TOPICS FOR PAPER #4
 

    30.  Discuss what I called the "bare" Truth-Condition theory of meaning, i.e., the claim that a sentence's meaning is the actual or hypothetical fact or "state of affairs" that makes or would make the sentence true.  Which of the objections raised against Davidson's implementation or against the Intensional version
would apply to the "bare" theory alone?  Can they be answered?

    31.  Discuss Davidson's complicated implementation of the Truth-Condition theory.  Press an existing objection (this includes the Liar objection) harder against him; or defend him against one of the objections; or pose a new objection of your own.

    32.  Explore the problem posed by the Liar Paradox for any or all versions of the Truth-Condition theory.

    33.  In class I briefly explored a possible rapprochement between Grice and Davidson, the one envisaged on pp. 145-46 of my textbook chapter on Davidson.  But that compromise or hybrid position can be given either a Gricean or a Davidsonian spin.  Here's the Gricean version:  "Sure, sure, we need syntax and truth theory to overcome the four obstacles and complete Stage I.  But that's just paperwork.  (Thanks, Donald, you can go now.)  The fact remains that what meaning really is, at bottom, is communicative intentions.  Grice rules."  Here's the Davidsonian version:  "Once Grice has admitted that sentence meaning is projected using syntax and truth theory from the referential meanings of subsentential components, chiefly singular terms and predicates, he's singing our song.  That the subsentential expression meanings are functions of subsentential speaker-meanings means only that we now have a Gricean theory of referring, that now competes with description theories, the Causal-Historical theory, etc.  But Davidson's Truth-Condition theory has never tried to explain referring; we're entirely neutral on that, and we just suppose that some theory of referring is correct.  So Grice is just not addressing the same data we are, and although he has made an interesting and important contribution to the theory of referring, he has said nothing useful about sentence meaning, which is the present topic.  Davidson rules."  Is there a real issue here?  If you think so, expound it and adjudicate it.

    34.  In what little space you have, try to work out the Gricean theory of expression-referring.  The idea would be that (e.g.) a name, such as "Geoff Sayre McCord," refers to the person it does refer to in our dialect because: when we use it, we do so with the communicative intention of calling our hearers' attention to that person as opposed to any other person; similarly for natural-kind terms.  (Notice that the referring expressions you'll be dealing with are unstructured, so you won't have to get into the messy details about "resultant" procedures mentioned in the textbook excerpt on Grice's strategy for Stage I.)   If you have the space left, briefly compare your Gricean theory to description theories and/or the Causal-Historical theory; does it have advantages over those?

    35.  Assess Strawson's argument against Davidson, as you now understand it.

    36.  Meditate upon malapropisms and spoonerisms.  Is Davidson right in the moral he draws?  Or should we understand malapropisms differently?

    37.  Assess David Lewis' “Determination” argument for the Truth-Condition theory (pp. 153-54).

    38.  Discuss the Intensional or possible-worlds version further, pro or con.

    39.  Sketch and defend your own (proto-)theory of meaning.  Do you think semantic phenomena can be reduced to items of some less problematic kind?
How would you explain the "meaning phenomena"?  (Naturally, I don't expect much detail in five or even ten pages.)  If you like, borrow freely from previous
theories, and try to come up with a synthesis or hybrid view that avoids objections we raised against its predecessors; or you may propose and defend an
entirely different account.  But in either case, exhibit the advantages of your idea.