Choosing War: The Decision to Invade Iraq and Its Aftermath
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Occasional_Papers/OP5.pdf
By Joseph J. Collins (Institute for National Strategic Studies)
Reviewed by Amb. (ret.) Michael Cotter (Vice President, American Diplomacy)

This case study prepared by a senior professor at the National Defense University's (NDU) Institute for National Strategic Studies, should be required reading for everyone interested not only in the conduct of the Iraq War but also those interested in improving the function of the U.S. Government's national security apparatus. Although written in November 2007, the study was just released by NDU this month. The author, Dr. Joseph Collins, is a retired military officer who as a civilian served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations from 2001 to 2003. He knows whereof he speaks.

His study contains detailed information on the actions leading up to the war, on the war planning process, and on the mistakes made in not adequately addressing the post-conflict phase. Though unstinting in his criticism, Dr. Collins is unwilling to assess individual blame, noting that many major players have yet to provide their insights.

More important than the criticisms, many of which in any event restate what has been published ad nauseum elsewhere (although seldom so succinctly and to the point), is Dr. Collins extensive list of the challenges facing the U.S. in the national security area and his recommendations on how to improve interagency planning. Of particular interest to those interested in the Foreign Service are his recommendations that over the next five years State Department and USAID staffing should be increased by 50 percent and funding for those agencies doubled. He also recommends “cultural and organizational” changes needed across the national security agencies. Of interest here is the suggestion that all agencies need to replicate the armed forces and require interagency experience as a criterion for promotion into the Senior Executive and Foreign Services.

Although at first glance the study's sixty pages may look intimidating, minus the introduction and extensive notes, the meat is a much more manageable thirty-five pages. It is hard to imagine how anyone involved or interested in how our government addresses critical national security issues could better spend his or her time than reading those thirty-five pages.