

## **Dissertation Outline**

### **Determinants of Support for the European Union in Central and Eastern Europe**

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## **1. Research Question**

Since in 1993 the European Council expressed at the Copenhagen summit that the associate countries of Central and Eastern Europe should become members of the European Union, these countries saw their future within the European Union. Therefore, it can be argued that the foreseeable membership was an issue within the Central and Eastern European countries already in the 90s. This issue became more and more important in the new century, when in 2002, again in Copenhagen, the EU invited the eight countries (and in addition Malta and Cyprus) to join the EU. In 2003 all countries I'm interested here, hold successful referendums about the EU membership and as all 'old' member states eventually agreed to the Treaty of Nice, which provides the structural prerequisites for the enlargement, Estonia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia could join in 2004.

While the EU is not only an elitist project anymore (as the referendums for example show), it relies on the support of the people as any other democratic system as well. The opinion and orientations of the Central and Eastern Europeans are really important in structuring the future of the continent. And with reference to the research on political support and political culture (Almond/Verba 1963; Easton 1965) one can say that the stability of the European political system depends on the attitudes of the people towards that supranational state. The support for the new, rather unknown and distant political system is essential for a successful future of the European Union. Because of the importance of support for the EU it is crucial to understand the determinants of support. Thereby one must consider the extraordinary nature of the EU and the special situation in Central and Eastern Europe. Therefore my first research question asked for the determinants of support: (1) How can we explain the support for the political system of the European Union in Central and Eastern Europe before and after the EU accession?

One characteristic of the Central and Eastern European case is the role of the nation state. I argue that the European Union has been in people's mind even before the accession and that attitudes towards the European Union have developed over time. Citizens understand and evaluate the European Union as a self-contained political system, but the nation state remains an important factor when generating the attitudes towards the European Union. This is because the nation states are the first and foremost reference object when thinking about political issues. Therefore within a set of determinants of support I lay a special emphasis on the role of the nation state. Therefore a subordinated research question is: (2) Do the attitudes towards the nation state affect the evaluation of the European Union?

From the literature we know, that "[p]eople make up their minds in different ways" (Sniderman/Brody/Tetlock 1991: 8). Therefore it is likely that certain determinants of political support have different weights for different people, e.g. the attitudes towards the nation state may be especially relevant for citizens who are not familiar with the European system, while citizens who are well aware of European affairs do rely less on these issues. They know certain aspects of the EU and these aspects are crucial for the support of the EU. For that reason I ask: (3) How do attitudes towards the EU differ between people with different levels of political knowledge?

In this outline of my theory-driven empirical thesis I will firstly present the theoretical background, namely a general model of support for a political system and a model of support for the EU. After that I will present my hypotheses before I will give some information about my data and research method


## **2. General Model of Support for a Political System**

Because the European Union can be characterized as a political system, we can apply models designed for national political systems to describe the support for the EU. But in a second step the unique supranational character must be considered and implemented into the original model.

The systems theory provides a useful concept, which can be seen as the starting point for my considerations. David Easton states that support for the regime is an important determinant for stability (Easton 1965). He defines “support as an attitude by which a person orients himself to an object either favorably or unfavorably, positively or negatively“ (1975: 436). His concept is connected to the research by Almond and Verba, who present the concept of political culture, stating that the congruence of system structure and system culture, defined as “the distribution of attitudes toward the national community, the regime, and the authorities” (Almond 1996: 28) is a requirement for persistence (Almond/Verba 1963; Fuchs 2007). Therefore support is an attitude of individuals and thus a socio-psychological concept, which can be caught with socio-psychological instruments (Fuchs 1989).

