|
"Semi-Positive" Economics and Pareto Efficiency Ralph T. Byrns Preliminary
Draft: Please contact the author to receive permission before citing. [T]he study of social phenomena receives much impetus
from a strong moral and reforming zeal, so that many ostensibly
"objective" analyses in the social sciences are in fact disguised
recommendations of social policy. Ernest Nagel The Structure of Science:
Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Harcourt, Brace and
World, Inc. NY NY 1961. If a phenomenon admits of a complete mechanical
explanation it will admit of an infinity of others which will account equally
well for all of the peculiarities disclosed by the experiment. Henri Poincaré The Foundations of Science, Paris 1892 The
goal of m The business of an economist is a positive, not a
normative, one. That is, given a social objective, the economist can analyze
the problem and suggest the most efficient means by which to attain a desired
end. Charles Ferguson and
Charles Maurice Economic Analysis, Revised Edition Richard D. Irwin,
Inc., Homewood, Illinois, 1974. Most
of us would agree with the implicit advice that aspiring economists eschew
their value judgments if they want to be considered seriously in this
profession. Note, however, that F-M assume that efficiency is socially
desirable--a value judgment shared by most of us. [See Pareto
efficiency in Economicae
for elaboration.] Beyond this, there is the assertion that there is a unique
and efficient means by which to accomplish the social objective. If the social objective is stated in
general terms, there will be no uniquely efficient means by which to attain
the social objective; thus, economists' recommendations will reflect their
personal value judgments. The social
decision maker, in order to specify completely the social objective in a
manner that yields a uniquely efficient solution, must know the choices
society faces (a grand utility possibilities frontier?), in which case the stated
social objective may embody a unique and efficient method of attainment. In
other words, unless the full social welfare function is ordinally specified,
the "efficient" proposal made will inevitably reflect the economist's
normative biases; it will not be unique.
On the other hand, if the arbiter of the social objective selects from
a menu of efficient points, no further work is required of the economist. Can it be that even in heuristic
definitions of positive economics, economists carry with their intellectual
baggage a hatbox full of value judgments?
Certainly the F-M statement is not exceptional. This
paper contends, however, that any pundit/theorist/writer of any persuasion on
any subject abstracts a tiny body of information from an infinitely greater
body of phenomena, interprets and simplifies it to suit his/her impressions qua
biases qua received [conventional?] wisdom, and delivers the product
[including, e.g., my own musings] to the reader as predigested as the mashed
regurgitations fed by parent birds to their chicks. Thus, a completely
value-free economics is an empty box; and stripping all value judgments from
economic analyses leaves a sterile carcass which consists of nothing more
than either slippery logic or tautologically incomplete mathematics. Unfortunately,
the elegance of Paretian efficiency has led many economists to treat the
concept as if it were positive in contexts that are normative. This poses special difficulty in the
analytics of optimality in consumption.
We argue that economists' intellectual preoccupation with efficiency
has led many in the profession to advocate (implicitly) particular
assignments or reassignments of property rights, which are conceded by most
economists (when wearing their positive economists' hats) to be properly the
province of legal and political processes. Finally, we argue that explicit
recognition of the value judgments inherent in any economic analysis will
permit the addressing of social problems for which economists have a
comparative analytical advantage over those upon whom we slough off certain
questions of equity and income distribution. Can Meaningful and Value-Free Behavioral Models Be
Constructed? It
is a commonplace that the scientific method consists, first, of abstracting
from the real world the phenomenon to be explained. Problems of
Abstraction We are pretty sure that the ant has no idea about
the world that humans inhabit and there is equally no reason to suppose that
the world that is accessible to humans is all the world there is ... Kenneth Boulding
[1987] "The Epistemology
of Complex Systems" European Journal of Operational Research, p. 110-116 Our
sensory apparati are sufficiently crude that we cannot, however hard we
concentrate, sense more than small portions of the spectra of such stimuli as
light, heat, sound, pressure, and odor--radio waves, X-rays, and a myriad of
other forms of energy and matter are simply outside our sensory range,
although some of these are discernible though the use of specialized
instruments.[1] Even
within the boundaries of our limited senses, the phenomena which continuously
bombard us would result in sensory overload and nervous breakdowns if we did
not block out most stimuli. (If you move next to the tracks, in short order
you no longer hear the trains.) In
part, our sensory screens operate automatically; in part, they are
volitional. We choose to concentrate
on some phenomena and to ignore others.
