|1. An earlier version of this paper was presented in June 2000 at a Siena College conference on 'World War II: After 60 Years' in Loudonville, NY. The author wishes to thank Matthew Costello and Byrne Memorial librarians David Kohut and Ursula Zyzik of Saint Xavier University for their assistance. Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb and the Architecture of the American Myth (New York, 1995), 531-32; Barton J. Bernstein, The Atomic Bombings Reconsidered, Foreign Affairs, Jan-Feb 1995, 147.|
3. The name Metallurgical Laboratory, was a ruse that served as a convenient blind. Arthur H. Compton to Irwin Stewart, April 30, 1943, roll 10, file 156, Bush-Conant File Relating to the Development of the Atomic Bomb, 1940-1945, Records of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, Record Group 227; National ArchivesGreat Lakes Region (Chicago).
4. Michael B. Stoff, Jonathan F. Fanton, and R. Hal Williams, eds.,The Manhattan Project: A Documentary Introduction to the Atomic Age (New York, 1991), 140-47. In addition to Franck, the other committee members were Donald J. Hughes, James J. Nickson, Eugene Rabinowitch, Glenn T. Seaborg, Joyce C. Stearns, and Leo Szilard.
7. The use of the term demonstration has often confounded students of the war because of the myriad applications of the term. Frequently, it referred to the use of the atomic bomb in a non-combat mode such as an uninhabited area in Japan or even the United States. A technical or a test demonstrations purpose was to induce Japans surrender or to gain international support should a combat use against urban areas subsequently ensue. The term military demonstration could suggest a limited counterforce attack against a military target that would produce minimal collateral damage to civilians. Military demonstration, however, was frequently used as a euphemism for strategic nuclear bombing of a full range of military and non-military assets.
8. Stoff, et al., eds., Manhattan Project, 143. The term fission, based on cell division in biology, refers to a neutron splitting of a uranium (or plutonium) nucleus into two smaller and similar-sized nuclei. Physicists Lise Meitner and her nephew Otto Robert Frisch coined the term in 1938.
10. Stoff, et al., eds., Manhattan Project, 144. For support of the development of the atomic bomb and the Franck Reports, misspelled as Frank, surrender ultimatum as a means of transferring the burden of responsibility to the Japanese themselves, see Norman Cousins and Thomas K. Finletter, A Beginning for Sanity, The Saturday Review of Literature, June 15, 1946, 6-7.
12. National Archives Microfilm Publications Pamphlet Describing M1108, Harrison-Bundy Files Relating to the Development of the Atomic Bomb, 1942-1946, (Washington, D. C., 1982), 1. In addition to Stimson and Harrison, other members of the Interim Committee were Ralph Bard, Vannevar Bush, Jimmy Byrnes, William L. Clayton, Karl T. Compton, and James B. Conant. Bard, undersecretary of the navy, authored a memorandum that has also been erroneously portrayed as a great departure from the Interim Committees consensus on using the atomic bomb as soon as possible, on a war plant surrounded by workers homes While recommending an atomic warning, bilateral talks somewhere on the China coast, and an offer to retain the emperor, Bard proposed a mere two-to-three day bombing delay to induce Japans surrender on these terms. Notes of the Interim Committee Meeting, June 1, 1945; roll 4, file 3; Correspondence (Top Secret) of the Manhattan Engineer District, 1942-1946, Records of the Office of the Chief of Engineers, Record Group 77; National ArchivesGreat Lakes Region (Chicago). [Emphasis in original]; Ralph A. Bard, Memorandum on the Use of S-1 Bomb, June 27, 1945; roll 6, file 76, Harrison-Bundy Files Relating to the Development of the Atomic Bomb, 1942-1946, Records of the Office of the Chief of Engineers, Record Group 77; NAGreat Lakes Region (Chicago). [Hereafter referred to as H-B Files]. S-1 was one of several code names used for the Manhattan Project during the war.
15. Bernstein, Atomic Bomb, 26-9; Jeffrey Porro, Paul Doty, Carl Kaysen, and Jack Ruina, eds., The Nuclear Age Reader (New York, 1989); 11-13, William L. Sweet, The Nuclear Age: Atomic Energy, Proliferation, and the Arms Race, 2nd ed. (Washington, 1988), 9.
18. Ronald E. Powaski, March to Armageddon: The United States and the Nuclear Arms Race, 1939 to the Present (New York, 1987), 18. Joseph Rotblat, 1995 Nobel Peace laureate, left Los Alamos in 1944 upon learning that Germany was not developing an atomic bomb. His moral opposition to continued atomic-weapons development was, however, a solitary act of protest and not part of any organized effort. He was threatened with arrest if he discussed his anti-bomb beliefs and, therefore, dissembled that family reunification in Europe was his reason for leaving the Manhattan Project. See Joseph Rotblat, Leaving the Bomb Project, in Ending War: The Force of Reason, Essays in Honour of Joseph Rotblat, Maxwell Bruce and Tom Milne, eds. (London, 1999), 12-13; Susan Landau, From Fission Research to a Prize for Peace, Scientific American, January 1996, 39.