The general model of support according to Fuchs consists of the most important predictors of political support, identified in the literature. These predictors are arranged in a hierarchical order according to their level of abstraction (Fuchs 1999) (see figure 1). The support for a regime’s structure is determined by the commitment of the people to democratic values. This concept is approximately the same as Easton’s concept of legitimacy. Other determinants of support refer to the reality (i.e. the existing democracy in a country) with special emphasis on political performance (Fuchs 2003). According to Roller political performance can be defined „as the evaluation of what political actors do and the outcomes of these actions“ (2005: 20). Through generalization, performance becomes an object of evaluation of the political regime and resembles Easton’s concept of trust (Fuchs 2003). It can be understood twofold: firstly, systemic performance includes the evaluations of any kind of output a system can generate. The standard of evaluation is an instrumental mode of orientation. Secondly, democratic performance describes the evaluation of the system in a normative, moral way by adjusting the reality of the system with personal values concerning a democracy (Fuchs 1998b; Roller 2005). Therefore, a political system is supported if the people recognize that political reality corresponds to democratic principles and that the outputs created by the system are useful and advantageous for the people (Fuchs 2003). Beneath performance another attitude can be relevant when evaluating a political regime: the identification with the political community as an affective binding of the people to a system. Easton introduces this concept because he thought that the diffuse feelings of an individual to a certain community can be transported to the system if the community is associated with that system (1975; Fuchs 2003).

Figure 1: Fuchs’ general model of support for a political regime (Fuchs 1998a, 2003)



**3. Model of Support for the European Union**

Can the model described above be used to analyze the European Union? The EU is a system sui generis and therefore, it must be treated like this, which means, the models developed to analyze nation states must be reconsidered in the light of the EU’s nature.

First and foremost one must consider if the people understand the nature of the EU. That means do the citizens know that the EU is a supranational regime established above the nation

states? There are two positions making up the ends of a continuum. Most scientists argue that the people recognize the political dimension of the economic integration established after the Maastricht Treaty (Fuchs 2003). On the other hand, the European institutional structure and decision-making process is highly complex and opaque. Therefore, it is very difficult to understand information about the EU and it is unlikely that the citizens develop independent attitudes towards the EU because of the lack of interest and the lack of information. In the first case, it is probable that the people use new objects when evaluating the EU because they are aware that the former merely economic integration project changed into a political system. According to the second opinion, the people do not change the criteria of evaluation after Maastricht because the EU is not a political object to them (Fuchs 2003).

There are good arguments for both sides but the situation is not black-and-white. I argue that people hold attitudes towards the EU but these attitudes are influenced by attitudes towards the national system. Because of the centrality of the nation state, attitudes towards this system must be included into a model of support for the EU. Therefore, a modified or extended model is introduced to explain support for the EU.

This extension is especially necessary because of the distant and alien character of the EU for ordinary people. The attitudes towards the nation state can function as shortcuts for people when asked to evaluate the European Union (Anderson 1998; Tverdova/Anderson 2004). The literature shows that citizens use heuristics or shortcuts if they do not possess the cognitive and motivational resources to handle information (Lupia 1994; Schoen 2006). It is assumed that the formation of attitudes towards the EU varies with the level of knowledge, interest, or information. On the one hand, there are citizens eligible to develop self-contained attitudes only based on EU-attitudes. On the other hand, there are the people, who use the national aspects as shortcuts while evaluating different aspects of the European Union, including support for that system.

Furthermore the situation in Central and Eastern Europe argues for the extension of the model by national attitudes because it makes a difference if attitudes towards the EU are studied within member states or within non-member-states. It can be argued that before the accession the citizens in the new member states knew something about the EU and held attitudes towards the European integration, but these attitudes relied mostly on national attitudes. It is rational not to search for information about the EU before the accession and membership some years away. Therefore, it is likely that Central and Eastern Europeans use heuristics, namely information about the national states to express opinions about the EU (Tverdova/Anderson 2004), especially before May 2004.

Fuchs (2003) gives another reason, why attitudes towards the nation state are relevant in the European context. Because of the institutional arrangements of the EU, the nation states are still the dominant actors on the European stage. He also calls for a “middle solution”, i.e. combining national and European attitudes in one model (Fuchs 2003).

Therefore, the model tries to acknowledge the cognitive resources of the citizens and the special situation in Central and Eastern Europe. The new model is based on and strongly influenced by the EU-model of Fuchs (2003). While he extends the model of support by a more vague and general national determinant, namely a “generalization of national attitudes”, I did a modification of his model by specifying these national attitudes.