These screening mechanisms may pose far more of a difficulty for
social scientists than for physical scientists; the volitional aspects of
screening confront us with the problem that we may perceive only those social
phenomena which we wish to perceive, and only in terms that are consistent
with our value systems. Selection
among Hypotheses The
second step in the scientific method consists of the development of hypotheses
that might explain phenomena which have been perceived, however imprecisely,
and abstracted from the real world.
That development of any hypothesis which does explain some phenomenon
is a difficult and time consuming process can be attested to be any
researcher who has ever addressed some vexing problem. Still, the previous quotation from
Poincare' is echoed by Milton Friedman: Observed facts are necessarily finite in number;
possible hypotheses infinite. If there is one hypothesis which is consistent
with the available evidence, there are always an infinite number that are. Milton Friedman [1953] "The Methodology
of Positive Economics" Essays in Positive Economics Thus,
we are faced with the quandary of selecting one from an infinity of hypotheses
which are identical in their logical validity. Given that a theory is internally
consistent, other than tautological, and in accord with the phenomena to be
explained, by what criteria is one hypothesis more compatible with truth than
are all others? Generality One
suggestion is generality, which has been offered by Friedman, Poincaré', and
Popper[2],
among others. Generality is achieved
though a process of abstraction; it is the attempt to get down to the bare
bones of causal systems. In some
senses, generality, simplicity, elegance, and economy are synonyms. Assuming identical acuity of sensory
mechanisms, the most basically inferior and poorly trained of intellects will
perceive as much data as can the best and brightest; it is the ability to
disregard the unimportant that seems to characterize genius. The
process of abstraction is often, however, at odds with realism. On average,
the more abstractly stated an hypothesis, the lower its explanatory power in
addressing some subset or a specific data point randomly drawn from some set
of observations. (This objection to
abstraction is at the root of the non-Aristotelian system of logic
promulgated by Korzybski and his followers.[3] Take
any general proposition that is widely held to explain the behavior of some
highly aggregated dependent variable.
If the data point selected is less aggregated, then some less general
proposition tends to be more predictive of the dependent variable associated
with that data point since the less general proposition will be less
abstract; it will embody more information about the dependent variable. For example, as the behaviors of Americans,
then black Americans, then black American women, then black American women in
their 20's, then black women in their 20's from New York are to be explained
(with regard to, say, labor force participation rates), as hypotheses about
behavior are made more and more specific, the explanatory power of such
hypotheses will increase so that more aspects of the labor market behavior of
these subgroups are explicable, and there will be decreases in prediction
errors. An
additional problem associated with generality may be deduced from Thomas
Kuhn.[4] [T]hose paradigms popular with investigators during
one era may cause an incredible proportion of intellectual resources to be
devoted to the refining of abstract systems that ultimately may prove totally
incorrect. Thus,
while generality (i.e., simplicity) may cause previously unmanageable
problems to yield to analysis, there is a danger that generality may become
so much a fetish as to replace the goal of ascertaining true behavioral
relationships in a social system. Both
Korzybski and Pirsig[5]
emphasize that accepted scientific truths (hypotheses) change rapidly under
the onslaught of the scientific method, and should be dated. The "eternal verity" of the Law
of Gravity as propounded by Newton has required considerable modification to
be useful in an era of Einsteinian relativity and space exploration. The particular modes of abstraction used in
the development of general hypotheses are inherently and unavoidably
influenced by the state of the art, the institutional setting, and the value
systems of the researcher. Harmony Poincaré'
offers "harmony" as a desirable characteristic of an hypothesis.[6]
Harmony might be interpreted to mean that the hypothesis "feels
right"; to as high-powered a mathematician as Poincaré', the elegance of
an hypothesis undoubtedly contributed much to its harmony. Alternatively, harmony may mean that the
hypothesis contributes to the orderliness which characterizes most scientific
views of the world. The belief that
the world is convergent and orderly rather than chaotic and explosive is
reflective of one's metaphysical perspective, and so to use harmony as a
criterion for hypothesis selection clearly is incompatible with the ethical
