For the record, here's a catalogue of the uses we've seen of the contested phrase.  Some of them are very closely interrelated, but they're at least logically distinct.

    (1) (Stalnaker, p. 342)  Russellian content, composed of objects, properties and relations, as opposed to Fregean content composed of senses and "concepts" only.

    (2) (Stalnaker, p. 343)  "Informational" content in his radically coarse-grained sense.  [He argues convincingly on p. 345 that such content is so coarsely grained that it could not be associated with any particular concept(s) in any useful sense of the term.]

    (3) Fine-grained perceptual content in roughly Peacocke's sense, involving very detailed qualitative-perceptual properties; see the quotation on p. 376 of Gomez-Torrente, about "texture, hue, saturation, and brightness..., together with...degree of solidity."  [It does not seem that our everyday concepts have enough grain to capture all the qualitative differences we constantly perceive.]

    (4) Essentially indexical content.  [Suggested by Peacocke; Gomez-Torrente interprets him as meaning at least that.]

    (5) Unbelievably rich content in Gomez-Torrente's sense (p. 379); "...sheer difference in the quantity of information....  A rich perceptual state...rules out many more possible circumstances than the average belief...."

    And I would add the way I myself am accustomed to using the term:

    (6) Content represented within a subject's psychology, e.g. by the subject's visual system or even by subagencies of the language module, that cannot (or cannot at all easily) be expressed in the subject's own person-level concepts.