As before, these are suggestions only and you are not restricted to them, but if you have a different topic you'd like to try, you should discuss it with me in advance.

    1.  Discuss what I called the "bare" Truth-Condition theory of meaning, i.e., the claim that a sentence's meaning is the actual or hypothetical fact or "state of affairs" that makes or would make the sentence true.  Which of the objections raised against Davidson's implementation or against the Intensional version would apply to the "bare" theory alone?  Can they be answered?

    2.  Discuss Davidson's complicated implementation of the Truth-Condition theory.  Press an existing objection harder against him; or defend him against one of the objections; or pose a new objection of your own.

    3.  Assess David Lewis' “Determination” argument for the Truth-Condition theory (pp. 153-54).

    4.  Explore the problem posed by the Liar Paradox for any or all versions of the Truth-Condition theory.

    5.  Discuss the Intensional or possible-worlds version further, pro or con.

    6.  Sketch and defend your own (proto-)theory of meaning.  Do you think semantic phenomena can be reduced to items of some less problematic kind?  How would you explain the "meaning phenomena"?  (Naturally, I don't expect much detail in five or even ten pages.)  If you like, borrow freely from previous theories, and try to come up with a synthesis or hybrid view that avoids objections we raised against its predecessors; or you may propose and defend an entirely different account.  But in either case, exhibit the advantages of your idea.

    7.  Discuss Grice's theory of "conversational implicature" on its own terms--i.e., respond to Grice's article without adverting to Davis or Carston.

    8.  State a traditional philosophical issue and show how the notion of conversational implicature illuminates it.

    9.  Defend Grice against Davis; or, push Davis' objections further.

    10.  Ditto Carston.

    11.  As precisely as you can, articulate the difference between conversational implicature and what on p. 158 Grice calls "conventional" implicature.  How (if at all) does conventional implicature differ from ordinary logical implication as you understand it?  Say some more about conventional implicature.