neutrality towards which it is advocated that economists aspire. Scientific Advance Karl
Popper has argued that one valid test of an hypothesis is whether or not the
hypothesis "would constitute a `scientific advance'."[7] Such a criterion is completely arbitrary
and vacuous, in that the judgment of whether or not hypothesis A is an improvement
over hypothesis B becomes either existential and individualistic, or a matter
for consensus or majority vote. If
"scientific advance" means an increase in explanatory power, this
criterion does not help in hypothesis selection. Predictive Power Milton
Friedman has been in the vanguard of those who argue that predictive
capability be the major test of an hypothesis.[8] Unfortunately, on a purely logical ex post basis, all that is gained by
successfully exposing an hypothesis to new data are extra degrees of
freedom. If an hypothesis fails to
predict, it is tautologically true that it fails to explain and, as Paul
Samuelson puts it, "An exception does not prove the rule; it disproves
it." [9] Inasmuch
as Aristotelian logic does not depend on a time dimension, the criterion of
prediction is no more than a restatement of the principle that hypotheses, to
be valid, must explain. Thus, we are
left with the conclusion that predictive accuracy does not facilitate
selecting from among the infinity of hypotheses which fit the data to be
explained; just as there are an infinity of hypotheses identical in their
explanatory power, so too will there be an infinity with identical predictive
power. Reprise None
of these tests of hypotheses can be derived logically, nor are any
"scientific" unless science is defined to contain large doses of
mysticism. Milton Friedman
overqualifies the word "arbitrary" in asserting that: The
choice among alternative hypotheses equally consistent with the available
evidence must to some extent be arbitrary, though there is general agreement
that relevant considerations are suggested by the criteria `simplicity' and
`fruitfulness.'[10] Unless
scientific truth is defined in democratic terms, an appeal to consensus does
not reduce the arbitrariness of the use of these or any other criteria. That value judgments may permeate the
process of hypothesis development can be inferred from all writings on the
topic. Again, a quote from Friedman,
who is representative in stating that:[11]
The
construction of hypotheses is a creative act of inspiration, intuition,
invention; its essence is the vision of something new in familiar material.
The process must be discussed in psychological, not logical, categories . .
." If,
as John Neville Keynes suggests,[12]
positive science consists of descriptive statements of "what is,"
with normative science focusing on "what ought to be," and if our
descriptions of "what is" are colored by feelings about "what
ought to be," then "positive economics" is a mirage. The
scientific method is commonly described as observation of the real world
(through our sensory screens), the development of an explanatory hypothesis
(which, if it is successful in explaining, will be only one of many such
hypotheses), the examination o f
the hypothesis in a mathematical-logical construct for internal consistency,
and finally the empirical testing of the hypothesis by applying it to some
new set of data. That
interpretation of empirical results may be ambiguous is well known; it is not
uncommon to find the same data and results used in support of mutually
inconsistent hypotheses. That
fundamentally different value judgments might explain such cases seems
reasonable. Only in the process of
submitting theory to mathematical-logical tests for internal consistency can
we be even modestly sure of our ethical neutrality. Thus, if all facets of value-influenced
economic analysis are eliminated, all that remains are tools; in the development
of new tools, we may be scientific. In
applying these tools it is not possible to be ethically neutral, as both the
data and the hypotheses chosen for testing and the interpretation of the
results of tests are inextricably influenced by our value judgments. The Question of Consensus on Economic Policy At
this juncture, the objection may be raised that the advocacy of particular
policies is clearly within the sphere of normative economics; this point must
be yielded. However, some of the
economists who have been most vociferous in their expressed desire that
economics become a more positive science have been equally vehement in
believing that policy implications may be derived from positive
analytics. Two statements from
Friedman address this issue[13] Normative economics and the art of economics . . .
cannot be independent of positive economics . . . . . . differences about economic policy among
disinterested citizens derive predominantly from different predictions about
the consequences of t Friedman's
suggestion that "men can ultimately only fight" about fundamental
differences in basic values contradicts the concept that economics is the
study of mechanisms through which humans resolve conflicting objectives.
