1995-1997 DEVELOPMENTS
Part Five
The 1994 Brussels summit established the CJTF concept as the key instrument for updating the Alliance’s military structures in order to deal more efficiently with non-Article 5 missions and to support ESDI’s development. Although the term CJTF denotes a multinational, multiservice task force, the heart of the concept entails creating in advance a combined structure with staff, procedures, and planning, so that a group of countries responding to a non-Article 5 crisis could use assets according to the particular need.58

“U.S. defense officials conceived CJTF as a means both to further adapt NATO’s military structure to post-Cold War missions and to support ESDI by making NATO assets available to a WEU military operation.”59 CJTF intervention would essentially take place either under NATO command, if the U.S. were a major player, or under that of the WEU for distinctly European operations. Overall, it would allow for more effective sharing of global military burdens between the United States and Europe and pave the way for the WEU to conduct missions in which the Americans had little or no direct interest or involvement.60

However, efforts to implement CJTF have been the object of considerable frustration. Significant differences emerged between the U.S. and France on how to set up both NATO- and WEU-led CJTFs. “Whereas the US wanted to use CJTF to give NATO’s IMS [International Military Staff] the flexibility to respond to non-Article 5 missions, the French argued that the IMS is inherently unsuited for those type of missions.”61 The French in particular resisted extending the existing American-led major NATO commands—especially Allied Command Europe—to non-Article 5 missions. They worried that this extension would effectively mean American political control over the mission. As a consequence they leaned heavily in the direction of European structures for non-Article 5 missions. For its part the United States was particularly concerned about the use of NATO assets in European-led CJTF missions in which the Americans did not participate.62

The French position toward NATO began to change under the leadership of President Jacques Chirac. On 5 December 1995, France announced its decision to return to the Military Committee (MC), from which it had withdrawn in 1966, and to participate in deliberations about NATO reform. France’s decision, which represented a reorientation in its relations with the Alliance, “was warmly welcomed by the German leaders and the German defense community.” Despite the rapprochement with the Alliance, the French have continued their efforts to merge the WEU into the EU. The Germans supported them. Chancellor Kohl in particular wanted to push forward the “proud and symbolic European phalanx.”63

Thus, when the French and the Germans met with other European ministers at a seminar at Freiburg, on 27 February 1996, they “arrived at a compromise alternative to Germany’s early proposals for the extension of majority voting to CFSP deliberations of the European Council.”64 The adopted proposal for “constructive abstention” should provide, in the medium term, the framework under which the WEU could merge into the EU. But, taking into account the strictly Atlanticist conceptions of the German military and those of the majority of the German diplomats and politicians in politico-military matters, each Franco-German initiative must be “corrected” by a gesture toward NATO. On 19 March 1996, Werner Hoyer, Parliamentary State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry, signaled immediately the extent to which the French and German conceptions on European defense still diverge: “We clearly reject the [French] ideas that would end [up by] replacing NATO’s integrated command structure and [we] will speak out against every measure that could give the impression of driving a wedge into the transatlantic relationship.”65

Inside the Alliance the differences between the Americans and the French concerning the implementation of the CJTF concept were overcome. The NAC was designated to steer CJTF operations politically and the operation itself would be guided by the newly established Capabilities Coordination Cell, under the MC and within the IMS. Despite some notable unanswered questions,66 the acceptance of the political CJTF could be considered as an important element in the restructuring of NATO’s integrated military structure. German officials were supportive of this process and remained sincerely attached to a form of Europeanization of NATO, but the reflex of resisting strong U.S. pressure maintained their “dual-track” approach in the Franco-American debate. They looked forward with optimism to the important June 1996 NAC, which was to be held in Berlin. In the words of Klaus Kinkel, the German Foreign Minister:

Therefore [they] welcome the fact that the links between NATO and the WEU have increasingly been strengthened on the basis of the agreed principles of complementarity and transparency. NATO will support the WEU in developing its operational capabilities, but this must not lead to a duplication of structures and bureaucratic procedures if only for reasons of efficiency and cost. The concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) is the key to this. Here, too, Berlin must set the course for the future.67

The decisions taken by the ministerial NATO Council on 3 June 1996 concerned basic political requirements for the adaptation of the Alliance. The final communiqué contained three important points, under which the Allies agreed to several practical arrangements in support of ESDI, but avoided dispositions that might have led to a split within the Alliance. It is important to mention that during the negotiations concerning the “most European” communiqué of all NAC meetings, “none of the member states had clear-cut ideas about the European Security and Defense Identity and the precise relationship between the European Union, the WEU and NATO.”68

    The first of these concerned the maintenance of the Alliance’s military effectiveness, both for Article 5 and non-Article 5 operations. These tasks should be carried out by a single multinational command structure in which the European element would predominate and which would facilitate participation by the PFP partners and other non-NATO countries. The CJTF element should be the key concept in this.