27. George W. Parker to Arthur Holly Compton, July 16, 1945; roll 6, file 76, H-B Files. M. D. Whitakers name appears just below Comptons as an addressee in whose care the letter would be sent to Compton. On atomic diplomacy see Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam, the Use of the Atomic Bomb and the American Confrontation with Soviet Power (New York, 1985); Alperovitz, Decision to Use; Powaski, The Cold War: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1917-1991 (New York, 1998), 67.
31. Petetion [sic] to the Administration. DSM stood for Development of Substitute Materials which was yet another code name for the secret atomic-bomb project. Shortly after the war, Ballantine became more circumspect in his overt support for nuclear weapons when he signed a Clinton petition that criticized General Leslie R. Groves for publicly dismissing the possibility of nuclear proliferation and claiming an American nuclear monopoly would guarantee victory in a future war. To the Interim Committee on Nucleonics, September 24, 1945, roll 6, file 77, H-B Files. I was informed about the September petition by Gene Dannen e-mail to the author, July 12, 1999. Dannens website, http://www.dannen.com/szilard.html contains a very useful annotated chronology of many documents from Manhattan Project scientists that involve the decision to use the atomic bomb.
33. Ibid. While it accurately assessed in principle the conditional-moral argumentation of Szilards petition, the latter claimed, after Germanys surrender, that the initial rationale of DSM to prevent a German atomic monopoly was averted.
35. Interview with Dr. Albert Wattenberg, April 24, 1992, 24, Argonne National Laboratory History Project, Albert Wattenberg Papers, National ArchivesGreat Lakes Region (Chicago). This is a transcript of an oral history with Wattenberg, a Metlab physicist, who signed the Szilard petition.
38. Leo Szilard to Arthur Holly Compton, July 19, 1945 and August 6, 1945, roll 6, file 76, H-B Files; See also Leo Szilard to Matthew J. Connelly, August 17, 1945; Leo Szilard to Robert M. Hutchins, August 29, 1945, in Spencer R. Weart and Gertrude Weiss Szilard, eds., Leo Szilard: His Version of the Facts, Selected Recollections and Correspondence (Cambridge, Mass., 1978) 215-16, 220.
41. Lloyd C. Gardner, Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 1941-1949 (New York, 1970), 182. The Franck Report initially was published in Before Hiroshima, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May 1, 1946.
43. Bird and Lifschultz, Editors Note, 552. In addition to the seventy signatures on the Szilard petition, eighty-seven names appear on Clinton Laboratories petitions. These figures exclude the July 3rd petition that was superseded by the July 17th version. However, Szilard later claimed he obtained about fifty-three signatures on the July 3rd draft. See Weart and Szilard, Leo Szilard, 187.
44. The list is untitled and contains only the date of the Szilard petition: July 17, 1945, roll 9, file 108, H-B Files. Ten women signatories appeared, in the following order, on the petitions composite list: Ethaline Hartge Cortelyou, junior chemist, Katharine Way, research assistant, Mary Burke, research assistant, Mildred C. Ginsberg, computer, Hoylande Young, senior chemist, Information Section, Miriam P. Finkel, associate biologist, Mary M. Dailey, research assistant, Margaret H. Rand, research assistant, Health Section, Marguerite N. Swift, associate physiologist, Health Group, and Marietta Catherine Moore, technician. Of the eighty-seven Clinton personnel who signed petitions, all appear to be male.
45. The revised composite is untitled and contains only the date of the Szilard petition: July 17, 1945, roll 6, file 76, H-B Files. A handwritten note with unrecognizable initials accompanied it: This is a list of people who signed the Szilard Petition of 17 July 45 to the President. There is included in brief the information on each person available in the Chicago area files. July 2, 1947, roll 6, file 76, H-B Files.
46. For a comprehensive treatment of Cold War repression of liberal scientists see Jessica Wang, American Science in an Age of Anxiety: Scientists, Anticommunism, and the Cold War (Chapel Hill, 1999).
51. R. Gordon Arneson, Memorandum for the Files, May 24, 1946, 4, roll 6, file 76, H-B Files. While recording secretary, Arneson was then a second lieutenant. See also Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York, 1988), 634, 644.
52. Notes for Possible Use of Secretary Patterson In Talking to Mr. Charles Ross, ND, roll 6, file 76, H-B Files. Robert Patterson followed Stimson as Trumans secretary of war and Ross was the White House press secretary. These notes were certainly written by Arneson, because entire passages of these talking points appeared verbatim in his Memorandum for the Files.
62. Notes for Possible use of Secretary Patterson. The president was out of the country, due to the Potsdam Conference, from July 6 to August 7. See Arneson "Memorandum," 3. It is possible that Truman may have seen an antibomb letter from an O. C. Brewster, from New York, an engineer with the Manhattan Project. See Robert J. Donovan, Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman, 1945-1948 (New York, 1977), 69-70; Fletcher Knebel and Charles W. Bailey, The Fight Over the A-Bomb, Look, August 13, 1963, 20-21.
63. Raymond Swing, In the Name of Sanity (New York, 1945, 1946), 74. Since the Franck Report was completed five weeks before Trinity, one may conclude he was referring to a Szilard petition. On his internationalist perspective see especially chapters 1-2, 18-21. On Swings critique of nuclear weapons see John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947 (New York, 1972), 269.