

**Reconsidering Party Cues and Mass Opinion toward  
European Integration**

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Political parties, candidates, the media, interest groups, and other social and political leaders frequently take public policy stands with a view to influencing public opinion. Not surprisingly, a great deal of empirical research on mass behavior has investigated the effect of these elite cues on mass opinion. However, demonstrating empirically the effect of elite cues on public opinion is far from straightforward. The fundamental problem is that we have good theoretical reasons, at least in democracies, to expect political elites and the media to adopt policy positions in response to the preferences of voters. This raises a clear problem of endogeneity in estimating elite effects on mass opinion. We could also imagine that elites and voters respond to similar stimuli (e.g., an international event), raising the problem of omitted variable bias. For these reasons, it is difficult to interpret correlations between elite opinion and mass opinion (for further discussion see Gabel and Scheve 2005).

This methodological problem is relevant to the study of mass support and opposition to European integration. Elites play an important role in many stories for why European Union citizens support or oppose European integration. For example, Gabel (1998), Jones and Steenbergen (2002), Franklin, Marsh, and McLaren (1995), Franklin, Marsh, and Wlezien (1994), Wessels (1995), Ray (2003a), and Ray (2003b) all argue, at least implicitly, that political parties shape how their partisans view the European project and the value of EU membership.

How much influence do political parties have on mass opinion? Clearly, voters do not move in lock-step with elites on European integration (Hooghe 2003; Schmitt and Thomassen 2000). But under certain conditions we might expect parties to exert a strong effect on mass opinion. Ray's (2003a) study is particularly important on this point. Ray

(2003a) develops an argument about the conditions under which party cues will be influential on voters. He notes that a party is most likely to influence its voters' attitudes toward European integration when it has a unified position, when voters are attached to the party, when the party system presents a range of alternative positions, and when the party considers the EU issue of high salience.

This framework for estimating the conditional effects of party cues is extremely helpful because it specifies systematic differences in how and when parties affect voters' opinions. But empirically these hypotheses are extremely difficult to test. Ray (2003a) recognized part of this problem: that party positions themselves may be endogenous to the opinions of partisans. The problem, however, is much more extensive. For example, the level of consensus in the party system about European integration could clearly be endogenous to voter opinion. Indeed, Gabel and Scheve (2005) make this argument, correct the estimation of elite influence accordingly, and show that the methodological problem leads to mis-interpretation of the elite effect based on typical OLS estimation. In addition, we could imagine that the salience a party attaches to the issue of European integration reflects the interests of the party's electorate. Finally, of particular interest to us, the level of dissent within a party on the issue of European integration could well result from divisions among partisans about that issue or from events that affect both the voters and party leadership.

We will focus in this paper exclusively on the methodological issues related to estimating the impact of intra-party dissent on voter cue-taking from parties. These issues are central to understanding partisan cues on European integration. First, as Ray (2003a) argues, intra-party conflict affects how voters receive and perceive cues about

European integration from their favored party. A cohesive and clear message should have a much greater impact on public opinion than an ambiguous or inconsistent cue. Second, intra-party conflict over European integration is fairly common. Many parties in the EU show internal division on the issue of European integration and this appears to affect how well parties can lead their voters (Franklin, Marsh, and McLaren 1994: 465). Indeed, given that issues of European integration are frequently unrelated to the traditional left-right dimension of political conflict, it is quite reasonable to expect internal conflict within mainstream parties over the European project (Marks and Steenbergen 2004). Consequently, the level of intra-party conflict over European integration is likely a critical factor in determining when parties shape public opinion. Whether this is true or not, of course, is an empirical question, which is the focus of our study.

Our general solution to these methodological problems is to develop instrumental variables (IV) for the endogenous regressors (e.g., the level of intra-party dissent on European issues) related to party cues. Our IV approach is not the only solution, and we discuss alternatives in the next section. However, we consider IV estimation techniques as under-exploited in the general literature on elite effects on mass opinion and in the specific context of party effects on public support for European integration (Gabel and Scheve 2005). Our specific aim in this paper is to develop an IV solution to the estimation of how the level of intra-party unity on the issue of European integration tempers the impact of a party's position on European integration on the attitudes of its voters.

The paper proceeds as follows. In the first section we discuss methodological solutions to the endogeneity and omitted variables problems endemic to estimating party effects on public support or opposition to European integration. We specifically discuss these problems regarding how intra-party unity affects how voters receive party cues. In the second section we develop our estimation strategy. The third section presents the results of our analysis and discusses their implications for our understanding of how parties shape their voters' attitudes toward European integration.

