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The Middle East Peace Process
The Middle East, more specifically the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli deadlock, has resisted the efforts of some of the most talented and energetic negotiators, including President Clinton. In a triumph of hope over experience, it has also enmeshed Mr. Blair for over a year. Recognizing this reality, he opened by citing former British Prime Minister Harold MacMillan, who stated that there was no Middle East "problem," because "a problem is something with a solution." Blair attempted to refute such defeatism. He adroitly posed the essential conundrum: Israeli demand for security before accepting a Palestinian state versus Palestinian refusal to make concessions without the reality of state authority. But identifying the bases of disagreement (long the only elements of Israeli-Palestinian agreement) is barely a starting point. In Blair's view, the traditional approach of seeking to agree on terms for a two-state solution – territory, refugees, Jerusalem (i.e., the theory) – in order to change the reality of what was happening on the ground (i.e., the practice) is wrong. Rather, the political process and changing the reality have to march in lockstep. He postulated that for a variety of reasons, including regional concern over Iran, the Palestinian-Israeli problem is open for solution. To reach the two-state objective, he emphasized the need for (a) a vigorous negotiating process; (b) an effective Palestinian security/police force; (c) economic/social change building on remarkable recent economic progress; and (d) a new strategy for Gaza, as there cannot be two Palestinian states and the status quo cannot be maintained for another year. Blair concluded by calling for action now, not returning to "square one," but building on recent accomplishments. An agreement, in his view, would provide international, not just regional, benefits. On the other hand, nobody has yet lost money betting against peace in the Middle East. |
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