Indeed, one of the major virtues of the price system is that it is such an
instrument. Samuelson [1963] and Samuels [1972] are among those who have
addressed the price system as a system of mutual coercion. It
is the correct judgment of Walter Heller[14]
that Economists widely, in some cases almost uniformly,
favor tougher antitrust policy, freer trade, deregulation of transportation,
pollution taxes in place of most prohibitions, and tax reforms to remove tax
shelters. They oppose fair trade laws,
restrictive labor and management practices, distortive zoning laws and
building quotas, ceilings on interest rates, maritime subsidies, and pure (or
impure) pork barrel projects. Some
might argue that such near unanimity across the broad spectrum of political
ideologies held by economists supports Friedman, and is an indicator of the
power of positive economics in applying efficiency criterion to a number of
policy issues. An alternative
hypothesis is presented below. Pareto Optimality and
Policy Recommendations In
his 1974 bestseller, Zen and the Art of
Motorcycle Maintenance, Robert Pirsig divided humankind into two camps, romantic
and classical.[15] The romantic mode is primarily inspirational,
imaginative, creative, intuitive. Feelings rather than facts
predominate. "Art," when it
is opposed to "Science," is often romantic. It does not proceed by reason or by
laws. It proceeds by feeling,
intuition and aesthetic conscience . . . . The classic mode, by contrast,
proceeds by reason and by its laws . . . . (Pirsig
oversimplifies, in that some individuals may strive for the logical clarity
of the classical mode within the context of their professions, but might be
characterized as mystics in their religious practices.) The
impetus for the study of economics instead of some other logical discipline)
derives from the romantic. The drive
for rigor, elegance, and ethical neutrality, once one begins to study
economics, originates in a classical world view. For most, the choice of economics as a
discipline and life's work is reflective of dissatisfaction with the current
order, and a desire to do something "useful" in changing things for
the better. The following statement by
Abba Lerner reveals both classical and romantic impulses.[16] The nearest thing to a systematic philosophy is my
feeling that it is only concern with improving the condition of man which
justifies work in economics. This, in
spite of the keen enjoyment I have always felt, and still do, in the mental
exercise involved and in the achievement of elegant proofs and diagrams. However, I have always felt that this could
have been obtained in a higher degree if I had gone in for mathematics or
chess, which I refrained from doing for the very same reason, namely that I
found economics about equally enjoyable and much more useful. Earlier
economists freely voiced their value judgments in advocating social reforms
or in prescribing moral behavior. This
is quite evident in perusals of the works of Smith, Mill, Marshall, or
Fisher. From the perspective of 2004,
many of their opinions appear quaint and their value judgments stand in
marked contrast to the seemingly objective prose that permeates contemporary
journals. The
gradual ascendance of Comte's logical positivism throughout the social
sciences, coupled with Lionel Robbins' argument[17]
that no market test can be devised through which to ascertain interpersonal
utility comparisons, and merged with the extensions by, e.g., Allen and
Hicks, of the mathematical tools pioneered by Walras, Edgeworth, and Pareto,
led to a reaction against the romanticism implicit in the value explicitness
of earlier economists. The
incorporation of Pareto criteria into the "new welfare economics"
was symptomatic of this reaction, just one manifestation of the attempt to
force economic analysis into a classical mode, less human in being bereft of
explicit value judgments, but (superficially at least) more in keeping with
an attitude of ethical neutrality.