## **I. Estimating the Effect of Intra-Party Dissent on Public Support for European Integration**

The typical strategy for estimating the effect of party positions on public support for European integration is to estimate the contemporaneous (partial) correlation between a measure of party positions and partisan's opinion on European integration. To take the level of party unity into account, we would then interact a measure of party unity with party position to estimate the conditional effect of party positions on mass opinion for different level of party unity. This is essentially the strategy adopted by Ray (2003a).

These partial correlations, however, may be poor estimates of the causal effect of party positions for a variety of reasons. We will focus on two. First, we may fail to account for unobserved or unmeasured determinants of support for European integration that also affect the level of intra-party unity on that issue (omitted variable bias). For example, an event (e.g., enlargement of EU membership or a piece of EU legislation) may cause divisions among the electoral constituent of a party on the issue of European

integration. This event may simultaneously stimulate divisions among the party activists and leaders, perhaps for the same reasons it affected voters. The resulting omitted variable bias would undermine inferences about party cues.

Second, voter opinion may be an important determinant of the level of intra-party dissent. Many parties have factions with distinct constituents that could differ on European integration. As discussed earlier, issues of European integration often cross-cuts the traditional left-right dimension of political conflict (Gabel and Anderson 2003). This means that supporters of mainstream political parties are likely to differ among themselves on European issues. Party leaders vying for control or influence in the party have incentives to advocate for these different partisan views on Europe and represent the voter heterogeneity of opinion over Europe at the party level. In sum, the observed level of party unity on European integration may be endogenous to voter opinion. Under these conditions, the observed correlation between party positions, intra-party dissent, and voter opinion toward Europe may provide a dubious estimation of the causal effect of parties on public opinion.

The two most common solutions to these types of problems in the broader literature has been the use of time-series analyses and survey/laboratory experiments. Time series analyses attempt to solve ambiguity about the direction of causation by looking at the timing of changes in party positions and those of their partisans. This strategy is a clear improvement on cross-sectional research designs but has three limitations. First, parties may appear to lead their voters simply because they anticipate correctly changes in their voters' opinions rather than cause them. Second, time series analyses do little to solve the omitted variable problem. Third, in the context of public

attitudes toward European integration, we have very few relevant time-series datasets. Some national election studies—e.g., the British Election Study—do provide rich time-series data with relevant questions regarding European integration (see, for example, Evans 2002). However, for cross-national studies, the Eurobarometer is the primary survey and it does not support individual-level time-series analysis.

The most common alternative to the cross-sectional or time-series designs is laboratory or survey experimentation. Properly constructed, these experiments are free from the endogeneity and omitted variable bias problems. However, they generally are hard to construct appropriately to test the specific claims associated with party influence on public support for European integration. For example, it is difficult to manipulate experimentally the level of internal party dissent so as to simulate the environment of actual partisan cues (see Gabel and Scheve 2005 for further discussion).

Given these limitations, we propose an instrumental variables (IV) solution to the estimation problem regarding the impact of party unity on the effect of party cues on public support for European integration. Specifically we argue that the method of candidate selection within a party represents a valid instrument for the level of dissent within a political party on the issue of European integration. Parties vary in how open their candidate selection process is to influence from activists and the general membership. We contend that as candidate selection processes become more centralized and closed, the more dissent we will observe between party activists and the party leadership on policy, generally defined. Thus, we would expect candidate selection rules to be correlated with the observed level of intra-party dissent regarding European integration. And, we would not expect the candidate selection rules to directly influence

the position that voters take on European integration. If we are correct, the IV estimation strategy will purge the potentially endogenous regressors—i.e., the level of intra-party dissent and its interaction with party position—of variation that is not a function of the exogenous variables. Furthermore, IV estimates can eliminate bias due to omitted variables.

