any version of the argument succeed in showing anything of interest about qualitative states/events?

    44.  Defend the adverbial theory of sensing against Jackson’s “many property” problem and subsequent objections.

    45.  Assess the Representationalist reply to the After-Image argument.  And/or, assess the Representational theory of qualia more generally; defend it against the objections, or press further objections yourself.

    46.  If you’re not a Representationalist, give some other account of qualia in the strict sense.  What do you think they are?

    47.  Defend some position on Nagel’s split-brain issue.  If you choose one of his five, motivate it and defend it against his existing objections.  Or, you might think up a sixth position.