BLEEDING FOR HUMANITY: Humanitarian Intervention is Politics – A New Doctrine
http://www.harvardir.org/index.php?page=article&id=1860
By Stephen Wertheim, Managing Editor Emeritus, Harvard International Review
Reviewed by William Lefes

In this essay, Stephen Wertheim challenges the “responsibility to protect,” especially in cases of genocide, and therefore highlights the frustrating attempts by scholars to wrap their heads around the problem of humanitarian intervention in a world that sees genocide as the tour de force in sustaining political power. It used to be that a good ole coup d’état was sufficient. The author has done a creditable job of informing us of the nature of the beast. Genocides arise from tribal or clan animosities. They are not political in the usual sense of the term. The origins of genocides, therefore, complicate the use of diplomacy in their resolution.

The author cites several experts in the field whose opinions vary widely. Michael Ignatieff, for example, believes that humanitarian interventionists have "blood on their hands." He has a point in that interventions are in essence a war on a country that may not have infringed on the rights of the attacker.

Samantha Powers, in her Pulitzer prize-winning book A Problem from Hell, blamed the United States for its blindness during a century of inaction. Despite its vast resources, Powers noted, the United States has done nothing to stay the ravages of genocides around the world. Unfortunately, she ignored the challenges of post-conflict reconstruction while mocking the constraints of public opinion.

Until recently, humanitarian intervention has been in vogue. Vice President Joe Biden in 2007 called for sending troops to end Darfur's genocide. UN Ambassador Susan Rice has long championed U.S. bombing of Sudan to stem the tide of genocide. President Obama, on the other hand, argues for multilateral prudence and pragmatism.

The question that haunts all of us is whether or not stopping the killing with armed forces is just. The reason for the question is that intervention to stop the killing in another country is tantamount to war. There is no way around this. Once troops are on the ground and the fighting begins, deaths on both sides of the conflict will occur. Whose side is the interventionist on? It is difficult to separate the good guys from the bad. Who determines who the good guys and the bad guys are? We have seen evidence of this quandary in Iraq and Afghanistan, where we think we know the good guys from the bad. The International Red Cross is probably the only entity that is able to maintain rigid impartiality in a war-like situation. And then they can only help the victims, but cannot do anything to stop the killing.

The author believes that the "time to do something" is at our doorstep. But he and others are without answers on what to do because we have to face the reality of "war" and its aftermath. Unfortunately, the war’s end may come about only when the genocide perpetrators achieve their original objective of eliminating the victims or reducing their numbers to a level insufficient to sustain fighting forces. Even so, the free-for-all that will follow to "take over the country" may be as destructive as the conflict itself.

Michael O’Hanlon proposed the establishment of a rapid-deployment U.S. military division dedicated to halting future genocides. Unfortunately, here again the question arises: Who knows how to rebuild a broken society? Countries with internal conflicts usually do not have shadow governments waiting to take over after the conflict's fires are quenched, and no one really knows how to rebuild a broken society. Experience with post-Cold War attempts in the Balkans, Haiti, Afghanistan, and Iraq attests to this observation.

In her 2007 study of genocide, Patricia Sullivan found that great powers failed to achieve their primary political objectives in nearly 40% of military operations against weak states and non-states since 1945.

The difference between "stopping" and "helping" is enormous. The former implies "war" while the latter has very little to do with stopping genocide. The issue becomes a moral one and avoids confronting the political and strategic causes of genocide. Nevertheless, stopping genocide is an act of war and nothing can gloss over that fact. This begs the question as to whether to proceed on the basis of a "just" war, the definition of which can be debated for a long time.

In rethinking Rwanda, where over 800,000 Rwandans perished in 100 days, some experts now think that the genocide could have been prevented. In retrospect, however, the conditions did not augur well for a victory. Under U.S. pressure the UN cut its peacekeeping force from 2,100 to 270 troops. The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflicts affirmed that a force of 5,000 ground troops would have readily stopped the Rwanda genocide. The force would have focused on stemming the violence around the capital and preventing it from spreading into the countryside, taking advantage of a "window of opportunity." In reality, that "window of opportunity” never materialized. Given the logistics of sending more troops and gaining the permission of the U.S. Congress in a timely manner to mount an armed campaign, it is doubtful that anything the United States or the UN could have done would have averted the disaster in Rwanda once it started.

What can be done in the case of genocides? Our experience to date is compelling. The answer: "Not much!" There are several options that may help, however. A worldwide effort to freeze international funds that belong to the country in question is usually not practical as "someone" out there will continue to trade with that country. The other alternative is general agreement to bomb the country’s palaces, army camps, military installations, and ammo stores. Bomb, but not invade! This is not a good tactic, but it is the one that may garner Congressional and foreign government approval. If the world knows that this is an option that will be utilized, the therapeutic effect could be enormous.