Consistent with Ray (2003a), we model intra-party dissent as conditioning the effect of party positions on public opinion. Formally, we want to estimate the following equation:

$$\text{Support for Europe}_{ip} = B_0 + B_1 \text{Dissent}_p + B_2 \text{Party Position}_p + B_3 \text{Dissent}_p * \text{Party Position}_p + \Gamma Z_i + e_{i,p}$$

*Support for Europe* is an individual-level measure (indexed by *i*) for partisans of party *p*. Assume higher values of this variable represent greater support for integration. The variables *Dissent* increases with the level of intra-party disagreement on European integration. The variable *Party Position* increases with the party's support for European integration. Both *Dissent* and *Party Position* are party-level measures common to partisans of the same party, indexed by *p*.  $Z_i$  is the vector of control variables used in Ray (2003a). Our hypothesis is that  $B_2 + B_3 * \text{Dissent}$  is positive but decreases as *Dissent* rises. In other words, an increase in a party's support for European integration should translate into an increase in support for Europe among that party's supporters, but this effect should diminish as the level of intra-party disagreement over that issue increases.

The methodological problem here is that an OLS regression that estimates the parameters  $B_1$  and  $B_3$  from a cross-sectional survey data is likely to be biased and

inconsistent due to the endogeneity and omitted variable bias described above.<sup>1</sup> For example, factions within a party may appeal to different constituencies and these constituencies may differ in their preferences over European integration. Indeed, a variety of scholars argue that the question of European integration is orthogonal of (or at least significantly independent of) the left-right dimension that distinguishes the policy positions of voters and mainstream parties in Western Europe (Marks and Steenbergen 2004). Thus, we might expect the party activists within a party may diverge in their attitudes toward European integration due to the differences in their constituent groups. This makes a component of the interaction term endogenous to the dependent variable (*Support for Europe*) and thus the interaction term itself, which generates correlation between  $e_{i,p}$  and the regressors. This endogenous relationship can bias all the coefficient estimates in the model.

The textbook solution to this estimation problem is to identify and instrumental variable that is correlated with the potentially endogenous *Dissent* but that is otherwise uncorrelated with *Support for Europe*. To do this, we need to describe the dataset we employ in this analysis.

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<sup>1</sup> Of course, the estimation of the parameters  $B_2$  and  $B_3$  could also suffer from endogeneity related to the variable *Party Position*. As Ray (2003a) argues, because parties have incentives to take positions so as to attract votes, the positions parties adopt on European integration may be endogenous to their voters' opinions about Europe. We agree that this is extremely likely and also a serious concern. However, we do not have a strategy for instrumenting for party positions. Ray (2003a) offers one such strategy, but we have concerns about the validity of his instruments. First, we have been unable to replicate his IV estimation technique. As we discuss later in the paper, all 1<sup>st</sup> stage regressors except the endogenous regressor at issue must appear in the 1<sup>st</sup> stage regression along with the instruments. According to Table 1 in Ray (2003a), this was not the case in his analysis. This is a serious problem (see Acemoglu forthcoming). Second, he provides no tests of over-identification or a strategy for estimating standard errors on the instruments in the 2<sup>nd</sup> stage regression. This, of course, does not mean we have a better solution and we agree that the endogeneity issue is serious.

### *Data and Measurement*

We chose data appropriate to replicate Ray's (2003) OLS analysis of the effect of party positions conditional on party unity for 1996. We do not include variables used by Ray (2003a) to test other conditional effects of party cues (e.g., the salience the party attaches to European integration). We exclude these variables because they are not of direct interest here and because we do not have appropriate instruments for those conditional effects.<sup>2</sup>

For individual-level opinion and control variables we use Eurobarometer 44.2 Bis, which was conducted in 1996. The dependent variable, *Support for Europe*, is an index based on responses to the two standard survey questions asking respondents to evaluate whether their country's EU membership is a good thing and asking respondents whether they favor further efforts to unify Western Europe. This index ranges from 0 (lowest support) to 100 (highest support). The coding of this variable and all other individual-level variables is provided in the Appendix and replicates Ray (2003a).

The party level variables are derived from the Marks and Steenbergen party dataset based on an expert survey conducted by Gary Marks, Marco Steenbergen, David Scott, and Carole Wilson. This dataset includes the data used by Ray (2003a) for party positions on European integration and the level of intra-party dissent.<sup>3</sup> The variable *Party Position* ranges from 1 (Strongly opposed to European integration) to 7 (Strongly in favor of European Integration). The variable *Dissent* ranges from 1 (complete unity on European integration) to 5 (Leadership position on European integration opposed by a majority of party activists).

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<sup>2</sup> Recall from the introduction that we consider many aspects of party influence on public opinion to be vulnerable to endogeneity problems.

<sup>3</sup> The data are available at: <http://www.unc.edu/gwarks/>.