Harry Johnson is typical in arguing that:[18] The `new welfare economics,' which emerged rapidly
in response to Robbins' challenge, has made economists much more aware of the
pervasiveness and relevance of value judgments in economic analysis and
prescription, and much more careful about treating them explicitly. As
a mathematical system of marginal conditions for joint, constrained
optimization, Pareto criteria appeal to the classical, positivist
spirit. If the apparently innocuous
assessment is made that society desires maximization, then efficiency
criteria seem to permit reconciliation of this classical mode with the
humanistic and romantic vision of reality which has as a goal the
promulgation of policy recommendations, and which impelled most of us into
economics as a discipline instead of mathematics or engineering. The
desire for a positive economic science has resulted in an attempt to divorce
issues of resource allocation from those of income distribution.[19] Guided by their classical instincts, most
economists insist that resource allocations be governed by efficiency
considerations, given the assumption that society dictates optimization as a
goal. When an efficient solution is
proposed and rejected, we too often brand those who veto our proposals as
irrational. Within the context of
Pirsig's model, they either fail to understand or don't appreciate the
classical essence of economic efficiency and market solutions, and might more
aptly be characterized as romantic.
Those who tend to the romantic in their allocative preferences may be
objecting to certain aspects of economic efficiency or to market outcomes, to
the extend that these outcomes seem inequitable or unaesthetic. Economists commonly counter objections
based on the undesirable income-distribution consequences of particular
policies with the suggestion that the political process, not the market
place, is the proper mechanism for income redistributions. Negative income tax schemes are sometimes
offered as possibly efficient means by which to accomplish desired transfers. As
with all divorces, the intellectual separation of the income from the
allocative effects of specific policies engenders numerous messy problems. First, it is hard to distinguish those who
benefit from those who lose as a result of changed policy.[20]
The suggestion that the losers be compensated through a negative income tax
succeeds only in that advocates of inefficient policies may be forced to admit
that their constituencies are not impoverished and are unlikely to become so
as a consequence of the adoption of efficient policies. Second, if the income distribution effects
of policy changes are felt by some to be sufficiently important to warrant compensation
of losers by gainers, individuals who lose in the course of income transfers
have reduced incentives to efficiently use the resources to which they have
legal title. The
possibility that inefficiency is associated with income transfers leads to
the fundamental question of property rights.
Following the seminal work of Coase,[21]
a vast literature has emerged to the effect that allocative inefficiency is
eliminated if perfect information obtains and the rights to all property are
clearly defined. (For elaboration, see
the bibliographies of papers in the volume edited by Wunderlich and Gibson[22]) If efficiency is assured whenever all
property rights are assigned, then it would seem that the state can cause the
attainment of any point in the analytical core of an economy through some
configuration of property right assignments.
Seen in this light, any problem of income distribution generated by a
change to an efficient policy can be rectified by assigning or reassigning
property rights. A
fly appears in this ointment when we recognize that changes in tastes,
technology, or any other variable that most economists treat as parameters
will redistribute income. (An
unfortunate by-product of the wide use of comparative statics is the tendency
to treat parameters as constants; such parameters change constantly, so no
state assignment of property rights will yield some static, politically
"optimal" income distribution.
