

The European Union (EU) as a ‘Civilian’ and ‘Normative’ Power’: Connotational Meanings from Outside

Paper Presented at the

**EUSA Tenth Biennial International Conference
Montreal, Canada (May 17-May 19, 2007)**

**by
Syuzanna Vasilyan
PhD Candidate
Centre for EU Studies
Ghent University**

Prologue

The ‘civilian/normative power Europe’ literature, which has gained allure not only in the academic but also policy circles on EU external relations has been developed with the US considered as a major case with which the EU is contrasted. Indeed, the EU is presented as full of virtues, while the US is a bearer of vices. In the meantime, not only is the ‘civilian/normative power Europe’ literature generic and deficient, i.e. devoid of tangible proofs of the EU’s civilianness/normativity in contrast to that of the US, but it is also largely supply-side rather than demand-side driven. This is self-contradictory since the concept ‘power’ presupposes an agent-object relationship and, thus, cannot be understood merely from an outbound perspective in an inter-subjective political environment.

Some scholars (Diez, 2005, p. 615; Nicolaidis and Howse, 2002, p. 783), including Manners himself (Manners, 2006, p. 195), identify lack of reflexivity as a major drawback of the conceptual framework. Diez (2005, p. 616) argues that the discussion about ‘normative power Europe’ does not really examine whether the EU ‘has normative power in the relational sense’. He claims that since normative power ‘refers to a relationship and implies a capacity ‘to shape the values of others’, ‘the difference between the EU as a civilian power and other forms of normative power should be analyzed more carefully’ (p. 636). The author (Ibid.) believes that (self-)reflection would ‘rescue the idea of ‘normative power Europe’ from becoming a ‘self-righteous, messianistic project that claims to know what Europe is and what others should be like’. Sjursen (2006a, pp. 169-170) thinks that ‘in order to assess whether the conceptualizations of the EU as a ‘normative’, ‘ethical’, ‘civilizing’ power are simply co-optations of the agenda of those in power (because they are also ‘used by EU officials when describing the EU’s international role’), it is important to conduct ‘systematic empirical investigation’.

With the aim to help the 'civilian/normative power Europe' concept survive this paper calls for it to move out of its cosy defensive EUro-centric shelter, undergo a meticulous check-up and be ready for taking offence by focusing on the following questions:

- What are the connotations of a 'civilian/normative power' EU?
- Can the US also be claimed to be one?
- How different is the US from the EU from an outsider perspective, for example, the South Caucasus?

The paper will argue that although the US is contrasted with the EU in the 'civilian/normative power Europe' literature, the US is neither ideologically conflict-prone (despite the sensational cases of intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq) nor normatively averse (despite its obstinacy to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention Protocol, the Kyoto Protocol and the Rome Treaty of the International Criminal Court (ICC), non-abolition of death penalty and lack of social security). This study proposes that other cases, such as the South Caucasus, can testify to the civilian/normative nature of the US.

The choice of the case is justified by the following reasons. Firstly, through the inbound lenses, given the internal heterogeneity of the case – the South Caucasus comprising the three states of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, represents a best case against which EU's in comparison to the US's civilianness/normativity can be tested and possibly contrasted with that of the US. To substantiate, Armenia is a landlocked state with no natural resources, no diplomatic relations either with Azerbaijan or Turkey and left out of the regional energy projects. Azerbaijan is a Muslim Turkic country with abundant hydrocarbon resources. Georgia is already closely situated to the EU sharing a littoral state across the Black Sea with recently recruited EU member-states. Secondly, given the relatively low Freedom House scores in the South Caucasian countries, which have long benefited from external assistance (with Armenia and Georgia being 'partly free' and Azerbaijan 'not free'), and the presence of three regional conflicts of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh, the exposition of the EU's and the US's civilian/normative nature would be most vivid here (Freedom House (2006a, 2006b, 2006c). Thirdly, from an outbound angle, both the EU and the US claim to be well-disposed towards the 'region', i.e. wishing to make a positive change. For the EU, the South Caucasus is on the remote Eastern flank of its Neighbourhood - 'a main external priority' (European Commission, 2007). For the US, the South Caucasus has been an intersection where its NATO-ally Turkey, Russia and Iran meet. Therefore, the case could be the 'venue' where the EU and the US can enter into a race competing for the title of a civilian/normative power. It is, thus, assumed that if the EU, as much as the US, is indeed a civilian/normative power it would manifest itself in the best possible way in this 'region'. And, conversely, their behaviour would be most controversial, if it were to be

the case, exactly in a place, like the South Caucasus, given the complicated political context.

To corroborate, the paper will, firstly, tease out the conceptions of civilianness/normativity. Secondly, it will a) focus on the shortcomings of the conceptual framework and b) bring out the cures proposed by the scholars. Thirdly, it will apply the connotations of a 'civilian/normative power' both to the EU and the US with respect to their policy towards the South Caucasus. Lastly, it will analyze the inbound perspective by seeing the EU and the US as donors. This undertaking will be carried out by relying, among others, on discourse and financial evidence. It will supposedly fill in the gap in the 'civilian/normative power Europe' literature by introducing intricacies and enriching the theoretical propositions with empirical investigation.

