Although single votes have little direct influence on elections, the fortunate people who live in democracies can vote to collectively determine who will govern. But how accurately are voters’ preferences reflected by election results? Does the system of voting matter?

Majority Rule

Groups of a dozen or more people often find it difficult to agree perfectly on almost anything. Group decisions tend to be middle-of-the-road compromises that are often inconsistent with any individual’s preferences.

Majority rule voting systems require votes from 50% plus one of the voters.

People on the losing side of almost any simple majority-rule vote almost invariably perceive the outcome as harming their interests. (Otherwise, they would vote with the majority—votes reflect expectations of gain or fears of loss.) Majority voting may even result in economic inefficiency, since the minority’s losses may outweigh all gains to the side able to swing a majority of votes.

-          Potential Inefficiencies  Although majority voting can be efficient, the example in Table 1 points out the possibility of inefficient results. Proposal X is defeated even though its benefits outweigh the costs by $300, but Proposal Y passes despite costs ($2,000) exceeding benefits ($1,700) by $300.

 

Table 1  Inefficient Outcomes under a Simple Majority Voting Rule
Beneficial Proposal X is Defeated					Excessive Proposal Y is Approved
Individual	Benefits	Tax Cost	__Votes _Aye     Nay		Individual	Benefits	Tax Cost	_  Votes             Aye   Nay
A	$ 700	$ 400	X		A	$ 425	$ 400	X
B	600	400	X		B	575	400	X
C	350	400		X	C	450	400	X
D	375	400		X	D	150	400		X
E	275	400		X	E	100	400		X
Total	$ 2,300	$2,000	2	3	Total	$1,700	$2,000	3	2

 

Note that all could gain from its passage of Proposal X if supporters shared their gains with the potential losers. If opponents of Proposal Y compensated the potential gainers, all could gain from its defeat. Thus, it is efficient to pass Proposal X and to defeat Y. Majority rule voting yields inefficiency on both proposals, however, because it is illegal to pay money for votes. This is one reason for secret ballots. Markets for votes might shrink the inefficiency inherent in many voting situations, but a market approach to voting is widely viewed as unethical or inequitable.

 

A basic problem is that intensities of preference are easily registered in markets, but not by a majority rule. You can buy more or fewer peanut butter pizzas based on how much you like (or dislike) them, but even if you passionately care who is elected dogcatcher, your vote counts no more than that of someone who randomly casts a vote that offsets yours.

-          Potential Inconsistencies  The results of majority rule voting can be inconsistent and unstable, especially in sequential election systems (e.g., party primaries). Suppose, for example, that Ms. Smith, a Republican, could beat any Democrat for the presidency, but she has no chance because hard-core Republicans will nominate Mr. Jones, who loses to any Democrat. Table 2 assumes a three-party system to make this point. Assume voters are roughly divided into thirds between the Tory, Whig, and Populist parties, and that the ultimate winner must receive over 50% of the vote. If no one receives a clear majority, then the top two candidates meet in a runoff election.

 

Table 2  Potential Inconsistencies in Voting
____________________________________Parties in Runoff____________________
Voter Preferences	Tory vs. Whig	Whig vs. Populist	Populist vs. Tory
Tory voter preferences	Tory	Whig	Tory
Whig voter preferences	Whig	Whig	Populist
Populist voter preferences	Tory	Populist	Populist
Winner	Tory	Whig	Populist

 

Suppose Tory voters despise Populists and will vote for Whigs if there are no Tories in a runoff election. Whig voters, however, vote for Populist Party candidates over Tory candidates in runoff elections. To complete this circle, Populist voters will support Tory over Whig candidates. Table 2 shows the potential results if no candidate receives a clear majority in an initial election. Tory candidates win against Whigs in runoff elections, who would win against Populists, who, in turn, would beat the Tories.

 

Some analysts fear that the possible inconsistencies resulting from majority rule voting may foment instability, with parties taking turns being in power. This is known as the voting cycle phenomenon. An alternative explanation for voting cycles is that voters do not want any party to have a monopoly on political power. This may partially explain, for example, why voters elected Republican presidents in eight of the thirteen national elections held from 1950 through 2002, but during much of this period, Democrats held majorities in both the US Senate and the House of Representatives, as well as a majority of governorships. Nevertheless, voting cycles can trigger policy flip-flops, wreaking havoc for long-range planning by consumers, workers, and business investors and managers. Policies might be more stable if changes required unanimous votes.