## II. Instrumental Variables for Estimations of Party Unity Effects

Appropriate instruments for *Dissent* must be correlated with intra-party disagreement on European integration but otherwise uncorrelated with *Support for Europe*. Specifically, the instruments must have a significant partial correlation with *Dissent* and *Party Position\*Dissent* after controlling for all other exogenous determinants of *Support for Europe*.<sup>4</sup>

Our approach for identifying valid instruments is to specify characteristics of party organizations that influence how cohesive party activists and leaders will be on policy generally. One relevant feature of party organization is the candidate and leadership selection rules. A highly centralized selection process dominated by the central party organization should be much more likely to foster dissent between the party leadership and party activists than an open candidate selection process where party leaders must gain the support of party activists or where party members have a direct say in the selection of leadership and candidates. Recall that *Dissent* ranges from complete unity within the party to a leadership position opposed by a majority of party activists. Because of how this is worded, we expect *Dissent* to be negatively related to the openness of the candidate selection process.<sup>5</sup>

Fortunately, several previous studies have described and categorized candidate selection rules for a large number of political parties in the European Union member-states. In particular, I rely on the classification of Krouwel (1999), who distinguishes

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<sup>4</sup> Because our analysis includes controls for country fixed effects, this means that identification comes from within country variation.

<sup>5</sup> The definition of dissent is important here, because if we were simply asking about the level of dissent among elected representatives, we would expect the opposite relationship with candidate selection rules.

parties according to the number and status of participants in the leadership and candidate selection process. He defines a closed or centralized process as one where the incumbent national leader or the party central office/national executive largely controls the leadership and candidate selection process. As participation expands to include local party leadership and the rank-and-file, the process becomes more open. His original classification of parties involved seven categories. I use a five-category version of this classification scheme adopted by Pennings (1999) to create the variable *Candidate Selection*. This variable varies from 1-5, with closed systems coded as (1) and the most open systems coded as (5). Note that Pennings (1999) does not report candidate selection scores for all parties in all EU member-states. In particular, I do not have scores for Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Luxembourg. Thus, the analysis is limited to the fifty-seven parties for which scores are available from Pennings (1999).

We are aware of no argument that the adoption party candidate selection rules is due to public support for European integration. Candidate selection rules have changed over the last two decades in Western Europe, generally becoming more democratic and open (Bille 2001; Pennings and Hazan 2001). These changes appear to have been driven by party attempts to attract and retain membership or to strengthen the role of the party leadership (Pennings and Hazan 2001; Katz 2001). In addition, Lundell (2004) identifies significant regional variation in organization traditions. We are also not aware of any argument for why a party's candidate selection rules would influence its constituents' attitudes toward European integration except through these rules' impact on the cohesiveness of the party position on European integration. Thus, the instrument appears to satisfy the exclusion restrictions.

Although we provide a theoretical argument to make our instrumentation strategy plausible *ex ante*, it is still necessary for us to provide as much evidence as possible that the chosen instruments meet the assumptions for IV to provide consistent estimates. We cannot directly verify the assumption that the instrument is not correlated with the error term in the 2<sup>nd</sup> stage regression. But we can evaluate whether the instrument is in fact significantly correlated with the endogenous regressors in our data and whether they have the theoretically expected effect on the endogenous regressors.

Recall that one of the two endogenous variables for which we are devising instruments is the interaction between party positions and the level of intra-party dissent on European integration (*Party Position\*Dissent*). This means we estimate two 1<sup>st</sup> stage regressions: one for *Dissent* and one for *Party Position\*Dissent*. To instrument for *Party Position\*Dissent*, we interacted *Candidate Selection* with *Party Position* and included this in the 1<sup>st</sup> stage regressions so that it would correlate with the endogenous interaction variable as well as with intra-party dissent itself. Table 1 reports the results of two ordinary least squares 1<sup>st</sup> stage regressions, one for *Dissent* and one for the interaction term *Party Position\*Dissent*. Our interest is whether the instruments are significantly correlated with these two endogenous regressors after controlling for the included exogenous variables in the model, including country fixed effects. Identification in this regression thus comes from within country variation.

The F-test for excluded instruments in both regressions is significant at the .01 level, indicating that the two instrumental variables are jointly significant. The signs on the coefficients are in the expected directions. Since the model includes an interaction term involving *Candidate Selection*, we must interpret the marginal effect of increases in

the openness of candidate selection (e.g., an increase in the value of *Candidate Selection*) based on the coefficients for both the main effect and the interaction term. The results indicate that increases in the openness of candidate selection are associated with lower intra-party dissent. The results of the second model show that the interaction between *Dissent* and *Party Position* is positively related to the interaction between *Candidate Selection* and *Party Position*. This is consistent with expectations.

