As before, these are suggestions, but if you have a different topic you want to try, you must discuss it with me in advance.

    16.  Though Kripke's notion of a "rigid designator" and his ancillary distinction between "fixing sense" and merely "fixing reference" are now dogma, some philosophers are uneasy about them, especially the former.  If you too are uneasy about "rigidity," take this opportunity to articulate that uneasiness.

    17.  Do fictional names pose a special problem for Kripke?  Consider this either in regard to his rejection of the Name Claim, or in regard to his positive Causal-Historical account.

    18.  How might Kripke address one or more of the Five Puzzles, now that he has rejected the Name Claim?  (The question is deceptively simple.)

    19.  Respond on Kripke's behalf to Evans' counterexamples.  Or, discuss any one or two of the examples in detail.  (The 'Kingston' example proved pleasantly controversial.)

    20.  Offer your own criticisms of the Causal-Historical picture.

    21.  Discuss Evans' own account of reference.

    22.  Discuss the view(s) of natural-kind terms defended in Putnam's "Meaning and Reference."

    23.  If you’re interested in rigid designation, Direct Reference, and singular terms other than names and descriptions, write something on Kaplan’s “Dthat.”