TransAtlantic Perspectives, Vol. I (March 2002)

The view from Germany, Olivia Voils

The Changing Face of German Foreign Policy:  US and German Perspectives

1.1 Introduction

Like many other countries around the globe, Germany has been forced to adjust to the world after September 11.  The German response to September 11 has been multifaceted and at times contradictory, involving criticism of US policy, feelings of solidarity with the United States, and internal debate about Germany’s role in military intervention.  The last aspect is particularly interesting considering the ever-present implications of the country’s Nazi past.

Because Germans and Americans have different understandings of the type of involvement required in the war against terrorism, tensions within the transatlantic relationship are a result.  To understand the dimensions of the US-German relationship after September 11, one must look at the basic differences between US and German foreign policy; the criticisms of US foreign policy (particularly from the media) in the aftermath of September 11; the state of the transatlantic relationship and domestic political disagreements about German military action; and the implications of the German decision to participated in Afghanistan. 

1.2 Differences between German and US foreign policy

Since the end of the Cold War, Germany’s approach to foreign policy, and in particular foreign security and defense policy, has been necessarily multilateral in nature and strongly based within the NATO structure.  Before 1990, any active policy was limited by Germany’s weak military, and German foreign policy was primarily based on the country’s geographical and political position situated between the east (USSR) and the west (US) and its necessary dependence on the United States and other western allies for military support.  After the fall of the Iron Curtain, a reunified Germany began taking on a foreign policy role of its own. During the Helmut Kohl administration of the early 1990’s, Germany began rebuilding its foreign policy based on multilateralism within the framework of the EU and other international institutions, such as NATO, the WEU, and the UN. 

The United States has often criticized the multilateral, European approach to defense for its complex structure, excessive bureaucracy and endless debates that discourages expediency in decision-making.  This US position, however, fails to recognize different methods of doing foreign policy.  Whereas the United States prefers a power and military approach to foreign policy, Germans and Europeans in general try to exercise a more diplomatic approach, one based on dialogue and negotiation that emphasizes multilateral action and justification under international law for intervention.  The United States often takes the expedient approach to military operations and relies on high-tech weaponry to flex its muscles.  However, we have reached a point in time when the US can solve “military problems” it sets out to address but the global problems facing us are more complex than these. If the US insists on continually launching unilateral operations that clash with the policy of European countries, then diplomatic relations among the allies are sure to suffer. 

1.3 A Pleasant Surprise?

The Bush administration’s initial deliberate and calculated period of analysis directly following September 11 surprised many politically active Germans who often question US foreign policy practices.  Not only did Washington wait before reacting, but the Bush administration also immediately consulted NATO and the UN.  Many Germans interpreted American reserve and openness to dialogue as a positive step, and a surprising move.  Many had expected immediate, rash military attacks against potential guilty parties to avenge the US loss. Germans therefore withheld criticism as they waited for the American response.

However, the delay of German criticism lasted only as long as the period of US deliberation.  Debates about the goals and methods of American efforts to track down the terrorists continue to dominate both the German media and the parliament.  This critical perspective in Germany is remarkably different from the situation  in the United States, where there is not even a platform for criticism. 

This is related to fundamental differences in the function of the media in the United States and Germany.  The media – television, newspapers, press – play a very different role in German public life than in the US. That is, the media in Germany offer a framework in which interest groups and political parties can express their opinions in opposition to the current federal administration.Germany has two major nationwide publicly-owned television stations, ARD and ZDF, that feature news and political dialogue programs along with regular programming.  The ARD is unique in that air time access is distributed among the different Bundesländer (German federal states).  This federalist apportionment ensures that all Bundesländer receive a voice in the media.  At the end of each program a short credit informs the viewers which state sponsored that particular production.  The ARD and ZDF provide the public with alternatives to mainstream cable stations, which inevitably represent political biases according to the private owners. 

