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American Diplomacy
Commentary and Analysis

April 2008

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Effective interagency coordination has become an increasingly important topic of discussion and study within the U.S. military, particularly as military forces, largely by default, have increasingly taken on traditionally civilian roles in reconstruction and stabilization operations and foreign assistance. In this essay, three students at the Joint Forces Staff College find that the State Department “is not viewed as an effective organization on par with the military combatant commands in influence or leadership, by the Congress, the Defense Department, many interagency partners, or even within the State Department.” They conclude that State “should be the pre-eminent diplomatic and interagency leader abroad, but it must be reorganized to become more relevant, robust, and effective.” Their solution is creation of “Regional Chiefs of Mission” that would replace the current geographic bureaus and report directly to the Secretary of State, together with development of agreed-upon geographical re-alignments that would pair them with the military combatant commands.— Ed.

INTERAGENCY LEADERSHIP: The Case for Strengthening the Department of State

National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44 requires the Department of State (DOS) to “lead” interagency efforts for stabilization and reconstruction operations, tasks it simply is not organized or prepared to do, even with recent personnel moves supporting the new “Transformational Diplomacy” concept. It is critical the U.S. government reorganize, revitalize, and invigorate the diplomatic corps, ensuring a new construct to enable its leadership in interagency operations. DOS must reorganize to step from the shadow of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) regional combatant command construct and articulate a vision of diplomatic leadership that convinces the U.S. Congress of its value as an indispensible pillar of American power.

Since the end of the Cold War, alarm bells have been ringing in diplomatic circles and policy think tanks about the organizational structure and effectiveness of the DOS’s diplomatic and interagency effort. In 1999, the DOS reported its overseas mission “is near a state of crisis,” “perilously close to the point of system failure,” and lacking an “interagency process to ‘right-size’ posts as missions change.”1 In 2001, the bipartisan U.S. Commission on National Security for the 21st Century reported:

The DOS, in particular, is a crippled institution, starved for resources by Congress because of its inadequacies, and thereby weakened further. Only if the State Department's internal weaknesses are cured will it become an effective leader in the making and implementation of the nation's foreign policy. Only then can it credibly seek significant funding increases from Congress. The department suffers in particular from an ineffective organizational structure in which regional and functional policies do not serve integrated goals, and in which sound management, accountability, and leadership are lacking.2

Within the DOD, there is a growing recognition that the other elements of national power must be bolstered to meet national security objectives. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recently surprised many pundits by making a speech in which he called for “strengthening our capacity to use ‘soft power’ and for better integrating it with ‘hard power’.” Developed by Joseph Nye, the concept of “soft power” refers to the use of values and culture to influence people and countries into supporting your goals, rather than using the “hard power” of military and economic threats, inducements, or direct action.3

The U.S. government has done much to press the military toward a stronger interagency footing, but there has been little change in organization or doctrine by the other government departments; most notably the DOS. DOD should not be expected to shoulder all responsibility for interagency transformation across the government. Recognizing that American power is much more than its military arm, Secretary Gates called for “a dramatic increase in spending on the civilian instruments of national security — diplomacy, strategic communications, foreign assistance, civic action and economic reconstruction and development.”4 The DOS is the lynchpin in bringing all of these non-military planks of U.S. power to bear overseas.

The overuse of American military power and overarching influence of DOD’s regional combatant commands has the unsettling effect of making American foreign policy appear primarily militaristic in nature to foreign observers. Currently, a major concern for American diplomacy is America’s image around the world. Especially troubling are the current public opinion polls in functioning democracies. Increasingly, Americans are viewed with suspicion, distrust and, in some cases, outright hatred. Attitudes in the EU are of particular interest as the United States has many significant ties, historically, diplomatically, and militarily. Influenced by the Iraq War, a 2004 Pew Research Center world opinion poll showed “discontent with America…has intensified.”5 Since then, the world perception of American image and motives has only gotten worse. In a 2007 poll of 25 countries, 49 percent said the United States played a mainly “negative role” in the world, while 68 percent of respondents stated the United States “provokes more conflict than it prevents."6 The message is clear; if the U.S. hammer of “hard power” is the tool of choice, then every problem will begin to look like a nail, a prospect that will further alienate friends and create more foes.