#### **4. The Extended Model**

##### **4.1. Main Expectation**

The dependent variable in the model is generalized support for the European Union. This support is influenced by five direct predictors. Three of these determinants are related to the EU measuring systemic performance (instrumental standard of evaluation), democratic performance (moral standard of evaluation), and European identity (affective standard of evaluation). Each of these predictors is influenced by their national equivalents. Additionally to their indirect influence on EU-support, two of these national variables, namely national

systemic and democratic performance, have a direct influence on EU-support (see figure 2).<sup>1</sup> The importance of these determinants is frequently discussed in the literature and the relevance and direction of each predictor is an empirical question (Fuchs et al. 1998). My expectation is that the six predictors have a positive effect on generalized support, i.e. all direct and indirect effects in the model are expected to be positive. In the following I will explain this expectation in more detail.

Figure 2: Model to explain the support for the European Union



#### 4.2. Influence of Attitudes towards the EU

I model three direct predictors of generalized support for the European Union, which represent different political objects, which on their parts represent three different standards of evaluation. The first and the second predictor refer to the question whether the system performs like it should perform (Fuchs 2007). Systemic performance of the EU refers to the expected benefits of the EU for the country and its citizens especially according to the evaluation of economic outputs. Democratic performance of the EU refers to the functioning of the political system of the EU in accordance with the democratic values the citizens have (Roller 2005; Rohrschneider 2002). There is evidence that both kinds of performances are important for evaluating the EU. Many studies show that there is a relationship between economic conditions and support (see e.g. Gabel/Palmer 1995; Eichenberg/Dalton 1993, Gabel 1998) and others show that attitudes towards democratic qualities play a crucial role as well (see e.g. Rohrschneider 2002).

The third direct predictor is related to a European identity, i.e. the identification with an “imagined community” (Anderson 2006: 5f.). There is the normative argument that people who identify with the European community will support the political system related to that community (Carey 2002; Laffan 1996). Despite the fact that a European demos does not exist (Fuchs 2000; Kielmannsegg 2006; Sanchez-Cuenca 2000), an awareness of a European community exists and this affective attitude can influence the support for the system.

I would therefore expect:

Hypothesis 1: The better the systemic performance of the EU is evaluated, the higher is the generalized support for the EU.

Hypothesis 2: The better the democratic performance of the EU is evaluated, the higher is the generalized support for the EU.

Hypothesis 3: If the citizens identify themselves with Europe, then the generalized support for the EU is higher.

<sup>1</sup> It is not possible to measure the commitment of the citizens to democratic values because the data set to not provide an adequate indicator. For answering the research question this does not present a problem. I do not have to set the normative standard of evaluation aside since it can at least be measured at the process level (democratic performance). Therefore, it is still possible to measure three groups of predictors for support each presenting another standard of evaluation and it is not the centre of this analysis to describe the perceived democratic values of the EU.

#### 4.3. Influence of Attitudes towards the Nation State

While the relationship between the EU-predictors and support is straightforward, the relationship between the national attitudes and European attitudes on the one hand and national attitudes and generalized support on the other is more complex.

There is an ongoing discussion if there is a positive or negative relationship between the performance of the nation state and the performance of the European Union or as Martinotti and Stefanizzi state it: The EU “may represent a symbolic threat or, alternatively, a chance to make up for the bad governance of the national state” (1995: 166). One can argue that the relationship is a negative one. If the nation state is seen positive, the citizens do not want to give it up for a supranational system (Christin 2005). On the other hand, there is evidence in the literature that citizens evaluate the EU in a beneficial way if they see their own country’s system affirmatively. Firstly because of the role of the nation state as a heuristic as stated above (Anderson 1998). Since the EU is an alien system, the attitudes towards the performance of the national state are transferred to the European level without differentiating the political levels. Another argument is the fact that the national actors are also the relevant actors in the EU. Therefore, if the people approve the success of the authorities in the national political arena and trust them, they will transfer these competences to the European arena as well (Anderson 1998; Ehin 2001; Christin 2005). I will follow the latter line of reasoning and therefore the following two hypotheses are worth to consider:

Hypothesis 4: If the citizens evaluate the systemic performance of the nation state positively, they evaluate the systemic performance of the EU positively as well.

