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Challenging Pop-Ups with Trademark LawOn to the Second Circuit: A Monumental Impact (No. 04-0026(L) (2d Cir. Feb. 6, 2004)) The upcoming Second Circuit decision on 1-800 Contacts will pose a defining moment in cyberspace law. Given the recent arrival of pop-up advertising, the court must confront a difficult issue with obviously no real precedent. Thus, any appellate decision resolving this conflict will have a significant impact on trademark use on the Internet, including not only the use of pop-up advertisements, but Internet advertising in general. Furthermore, the Second Circuit's decision will likely delineate a legal standard for the "use" requirement for trademark infringement under the Lanham Act.
Furthermore, WhenU claims that it engages in a form of comparative advertising—a cyberspace equivalent of one company handing out leaflets in front of a competitor’s store or locating a store next door to a competitor’s premises. Nonetheless, 1-800 Contacts asserts that the use of the registered trademark of another party as part of a comparative advertisement is only permitted when the trademark is used in such a manner that does not cause confusion as to source, sponsorship, affiliation or approval. Comparative advertising that is likely to cause confusion as to the source of a product is not permitted. Therefore, the Second Circuit faces the challenging task of interpreting the “use in commerce requirement” in which the contrary definitions advocated by the parties place two fundamental purposes of trademark law at odds with one another. Historically,
trademark
law served two fundamental purposes: to
identify the source of goods and services; and to protect against
competing
producers free-riding on their rival’s trademarks.
The U-Haul and Wells Fargo courts’
interpretations
of the “use in commerce” definition embodied the first trademark law
purpose,
as these courts held that in order to illegally use a trademark, that
use must
identify the source of goods or services in a way that is likely to
cause
confusion. However, the 1-800
Contacts court rejected the findings of “use” by these previous
decisions,
and thereby rebuked a “use in commerce” definition that required source
identification. Although the 1-800
Contacts court relied on section 1127 to define trademark use, the
underpinning of its holding reflected the second fundamental purpose of
trademark law, as its definition of “use in commerce,” instead,
prevented WhenU
from free-riding on the good will and reputation of 1-800 Contacts’
trademarks. Thus, this definition of
“use” protects trademark holders from unfair competition.
The prevention of unfair competition is not
only a general underlying premise of trademark law, but also an
important
purpose of the Lanham Act. Based upon this purpose and premise, the
Second
Circuit should affirm the 1-800 Contacts decision, and
definitively hold
that ad-server hosts, such as WhenU, illegally “use” another’s
trademark in
commerce, and therefore liable of trademark infringement. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 467 (2d Cir. 2004) (No. 04-0026(L)). Brief for Appellant-Defendant WhenU.com Inc., 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 467 (2d Cir. 2004) (No. 04-0026(L)). David L. Hudson Jr., Ruling Pops Up Into Controversy, 3 No.2 ABA Journal E-Report 2, Jan. 16, 2004, at 3. Neel Chatterjee & Connie E. Merriett, U-Haul International, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc., and 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc.: Pop-Up Advertising as ‘Use in Commerce’; Under the Lanham Act: A Case Analysis, 20 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 1113, 1136 (2004); See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2001). |