The U.S. Government’s Interagency Initiatives

For at least a decade, it has become increasingly obvious that the deployment of U.S. military forces abroad requires much more than military activity.7

Ambassador (retired) Robert E. Hunter, The RAND Corporation

The movement toward an interagency framework has been a matter of importance for the last two presidents in the area of stability and reconstruction. In 1997, President Bill Clinton approved Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56. This directive was intended to lay the foundation for “interagency planning of future complex contingency operations” and was intended to spur a cross flow of U.S. government professional education at institutions like National Defense University and the National Foreign Affairs Training Center. Focusing curricula and exercises on interagency practices and procedures, PDD 56 called upon government agencies to institutionalize lessons learned from complex contingency operations in Haiti and Bosnia.8

In 2005, President Bush signed NSPD 44, which lays out detailed responsibilities for governmental departments in supporting stability and reconstruction, including specific responsibilities for the DOS. Born of the lessons learned from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, NSPD 44 requires DOS to “coordinate and lead integrated U.S. Government efforts…to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities,” and “coordinate interagency process(es) to identify states at risk of instability, [and] lead interagency planning to prevent or mitigate conflict.” NSPD 44 also charges DOS with developing “detailed contingency plans for integrated U.S. government reconstruction and stabilization efforts” and to “lead U.S. government development of a strong civilian response capability including necessary surge capabilities.”

The directive seeks to “achieve (the) maximum effect” of federal government operations by strengthening the interagency efforts of government to “prepare, plan for, and conduct reconstruction and stabilization assistance” by harmonizing interagency activities with military plans and operations.9 A major key to this government effort is the transformation of the diplomatic element of national power to fulfill its NSPD 44 leadership role.

DOD has moved increasingly toward an interagency approach to national security issues. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) places more emphasis on interagency operations and cooperation. In 2001, the term “interagency” was mentioned 13 times in the QDR, whereas “interagency” is mentioned 47 times in QDR 2006. QDR 2006 calls for the creation of National Planning Guidance to direct the development and coordination of both military and nonmilitary plans and capabilities. Extrapolating lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan, QDR 2006 places special attention on stabilization and reconstruction efforts and emphasizes that services and combatant commanders must place stability operations planning and doctrine on par with combat operations. Importantly, the QDR urges greater collaboration between regional combatant commanders and the DOS.

It is clear we cannot achieve all we might without significant help from the rest of the U.S. government. Within the Executive Branch, we are seeking ways to achieve greater efficiencies in the interagency, in our work with partners in the Departments of State, Treasury, Justice, and Homeland Security, the CIA, and other participants in the Global War on Terror.10

DOD, QDR 2006

DOD policies and the QDR system express the need to incorporate interagency expertise into DOD operations. However, the challenge for DOD is to integrate into an interagency effort, while not becoming the focal point for all interagency leadership roles and responsibilities. Such acquiescence would relieve other agencies, like DOS, of their responsibilities in leading non-military interagency functions. Congress, however, has prodded DOD to take on additional interagency roles and missions. There have been a number of Government Accounting Office (GAO) audits of DOD interagency efforts based on Congressional requests. DOD consistently acknowledges the need to improve interagency cooperation, but also retorts, “Stability, security, transition and reconstruction are inherently interagency in nature, but the (GAO) report is directed exclusively at DOD,” and “DOD…cannot adopt recommendations on behalf of other relevant government agencies.”11

DOS Interagency Initiatives           

The scope and complexity of the changes facing the nation demand that the United States transform and strengthen its foreign affairs institutions. Military power is critically necessary, but is insufficient on its own to secure the interests of the American people.12

DOS Advisory Committee on Transformational Diplomacy, 2008

In recent years, the DOS has taken many steps toward addressing its shortfalls in fulfilling its interagency roles and creating an expeditionary capability to meet its stability and reconstruction leadership role. In 2004, the Department created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) to increase DOS capability in this arena. In 2006, the Department unveiled its “Transformational Diplomacy” philosophy, with plans to focus efforts on institutionalizing and spreading democracy and foiling the symptoms leading to failed states. The DOS describes the threat posed by failed states as providing “breeding grounds for terrorism, crime, trafficking, and humanitarian catastrophes, and can destabilize an entire region.”13