Hypothesis 5: If the citizens evaluate the democratic performance of the nation state positively, they evaluate the democratic performance of the EU positively as well.

Beneath the indirect effect of attitudes towards the nation state, these attitudes can influence the generalized support for the European Union directly. This is especially realistic if one considers the usage of national attitudes as shortcuts. The underlying assumption is that the citizens use their evaluation of national political performance to evaluate the EU, especially if they have little information about specific European characteristics like the political system or benefit. The direct relationship between the systemic and democratic performance of the nation state and generalized support for the EU is assumed to be in the same direction as the indirect influence. This leads to the hypotheses:

Hypothesis 6: The better the systemic performance of the nation state is evaluated, the higher is the generalized support for the EU.

Hypothesis 7: The better the democratic performance of the nation state is evaluated, the higher is the generalized support for the EU.

Regarding the relationship between national and European identification, the situation is ambiguous. Before thinking theoretically about the direction of a relationship between these two identities, it must be clarified if such a relationship can exist, i.e. is it actually possible to feel attached to two imagined communities?

There is strong evidence that this is possible. For example Deutsch argues that citizens have a terminal community, i.e. the identification with the community on the highest level (1966). But beneath this terminal community other identities with communities on lower levels can exist. Van Kersbergen also argues that European allegiance has its origin in national allegiance and that the European integration depends on both loyalties (van Kersbergen 2000). Duchesne and Frogner present, that Hoffmann (1966) as well as Inglehart (1970) hypothesized “that national identity is the springboard, not the gravedigger, of European identity, with national identity providing a model of what it is to belong to a remote political community (1995: 194). This leads to the conclusion that multiple identities are possible and that the relationship among them can be integrated into the support model. Especially in the European case, such multiple identities are possible because the objects of identification, namely the national state and the EU are not arranged in an incompatible relation, but are organized in a hierarchical way (Westle 2003). Despite the possibility of multiple identities

the two identities do not always go together and if someone feels only attached to one community, this is normally the national one (Duchesne/Frogner 1995; Marks 1999). Now a further question appears: What does the relationship between the two identities look like? It is shown by Marks and Hooghe “that national attachment is *not* mutually exclusive with either European attachment or support for European integration” (2003: 19) and if the two identities go together their relationship is a positive one (Marks/Hooghe 2003; Marks 1999). This following hypothesis can be formulated:

Hypothesis 8: If the citizens identify with the national community, they are more likely to identify with the European community as well.<sup>2</sup>

#### 4.4. Changes over time: the situation before and after the Accession to the EU

Before May 2004 the EU was an alien and distant system, mostly communicated to Central and Eastern Europeans by the national political elites. Despite this distance the citizens started to form attitudes towards the EU, especially when it became clear that the future of their countries lay in the EU. After the accession, the European system became more and more obvious and part of the daily life. This can affect the level of support as well as the role of different objects of evaluation. Three developments seem to be likely:

With reference to Evans and Whitfield (1995) it is assumed that citizens support a new and unknown system in economic and political respects, i.e. they provide a leap of faith to the system before it comes to reality. But after implementing this system the support decreases.

Hypothesis 9: Generalized support for the European Union decreases after the accession.

The development of self-contained attitudes to a former distant system relies on information and motivation to acquire this information (Zaller 1992). It is presumed that it is easier for citizens to gain information about the EU after their country became an EU-member. Then the EU influences daily politics to a higher extend and can easier find its way to the citizens' awareness. Therefore, it is assumed that more citizens form attitudes towards the EU after the accession.

Hypothesis 10: The proportion of no answers or “Don't know”-answers decreases over time and especially after the accession in May 2004.