Regressor	<i>Dissent</i> Coefficient (SE)	<i>Dissent*Party Position</i> Coefficient (SE)
<i>Candidate Selection</i>	-1.15 (0.40)	-4.23 (1.96)
<i>Candidate Selection*Party Position</i>	0.144 (0.06)	0.468 (0.31)
<i>Party Position</i>	-0.65 (0.17)	-0.43 (0.82)
<i>Female</i>	-0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)
<i>High Occupational Status</i>	-0.07 (0.03)	-0.42 (0.03)
<i>Income</i>	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.05 (0.02)
<i>Low Education</i>	0.03 (0.03)	0.16 (0.13)
<i>High Education</i>	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.21 (0.13)
<i>Political Discussion</i>	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.10 (0.05)
<i>Constant</i>	7.75 (1.07)	23.75 (5.40)
F-statistic for test of excluded instruments:		
F p-value	7.82	5.28
Observations	.00	.01
		18,331

Table 1. *OLS Estimates of Intra-Party Dissent*. This table reports the OLS coefficient estimates and their robust standard errors clustered on party (in parentheses) of two models. The models include country fixed effects. The dependent variable for the first model is *Dissent* and for the second model is *Party Position\*Dissent*.

### III. Empirical Results

Table 2 reports the results of an OLS estimation of the effect of intra-party dissent on the relationship between party positions and public opinion on European integration. We can facilitate interpretation of the conditional effect of party positions on support by calculating the marginal effect of *Party Position* for different values of *Dissent*. Figure 1 provides a plot of this marginal effect with standard error for the full range of possible values of *Dissent*. The figure shows that a change in party position has a statistically significant positive effect on the level of support expressed by their partisans for values of *Dissent* less than 3. Note that *Dissent* has a mean of 2.28, a standard deviation of 0.75 and an observed range of 1 to 4. Thus, party cues appear to shape voting behavior for most of the observed level of intra-party dissent. Also, the magnitude of this party cue effect decreases slightly as the level of intra-party dissent increases. This is generally consistent with Ray (2003a), showing that party cues can influence their voters' opinions, but the magnitude of this effect declines and eventually disappears as intra-party division on the issue increases.

Table 3 presents the results of the IV estimation, based on the 1<sup>st</sup> stage regressions reported in Table 1. Figure 2 plots the marginal effect of a one unit increase in *Party Position* on *Support for Europe* for different levels of intra-party dissent on that issue. The results are similar to those presented in Figure 1. For parties with a united position on European integration, changes in their position have a statistically significant and positive effect on the attitudes of their voters toward European integration. This effect declines in magnitude as *Dissent* increases.

Note two important differences between Figures 1 and 2. First, in comparison to Figure 1, the range of values of *Dissent* for which party positions affect public opinion is much smaller. The IV estimation indicates that party positions only cause change in their voters' opinion when *Dissent* is less than 2.2. Given that the median value for *Dissent* is 2.1, almost half of the observed parties in this study do not exert an influence on their voters' opinions toward integration due to their level of *Dissent*. Second, the magnitude of the marginal effect in Figure 2 is much greater than in Figure 1 for parties that have a low value on *Dissent*. For example, for a united party (*Dissent*=1), a one-unit increase in *Party Position* is associated with a six point increase in public support in the OLS estimation but the same change is associated with a ten point change in public support in the IV estimation. In sum, the IV estimation indicates that the OLS results exaggerate the range of *Dissent* for which party positions influence voter opinion but understate the impact of party positions on voter opinion when a party presents a united front.

This analysis suggests that the omitted variable and endogeneity problems associated with estimating the role of intra-party dissent on partisan cues is substantively meaningful. Given that close to half of the parties in the analysis had a *Dissent* score of 2 or more, party cues play a limited role in directing the attitudes of partisans. However, in the limited range where cues matter, they have a much greater impact on voter opinion than we would infer from a standard OLS estimation.

