State Department Releases New History Volumes: Intelligence Community, Greece/Cyprus/Turkey, South Asia
The State Department's Office of the Historian on December 21 released three new volumes in the Foreign Relations of the United States series. They are:
The Intelligence Community, 1950-1955
During Walter Bedell Smith's tenure as Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), he established the Agency as the central coordinating institution for intelligence in the U.S. Government. Smith reorganized the CIA into directorates and began to shape the position of the DCI into the ideal of a real coordinator for all U.S. intelligence. Smith also oversaw the initial production of National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) analyses that are still used today. Moreover, Smith wrestled the capability for clandestine operations away from the Office of Policy Coordination (which had been under the authority, at least in part, of the Department of State) and cemented that function firmly within the Directorate for Plans.
In 1953, President Eisenhower appointed Allen Dulles to replace Smith as DCI and increasingly called upon the CIA to expand and use its clandestine capability to support U.S. foreign policy. While Dulles was hailed as the successful facilitator of the CIA's clandestine service, his reputation, along with that of the CIA, was challenged by two reports produced in 1955 by the Hoover Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch. The first study was conducted by a group led by General James Doolittle, which looked at the CIA's covert operations and noted that the exponential growth of the CIA did not come without some significant growing pains. The report charged that these experiences resulted in poor administration, management, and security, and suggested a bias towards clandestine operations at the expense of intelligence collection, which the report stated should focus on the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and China. The second study, put together by a more general task force on intelligence led by General Mark Clark, examined the entire intelligence community (a term that it coined), and called upon the DCI to concentrate more on intelligence issues facing that larger community and pay less attention to the day-to-day administration of the CIA. The study also called for bipartisan congressional and public oversight, improving counter-intelligence security measures, and better benefits for CIA employees. While both of these reports highlighted important problems facing the CIA, neither undermined the support of President Eisenhower for Allen Dulles as DCI. Dulles continued to direct the CIA and serve as Director of Central Intelligence until the first year of the Kennedy administration.
The volume and this press release are available on the Office of the Historian website at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/truman/c24687.htm. Copies of the volume will be available for purchase from the U.S. Government Printing Office online at http://bookstore.gpo.gov <http://bookstore.gpo.gov> (GPO S/N 044-000-02605-8; ISBN 978-0-16-076468-4), or by calling toll-free 1-866-512-1800 (D.C. area 202-512-1800). For further information contact Edward Keefer, General Editor of the Foreign Relations series, at (202) 663-1131 or by e-mail to email@example.com <mailto:firstname.lastname@example.org> .
Greece, Cyprus, Turkey, 1973-1976
In mid-July 1974, the Nixon administration then in the midst of the Watergate scandal learned that Turkey had invaded the eastern portion of Cyprus to protect Turkish Cypriots. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger tried to facilitate a settlement of the crisis, conducting shuttle diplomacy between Athens, Ankara, Nicosia, and elsewhere. With the resignation of President Nixon on August 9, the crisis became the responsibility of President Gerald Ford. Even with Ford's strong contacts in Congress, the new administration found itself at odds with the legislative branch, which had cut off U.S. arms to Turkey. Ford and Kissinger believed that such a prohibition limited their diplomatic options and their ability to influence the situation, and they complained about the influence of Greek-Americans in Congress. Kissinger pursued a negotiated settlement to end the partition of Cyprus at every opportunity, including the UN General Assembly, CENTO, and the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe; however, a solution to this problem eluded him. The documentation indicates a significant shift in U.S. policy toward the region over the course of this crisis. Whereas previous policy had focused on trying to expedite a solution to the ongoing conflict between the two communities on Cyprus by encouraging internal and international discussion, this threat to NATO's southern flank shifted the primary focus of U.S. policymakers away from encouraging discourse and towards ensuring that Greece and Turkey two key NATO allies did not come to blows over Cyprus.
In addition to the two U.S. administrations' efforts to develop a solution to the problems caused by the situation in Cyprus, the documents in this volume provide a unique insight into how the Executive Branch operated during the Watergate scandal. Secretary of State Kissinger updated in person and by telephone an increasingly distracted President Nixon, who was vacationing in San Clemente during the July 1974 crisis. Transcripts of Kissinger's telephone conversations thus provide a valuable addition to the documentary record, both of the crisis and of Kissinger's relationship with President Nixon. As Nixon became increasingly entangled with Watergate and faced possible impeachment, he granted Kissinger considerable authority to manage the crisis. When Nixon resigned in August 1974, Kissinger made a virtually seamless transition to working with President Ford, who continued to let him take the lead in attempting to resolve the Cyprus crisis.