It is expected that not only the level of support changes after accession but also the relevance of different objects of evaluation. It is assumed that EU-attitudes are formed as the date of the enlargement approaches and especially after gaining membership. A hypothesis comparing the influence of different predictors over time is formulated:

Hypothesis 11: The predictors referring to national attitudes lose explanatory power over time.

#### 4.5. Effect of political knowledge

What and how people do think about the EU is dependent on their political information, motivation, and knowledge. Especially the use of national attitudes as shortcuts is influenced by these factors. Furthermore the literature shows that political aware people think more positive about the EU than less aware people (Sinnott 1997).

Therefore I will test one descriptive and one explanatory hypothesis.

Hypothesis 12: Within the group of high aware citizens the level of support for the EU is higher than in the group of low aware citizens.

Hypothesis 13: The explanatory power of the predictors measuring national attitudes is higher among the group of low aware citizens.

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<sup>2</sup> Because of conflicting findings in the literature, I do not expect a direct influence of national identity on generalized support for the EU. Furthermore it is implausible that national identity can function as a shortcut. There is also an empirical reason: a possible effect is maybe not visible in an analysis covering the whole Central and Eastern European region because national identity is a country-specific concept.

Furthermore I argue that after the accession both groups, low and high aware people, learn more about the EU. Therefore the influence of national attitudes changes after May 2004 as stated above. However there are still differences between the groups because it is likely that the high aware citizens learn faster and more about the EU. That's why the low aware group still relies on national attitudes when evaluating the EU while the high aware group concentrates more on EU-attitudes.

Hypothesis 14: The attitudes towards the nation state remain relevant for explaining support for the EU after the accession among the group of low aware citizens, while they become weaker among the group of high aware citizens.

## 5. Data and Research Method

In my thesis I test the stated hypotheses empirically by using the survey data from the Candidate Countries Eurobarometer (2001 till 2004) and the Standard Eurobarometer (starting 2004). I analyze the eight former communist countries, which became members of the European Union in May 2004: Estonia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. I selected these cases because they form a relative homogenous group, i.e. they share the same historical experience (communist legacy, transition to democracy, accession to the EU at the same point in time). So I can test if my model, which was modified in respect of the special situation in Central and Eastern Europe, is valid for that region. I study the time span between 2001 and 2007. There are five CCEB data sets (one in 2001, 2002 and 2004 and two in 2003) and six EB data sets (one in 2004 and 2007 and two in 2005 and 2006), which contain the relevant indicators for this analysis. Therefore, I have enough points in time to analyze the development of attitudes towards the European Union before and after the accession.

To answer the research questions and to test the hypotheses I proceed as follows: I test the descriptive hypotheses concerning the development of attitudes towards the EU from 2001 until 2007 by relying on all useful data sets of this period. For all other hypotheses dealing directly with the model of support for the EU I choose to analyze two points in time, namely 2002 and spring 2006. With these two data sets it is possible to compare the attitudes before and after the accession because they ensure some temporal distance. Furthermore this choice has a pragmatic reason: these two data sets contain the relevant items I need.

The following table shows the used indicators measuring the different constructs of my model (for accurate question wording of the indicators see Appendix):

Table 1: Constructs and related indicators

|  |   | 2002 Autumn | 2006 Spring |
|--|---|-------------|-------------|
| <b>Generalized Support</b>             | Membership  | X           | X           |
| <b>EU Systemic Performance</b>         | Benefit   | X           | X           |
|  | EU-membership helps national economy                                  | X           |             |
|  | EU-membership stabilizes economy                                      |             | X           |
| <b>EU Democratic Performance</b>       | Trust in the EU   | X           | X           |
|  | Trust in European Institutions (EP, Commission, Council, Court, Bank) | X           | X           |
|  | Satisfaction with the way democracy works in EU                       |             | X           |
| <b>European Identity</b>               | European pride  | X           |             |
|  | Attachment to EU  |             | X           |
| <b>National Systemic Performance</b>   | Expectation: employment situation in country                          | X           | X           |
|  | Expectation: economic situation in country                            | X           | X           |
| <b>National Democratic Performance</b> | Satisfaction with the way democracy works in country                  | X           | X           |
|  | Trust in national government  | X           | X           |
|  | Trust in national parliament  | X           | X           |
| <b>National Identity</b>               | National pride  | X           |             |
|  | Attachment to country   |             | X           |