Additionally, the Department is in the process of creating an Active Response Corps (ARC), which will serve as the “expeditionary arm of the DOS,” providing a pool of trained personnel for immediate deployment to a failed or failing state crisis worldwide. As of August 2007, there were a total of eleven trained ARC personnel with expectations for a total of 33 people trained and available in 2008. The Department also has plans to create a 300-person Stand-by Reserve Corps (SRC), composed of active duty and retired Foreign Service personnel. A third tier of reserve capacity, the Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC), is also on the drawing board. It would be composed of approximately 350 professionals from a variety of professions needed to stabilize and rebuild nations. Transformational diplomacy also calls for a movement of over 200 Foreign Service positions from large embassies, primarily in Europe, to more challenging diplomatic posts in hot spots and troubled states, mostly in the third world. As part of its 2008 budget request, the DOS requested an additional 93 Foreign Service positions to build up embassy staff in troubled states.14

Structurally, DOS is organized into six regional bureaus:

  1. Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, which covers Europe and Russia.
  2. Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, responsible for Northern Africa and the Middle East.
  3. Bureau of African Affairs, covering Africa south of the Sahara.
  4. Bureau of South and Central Asia, which ranges from Afghanistan to Sri Lanka.
  5. Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, which covers East Asia and Pacific island countries.
  6. Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, which covers the Americas from Argentina to Canada.

Each bureau is led by an Assistant Secretary, who oversees diplomatic efforts for their region and advises the Under Secretary of State on policy.15 The current DOS organizational structure places the bureaus three layers below the Secretary of State.16

None of the DOS regional bureaus matches the combatant command regions in the DOD Unified Command Plan, which creates seams in U.S. government policy and coordination. For instance, the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs must work with three separate regional combatant commands for military matters in its region of responsibility. Conversely, the Commander, U.S. Central Command, must deal with three separate DOS Bureaus when coordinating policy, as well as several special ambassadors and envoys for specific countries and issues. The mismatch in areas of responsibility creates operational seams, which compound the problems of effective, synergistic U.S. policy. The map below, Figure 1, provided by DOS, shows the disconnect between DOS regional bureaus and DOD combatant commands.

Figure 1. Comparison: DOS regional bureaus and DOD combatant commands17

Combatant Command vs Bureau Map

The DOS 2025 Working Group, a bipartisan commission tasked with evaluating DOS transformational efforts, cited concerns with the mismatch between DOS regional bureaus and other departments like DOD. The 2025 Working Group stated, “regional constructs create fundamental strategic challenges — particularly for national security organizations — in the form of the seams between regions that are susceptible to exploitation by adversaries,” and concluded that the U.S. government must “reduce duplication of effort, and minimize vulnerabilities in the seams between agencies.”18

Shortfalls in the DOS Interagency Effort

While recent Transformational Diplomacy initiatives have breathed new life into the diplomatic corps by focusing resources and strategy on a new set of goals, the DOS has yet to make fundamental changes in its organizational structure to meet its NSPD-44 responsibilities to improve its overall effectiveness. The shifting of 200 personnel from one region to another is akin to moving deck chairs around on the Titanic; without fundamental changes to the DOS organizational structure, it will be a losing battle to fulfill the Department’s leadership responsibilities for stability and reconstruction.

Recently, DOS has agreed to place a senior diplomat under a DOD regional combatant command’s chain of command. The fledgling U.S. African Command (USAFRICOM), which will become fully operational in October 2008, announced Ambassador Mary Carlin Yates, a senior U.S. diplomat, will become the Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Activities (DCMA) for USAFRICOM. Yates will become the first senior civilian official from outside the DOD to become integrated into a combatant command military structure. As DCMA, Yates will direct the command's civil-military plans and programs and be responsible for policy development, resourcing, and program assessment for the command's security cooperation program. Ambassador Eric S. Edelman, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, summed up this new initiative by stating, "This is a great opportunity to better integrate government agencies in a place where diplomacy and defense are so intertwined."19 However, Yates will not have authority over the regional bureaus in Africa, the embassies in the region, or other State Department programs.

