The workshop aimed at addressing the issue of European integration at the intellectual level, after the fall of the Iron curtain. The political and social backgrounds that led to marked differences in intellectual self-representation between the East and the West are well known, and there was implicit agreement among the participants as to the content and import of these differences. The workshop evolved as a free flowing discussion around several key issues: the concept of civil society; the idea of Europe (as in: reaching European standards, joining Europe, waiting at the gates of...); the cultural significance of intellectual engagement; the issues of communication in the information age. 

        The first panel's two presentations by Jeffrey Goldfarb and Aleksander Smolar (discussant Daniel Chirot) debated the validity of the concept of civil society in present day Europe. Jeffrey Goldfarb, whose paper is posted here, explained that "civil society" is a rather loose term, hard to define, and currently used by a diverse set. In the context of Soviet-type political systems, it described the "parallel society", dominated by intellectuals, where people acted as if they were free from government control - "as if" actually became a concept in itself. In this way, the civil society was often understood as opposing intellectual impractical dreams to political realism, and it attracted, we might add, a lot of sympathy as a form of anti-politics. Goldfarb further stated that after the fall of communism the civil society earned a somehow utopian status, in contrast with party politics and parliamentary democracy, which became the norm. 

        Aleksander Smolar, in a friendly rebuttal, maintained that the political objectives of the civil society strategy should not be underestimated. While the civil society was conceptualized as a cluster of independent institutions capable of limiting the political space, it did not offer a viable governing alternative. It did undermine the existing political order and opened the door for a democratic political system. The utopian component was bestowed on the civil society by critics who saw in it a tool for solving not only the problems of the East but also of the West. For these reasons civil society can not be confounded with Habermas's definition of public sphere. 

        In the discussion, Miroslav Kúsy reminded the audience that civil society should not in any case be considered a Western import, since it has historical roots in Central Europe, in Tomás Garrigue Masaryk's concept of "small work" or "small deeds." Jacques Rupnik warned against possible idealistic views of civil society versus politics: currently, a way of assessing the strength of the civil society in former communist countries is to consider the number of NGOs. By this measurement, Bosnia should have the strongest civil society in the area - obviously not a model to follow. 

        This discussion brought to light the division between what could roughly be called the "idealist" camp and the "realist" one. For idealists, civil society represents a new way altogether: anti-politics as the normal state of things, not just as a means of fighting dictatorship. The Helsinki Citizens' Initiative, which in 1990 moved its headquarters to Prague, best represents this view - this is how civil society is seen as a cure for all ills, Eastern (communist) or Western (capitalist, liberal) alike. The realists would rather see the political implication of the concept of civil society in the context of communist dictatorship. In normal conditions, civil society is a prerequisite, and subsequently a byproduct of democracy: freedom of speech and of association span citizens’ initiatives, which in turn influence the political process. They point to the necessity of politics and warn of the intellectual temptation of creating civil society by command. To this position rallied most former dissidents who got involved in politics after 1989. 

        The panel on the responsibility of intellectuals included two papers concerned with the condition of intellectuals in West European countries (France - Christophe Charle, and Germany - Michael Geyer) and one in a East European country (Miroslav Kúsy - Slovakia). The papers are posted here in full. The presentations themselves, as well as the discussions underscored the differences, rather than the similarities between intellectual self-representation in the East and the West. Christophe Charle ended his analysis of political positioning of French intellectuals since the Dreyfus Affair with the assertion that France is currently witnessing a revival of intellectual engagement - an observation that runs contrary to common opinion (see the numerous pronouncements on the death of the intellectuals, especially in France). There is a price to pay: the need for intellectual involvement arises from perceived political and social crisis. In France, and by extension, in Europe, intellectuals are called upon nowadays to respond to the disruptions wrought by globalization and international competition. Intellectuals, in Charle's opinion, do have, then, the duty to oppose both the rise of nationalism and "unbridled liberalism." 

        This point prompted a great deal of controversy during the discussions: Vladimir Tismaneanu, the respondent of the panel, noted that the very phrase "unbridled liberalism" sets off alarm bells in the context of Eastern Europe's political and social changes. Liberal reformers in Eastern Europe are often confronted with accusations of "ultra-liberalism" or "excessive capitalism" by former communists eager to recapture political legitimacy. Furthermore, Tismaneanu observed that nationalism and liberalism should not be put on the same level, as likely dangers to a democratic order. In light of recent developments, nationalism's potential for disruption is far greater: it is not liberalism that destroyed Yugoslavia, concluded Tismaneanu. 

