Dorit suggested in class that the Burge-Heil view of self-knowledge can be applied against Boghossian's argument.  But I don't yet see how that application is supposed to go; I don't see exactly where Burge-Heil cuts into the argument.  Here's a formulation of the argument in light of that Wednesday's class discussion:

     Consider the propositions,

            (A) If I am thinking that water is wet, then water exists.
            (B) I am thinking that water is wet.
            (C) water exists.

Now:

            (1) If externalism is true, then I can know (A) a priori.

[Because, according to Boghossian, since externalism is a philosophical thesis  I can know it a priori by purely philosophical reflection,  and externalism a priori entails (A)].

            (2) If I have privileged access, then I can know (B) a priori.

            (3) If I can know (A) a priori and I can know (B) a priori, I can  know (C) a priori.

[By one additional step of Modus Ponens.]

But
            (4) No one can know (C) a priori.

So
            (5) Either externalism is untrue or I do not have privileged access.
 

     Now, where does Burge-Heil cut in?  It would have to be at either (1) or (2).  Would they deny (2)?  Why?