In short, DOS is not viewed as an effective organization on par with the military combatant commands in influence or leadership, by the Congress, the Defense Department, many interagency partners, or even within the State Department. Gerald Loftus, a DOS Foreign Service Officer from 1979 to 2002, wrote recently in Foreign Service Journal, “The superstars of the U.S. official presence overseas are, let’s face it, not the 190 or so ambassadors accredited to conduct bilateral relations, but the four-star geographic combatant commanders.”20

There are many challenges for the DOS. It is chronically underfunded. Its regional bureaus have territorial boundaries that do not match those of the DOD or other governmental agencies. Its bureau chiefs are all in Washington, not in the region for which they are charged with oversight and policy, or collocated with any of the regional Combatant Commands. Until recently, the DOS did not have an expeditionary ability to deploy experts in support of stability or reconstruction operations. While the steps taken to support transformational diplomacy are very positive developments, the organizational structure remains an issue.

DOD’s regional combatant commanders have come to be perceived by states and other actors as the most influential U.S. government regional representative. It is argued that the resources that combatant commanders control, their presence and frequent travel throughout the region, and even the symbolic impact of their aircraft and accompanying contingent of uniformed service members, all combine to place them in a perceived position of preeminence.21

DOS Advisory Committee on Transformational Diplomacy, 2008

While DOS has designated S/CRS as its lead organization to coordinate and institutionalize the U.S. government reconstruction and stabilization effort, it is technically not empowered to make any real coordinated effort. As it stands now, the S/CRS must work through several departments and agencies throughout the government, including DOS regional bureaus. S/CRS is simply not organized or empowered in the current DOS organizational template to meet State’s NSPD 44 requirements and, as noted by the Congressional Research Service, “many supporters are concerned that it has not been given the authority to compel cooperation.”22 Thus, despite the 2004 activation of the DOS Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, there is a perceived lack of DOS leadership and innovation in fulfilling its stability and reconstruction responsibilities.

There is a real danger that NSPD 44 will never achieve a robust capability and that, by default, DOD will become the lead agent for stability operations…the bottom line is a piecemeal approach will not work.23

Colonel Kenneth Dahl, Federal Executive Fellow, The Brookings Institute

Illustrative of this fact is the growing schism between DOD and DOS in Iraq. DOD assessed DOS is not being proactive in its NSPD 44 leadership role and has decided to take matters into its own hands to fill the perceived leadership gap. DOD has placed a Deputy Undersecretary of Defense in the role of kick-starting Iraqi private industry to support stability and reconstruction, a notion that seems counter to DOS’ stated role in NSPD 44. The press has characterized the friction between DOS and DOD over Iraq reconstruction policy as a “bureaucratic knife fight” and determined that the “bickering has hamstrung initiatives to promote stability.”24 DOD was able to support this unorthodox reconstruction effort by articulating a plan of action to Congress, netting $50 million for this initiative to reopen closed Iraqi state-owned factories. DOD’s provocative moves were not supported by many in DOS, and caused some to wonder aloud, “Why is the DOD in this space?”

From the perspective of DOD, DOS has not truly reorganized or revitalized its organizational structure to live up to its NSPD 44 leadership responsibilities, thus necessitating DOD leadership to fill this perceived gap in capability. DOD initiative in this arena is a double edged sword, as it invites many observers to conclude that DOD should take the lead in stability and reconstruction operations. For instance, the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) requested the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to conduct and publish a study that proposed eight options for restructuring the Army, one of which called for the establishment of Army Stability and Reconstruction (S&R) Divisions.25 Of course, a major reorganization of the Army to support S&R would reduce its ability to fight wars because it would require the Army to convert between six and eleven Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) to S&R specialties. Such a move by DOD would further solidify the perception that DOD is the de facto lead for stability and reconstruction.

Recommendations

In order to increase American diplomatic power and improve interagency coordination, it is critical to create a diplomatic post on par with the military’s theater combatant commander, providing leadership and oversight, and coordination of regional diplomatic efforts with emphasis on crisis response, stability operations, and “soft power” projection. Placing some diplomatic expertise in the combatant commands, as is being done with USAFRICOM, appears to further the notion that the regional military commander is the “most influential USG representative” and in a “position of preeminence.” DOS must make bold moves to reorganize and revitalize its ability to project diplomatic power and lead the U.S. government’s interagency efforts overseas.

