The Arab Spring engendered much optimism among many of the West’s Middle East observers, who believed they were witnessing a movement toward more democratic societies that had begun to gain momentum. The same observers also speculated that the uprisings undermined Al Qaeda’s doctrinal belief that only terrorist violence could overthrow the authoritarian leaders of the Arab countries. The mostly peaceful removal of Tunisia’s and Egypt’s rulers seemed to put the Al Qaeda doctrine, and perhaps the organization’s existence, in question.

As the Arab Spring subsided, with only Tunisia’s revolution—and possibly Libya’s—still on a democratic projectory, fading optimism also called for a reassessment of the Arab Spring’s effect on Al Qaeda. The authors, both associated with Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies, argue that the Arab Spring’s effect was nil. The reason for this is that Al Qaeda’s leadership deftly subsumed the Arab Spring within its own ideology and took credit for the uprisings. The uprisings it described as a “step in the right direction.” While the Sadat assassination was an act of the jihadist vanguard, the entire population achieved Mubarak’s removal. Zawahiri, bin Laden’s successor, reminded his readers that he was involved in a number of mass protests in Egypt in the Seventies.

In a number of ways, therefore, the Arab Spring cleared a path for a revival of jihadist movements in the countries in which the uprisings had occurred. Though the security services of Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt had previously broken up jihadist cells, recruiting, and financing, Al Qaeda sees the uprising in those nations as providing operating space and a more benign environment for its growth.

Despite being surprised by the uprisings and the perceived refutation of Al Qaeda’s basic reason for existence, its leadership responded with alacrity and turned the popular uprisings to their advantage. The authors also observed Al Qaeda’s satisfaction at watching the U.S. influence decline precipitously in the region.