Because of restrictions of the data – no panel data, different indicators for the constructs – I cannot analyze changes on an individual basis. Therefore I conduct an aggregate analysis and treat my cases as one region to make statements about Central and Eastern Europeans. Furthermore, the comparison over time must, at least in some parts, rely on the comparison of theoretical constructs instead of indicators.

The empirical part of my theory-driven empirical thesis is subdivided into three parts. First I apply descriptive statistics to test the hypotheses about level and change of support. After that I do a confirmatory factor analysis to test if the people can distinguish between the constructs and if the given indicators load on the “right” factors. Then I test the model of generalized support for the EU as a structural equation model because with this method, complex hypotheses involving causal relationships among constructs can be tested. I apply this method to test the hypotheses about the influence of different objects of evaluation on support. In the last step I divide the data sets with regards to the political awareness of the citizens measured by the amount of right answers to factual knowledge questions. I do a multi-group analysis with these split data sets to show if there are differences in the explanatory power of certain determinants between knowledge groups.

## Appendix: Question Wording

| Constructs                      | Indicators   | Data Set    | Question wording  | Coding   |
|---------------------------------|--|-------------|---|--|
| Generalized Support             | EU-Membership  | 2002        | Generally speaking, do you think that (COUNTRY)'s membership of the European Union would be ...?  | 1 a good thing; 2 a bad thing, 3 neither good nor bad, 8 DK / no opinion (spontaneous), 9 NA/refusal (spontaneous)   |
|                                 |  | Autumn 2006 | Generally speaking, do you think that (COUNTRY)'s membership of the European Union is ...?  | 1 a good thing, 2 a bad thing, 3 neither good nor bad, 4 DK / no opinion (spontaneous)   |
| EU Systemic Performance         | Benefit  | 2002        | Taking everything into consideration, would you say that (COUNTRY) could get advantages or not from being a member of the European Union?   | 1 yes, it could, 2 no, it couldn't, 8 DK / no opinion (spontaneous), 9 NA/refusal (spontaneous)  |
|                                 |  | Autumn 2006 | Taking everything into consideration, would you say that (OUR COUNTRY) has on balance benefited or not from being member of the European Union?   | 1 not benefited, 2 benefited, 3 DK / no opinion (spontaneous)  |
|                                 | EU-membership helps national economy                             | 2002        | Thinking about the enlargement of the European Union to include new European countries, including (COUNTRY), do you tend to agree or tend to disagree with each of the following statements?: Being a member of the European Union would help the (NATIONALITY) economy   | 1 tend to agree, 2 tend to disagree, 8 DK / no opinion, 9 NA / refusal   |
|                                 |  | Autumn 2006 | Please tell me for each statement, whether you agree or tend to disagree?: I feel we are [will be] more stable economically because (OUR COUNTRY) is [will be] a member of the European Union   | 1 tend to agree, 2 tend to disagree, 3 DK / no opinion   |
| National Systemic Performance   | Expectations   | 2002        | What are your expectations for the year to come: will 2003 be better, worse or the same, when it comes to...?:  | 1 the same, 2 worse, 3 better, 8 DK / no opinion, 9 NA / refusal   |
|                                 |  | Autumn 2006 | the economic situation in (COUNTRY)<br>the employment situation in (COUNTRY)<br>What are your expectations for the next twelve months: will the next twelve months be better, worse or the same, when it comes to...?   | 1 the same, 2 worse, 3 better, 4 DK / no opinion   |
| EU Democratic Performance       | Trust: the European Union (EU)<br>Trust in European Institutions | 2006        | I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it?: The European Union<br>And, for each of them, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it?<br>1) The European Parliament, 2) The European Commission, 3) The Council of Ministers of the European Union 4) The Court of Justice of the European Communities 5) The European Central Bank | Coding CCEB: 1 tend to trust, 2 tend not to trust, 8 DK / no opinion, 9 NA/refusal<br>Coding EB: 1 tend to trust, 2 tend not to trust, 3 DK / no opinion<br>Coding CCEB: 1 tend to trust, 2 tend not to trust, 8 DK / no opinion, 9 NA/refusal<br>Coding EB: 1 tend to trust, 2 tend not to trust, 3 DK / no opinion |
|                                 |  |             | Spring  | And how about the way democracy works in the European Union?   |
| National Democratic Performance | Satisfaction with the way democracy works in [COUNTRY]           | 2002        | On the whole, are you ... with the way democracy works in (OUR COUNTRY)?  | 1 not at all satisfied, 2 not very satisfied, 3 fairly satisfied, 4 very satisfied, 8 DK / no opinion (spontaneous), 9 refusal / NA (spontaneous)  |
|                                 |  | Autumn 2006 | On the whole, are you ... with the way democracy works in (OUR COUNTRY)?  | 1 very satisfied, 2 fairly satisfied, 3 not very satisfied, 4 not at all satisfied, 5 DK / no opinion  |

