COMMANDER’S INITIAL ASSESSMENT, 30 August 2009
media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf?sid=ST2009092003140
By General Stanley A. McChrystal, Commander of NATO International Security Force, Afghanistan
Reviewed by Colonel James L. Abrahamson, contributing editor

During his election campaign, President Barack Obama frequently referred to Afghanistan as the “necessary war,” the battle on terrorism’s “central front” that the U.S. must win. Shortly after taking office, the president set forth what he believed must be achieved there. Midyear, he replaced his commander in Afghanistan with newly promoted General McChrystal and dispatched him to assess the situation. Two months in the making and involving both military and civilian expertise, the general’s sixty-five page assessment of the situation as of 30 August 2009 includes a five-page statement of purpose and summary, a twenty-two page very lightly redacted Commander’s Initial Assessment of the situation in Afghanistan, which also outlines what McChrystal believes must be done to accomplish the president’s aims, and nine annexes, some of which for reasons of security are incomplete.

The general’s report clearly implies a not-yet-officially requested but significant — “jump” — in the number of U.S. ground forces as well as a major civilian contribution to support economic, social, and political development. He clearly seeks, that is, to wage a counter-insurgency campaign rather than the more limited and largely off-shore anti-terrorist campaign that has recently appealed to pundits and politicians who have become weary of years of war or are reluctant to spend more money and put more lives at risk, even in the country that once gave shelter to al Qaeda. Readers watching that debate with interest, should read at least McChrystal’s assessment and demand from those advocating alternative approaches a strategic concept with chances of success that are at least comparable to the general’s proposed counter-insurgency campaign. When trying to make a personal judgment, readers should also consider what both approaches might mean to the United States, the people of Afghanistan, and the region.

The following sketch of the general’s assessment and the strategy he proposes is hardly comprehensive but is offered in hopes it will prompt readers to study the entire report. Using as guidance the president’s previous statements, General McChrystal defines his task as disrupting, dismantling, eventually defeating al Qaeda and associated terrorist groups, and preventing their return to Afghanistan. For the general, stability is “an imperative” for success in Afghanistan as well as preserving the security of the entire region. Though the current situation in Afghanistan is serious, even “deteriorating,” he maintains that U.S., NATO, and Afghan forces can accomplish their mission — if they adopt a new approach that can counter the two main threats to the president’s goals: an organized and determined insurgent force and the Afghan public’s crisis of confidence in both their government and McChrystal’s command, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

To counter those threats, he calls upon ISAF to make the population — its security and its support — the armed forces’ principal object. Simply seizing terrain or killing insurgents will not bring success. That outcome requires enough additional ground forces to seize the initiative from the Taliban, particularly in the most endangered areas, secure the population, and interact closely with the Afghan people and thereby regain their confidence. Those tasks require that outside forces better understand local cultures and languages and that, in small organizations, they live close by the civil population and make the people’s security a top priority, which will likely lead to better intelligence and obstruct Taliban efforts to intimidate and extort the population. U.S. and NATO forces must also partner, at all levels, and work to improve the effectiveness of expanded Afghan security forces (armed forces and police), which must ultimately assume responsibility for maintaining stability in their country. In addition, civilian and military components of ISAF must help improve Afghan governance at all levels -- eliminating corruption, replacing abusive or incompetent civilian leaders, promoting development, and restoring the faith of the Afghan people in their government. In short, General McChrystal believes that only an appropriately resourced and oriented civil and military counter-insurgency campaign has a chance of accomplishing his president’s goals.

Whatever the strategic preferences of readers as they consider America’s policy choices, they can also profit from the assessment’s description of: the major insurgent groups; their methods, financing, and strategies; ISAF’s present shortcomings as a counter-insurgency force; what must be done to correct them; external influences on events in Afghanistan; and identification of the potential civilian contribution to success in Afghanistan.