Daily German newspapers offer a plethora of alternatives all along the political spectrum.  As the leading German business newspaper, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) generally presents a more conservative view of the news.  On the other hand, the Süddeutsche Zeitung often has a more liberal interpretation, including critical pieces on domestic and international politics.  The best-selling daily German newspaper, the Bild Zeitung, caters to the mainstream populist public, has a tabloid appearance and more of a sensationalist rather than analytical approach to journalism.  These three examples are just a few among many German publications that give the public a variety of political slants on the same news stories.  As a result, Germany has an extensively developed framework for democratic dialogue and news reporting that enables critics to express strong opinions even if they are in direct contrast to the current federal administration’s party line.

In contrast to Germany, the mainstream media in the United States portrays an American-centric, pro-military perspective that supports the Bush Administration’s unilateralist position.  Afghanistan is not a special case; the patriotic wave in the United States following the terrorist attacks is a rather close-minded perspective applicable to the mainstream public opinion of much of US foreign policy.

Soon after the United States launched military attacks on Afghanistan, the German media began criticizing the unjustifiable bombings and emphasizing the unnecessary loss of innocent lives in an already war-torn and poverty-stricken country.  German media began showing more of the human suffering of the Afghan people rather than focusing on the US’s continuing hunt for Osama bin Laden.  Television news stories documented the twenty years of war that preceded the past five years of Taliban rule in Afghanistan.  The media stressed the harsh drought conditions that have further contributed to Afghanistan’s poverty.  One news report described the ‘cleanup’ effort in Afghanistan and the findings of thousands of bodies of women and children; the unknown numbers of civilian deaths in the bombings of Afghanistan far outnumber the death tolls of September 11. 

Any initial widespread support for the US war against terrorism gradually diminished, reaching its nadir at  the recent State of the Union Address on January 25 of this year.  With his warnings of an “axis of evil” President Bush lost any credibility that he might have gained with politically active and US-critical Germans.  Many interpreted Washington’s warnings about this axis that included, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, as a direct threat of attack. 

1.4 Germany’s critical perspective of US foreign policy 

Germany is in a difficult position in the context of US foreign policy.  On the one hand, German leaders recognize their country’s dependence on the United States for major security and defense operations.  On the other hand, many outspoken German politicians and pacifists have voiced their critical opinions against the self-serving, US approach to foreign policy.  Germans acknowledge the necessity of the US’s leading role in the world but believe that there are certain responsibilities that come along with that role, one of which is the recognition of an international need for multilevel cooperation and action.  Many Germans criticize what they see as hypocritical foreign policy moves – and argue that Washington often also acts when its own interests are at stake.

The situation in Afghanistan is just one more example.  Although the poor, war-torn country has little to offer the United States in terms of resources or capital, its terrorist camps represent the US enemy, who must be defeated.  Yet, Afghanistan is merely a stagnate developing country further victimized by the Taliban.  In order to win over the US-critical politicians and German public, the United States must recognize its responsibility to the needs of developing countries.  The process of rebuilding Afghanistan will be another test for US foreign policy. 

1.5 Wavering Solidarity: State of transatlantic relationship after September 11

Despite a show of transatlantic solidarity with the invocation of NATO’s Article five, NATO’s European members have been left out of military actions. The US has however largely carried out its military actions unilaterally, without NATO support, or through bilateral agreements with certain key partners, such as Great Britain. 

Germans have reacted differently to Gerhard Schröder’s commitment of solidarity to the US government in the war against terrorism.  This notion of solidarity has been interpreted on different levels depending on the general sentiment of Germans towards Americans.  A history of both pro-Americanism and anti-Americanism within Germany can be seen in the varying opinions that clearly delineate along political party lines.  The broad spectrum of German response can be seen both in the media and everyday life.  The popular, mainstream German public opinion has been more supportive of the political rhetoric of solidarity. 

On the other hand, many left-wing Green party members discount the existence of any actual solidarity between Germans and Americans, and would argue that they hold divergent ideas from the Americans on basic issues such as foreign policy objectives and treatment of developing countries.  At the same time, Chancellor Schröder has backed up his word to Washington with commitment of German troops and financial support and confirmed his support during his Washington visit in early February. 