|                      |   |   |  |
|----------------------|---|---|--|
|                      | Trust or NOT:<br>The<br>[COUNTRY]<br>government | I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it? | Coding CCEB: 1 tend to trust, 2 tend not to trust, 8 DK / no opinion, 9 NA/refusal<br>Coding EB: 1 tend to trust, 2 tend not to trust, 3 DK / no opinion   |
|                      | Trust or NOT:<br>The<br>[COUNTRY]<br>parliament | I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it? | Coding CCEB: 1 tend to trust, 2 tend not to trust, 8 DK / no opinion, 9 NA/refusal<br>Coding EB: 1 tend to trust, 2 tend not to trust, 3 DK / no opinion   |
| European<br>Identity | European Pride                                  | And would you say you are very proud, fairly proud, not very proud or not at all proud to be European?  | Coding CCEB: 1 very proud, 2 fairly proud, 3 not very proud, 4 not at all proud, 7 does not feel to be European (spontaneous), 8 DK / no opinion (spontaneous), 9 NA/refusal (spontaneous)<br>Coding EB: 1 very proud, 2 fairly proud, 3 not very proud, 4 not at all proud, 5 does not feel to be European (spontaneous), 6 DK / no opinion (spontaneous)           |
|                      | Attachment                                      | People may feel different degrees of attachment to their town or village, to their region, to their country or to Europe. Please tell me how attached you feel... to Europe?                      | Coding CCEB: 1 very attached, 2 fairly attached, 3 not very attached, 4 not at all attached, 8 DK / no opinion, 9 refusal/NA<br>Coding EB: 1 very attached, 2 fairly attached, 3 not very attached, 4 not at all attached, 5 DK / no opinion   |
| National<br>Identity | National Pride                                  | Would you say you are very proud, fairly proud, not very proud or not at all proud to be [NATIONALITY - refer to citizenship]?  | Coding CCEB: 1 very proud, 2 fairly proud, 3 not very proud, 4 not at all proud, 7 does not feel to be [NATIONALITY] (spontaneous), 8 DK / no opinion (spontaneous), 9 NA/refusal (spontaneous)<br>Coding EB: 1 very proud, 2 fairly proud, 3 not very proud, 4 not at all proud, 5 does not feel to be [NATIONALITY] (spontaneous), 6 DK / no opinion (spontaneous) |
|                      | Attachment                                      | People may feel different degrees of attachment to their town or village, to their region, to their country or to Europe. Please tell me how attached you feel... to (OUR COUNTRY)?               | Coding CCEB: 1 very attached, 2 fairly attached, 3 not very attached, 4 not at all attached, 8 DK / no opinion, 9 refusal/NA<br>Coding EB: 1 very attached, 2 fairly attached, 3 not very attached, 4 not at all attached, 5 DK / no opinion   |

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