The U.S. government must seek to use all instruments of American power in an integrated fashion to shape conditions in the world with the goal of reducing to a minimum the number of occasions when the U.S. must use force…the most effective, widely applicable, and least costly means of delivering power in this diversity of venues is through properly trained, experienced diplomats supported by an anticipatory, strategically focused, well managed organization.26

DOS Advisory Committee on Transformational Diplomacy, 2008

DOS should create a Regional Chief of Mission (RCM), responsible for leading and synchronizing interagency capabilities to project the full range of national power elements. This diplomatic post would work in tandem with the geographic combatant commander and ensure a diplomatic face is planted on the region, not just a military one. It would also provide a regional leader for coordinating the non-military elements of national power and take the lead role in integrating interagency approaches to fulfill government objectives.

DOS should reorganize by converting its current regional bureaus to build the RCM construct. Importantly, the RCMs should report directly to the Secretary of State, just as DOD’s combatant commands report directly to the Secretary of Defense. DOS should work with DOD to develop an agreed-upon regional template from which both DOS and DOD would operate, resulting in the regional pairing of DOS RCMs and DOD combatant commands. Figure 2 (below) provides a notional template for how the RCM would be organized. It provides a notional interagency division outlay to ensure DOS is prepared to lead and coordinate the interagency effort in their region of responsibility per NSPD 44. The joint-interagency planning cell between the RCM and combatant command provides a solid and enduring foundation for strategic regional planning. An important feature of the RCM staffing construct is the Regional Strategic Communications Division, which would focus all U.S. government communications, including military matters, into well sequenced and culturally packaged messages. The end result of the RCM construct is a fully enabled and well led diplomatic post capable of effective diplomatic engagement and interagency leadership. The RCM will lower the profile, but not the effectiveness, of the DOD regional combatant command.

Figure 2. Regional Chief of Mission — Notional Template.

The DOS bipartisan 2025 Working Group argued that DOS should “Institutionalize its ability to support the integration of the global affairs activities of all U.S. government departments and agencies,” and “refine its organizational structures…to improve the secretary’s span of control.”27 Importantly, the status of the RCMs, formerly regional bureaus, should be elevated in the DOS organizational structure. The RCMs should report directly to the Secretary of State, just as the DOD combatant commands report directly to the Secretary of Defense. This would also require a shift in DOS organizational and cultural thinking in which the thrust of DOS activities is focused on the support of regional RCMs and its ambassadors, much as the services support the combatant commands as the main operational element within DOD.

The RCM template accomplishes the recommendations laid out by the DOS 2025 Working Group by focusing expertise and assets toward a regional focus, rather than a functional one as has been done with the S/CRS. Realigning the DOS regional bureaus to occupy a common space with the DOD regional combatant commanders is central to the integration of the two strongest elements of American power. To eliminate seams between DOS and DOD, the bureau boundaries and military regions should match. Both departments should review and, and as necessary, adjust the boundaries of regional diplomatic bureaus and regional combatant commands so they match, to facilitate the synchronization of effort, achieve synergy, and integrate regional planning.

The RCM construct will continue to allow the political freedom of Ambassadors as direct representatives of the United States and the President’s emissary. The RCM’s role is simply to act as the American voice for the region. He or she would be responsible for developing and synchronizing a strategic plan for the region to support national objectives. As such, the RCM should be provided budget authority for the region, including formulating support budgets for the embassies in the region. Granting regional budget authority to the RCM will truly enable the post to effect change and focus scarce resources on the overarching problems in the area and embassy infrastructure shortfalls.

From a political standpoint, it is easier to sell military spending to Congress than spending for the DOS, because military spending equates to increased manufacturing and payrolls in congressional districts. The DOS has no natural political constituency. For many politicians, increasing spending on diplomacy equates to money being spent outside our borders. This viewpoint has proven to be short-sighted in an increasingly complex, globalized world. An investment in a reorganized diplomatic organization on par with the combatant command could pay huge dividends in preventing regional crises, humanitarian disasters, and regional war.