In our analyses, we need to recognize that society at large is
probably interested, not in property right assignment per se, but in the
income level and distribution that emerges under specific property right
structures. Since
the parameters that determine the income flows to particular properties
change values over time (sometimes quite rapidly), the reassignments of
property rights necessary to maintain an optimal distribution of income would
require an algorithm at least as complex as that employed in analyzing
general equilibration in markets. To
cavalierly slough this problem off onto the political process is to invite
rejection of suggestions for efficient policy. Given the states of analytics in the
disciplines of sociology, history, political science and law, some of whose
students are very likely to control the political decisionm Ascertaining
equilibrium solutions for resource allocation is a knotty problem, but
economists are aided in this task by such signals as (changes in?) relative
prices, quantities of inputs and outputs, and rates of entry and exit from
markets. Finding solutions that
achieve different possible income distributions poses even greater difficulty
in that such signals as are available are far from ambiguous. Many in the profession would avoid this
problem as requiring the interjection of ascientific value judgments. Value judgments are unavoidable, however,
any time we argue for some efficient or market solution. The proof of this lies in analysis of any
of those policies listed by Heller which seem to generate such unanimity
among economists, but such rejection by the public at large. If
the state has the right to determine property rights and if advocacy of
particular ownership patterns is not deemed proper for economists in their
positivist roles, then some contradictions are inherent in any discussion of
policy. For example, the efficiency of
free trade appeals to an overwhelming majority of economists; most advocate
the elimination of tariffs, quotas, and other barriers to trade. This position arises from
"positive" analytics through which it is trivial to show that
Utopian transfers which would result in a Pareto-safe move are theoretically
possible with the transition from a barrier-ridden to a free system of
international transactions. With
establishment of the "fact" that any losers from freer trade
policies can be compensated by those who gain, most economists (including, we
must admit, ourselves) proceed to argue for the elimination of any barriers,
and for "the" market solution. Ignored
is the curiosum that in establishing tariffs, the political structure
effectively has assigned a property right in the higher income stream
associated with the sale of the protected good. Policy changes that might eliminate some
inefficiencies almost invariably will cause income redistributions that should
not be ignored by economists who prize objectivity. The
position that ethical neutrality is achieved by ignoring the income
distribution effects of policy is tantamount to the assertion that
even-handedness is identical with arbitrariness, so long as that which is
arbitrary is random. This, the belief
that positive economic analysis encompasses the ascertainment of the
efficiency characteristics of alternative policies, and that the efficiency
or lack thereof of a particular policy stands as a ground for
"positivistic" policy recommendations, cannot be supported.[23]
Warren Samuels points out that:[24]
It
is inconsistent to support legal change in the interest of certain reforms
(e.g. efficiency) yet ignore distributional consequences, while opposing other
reforms (e.g., income redistribution) under the rubric of avoiding
interpersonal utility comparisons and
distributional-ethical questions; it is inconsistent and it is obscurantist. In
any discussion of policy, even if an economist can identify gainers and
losers and offers a policy that results in Pareto-safe moves, the specifics
of such policy will generate a division of the net gains which will either
reflect personal value judgments or be arbitrary. Even the most innocuous of specific
policies, derived as directly as possible from "positive"
analytics, cannot be ethically neutral.
Only with full identification of all policy options can the economist
legitimately claim to be simultaneously a positive scientist and a policy
technician. We believe this task to be
insurmountable. While questions of
income distribution are messy and offensive to the classical, rationalistic
streak in most of us, explicit treatment of such problems is both more honest
and probably more rewarding than the all too prevalent practice of disguising
unavoidable equity considerations under the cloak of verbiage about
efficiency and scientific objectivity. Some Concluding Remarks This
paper is not intended as a nihilistic condemnation of all economic
analysis. Rather, its purpose is to
point out the impossibility of a truly positive economics, and the potential
personal satisfactions that might be derived from dealing explicitly with
income distribution questions. Every
analysis unavoidably reflects the (perhaps unconscious) bias of the
analyst. Particularly unfortunate is
the common tendency to believe that certain (primarily free market oriented)
policies flow from positive analytics without benefit of the interjection of
value judgments. There is too
widespread a feeling that efficiency alone justifies virtually any
solution--especially those yielded by markets. Too often, economists advocate the
efficient solution, or the market solution, only to be bewildered when those
whom we advise fail to take advantage of our insights.[25] General
equilibrium models of market economies indicate the existence of an infinity
of efficient solutions, an infinity of market solutions; which one, if any,
might be attained is determined by the structure of property rights. If we can infer that a Pareto efficient
position, A, is deemed by policymakers to be inferior to some inefficient
state, B, it is incumbent upon us to spell out the details of the systems of
compensation or property rights that might permit attainment of as many different
efficient points which are Pareto superior to B as is possible. To throw up our hands, or to make
disparaging remarks about the intellectual caliber (or parentage) of decision
makers who reject the efficient solution we propose is to condemn the economics
profession to impotency with regard to policy. The
hypothesis that positive economics exists that is other than sterile for
policy purposes can be rejected; it does not fit the data. The attempt to clothe what is inherently a
normative science in the garb of "positive economics" is a fraud
which deludes most of us, who spend our professional careers deriving the
characteristics of the Pareto efficient solutions to pressing social
problems. More importantly, the
attempt to banish normative aspects from economics would leave a void as to
who might in an analytical manner address such social issues. That
a value free economics is a mirage is increasingly recognized in some
quarters. Sadly, much of this recognition is outside the mainstream of
economic analysis. Dennis Mueller reflects the thoughts of many members of
the "public choice" paradigm in pointing out that:[26] To say that we favor an unregulated or a less
regulated market to a more regulated one . . . introduces a value judgment .