    The second basic principle was the maintenance of the transatlantic link. NATO should remain the principal forum for transatlantic consultations and the instrument through which common interests were promoted.

    The third point was the promotion of the ESDI.69

From the American viewpoint, the 1996 Berlin NAC meeting concluded that, in the words of Walter Slocombe, the U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy:

    In the future, part of NATO’s peacetime responsibilities must include preparing for such assistance, in planning, exercises, training and staffing, for WEU-led operations. All of this should be done within the Alliance and within its military command structure, not as a separate (including de facto separate) parallel structure, or by elements that are ‘European only, American clean.’ It is essential from the U.S. point of view not to foster a bifurcated NATO, in which de facto if not explicitly, there are two systems, one for the U.S. and Article 5, and one for Europe and non-Article 5 operations.70

Despite some divergent positions, it can be appreciated that the June 1996 Berlin NAC meeting was

    a turning point in the debate on NATO’s internal adaptation, because it reconciled the Alliance-wide desire for more flexible, mobile forces that could be deployed for the full range of Alliance missions—from collective defence to crisis management and peace-keeping—with the aspiration of those Allies in the European Union to develop a tangible, credible European Security and Defence Identity.71

A few days later, on 13 June 1996, the ministers of defense of the NATO member countries met in Brussels for the spring meeting of the Defense Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group. During the discussions, the Germans pressed for strong political guidelines concerning the reform of NATO’s command structure, while the Americans reportedly felt that too many concessions had already been made to support the WEU. The United States also opposed a proposal to direct planning specifically toward the WEU’s Petersberg tasks. Despite the fact that Germany felt that CJTF “would provide, if properly used by the Europeans, sufficient opportunity for the expression of European identity on the military level,” the Germans considered, together with the French, that “’the Berlin signal well and truly represented the founding act of European identity within NATO.”72

The year 1997 witnessed wide conceptual differences between the French and the Germans in pushing forward the merger of the WEU within the EU, a condition sine qua non for realizing a genuine ESDI.

    First, the debate concerning the acceptance of the concept of a “lead-nation” capable of playing a key reconnaissance role in the conduct of an operation, ended with a last minute rapprochement on the conceptual plane at the May 1997 WEU ministerial meeting in Paris, supposedly due to the experience of Bosnia.

    Second, their different conceptions of the necessary degree of national sovereignty to be abandoned for achieving an effective decision-making body in the EU that would implement the projected CFSP, led to a fragile compromise.

    Third, within the framework of the EU, following the February 1996 Franco-German initiative, the EU member countries succeeded in updating at the Amsterdam Summit Article J-4 of the Treaty of Maastricht in connection with the Common Foreign and Security Policy operations.73 But, because the adopted guidelines did not receive unanimous agreement among the EU partners—the German and French conceptions in particular were widely different—a more significant achievement at the summit in the field of the ESDI was not realized.74

It could be concluded that1997 was a year of minimum progress in the institutional development of the ESDI.

    On the American side, in 1996-1997 the only major concern was the AFSOUTH debate. The Americans attempted to delay the discussion about the subject because this topic, combined with the “Deputy SACEUR” one, could lead to adjustments in the European position within the Atlantic Alliance and undermine American leadership. William Perry, then Secretary of Defense, stated that “the presence of the American Sixth Fleet was a determining factor in the regional balance of power. He also considered American leadership crucial as he thought this region to have the highest risk of crises.”75 Focused on the process of NATO enlargement, the United States tried to maintain a status quo in the American-European defense relationship and, thus, to avoid any source of further tension.

The German position during 1997 toward the Southern flank debate might be described as follows:

    In the quarrel which began in the summer of 1997 [in fact, in the summer of 1996] between the French and the Americans over the nationality of the commander of the Southern region, the Germans have supported France strongly and openly by very firm public declarations (e.g. Mr. Ruhe in Oslo on 25 September 1996), probably because they felt that a visible Europeanisation of NATO would reassure the Russians that NATO enlargement would not come at their expense. As a matter of fact, as soon as Russia accepted the fait accompli of NATO enlargement . . . at the Helsinki summit in March 1997, the Germans retreated and came up with proposals for a division of responsibilities in the Southern region which is far to say were impossible for the French to accept.76

In September 1997, the chairman of NATO’s Military Committee, General Klaus Naumann of the German Army, said, “The European nations in the region concerned do not support the French proposal. France is not speaking in behalf of Europe. The Mediterranean is NATO’s most endangered region. From a NATO point of view, at this time, it is good to have American command in AFSOUTH.”77