1.6 Internal divide over Germany’s Foreign Policy

The current Red-Green coalition federal government mirrors the divisions prevalent in German society as a whole.  This division in the German understanding of US solidarity can be seen in the discussions regarding German military participation in Afghanistan.  The long-disputed parliamentary debate over Bundeswehr (federal armed forces) engagement in the war against terrorism invoked German military history, sparked divisive partisan battles, led to a proposed vote of confidence by Chancellor Schröder and ended in an important decision for German foreign policy to keep moving forward. 

Germany’s brutal actions during World War II featured prominently in the long parliamentary debates and in the press coverage.  Any reference to German participation in military action inevitably conjures up memories of World War II and the Nazi Third Reich, which under Hitler’s leadership pursued a relentless, militaristic, expansionist political program.  As a result, any current and future involvement in military actions will always be analyzed in terms of Germany’s notorious history.  The Germans wish to avoid a repetition of the past but at the same time, and after much debate, they also want to assume a role commensurate with Germany’s economic power and world standing. The international situation of the last decade has called for increased German military participation. Germany has been moving forward with out-of-area  military operations (operations outside of the NATO jurisdiction). 

According to the 1994 German Constitutional Court decision, out-of-area military actions no longer go against the German Basic Law. This resolution also established that Parliament has the final decision on issues regarding German participation in military operations.  As a result, the administration implemented its top-down influence to push its Bundeswehr proposal through Parliament.

Both Chancellor Schröder (SPD) and Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer (Green Party) were in favor of sending German soldiers to join other international troops in operation Enduring Freedom.  Many Parliament representatives, particularly from the SPD and Green Party, were skeptical of German soldiers engaging in military action, and were not in favor of Bundeswehr participation.  The fact that Joschka Fischer, a member of the typically passive, Green Party, took a firm, non-characteristic position on the issue alarmed many Green Party members.  Using his political position to influence the votes of fellow Green party Parliament members, Fischer pressured his colleagues by questioning their loyalty to him and the Party in order to win affirmative votes for the military proposal.

The debate over troop deployment to Afghanistan almost toppled the Red-Green coalition under Schröder. Following the United Nations resolution declaring the terrorist attacks of September 11 a threat to international security, Schröder announced, on November 6, his proposal for making available up to 3,900 soldiers for the international war against terrorism.  The debate in Parliament lasted for nine days before the representatives reached a majority affirmative vote.

On November 13, Schröder strategically posed a vote of confidence in conjunction with the military engagement vote.  In this political move, Schröder was able to win over the support of most of the SPD and Green Party skeptics who played an instrumental role in obtaining a majority vote to pass the proposal on through Parliament..  Like in the case of Macedonia, where German soldiers still serve today, Schröder himself had a strong, even forceful, influence in convincing doubting members of Parliament to show their party solidarity and discipline.  On November 16, a majority of Parliament voted in favor of Bundeswehr engagement and at the same time passed the vote of confidence for the Chancellor.

There are currently 1600 Bundeswehr soldiers participating with the International Afghanistan peacekeeping troop ISAF.  Approximately 1200 German marines are stationed on the Horn of Africa in conjunction with the war against terrorism.  820 soldiers are patrolling the Arabian Sea together with other countries.  140 German paratroopers are serving at a US-marine base in Jibouti.  The German marines also have 280 persons serving with a NATO fleet in the Mediterranean Sea.  Further German personnel contributions include 50 German soldiers and civilians, 250 special forces, and 100 persons in Kenya.

1.7 How is Afghanistan different than the previous campaigns?

From the perspective of the United States, the question of German military intervention in Afghanistan has a clear-cut answer.  The Bush Administration does not and cannot understand the difficulty and the hesitation on the part of the Germans to take on more military operations.  The United States has little patience for the slow speed of the development of a European Union common foreign and security policy, and has, as a result, often undertaken action unilaterally, without Europe and Germany. The US has learned from unsuccessful UN-led operations in Bosnia that multilateral arrangements are often too complicated to carry out effectively. 

