Reconciling with the Taliban
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/reconciling_with_taliban.pdf
By Ashley J. Tellis, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Reviewed by Norvell B. DeAtkine

The relief of General Mc Kiernan and the nomination of General McChrystal to lead the U.S. effort in Afghanistan have underlined the belief among many observers that we are losing the war in Afghanistan. Insofar as most observers would have it, if we are not winning we are losing; there are no draws in this type warfare. Many of the pundits who predicted disaster in Iraq two years ago, it seems, have quietly shifted their prognostications of doom to Afghanistan.

In this thorough study, Ashley J. Tellis takes on two of the most salient arguments for a premature exit strategy and, without Pollyannaish optimism but in elaborate detail, skewers both. Midst the profusion of articles on Afghanistan erupting from all quarters these days, this one merits special attention. It is clear, cogent, and makes a number of telling points, each succinctly outlined and fully supported.

First is the argument advanced by Fareed Zakaria – whose opinion has weight in Washington circles – that the United States should talk to the Taliban. The idea being that the group contains moderate elements and the United States should attempt to separate “the global jihadist from the accidental guerrilla” – a term lifted from a new book by David Kilcullen meaning non-ideological insurgents fighting only because they feel threatened by outside forces. As the author explains, “a worse solution could not be imagined right now. Reconciling with the Taliban is a deceptively beguiling strategy” and is, as he adds, doomed to failure. Not surprisingly the Taliban believe they are winning and have no incentive to negotiate. It would inhibit reconciliation and possibly lead to a renewed civil war.

Secondly Tellis effectively depicts the oft-repeated mantra “graveyard of empires” as literary imagery originating from British Indian historiography but having little substance in reality. In fact the picture of the unconquerable Afghan fighter is not the reality. Sixteen different empires have conquered his domain. The more recent example of the Soviet defeat, Tellis views as a consequence of the insurgency turning into a super power conflict with the United States providing the edge, allowing the Afghans to defeat the Red Army. He describes the differences in the Afghan situation, both strategically and domestically, as far more favorable for the United States than the Soviets.

The author also emphasizes the “need to get the focus right.” By that the author means that even the most minimalist goals for the United States in Afghanistan cannot be met unless we pursue three policies, namely a durable commitment to the country, a “substantial” dedication of resources, and the effective implementation of a “classic” counterinsurgency strategy. Here the author cautions that over-emphasis on the counterinsurgency strategy to the detriment of nation building in Afghanistan and Pakistan will result in failure.

Using a definition lifted from a white paper issued from the White House, Tellis urges a minimalist strategy designed “to disrupt, dismantle, and eventually destroy extremists and their safe havens.” The standard definition of classic counterinsurgency is to focus more on winning over the support of the population than militarily defeating the insurgents. This entails nation-building, which the former administration tried to avoid. The dilemma presented by nation building while fighting an insurgency, particularly in third world insurgencies, is that all the nice things of nation building, e.g., roads, schools, clinics, do not necessarily bring population support. That emerges only when the population is convinced the insurgents have been beaten. The job given to the new U.S. military leadership in Afghanistan is therefore daunting indeed.