2. The CCFR and FPLP samples of leaders differ in several respects, most notably in the inclusion of senior military officers in the latter. This difference, as well as the two year time gap between them, may account at least in part for some of the differences in responses by leaders to identical items.
3. Specifically, in the six CCFR surveys, leaders ranked this goal lowest three times, second to lowest twice, and third to lowest once. It was ranked lowest four times by the general public, second to lowest once, and third to lowest once.
4. Most surveys indicate strong support for reducing the level of foreign aid, but there is also strong evidence that Americans are poorly informed about the actual costs of such programs. When asked what would be a fair or reasonable level of foreign aid, they typically propose figures that are far greater than actual U.S. international assistance expenditures. For evidence on this point, see Kull (1995).
In 1981, two Yankelovich, Skelly and White surveys found that, by a margin of 76 15 percent, the public disapproved of "giving economic and military support to anti communist allies even if they violate human rights," and almost as large a majority expressed the same view when the question specifically mentioned South Korea. Five years later a survey for the Overseas Development Council revealed that a very large majority -- 76 to 18 percent -- agreed that the U.S. should require recipients of foreign aid to make human rights reforms. Data from the Roper Center. On the linking foreign aid to human rights, also see Kull (1995).
7. Table 8 reports findings for only one of the "goals" questions. Analyses of the other four human rights goals questions [Tables 2-5] yielded very similar findings about the impact of party, ideology, foreign policy orientations, and domestic policy orientations. The tables are not reported here in order to save space.
8. Yankelovich, Skelly and White, March 1977 survey conducted for Time. Data from the Roper Center.
9. Gallup survey for Newsweek, November 13, 1985. Data from the Roper Center.
10. CBS News/New York Times surveys of January 13, 1990, May 22, 1990, June 3, 1991, and October 5, 1991. Data from the Roper Center. For a fuller discussion of surveys on China and human rights, see Waller and Ide 1995.
11. Times Mirror survey on August 17, 1995. Data from the Roper Center.
12. Multivariate analyses indicate that ideology dominates party identification as a source of variance in responses to human rights goal question. That is, once self-placement on a standard ideology scale is introduced into the analysis, the impact of party is significantly eroded.
13. There is no comparable analysis to assess how the four domestic policy groups -- liberals, libertarians, populists, and conservatives -- appraised the domestic policy issues because responses to several of those are also used to define the four groups.
14. There is ample other evidence that human rights policy is intensely partisan and ideological. See, for example, the Commentary symposium (1981) on "Human Rights and American Foreign Policy." The eighteen contributors, heavily weighted toward such conservatives and neo-conservatives as William Barrett, Midge Decter, Sidney Hook, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Robert Nisbet, and Michael Novak, predictably fired salvo after salvo at the alleged failings of the Carter administration's human rights policy. See also Lefever (1978) and Utley (1978). Critiques of the Reagan administration's human rights policies include Maechling (1983) and Jacoby (1986), while they are defended by Kirkpatrick and Gerson (1989). Post Cold War debates on such issues as Bosnia, China's trade status, and Cuba are hardly less passionate.