Lungu | European Security IV

At the same time, the conflict in the former Yugoslavia was escalating and it was impossible for the West Europeans to find an effective answer on their own. NATO’s position was not much better. After the 1991 Rome summit the Alliance “seemed to lapse into permanent confusion” as to which course to follow. The years 1992 and 1993 witnessed some steps towards NATO’s adaptation to the new challenges. The profound differences of opinion among the allies were about practical action outside the treaty area and Article 5; countries such as Germany, Denmark and Belgium articulated reservations. “This was expressed in the difficulty which these countries had in recognizing that the Alliance was playing an increasingly visible role in former Yugoslavia.”⁴⁸

In this context, the German Defense Minister, Volker Ruehe, sounded an alarm at the end of 1993. He called for reform of NATO since “we cannot just confine ourselves to reconfirming the Alliance’s basic mission in the past.”⁴⁹ This was followed by a plea for an Alliance that could undertake an active role outside the treaty area, and for “force and command structures” which reflected this.

Moreover, this function would require closer cooperation within the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and the development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union. The WEU would have to take on the defense aspects of this policy and, in conformity with the Maastricht Treaty, develop into the European pillar of NATO.

In May 1993, U.S. Senators Bob Dole and Richard Lugar voiced their discontent with President Clinton’s NATO policies, putting pressure on the administration to find a solution to the impasse. At the Spring Session of the North Atlantic Assembly, they complained about NATO’s impotence and failure to take action in former Yugoslavia: “The inability of NATO to act effectively is bound to raise grave doubts among both the American people and the Congress about whether the enormous yearly investment we make in NATO is reaping sufficient benefits.”⁵⁰

In this context, President Clinton advanced in June 1993 the proposal of organizing a NATO summit later in the year. “The summit was intended to confirm the continuing relevance of NATO as a European security organization and the American commitment to Europe.”⁵¹

The important steps in preparation for the summit were the “brainstorming sessions” of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) during July-September 1993 and the informal meeting of ministers of defense which took place in Travemunde at the invitation of the German defense minister from 19 to 21 October 1993.

During the “brainstorming sessions,” among other issues, the relationship between NATO and the WEU was of particular concern. Secretary of State Warren Christopher and the new U.S. Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council, Ambassador Robert Hunter, had insisted that “there must be separable but not separate capabilities,” but it was not very clear what the Americans meant by it. A second American proposal concerned an increase in the effectiveness of NATO in crisis management in Europe and, thus, an adjustment of the command and force structures would be required in order to make NATO a more efficient instrument for dealing with “Bosnia-type” crises. Finally, the Americans insisted on a greater European role in crisis management outside the NATO area. This implied that the NATO command structure would become more European and that it could also be used for carrying out missions under the flag of the WEU.⁵²

At Travemunde, Les Aspin, the American Secretary of Defense, presented the U.S. proposal to make the force and command structures better suited for out-of-area operations. This proposal was known as “the combined joint task force concept” (CJTF) and “has been developed in secret in consultation with SACEUR and was intended for carrying out peacekeeping and other operations by NATO and WEU.” The basic assumption was that the integrated command structure was still at the moment completely geared to Article 5 operations but was, in principle, flexible enough to carry out other missions. The idea was that SACEUR would commission the Major Subordinate Commanders to form central staff within their headquarters to carry out these operations. In the event of a crisis the CJTF would be activated and supplemented with specialized personnel. The CJTF would hold periodic exercises, especially in the field of peacekeeping. Finally, the CJTF should form the basis for the “separable but not separate” forces of a European security and defense identity.⁵³

With these preparations among others, the summit took place on 10 and 11 January 1994 in Brussels. The heads of states and government approved three important documents of the Partnership for Peace (PFP) and the CJTF concept on the first day. Besides the approval of these documents several decisions were taken which would significantly influence NATO’s agenda in the coming years.
First, it was decided that active support should be given to the development of the ESDI as a European pillar within NATO. In the statement, support was given to the WEU, as the embodiment of the European pillar within NATO. An important contribution was the commitment that NATO was

. . . ready to make collective assets of the Alliance available, on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council for WEU operations undertaken by the European allies in pursuit of their Common Foreign and Security Policy. We support the development of separable but not separate capabilities that could respond to European requirements and contribute to Alliance security.⁵⁴

This approach could avoid a costly duplication of military capacities within the WEU.

Second, the decision to develop further functions outside the NATO area was taken. This required immediately the revision of the “command and force structures,” with a view to better co-operation with the WEU and the NACC. The ambassadors were commissioned, with the advice of the Military Authorities,

to examine how the Alliance’s political and military structures and procedures might be developed and adapted to conduct more efficiently and flexibly the Alliance’s missions, including peacekeeping as well as to improve co-operation with the WEU and to reflect the emerging European Security and Defense Identity. As part of the process we endorse the CJTF concept as a means to facilitate contingency operations, including operations with participating nations outside the Alliance.⁵⁵

The conspicuous interest of Germany in stabilizing Central and Eastern Europe led Bonn to support the effort to create CJTFs, because CJTFs might give the WEU an increased role in possible operations in the region. This idea is emphasized also in the 1994 German White Paper on Defense:

In the future, it [the WEU] will be able to fall back on NATO structures and forces. This will render Europe capable of taking strategic action and at the same time prevent the building of dual structures that no one is able and willing to afford. . . . This new command structure must also be assured for European ends. The WEU must have the opportunity to use these headquarters.⁵⁶

It can be concluded that, in January 1994, NATO leaders approved an initiative to give the Alliance’s decades-old integrated military structure strikingly different capabilities for the future. Because the range of the decisions taken was much greater than was the case in Rome, the Brussels summit could be described as “without doubt the most important NATO meeting held in recent decades.”⁵⁷