This perspective is closely akin to Stigler's theory. Public choice models frequently link special-interest laws and regulations with the interests of those who administer them.

The public choice theory of regulation emphasizes that bureaucrats produce complex regulations so that their power and budgets will grow.

 

            The public choice theory of regulation augments the industry interest approach by pointing out that regulatory bureaucrats also have personal interests. Regulation may be excessively complex, for example, because this increases personnel requirements, feeding into empire building by heads of government agencies. The power of  bureaucrats is enhanced when broadly-written laws grant regulators substantial discretion over the form of regulation. This elicits lobbying by regulated firms and provides a market for experts who switch jobs back and forth between an industry and its regulators.

 

            Public choice theory combines with Stigler's industry interest theory to explain much of regulation. The voice of business is not the only input into regulatory processes, however, and in many cases, firms have conflicting interests. Real concerns about social well-being permeate both the political process and administrative agencies, and genuine public interest considerations may prevail.