Iranian Influence in the Levant, Iraq and Afghanistan
www.aei.org/publications/filter.all,pubID.27526/pub_detail.asp
By Frederick W. Kagan, Kimberly Kagan and Danielle Pletka
Reviewed by Michael Hornblow (associate editor)

Since the fall of the Shah in 1979 and the hostage crisis, Iran has been in the headlines on and off. In recent years with the ascent of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and Tehran's suspected pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, hardly a day goes by when there is not some discussion in the media of the desirability of the Bush administration or Israel launching military strikes against Iran. The authors of this valuable study believe that the desire of the Bush Administration and most of its supposed hawks to attack Iran has always been exaggerated and that few, if any, serious Iran analysts or defense specialists have recommended using force in the first instance.

The report is lengthy and demanding. The first part was written by Danielle Pletka, the vice president for foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI). It is a catalogue listing in often mind-numbing detail Iran's military and economic support to Syria, Lebanon, Hezbollah, the West Bank/Gaza, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Ms Pletka makes a convincing case that Iranian assistance to its allies in the Levant has been substantial and all of these entities have become more or less dependent on Tehran and might not be able to survive without the cash, arms, and diplomatic support that the Islamic Republic regularly provides.

The second part covers Iraq and was written by Kimberly Kagan, president of the Institute for the Study of War. It is particularly timely and well worth careful reading. Ms. Kagan contends that Iran and its Lebanese proxy, Hezbollah, have supported Shia militias and sectarian violence in Iraq since the 2003 invasion. She states that Iran has supplied weapons and advisors to multiple Shia and Sunni resistance groups in Iraq that have targeted Sunni Arabs, Coalition forces, Iraqi security forces, and the Iraqi government itself. Most importantly, Dr. Kagan demonstrates persuasively that Iran has supported Ansar al-Islam, a radical Sunni terrorist group with close ties to al Qaeda. In addition she contends that Iranian arms dealers have supplied new weapons to al Qaeda in Iraq and that Iranian arms have become an important part of al Qaeda's arsenal.

The third part describes Iranian assistance to Afghanistan. It was written by Frederick W. Kagan, a resident scholar at AEI. Dr. Kagan contends that Iran is pursuing a coherent and intelligent program to “Finlandize” Afghanistan (neutralize its role in international affairs) while creating a strategic buffer along the Iranian-Afghan border. He speculates that Iran is providing some military assistance to the Taliban as part of an effort to hinder coalition efforts there.

A fourth part of this package is titled “Conclusions.” This section summarizes everything that has come before and makes some policy recommendations.

In sum, the authors of this report believe strongly that we must focus on Iranian activities across a wide spectrum from economic aid to military support in addition to focusing on the nuclear problem. They demonstrate conclusively that Iran is the principal source of weapons, funding, training, and on-site advisers for both Sunni and Shiite insurgent and terrorist groups in Syria, Lebanon, the West Bank, Gaza, and Iraq.

The authors also highlight how Iran is using its economic power in the region using grants, loans, joint ventures, and private enterprises. The net result of all these activities has been to make Iran the "vital economic nexus" of the area between Kabul and the Mediterranean.

Most importantly, this is not done by happenstance. There are no rogue elements within the Iranian regime. The authors insist, rightly, that Tehran is pursuing a coherent, integrated, and often-transparent strategy and that the control of the Iranian Government as a whole over the activities of its agents in all fields is not in question.

The authors strongly believe, indeed it is the raison d'etre of this study, that Iran's non- nuclear activities pose a profound threat to the United States and its interests. The proxies, both political and military (Hamas, Hezbullah) that Tehran supports throughout the region are usually U.S. enemies. The economic assistance that Iran has provided Iraq and Afghanistan has weakened the control of Baghdad and Kabul over outlying regions and this runs counter to our efforts of strengthening that control.

What to do? The authors believe the U.S. must develop a more comprehensive strategy to address the challenges that Iran's policy in the region pose to our interests. We must prevent Iran from becoming the indispensable nation economically, politically, and militarily in the Middle East. At present the United States does not recognize the challenge and therefore does not compete with the Iranians. They are building roads and railroads in the region while the U.S. stands by. Southern Lebanon is beholden to Iran because our interest has waned.

The authors recommend that we work with other countries in the region to develop decentralized transportation networks and that our assistance programs should be designed so as to avoid dependence on Iranian power. Similarly regional oil and gas distribution networks should work around Tehran. In general the authors believe that we must mobilize and reorganize to face this new Iranian threat. They assert that our military is too small, our foreign aid programs are poorly conceived, our intelligence systems are dysfunctional, and our decision-making apparatus is poorly designed.