        The discussion revealed that the political and economic gap still existing between Eastern and Western Europe resonates in the position intellectuals take in relation to current issues that supposedly affect all Europe, such as globalization. For Western intellectuals concerned with social justice, cautioning against too much liberalism - especially economic liberalism - is a way of continuing the tradition of the intellectual as whistle blower, as defender of the rights of individuals against the reason of state, hence against the threat of market domination this time around. In contrast, public intellectuals in Eastern Europe, most notably the former dissidents and their disciples, promote liberal policies in an effort to fight off the ideological, political and economic burden of communism, as well as new dangers, such as nationalism. From this perspective, liberalism, both economic and political, amounts to an intellectual strategy in the service of the individual, rather than a crushing depersonalizing ideology. 

        Furthermore, intellectual positions are tied with different views on the relationship between the state and the individual. In the West, where civil rights have become established reality, concerned intellectuals demand that the state provide protection against encroaching economic pressures, and fear that the liberal emphasis on entrepreneurial freedom conceals an erosion of public and individual welfare. In contrast, liberal intellectuals in Central-Eastern Europe, who experienced state socialism protections as masked oppression, tend to emphasize individual freedoms, which the state must guarantee. On the other hand, and to come back to intellectual dialogue, the constant use of qualifiers such as "ultra" or "unbridled" in connection with liberalism, does imply a certain rehabilitation of liberalism. This might reflect the impact of East European intellectual discourse, which consistently revealed the weak points of Marxist theories and valued instead the possibilities of liberalism.

        A few exchanges on the nature of globalization, largely viewed in Europe as American domination - to which Jeffrey Goldfarb replied that American intellectuals are themselves concerned with issues such as the power of the market, potential media manipulation, lowering of cultural standards - made a fitting transition to the next panel, dedicated to "mental mapping", with presentations by Andrei Pippidi, Dubravka Ugresic and Jacques Rupnik, and a commentary by Larry Wolff. 

        The two papers on Eastern Europe (by Andrei Pippidi and Dubravka Ugresic), posted here in full, revealed deep feelings of estrangement rather than coming together on the part of intellectuals in Eastern - as opposed to Central - European countries. Pippidi's paper pleaded for rescuing South-eastern Europe from condescending stereotypes. Observing that European identity is often standardized along a rigid Western European pattern, Pippidi called for diversity without implied deference to the above mentioned standard. Specific regional identities, shaped by a common history prior to the communist era, are legitimate in themselves and should not be expected to conform to the master-European pattern. Pippidi tackled again the controversy around the endemic backwardness of Eastern Europe, which handicaps local aspirations of participating in the European cultural circuit.

        In a highly emotional presentation, Dubravka Ugresic articulated the numerous frustrations produced by the gap between the discourse of European inclusiveness and the reality of Eastern Europe's exclusion. Her argument evolved mainly around the manipulation of East European (in this case assimilated to Balkan) stereotypes. In her view, as in that of the preceding speaker, cultural stereotypes result from the Ur-stereotype of East European backwardness. They are currently used, successfully, as alibi in neglecting or mismanaging the problems of the region - most recently, and glaringly so, in the Yugoslav war. 

        Jacques Rupnik started his presentation on the political and cultural significance of Europe by clarifying that after 1945 the European project was largely conceived as a shield against "our own demons," based on the repudiation of ethnicity as organizing principle. Opposing European values to local ones can indeed appear intrusive and thus generate self-protective reactions - as the two previous papers showed - but at the same time it enables local forces to use the European project as a tool against petty parochialism. After 1989, that strategy was tried, to various degrees of success, by the "Westernizers" in East European countries, in an effort to defeat budding nationalist movements, that threaten to saddle the integration into the European Union. We might add that passionate debates arguing the right balance between local/regional/ethnic identity and larger European/universal values are not new in Europe (Eastern and Western), but the current political realities append a new sense of urgency, and deepen the feelings of condescending superiority, or, conversely, outraged inferiority, depending on one's position in the European political configurations. 

        In an interesting twist, European identity itself acquires a semblance of nationalistic defensiveness. Many intellectuals in Western Europe struggle to protect Europe from America, fearing that the process of globalization will dilute and ultimately swallow up Europe's cultural distinctiveness. Rupnik observed that fear of America, however, is more pronounced in the West than in the East, where exposure to American values signifies progress rather than capitulation. 