Nonetheless, Germany continues to take incremental steps within the context of military participation that are revolutionary in comparison with those made during the 50 years following World War II.  Germany’s foreign policy decisions and actions during the past ten years demonstrate Germany’s commitment to participate more fully in world affairs. The evolutionary development of German participation in military actions has been accompanied by a change in the terms of public debates about such interventions.  Following the end of the Cold War and German reunification in 1990, the debate regarding military operations was simply whether or not to get involved.  This debate was repeated over a number of individual cases of potential involvement.  Once that question had been answered affirmatively within the framework of the federal government, Parliament and the Constitutional Court, two new questions arose: what should the role of Germany be in the context of military intervention and conflict resolution?, and to what extent should the German armed forces involve themselves in foreign military conflict? 

The military debate has begun to include problems with logistics and questions of reform to the armed forces infrastructure.  The recent decision by the German government not to assume the lead of the international forces in Afghanistan not only reveals uncertainty about taking on too much responsibility at once, but also reinforces the lack of logistical capacity of the German armed forces. Germany has overcome many difficulties in coming to terms with its history, but the military discussion still carries the burden of Germany’s past. The German word Führung (leadership) alone carries negative connotations associated with Hitler, the Führer.  Therefore, the English term ‘lead role’ has been adopted by many German journalists when discussing the leadership of international troops.

1.8 Implications for the future of the transatlantic relationship

The war on terrorism presents a major military crisis that necessitates cooperation within the framework of EU-US cooperation.  In order to stave off terrorism on an international level, the collaboration from all countries is essential, on legal, political and military levels.  The development of the European Union is foreseen to expand Europe’s collective role in world military affairs.  European efforts to organize a  European Common Security and Defense Policy (ECSDP) proves their readiness to take on more of the responsibility for military intervention. 

Germany has a necessary symbiotic relationship with the European Union.  Following the reunification in 1990, Germany grew in both population and geographic size to an extent that once again raised historic questions about its potential threat to its neighbors.  With the fall of the Iron Curtain, the forty-year long bi-polar dynamic of East versus West came to a close.  For the first time since World War II, Germany was suddenly in a position to develop its own foreign policy.  The institutional framework of the EU continues to allow Germany to pursue its national interests diplomatically by multilateral means while the European partners benefit from Germany’s anchoring role as an economic, social, and political strength. 

The German government still has the difficult task of balancing its national sovereignty and power to the satisfaction of EU member states while still fulfilling its role in the transatlantic relationship as a strong US ally.  Despite demands from the US that Germany assume a leading role within Europe, Germany is still limited within the international community.  For example, Germany has no seat on the UN security council.  The EU framework could perhaps allow Germany to have a representational voice on a rotational basis if the UN awarded the EU one mutual seat.

The initial European responses to the September 11 terrorist attacks came from the national rather than the EU level.  This shows that there still remains much work to be done on the issue of a EU-wide foreign and security policy, and how this will work within the transatlantic framework.  The ideal transatlantic platform would allow the EU to implement its own mentality into foreign policy action, thus reaching a compromise with the dominant United States.  At the same time, the United States would gain the burden-sharing contribution of its EU counterparts. The United States cannot afford to ignore the European efforts to build a stable military, and should take advantage of the opportunity to contribute to the process. 

Within the current transatlantic relationship, Germany has critical leverage and the US has military leverage.  At times, it seems that the US cannot win the war of criticism, for they are criticized as the world police for taking on too much in world affairs but also criticized in other situations for not stepping in and helping many developing countries.  From the German perspective, the future of the EU will hopefully provide a solid framework in which European countries can leverage more military power and compromise with the US in mutual international campaigns.

In a recent speech given at the Woodrow Wilson Center on January 24, 2002 entitled “The Transatlantic Relationship and the New Global Agenda”, German Ambassador to the United States, H.E. Wolfgang Ischinger, emphasized the importance of a strong Europe for a prosperous, transatlantic relationship.  Ischinger spoke positively of the current EU-US relationship in light of September 11 and underscored the necessity of building a lasting relationship.  This need to cooperate can be seen in the meetings between Schröder and Bush in Washington during the first days of February.  These reinforced the political relationship between the two countries and reaffirmed Germany’s commitment to the war against terrorism despite critical press from both sides of the Atlantic.

Perhaps Ischinger’s hopeful outlook sounds a bit too optimistic in contrast to the critical perspective of many Germans, but realistically, Europeans and Americans must work together and find common ground to face future crises in the rapidly changing world.