ENDNOTES (Part Five)

  1. For a detailed analysis of the CJTF, see Charles Barry, “Combined Joint Task Forces in Theory and Practice,” in Philip H. Gordon, ed., NATO’s Transformation: The Changing Shape of the Atlantic Alliance, (London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1997), pp. 203-220.
  2. Robert Grant, “France’s New Relationship with NATO,” in Philip H. Gordon, ed., NATO’s Transformation: The Changing Shape of the Atlantic Alliance (London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1997), p. 62.
  3. In addition, it could accommodate participation by forces from non-NATO counties, especially CEE countries, in the framework of PFP cooperation.
  4. Grant, p. 63.
  5. Ibid., pp. 64-65. The American position in 1995 reflected views at the time when, in the context of the Yugoslav crisis, in Republican circles particularly, voices (such as Newt Gingrich, the Speaker of the House of Representatives) were arguing that European problems require European solutions, certainly when American interests were not at issue in the crisis.
  6. Parmentier, p. 30;International Security Review 1997, published by the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies (Whitehall, London, 1997), p. 5.
  7. International Security Review 1997, p. 9.
  8. Ibid. The “constructive absention” proposal envisaged that: (1) No EU member state will be obliged to provide national forces for multinational European military and police actions against its will; (2) Any member state that felt unable to take part in such multinational European action will be unable to hinder the others. The abstaining country will be expected to show solidarity with other EU states through political support for this majority-approved European action and by means of financial contributions through the EU budget. In the meantime the Council of Ministers should have the competence to decide on CFSP actions which the WEU is to carry out on behalf of the EU. See also de Wijk, pp. 122-125.
  9. These included the role that the NATO Major Commanders, SACLANT and SACEUR, would be able to play in CJTF operations, the conditions under which the WEU could make use of CJTF and NATO assets and which headquarters would receive CJTF nuclei.
  10. Klaus Kinkel, “Prospects for the Berlin Meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in June,” NATO Review, Webedition, no. 3 (May 1996), pp. 8-12. Available [On line]: [http://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/9603-2.htm]. [10 January 1998].
  11. de Wijk, p. 132. A small step was taken on 6 June 1996 when the WEU-NATO Security Agreement came into force and classified NATO documents were made available to the WEU.
  12. North Atlantic Council, Final Communiqué, 3 June 1996, par. 5-9.
  13. Walter B. Slocombe, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Remarks to the Atlantic Council, 14 June 1996. Text furnished by Professor David Yost, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.
  14. Admiral Norman W. Ray, NATO Assistant Secretary General for Defense Support, Speech at the Assemblee Nationale, 23 January 1997. Text furnished by Professor David Yost, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.
  15. Parmentier, p. 32. See also North Atlantic Council in Defense Ministers Session, Final Communiqué, 13 June 1996, par. 5-7.
  16. Amsterdam European Council, 16-17 June 1997. The key words for these operations are: “reinforced co-operation,” “replacement of the veto by abstention,” and “constructive abstention.” Thus, the Treaty does allow for a form of “constructive abstention,” whereby a state could abstain from a vote, allowing the decision to go ahead but without having to implement it. See The Treaty of Amsterdam, 2 October 1997, Article 1-Amendments to the Treaty of Maastricht, Provisions on a Common Foreign and Security Policy (Title V of the Treaty on European Union). Available [On line]: [http://ue.eu.int/Amsterdam/en/amsteroc/en/treaty/treaty.htm]. [10 February 1998].
  17. Parmentier, pp. 32-34. The changes made in Amsterdam were limited to the setting up of a foreign policy planning and analysis unit at the EU Council of Ministers; the appointment as a High Representative of an EU bureaucrat (the Secretary-General of the Council of Ministers), rather than a prominent politician, as some member states wanted; and closer cooperation--but no merger--between the EU and the WEU. Majority voting, it was agreed, would be used only in the “implementation” phases of foreign policy, whereas strategic choices would still have to be agreed unanimously.
  18. de Wijk, p. 136. After all, in the U.S. opinion, differences between Greece and Turkey could complicate the designation of a European commander for the southern region. France and the United Kingdom wanted a permanent ruling creating a Deputy SACEUR, who, in addition to his function as “second in command,” would also become the strategic operations commander or co-ordinator for WEU-led operations. Germany too moved gradually towards this position, which was adopted by the Alliance, in rather general terms.
  19. Parmentier, p. 30.
  20. He added that statistically Europeans do contribute much to the AFSOUTH forces: about 70% of land forces and 60% of air assets. “ In purely mathematical terms, there is some justification [for France’s argument, but] you have to look at the Mediterranean.” Deutsche Presse Agentur, 30 September 1997. Text furnished by Professor David Yost, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.