. . into what we like to pretend is a value free analysis of efficiency. With
the terms of trade turning against the United States, and the prospect that
the previous steady growth of the national pie may give way to a decline in per
capita income, the questions of how the pie should be divided, and through
the use of what (hopefully efficient) mechanisms, can be predicted to
increasingly occupy policy debates. If
policymakers turn to economists and find that we have not dirtied our hands
in analyzing this topic, we will have abdicated an opportunity for the
fulfillment of the romantic aspects of our personalities. Our classical impulses have caused many of
us to ignore the implicit vale judgments associated with the evaluation of
policies along efficiency lines. To
admit openly these value judgments may allow us to do productive research on
income distribution and in other areas that have previously been perceived as
outside the scope of `positive' economic science. REFERENCES James
M. Buchanan, "America's Third Century in Perspective," Atlantic Economic Journal, Vol. 1 #1,
Nov. 1973, pp. 3-12. James
M. Buchanan, The Demand and Supply of
Public Goods, Rand McNally & Co., Chicago 1968. Kenneth
E. Boulding, "The Epistemology of Complex Systems," European Journal of Operational Research,
Vol. 30, p. 110-116, 1987. Ronald
H. Coase, "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 3, 1960. Charles
Ferguson and Charles Maurice, Economic
Analysis, Revised Edition, Richard D. Irwin, Inc., Homewood, Illinois,
1974. Milton
Friedman, "The Methodology of Positive Economics," Essays in Positive Economics,
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1953. Walter
W. Heller, "What's Right with Economics," American Economic Review, Vol. LXV, No. 1, March 1975, pp. 1-26. Harry
G. Johnson, "The Economic Approach to Social Questions," National Affairs, Vol. 12 (Summer
1968), reprinted in Economics: Mainstream Readings and Radical Critiques,
edited by David Mermelstein, Random House, NY NY, 1970. John
Neville Keynes, The Scope and Method of
Political Economy, London 1898. Alfred
Korzybski, Science and Sanity: An Introduction to Non-Aristotelian
Systems and General Semantics, 4th ed., The International Non-Aristotelian
Library Publishing Company, Lakeville, Connecticut 1958. Thomas
S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions, 2nd ed., University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1970. Dennis
Mueller, "Anarchy, the Market, and the State," Southern Economic Journal, 54-4, April 1988, p. 821-830. Richard
A. Musgrave, The Theory of Public
Finance, McGraw-Hill, NY NY, 1959. Ernest
Nagel, The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific
Explanation, Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc. NY NY 1961. Robert
Pirsig, Zen and the Art of Motorcycle
Maintenance, William Morrow and Co., NY NY 1974. Henri
Poincare', The Foundations of Science,
Paris 1892. Karl
R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific
Discovery, Harper Torchbooks, NY NY 1968. Warren
J. Samuels, "Welfare Economics, Power, and Property" pp. 61-148 in
Wunderlich and Gibson [1972]. Paul
A. Samuelson, "Modern Economic Realities and Individualism," The Texas Quarterly, Summer 1963,
reprinted in The Collected Scientific
Papers of Paul A. Samuelson, edited by Joseph Stiglitz, The M.I.T. Press
1966, pp. 1407-1418. Gene
Wunderlich and W. L. Gibson, Jr., editors, Perspectives on Property, The Pennsylvania State University,
1972. |