The DOS 2025 Working Group criticized the Department’s poor ability to articulate an effective strategic and organizational vision to Congress, which ultimately weakens its ability to attain funding. Its working group stated that DOS must “improve (its) ability to secure the larger, longer-term, and more flexible resource streams and Congressional support that are required to carry out global missions” and “significantly strengthen (its) ability to engage and communicate with Congress.” 28 The RCM strategy would do much to help DOS articulate a compelling vision to Congress and justify additional funding.

In 2007, DOS received strong support from an unlikely ally, DOD, for increased spending.

Consider that this year’s budget for the Department of Defense — not counting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan — is nearly half a trillion dollars.  The total foreign affairs budget request for the State Department is $36 billion — less than what the Pentagon spends on health care alone. Secretary Rice has asked for a budget increase for the State Department and an expansion of the Foreign Service. The need is real.29

—Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense, 2007.

In summary, DOS should be the pre-eminent diplomatic and interagency leader abroad, but it must be reorganized to become more relevant, robust, and effective. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice remarked, “In extraordinary times like those of today, when the very terrain of history is shifting beneath our feet, we must transform old diplomatic institutions to serve new diplomatic purposes.”30 The RCM construct provides DOS a transformational template to meet the challenges of a post-Cold War world and meet DOS responsibilities under NSPD 44. Failure to make significant organizational changes to meet global challenges will only prolong the U.S. government’s inefficiencies in bringing all its power to bear in a changing global environment.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the individual student authors and do not necessarily represent the views of either the Joint Forces Staff College or any other government agency. References to this study should include the foregoing statement.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

U.S. DOS, The Report of the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel, America’s Overseas Presence in the 21st Century, Washington, November 1999.

U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, Executive Summary, January 31, 2001.

Joseph Nye, The Paradox of American Power, Oxford University Press, New York, 2002.

Robert Gates, U.S. DOD, Transcript from Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), November 26, 2007.

Research Center, Pew Global Attitudes Project, “A Year After Iraq War Mistrust of America in Europe Ever Higher, Muslim Anger Persists,” March 16, 2004.

U.S. Government, Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-56, Managing Complex Contingency Operations, May 1997.

U.S. Government, National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-44, December 7, 2005.

U.S. DOD, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 6, 2006.

Colonel Kenneth R. Dahl, New Security for New Threats: The Case for Reforming the Interagency Process, 21st Century Defense Initiative, The Brookings Institute, June 8, 2007.

NOTES


[1] U.S. DOS, The Report of the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel, America’s Overseas Presence in the 21st Century, Washington, November 1999, p. 5, available at: <http://www.state.gov/www/publications/9911_opap/rpt-9911_opap.pdf>.

[2] U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, Executive Summary, January 31, 2001, available at: <http://usinfo.state.gov/is/ Archive_Index/ Executive_Summary_of_U.S._Commission_on_National_Security_Report.html>.

[3] Joseph Nye, The Paradox of American Power, Oxford University Press, New York, 2002, pg 8-9.

[4] Robert Gates, U.S. DOD, Transcript from Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), November 26, 2007, available at: <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1199>.

[5] Pew Research Center, Pew Global Attitudes Project, “A Year After Iraq War Mistrust of America in Europe Ever Higher, Muslim Anger Persists,” March 16, 2004, available at: <http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=206>.

[6] British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), “View of US's Global Role Worse,” January 23, 2007, available at: < http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6286755.stm>.

[7] RAND Corporation, Integrating the Instruments of Power and Influence in National Security, 2006, available at: <http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/2007/RAND_CF231.pdf>.

[8] U.S. Government, Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-56, Managing Complex Contingency Operations, May 1997, available at: < http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd56.htm>.

[9] U.S. Government, NSPD 44, December 7, 2005, available at: <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-44.pdf>.

[10] U.S. DOD, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 6, 2006, available at: <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/QDR20060203.pdf>

[11] Government Accountability Office, Military Operations: Actions Needed to Improve DOD’s Stability Operations Approach and Enhance Interagency Planning, May 2007, available at: <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07549.pdf>.

[12] U.S. DOS, Advisory Committee On Transformational Diplomacy: Final Report Of The State Department In 2025 Working Group, January 28, 2008, available at: < http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/99903.pdf>.