<b>Regressor</b>	<b>Coefficient (SE)</b>
<i>Dissent</i>	1.75 (6.23)
<i>Party Position</i>	6.01 (2.09)
<i>Party Position*Dissent</i>	-0.70 (1.11)
<i>Female</i>	-3.37 (0.81)
<i>High Occupational Status</i>	4.86 (0.64)
<i>Income</i>	1.76 (0.25)
<i>Low Education</i>	-5.23 (0.80)
<i>High Education</i>	6.11 (0.95)
<i>Political Discussion</i>	3.64 (0.60)
<i>Constant</i>	17.96 (11.26)
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.15
Observations	18,331

Table 2: *Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of Support for European Integration.* This table reports the OLS coefficients and their robust standard errors clustered on party (in parentheses). The model includes country fixed effects. The dependent variable is *Support for Europe*.

<b>Regressor</b>	<b>Coefficient (SE)</b>
<i>Dissent</i>	23.05 (12.77)
<i>Party Position</i>	14.54 (6.12)
<i>Party Position*Dissent</i>	-4.82 (3.02)
<i>Female</i>	-3.27 (0.80)
<i>High Occupational Status</i>	4.50 (0.78)
<i>Income</i>	1.57 (0.29)
<i>Low Education</i>	-5.14 (0.86)
<i>High Education</i>	6.17 (0.93)
<i>Political Discussion</i>	3.54 (0.63)
<i>Constant</i>	26.78 (26.59)
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.14
Observations	18, 331

Table 3: *Instrumental Variables Estimates of Support for European Integration*. This table reports the IV coefficients and their robust standard errors clustered on party (in parentheses). The model includes country fixed effects. The dependent variable is *Support for Europe*. The variables *Dissent* and *Party Position\*Dissent* are the endogenous regressors. The instrument is *Candidate Selection* and its interaction with *Party Position*.




Figure 1. *Conditional Effect of a Party's Position on European Integration on its Partisans' Support for European Integration (OLS Estimates)*. This figure plots the magnitude of the effect of a one unit change in *Party Position* on the dependant variable *Support for Europe* at different levels of *Dissent* based on the OLS estimates presented in Table 2. The solid line traces out the estimated conditional effect while the dashed lines indicate the bounds of the 95% confidence interval for this estimate.




Figure 2. *Conditional Effect of a Party's Position on European Integration on its Partisans' Support for European Integration (IV Estimates)*. This figure plots the magnitude of the effect of a one unit change in *Party Position* on the dependant variable *Support for Europe* at different levels of *Dissent* based on the IV estimates presented in Table 3. The solid line traces out the estimated conditional effect while the dashed lines indicate the bounds of the 95% confidence interval for this estimate.

## Appendix

The variables from the Eurobarometer were coded consistent with Ray (2003a). The party position variables are drawn from Marks/Steenbergen dataset.

1. *Support for Europe*: This variable combines responses to two common Eurobarometer survey questions<sup>6</sup>:

a. “In General, are you for or against efforts being made to unify Western Europe?” For very much (3), For to some extent (2), Against to some extent (1), Against very much (0).

b. “Generally speaking, do you think that your country’s membership of the European Community is a good thing?” Good thing (2), Neither good nor bad (1), Bad thing (0)

Survey responses to these two questions were combined into an index according to the following formula:  $Support\ for\ Europe = (a + b) * 20$ . This index ranges from 0-100.

2. *Female* is a dummy variable coded one for females.

3. *High Occupational Status* is a dummy variable coded one for professionals, executives, and business owners.

4. *Low Education* is a dummy variable coded one for respondents who left school before the age of sixteen.

5. *High Education* is a dummy variable coded one for respondents who left school after the age of nineteen.

6. *Income* is the respondent’s income quartile, where one indicates the lowest quartile.<sup>7</sup>

7. *Partisanship*: Respondents were assigned to parties according to their vote intention question in the Eurobarometer: if there were general election tomorrow, which party would you vote for?”. This is consistent with Ray (2003: 984).

8. *Party Position*: Overall orientation of the party leadership towards European integration in 1996. (1-Strongly opposed to European integration; 2-Opposed to European integration; 3-Somewhat opposed to European integration; 4-Neutral, no stance on the issue of European integration; 5-Somewhat in favor of European integration; 6-In favor of European integration; 7-Strongly in favor of European Integration).

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<sup>6</sup> As in Ray (2003a), we delete responses of “don’t know.”

<sup>7</sup> Unlike Ray (2003a), we did not recode missing values on this variable to 2.5.

9. *Dissent*: Degree of dissent on European integration in 1996. (1-Complete unity; 2-Minor dissent; 3-Significant dissent; 4-Party evenly split on issue; 5-Leadership position opposed by a majority of party activists)

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