        The ensuing discussion highlighted the animosity lying beneath the surface of urbane intellectual conversation. Larry Wolff's excursus through the history of literary stereotypes on East European themes reinforced the impression that Eastern Europe, and the Balkan region in particular, was fated to a misconstrued subordinate place in the European imagination. However, some speakers pointed out that until the recent infighting, Yugoslavia seemed all but included in the European Union, much ahead of other communist bloc countries. It was not sustained prejudice, but the actions on the ground, justified by a strident nationalistic rhetoric, that contributed to the marginalization, and may have activated Balkan stereotypes in the process. Rupnik also noted that Yugoslavia presented a sad case of the "trahison des clercs" [treason of the intellectuals], since a number of the foremost intellectuals in the different republics - members of the internationally recognized 'Praxis' group in particular- often joined in the nationalistic chorus, rather than offering an enlightened alternative. 

        It remained unclear, however, what impact, if any, cultural stereotypes might have on the issues most cumbersome, in various degrees, to East Europeans: the economic and technological lag, the social issues of the transition, or even on specific question calling for intellectuals' involvement, such as establishing democratic institutions. Joining Europe appears most of the time as a pragmatic imperative. Dubravka Ugresic' piece even started with an enumeration of the practical ways that marginalize the Europeans of the East: the endless requirements for entry visas (which, be it said in passing, exceed the former Secret Police demands), the lack of convertible currency, the ensuing diminished opportunities. The further a country falls short of the financial, economic and political requirements of the European Union, the deeper the feeling of cultural misunderstanding, hence the stronger the appeal of the defense of the weak: guilt-inducing victimhood, transparent in the exasperated complaints about the 'club' one is not allowed to join (voiced also during this meeting). On the other side, a corresponding impatience with such reproaches does little to ease the impression of smug superiority, indeed a three tiers Europe is clearly shaping up. (Eastern - Central - Western Europe). Ultimately, these discussions showed how much the political and social conditions in each country influence a firmer or looser attachment to the European intellectual consensus. 

        The final panel combined a paper on cultural communication (Petr Bilek - paper posted here) and a presentation of the evolution of social sciences after the German unification (Michael Greven), with a response by Michael H. Heim. Bilek offered a commentary on the many instances of misunderstanding occasioned by the infatuation with global communication. Information absorbed with very limited, if any, knowledge of the cultural, social and political context leads to false perceptions of dialogue, and eventually to the hardening of stereotypes. Literature can provide a remedy, when it is given the appropriate credit, instead of being relegated to a disconnected special field - a point reinforced by Michael Heim in his response. 

        Michael Greven talked about the transformation of political science departments after the German reunification. In the GDR the discipline that stood in lieu of political science, and of most other social sciences as well, was scientific Marxism. With the reunification, this subject lost not only its privileged status, but, its name notwithstanding, came to be invalidated scientifically as well. Hundreds of former university professors found themselves out of the academia because their field simply disappeared. Naturally, they saw this process as a takeover, thereby democratization in fact meant control of academic standards by the West. Moreover, the move implied a questioning of the moral, along with the professional qualifications of these scholars, who made an abrupt shift from propagandists (of the state dogma) to victims of the new system, which devalued both their knowledge and their political attachments. That raised again the touchy issue of the smug West remodeling the East on its own terms. 

        In the discussion several speakers focused on this issue, pointing out that similar processes as in the GDR happened in the other Soviet bloc states, but, absent a reunification with a Western power, the local "Westernizers" took over, and tried to update the social sciences departments. The charges and counter-charges were the same, however, in the other countries the former practitioners of scientific socialism managed more easily to change their credentials and metamorphose into social or political scientists, [with the same speed the communist parties they supported metamorphosed into quasi social-democratic parties]. As a result, social tensions were averted, but the quality of scientific work, hence the formation of the new generations of social scientists, suffered. As for the ethics of this peculiar discipline, they pose a dilemma typical for the transition: scientific socialism was the dogma used to justify and legitimize an oppressive system, hence it seems fair that it should undergo moral scrutiny; on the other hand, eliminating a subject of study altogether, along with its students, runs contrary to the principles of an open and democratic academic system. 

        In delivering the conclusion of the workshop, Gale Stokes asserted that, placed in a position to make a new start, East European countries might be better served by James Madison' theory of "contentious society", rather than pin their hopes on the more elusive promises of the civil society - which prompted renewed discussions on the validity of such hopes. 

        Eight years since the fall of communism allow for some perspective on the events and the subsequent developments. This workshop, giving the opportunity for uninhibited discussion, helped elucidate some of the positions intellectuals in Eastern and Western Europe share, and those where they differ. Thanks to the general intellectual consensus (freedom of expression, freedom from government control, freedom of information, a sense of intellectual responsibility) reintegration is a feasible project; thanks to the divergence of opinions and positions it is a complex and challenging course. It became clear, however, that fears of a cultural colonization by the West proved exaggerated: the reintegration is taking place through dialogue and debate. What makes it an exciting process is that neither side is in a surrendering mood.