[13] Congressional Report Service, Diplomacy for the 21st Century: Transformational Diplomacy, August 23, 2007 available at: <http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA471776&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf.>

[14] Congressional Report Service, Diplomacy for the 21st Century: Transformational Diplomacy, August 23, 2007 available at: <http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA471776&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>.

[15] US DOS, DOS Bureau Map, available at: <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/c17251.htm>.

[17] U.S. DOS, Map — U.S. Department of Defense Commander’s Areas of Responsibility, available at: <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/65617.pdf>.

[18] U.S. DOS, Advisory Committee On Transformational Diplomacy: Final Report Of The State Department In 2025 Working Group, January 28, 2008, available at: < http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/99903.pdf>.

[19] U.S. DOS, Press Release, October 29, 2007, available at: < http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2007/October/20071029124738SztiwomoD0.5084345.html>

[20] Gerald Loftus, “Expeditionary Sidekicks? The Military —Diplomatic Dynamic”, Foreign Service Journal, December 2007, available at: <http://www.afsa.org/fsj/dec07/speaking_out.pdf>.

[21] U.S. DOS, Advisory Committee On Transformational Diplomacy: Final Report Of The State Department In 2025 Working Group, January 28, 2008, available at: < http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/99903.pdf>.

[22] Congressional Report Service, Diplomacy for the 21st Century: Transformational Diplomacy, August 23, 2007 available at: <http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA471776&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>.

[23] Kenneth R. Dahl, New Security for New Threats: The Case for Reforming the Interagency Process, 21st Century Defense Initiative, The Brookings Institute, June 8, 2007, available at:

< http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2007/07defense_dahl/dahl20070731.pdf>.

[24] Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Defense Skirts State in Reviving Iraqi Industry,” Washington Post, May 14, 2007, available at: < http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/13/AR2007051301165.html>.

[25] Congressional Research Service, Does the Army Need a Full-Spectrum Force or Specialized Units? Background and Issues for Congress, January 18, 2008, available at: <http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL34333_20080118.pdf>.

[26] U.S. DOS, Advisory Committee On Transformational Diplomacy: Final Report Of The State Department In 2025 Working Group, January 28, 2008, available at: < http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/99903.pdf>.

[27] U.S. DOS, Advisory Committee On Transformational Diplomacy: Final Report Of The State Department In 2025 Working Group, January 28, 2008, available at: < http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/99903.pdf>.

[28] U.S. DOS, Advisory Committee On Transformational Diplomacy: Final Report Of The State Department In 2025 Working Group, January 28, 2008, available at: < http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/99903.pdf>.

[29] Robert Gates, U.S. DOD, Transcript from Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), November 26, 2007, available at: <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1199>.

[30] U.S. DOS, Condoleezza Rice, Speech at Georgetown University, January 18, 2006, available at: <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/59306.htm>.

Lieutenant Colonel Shannon W. Caudill, USAF, is currently assigned as the Action Officer, Antiterrorism Interagency Coordination, in J-3, Directorate of Operations, the Joint Staff, Pentagon, Washington, DC. He was commissioned through ROTC at Norwich University in 1991. Lt. Col. Caudill earned a BS in Communications from Norwich University, an MS in Administration through Central Michigan University, and a Masters in Military Studies from Marine Corps University. Prior to his current assignment, he was the Commander, 100th Security Forces Squadron, Royal Air Force, Mildenhall, England.

Major Andrew M. Leonard, USA, will be assigned as the Director, External Programs, at the Inter-American Defense College in Washington, DC. He earned a BA in Political Science from Arizona State University (1996), AA in Spanish from the Defense Language Institute, and MA in Latin American and Iberian Studies from the University of California at Santa Barbara. Prior to his current assignment, Maj. Leonard completed Foreign Area Officer in-country training in Guatemala.

Sergeant Major Richard D. Thresher, USMC, is currently assigned as the Battalion I&I Sergeant Major, 4th Recon Bn, 4th Marine Division, San Antonio, Texas. He enlisted in 1990. He earned a Bachelor’s in Business Administration from the American Military University and is currently enrolled in a Master’s program in Public Administration with a concentration in Environmental Policy. Prior to his current assignment, Sgt. Maj. Thresher was the Battalion Sergeant Major, 2d Radio Battalion, 2d Marine Division, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.



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