Unanimity

Society deems some decisions so important that minority opinions are weighed more heavily in determining critical social policies. More than a simple majority vote is required. A constitutional amendment requires either a constitutional convention called by three-fourths of all state legislatures, or their ratification of an amendment approved by two-thirds of the members of both the U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives. Similar congressional votes are required to override a presidential veto. In most states, a jury trying a criminal case must reach a unanimous verdict, or the case must either be retried or abandoned by the prosecutor. In such situations, requiring unanimity or near unanimity limits exploitation of a minority. Moreover, any legal changes under pure unanimity rules presumably would benefit everyone or they would never be adopted. Thus, any changes would clearly improve economic efficiency.

 

One difficulty with requiring unanimity is that individuals who, on balance, are relatively unaffected by some proposal could withhold their votes to exert leverage over potential gainers from the proposed change. In a sense, requiring unanimity gives everyone the power to say, “It’s my ball, so we play by my rules or we don’t play.” Although some people might negotiate disproportionate gains for themselves simply because of their political leverage, no voter would ever expect to lose from any unanimous vote.

 

A far more serious problem is that a unanimity rule is biased in favor of the existing situation. Unanimity might operate well if an overwhelming majority views the current situation as equitable, but it totally blocks political remedies for inequity, leaving only informal negotiation, violence, or the market as avenues open for people to pursue what they perceive as justice. For example, a unanimity requirement precludes any redistribution of income or wealth other than one that is strictly voluntary. (Under a unanimity rule, slavery would still exist. Persuading every slave owner to agree to its abolition would be extremely difficult without a resort to violence.) A final flaw is that even though a unanimity rule protects the existing rights of minorities, it also provides only crude indications of the intensity of people’s preferences.

Point Voting

Point voting may reflect the intensities of peoples' preferences better than any “one-person, one-vote” rule.

Point voting assigns equal numbers of points to all voters, which they can allocate among various issues as they see fit.

Voters ideally would allocate their points in accord with their net expected gains or losses from given proposals. Thus, if individuals A, B, C, D, and E each have 100 points to allocate between the proposals in Table 1, they would ideally vote as in Table 3. Proposal X now passes and Proposal Y fails, rectifying the inefficient results under simple majority rule voting. Since Proposal X yields net benefits while Proposal Y’s costs exceed its benefits, ideal point voting corrects inefficiencies that emerge from a simple majority rule.

 

Table 3  Point Voting: A Cure for the Inefficient Outcomes in Table 1?
Beneficial Proposal X Now Passes					Excessive Proposal Y Now Fails
Individual	Benefits	Tax Cost	__Votes _Aye     Nay		Individual	Benefits	Tax Cost	_  Votes             Aye   Nay
A	$ 700	$ 400	92		A	$ 425	$ 400	8
B	600	400	53		B	575	400	47
C	350	400		50	C	450	400	50
D	375	400		9	D	150	400		91
E	275	400		20	E	100	400		80
Total	$ 2,300	$2,000	145	79	Total	$1,700	$2,000	105	171
*Ideally, all voters would apportion points based on net benefits (benefits–costs). Thus, because Individual A’s net benefits from Proposal X are $300 ($700 – $400), and Proposal Y  generates $25 ($425 – $400), Individual A ideally casts  92 votes for Proposal X and 8 votes   for Proposal Y.

 

A major flaw in point voting is that voters might skew their points toward issues they expect to be close, relying on other voters to ensure the passage or failure of issues not expected to be close. For example, suppose you favored more spending on both national defense and medical research. If you expected a landslide for a national defense proposal but a close vote on medical research, you would probably place all your votes for medical research. Point voting systems are flawed when, instead of voting their true preferences, people try to forecast the outcomes of elections and then vote strategically. Election results would conform neither to the majority’s will nor to reasonable benefit-cost decision-making.

 

No matter which voting system is used, most people view government as failing if election results do not reflect voters’ preferences. All voting systems are somewhat flawed in this regard, but the overwhelming use of majority rule voting has evolved out of two centuries of experimentation with other voting systems. We have examined voting from the perspectives of citizens. The other side of this equation is how electoral processes shape political campaigns and policies of the candidates and private interests who want to influence government policy.