The volume and this press release are available on the Office of the Historian website at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/xxx. Copies of the volume will be available for purchase from the U.S. Government Printing Office online at http://bookstore.gpo.gov <http://bookstore.gpo.gov> (GPO S/N 044-000-02600-7; ISBN 978-0-16-079017-1), or by calling toll-free 1-866-512-1800 (D.C. area 202-512-1800). For further information contact Edward Keefer, General Editor of the Foreign Relations series, at (202) 663-1131 or by e-mail to email@example.com <mailto:firstname.lastname@example.org> .
Documents on South Asia, 1973-1976
This e-volume documents the foreign policy of the Nixon and Ford administrations toward South Asia, 1973-1976, and should be read in conjunction with Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969-1972, and Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971, also available online. In addition to coverage of U.S. policy toward India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh, Volume E-8 provides documents on U.S. relations with the smaller South Asian states of Nepal, Bhutan, and Sri Lanka, and the Indian Ocean region, including the Republic of the Maldives.
The documents on India and Pakistan for this e-volume are combined into two chapters covering U.S. relations with both countries, with the landmark Indian nuclear weapons test of May 1974 as a point of division. The India-Pakistan War of 1971 cast a long shadow and defined the relationship of the United States to both countries for the Nixon and Ford administrations. The chief concerns of the United States were the enforcement of the 1972 Simla Agreement and the re-establishment of normal relations between India and Pakistan. Bilateral relations with India improved considerably from their 1971 nadir, until the 1974 Indian nuclear test. Nixon's appointment of Daniel Patrick Moynihan as Ambassador to India in 1973 led to the resolution of several long-standing economic and political tensions, although New Delhi continued to object to U.S. support for Pakistan and alleged a U.S. role in its domestic instability. India's successful nuclear test was a setback for bilateral relations, amplifying U.S. concerns about Indira Gandhi's close relationship with the Soviet Union, her declaration of martial law in 1975, and her decision to develop nuclear technology while dependent on U.S. food aid.
Relations between the United States and Pakistan were generally good, with President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto visiting Washington in February 1975. Nevertheless, U.S. policymakers remained anxious about Pakistani instability following the 1971 war, and about Bhutto's viability as a national leader. Washington was also concerned about Bhutto's attempts to quell domestic regional disturbances, particularly in Pakistan's northwestern frontier provinces, and to establish his legitimacy as a nationalist and populist reformer. Nevertheless, President Nixon's policy of providing military and economic support to Pakistan was continued during the Ford administration.
The themes of the Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Indian Ocean chapters expand on those developed in previous volumes on South Asia. In Afghanistan, the major event was the dissolution of the monarchy and its replacement by the republican government of Mohammad Daoud. The change in regime did not cause an alteration in U.S. policy, which, as in the past, attempted to offset Soviet influence in Afghanistan with diplomatic support and development assistance. The Nixon administration quickly recognized the new Afghan government and continued to provide it with development aid and opium eradication assistance, while mediating the continual Afghan dispute with Pakistan over both countries' Pushtun borderlands.
In Bangladesh, the United States also sought to establish solid diplomatic relations with a new government, that of Prime Minister Mujibur Rahman (frequently referred to in the documentation as Mujib), while seeking to limit the influence of other regional powers over the desperately impoverished country by providing food and development aid. The U.S. relationship with Dhaka was complicated by Bangladeshi suspicion of U.S. motives, as well as by the 1975 overthrow and murder of Mujib, followed by the establishment of a military regime.
In dealing with Sri Lanka, the Nixon and Ford administrations found the U.S. relationship with Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike complicated by the latter's presidency of the Non-Aligned Movement, as well as her continued attempts to establish an Indian Ocean Peace Zone and her criticism of the U.S. expansion of the British base at Diego Garcia. At the same time, U.S. policymakers attempted to assess and contain the expanding Soviet naval presence and influence in the Indian Ocean.
Finally, volume E-8 provides detailed coverage of the Nixon and Ford administrations' relations with Nepal and Bhutan, the first such coverage in the Foreign Relations series since the volumes covering the Eisenhower administration.
The text of the volume and this press release are available on the Department of State's website at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/e8/index.htm. For further information, contact Edward C. Keefer, General Editor of the Foreign Relations series, at (202) 663-1131, or by email to email@example.com <mailto:firstname.lastname@example.org>.