The "Civilian"/'Normative' Power Europe'

The concepts 'civilian' and 'normative' 'power Europe' have been developed separately under different circumstances and in different global contexts. The 'civilian power Europe' notion as introduced by Duchene, dates back to the 1970s, while the 'normative power EU' concept is a product of the 21st century. Duchene (1973, p. 19) argued that the 'EC's interest as a civilian group of countries long on economic power and relatively short on armed force' would assure it a distinctive role in external relations. Manners (2006, p. 184) put forth the 'normative power Europe' concept in order to capture the movement away from Cold War (and neo-colonial) approaches to the EU. The reason for introducing this conceptual novelty was that the concept 'civilian' carries a bias whereby the EU is compared to a state, rather than institutions and policies (Manners, 2002, p. 239). Some scholars, however, are in favor of collating the two. Diez (2005, p. 614) argues that the academic discussion and the political representation of the EU as a normative power are a part of the same discourse. They, thus, 'seem to be very close to each other' (Ibid.). Furthermore, he asserts that 'in a sense, civilian power can be read as one specific form of normative power in that at its heart lie particular kinds of norms (namely, civilian)' (p. 617). Telo (2006), on the other hand, seems to subjugate the EU's norms/values to its civilianness.

While this debate is more relevant for theoretical purposes, it is of less importance when dealing with policy analysis. For the purpose of this paper, therefore, it is reasonable to merge the two concepts by conceiving them as constitutive of each other in order to understand the nature of the EU's external policy thoroughly. Yet, it is worth expounding what these concepts are precisely about.

The 'Civilian/Normative Power Europe' Conceptual Framework

Contrary to one's expectations given the sway of the ambitious 'civilian/normative power Europe' concept, the literature does not deliver much accuracy. Telo (2006, pp. 51-55) states that the reasons because of which the EU 'can realistically be defined as an at least incipient, collective civilian power' are the following:

1. EU's own history, polity and policy
2. 'increasing convergence' around the 'European social model'
3. 'the almost magnetic attraction of the EU to its neighbors'
4. the fact that 'the EU develops its economic and political influence through 'common strategies and partnership agreements with surrounding countries', notably, the neighbors
5. the fact that the EU is 'now recognized as the second global actor'
6. the fact that 'the EU identifies itself with multilateralism on the global as well as regional level'
7. 'contributes to global governance by collectively encouraging states in other continents to deepen regional cooperation' and has developed a new dimension in international relations, or... intercontinental relations: that of interregionalism'
8. 'can count on the sizeable collective multi-level diplomatic corps'
9. together with its member states 'are playing an increasing military peacekeeping and peace-enforcing role and currently participates in a dozen or so missions around the world'.

These features, thus, seem to be a summary of the EU's nature, functions, role, behavior and narrative. Nicolaidis and Howse (2002, p. 782) refer to the peculiarity of the EU as a civilian power capable of exporting its model to other regions around the world. Reassessing the 'civilian power' literature but still moving along the same lines, Manners (2002, p. 240) states that EU's normative difference comes from its

1. historical context,
2. hybrid polity and
3. political-legal constitution.

He claims that 'the central component of the 'normative power Europe' is that it exists as being different to pre-existing political forms and that this particular difference pre-disposes it to act in a normative way in world politics' (2002, p. 242). In this sense, a normative power is a power, which is 'able to shape the conceptions of normal' (pp. 239-242) through ideas. Thus, 'the EU as a normative power has an ontological quality to it – that the EU can be conceptualized as a changer of norms in the international system, a positivist quality to it – that the EU acts to change norms in the international system; and a normative quality to it – that the EU should act to extend its norms into the international system' (p. 252). Apart from interpreting the EU's 'normativity' in axiological and deontological terms, however, Manners introduces prioritization: he

claims that 'the most important factor shaping the international role of the EU is not what it does or what it says, but what it is'. While this prioritization helps to draw a border-line between the 'civilian' and 'normative' power Europe conceptual frameworks, ironically, it works to the detriment of the 'normative power Europe' concept, leaving the latter replete with some shortcomings.

Firstly, the 'civilian/normative power Europe' literature remains tautological being apt to justifying the EU's civilianness/normativity through its idiosyncratic exposure, although, ironically, resorting to juxtaposing the EU with the US. Secondly, the concept is still inward-looking, outbound and self-centered. Thirdly, the literature is not only descriptive, but also prescriptive and idealistic. Last but not least, it is normatively charged. All these drawbacks do not help to amend and improve neither the understanding of the EU's external role nor the academic portrayal of the EU as an actor superior to others. The reason for this is that the latter a) do not allow to meet the demands implied by the essence of the concept 'power', b) do not provide the ground for comparing the EU with others and primarily the US and c) do not leave room for an inbound evaluation of the EU's power as compared with others (explicitly or implicitly). This corrodes the essence of the conceptual framework, although revealing a vast space to be satiated with research.

EU versus the US under the Civilian/Normative Guise

When 'honoured' as a 'civilian/normative power', the EU is depicted in opposition to the US. To signify this difference while apportioning an important international role to the EU, the academe has branded the latter with such contradictory labels as a 'cooperative empire' (Whitman, 2005, p. 33) with 'passive aggression' (Leonard, 2005, p. 51) potential. Diez (2005, p. 613) notices that there is widespread belief in the European political and academic circles that 'the EU is a novel kind of power not only in its own institutional set-up, but also in its external relations. It is said to rely on civilian rather than military means'. He further argues that one of the differences between the EU and the US 'is that the US has sought to project, and often impose, its own norms' (2005, p. 622). Hyde-Price (2006, p. 217) states that 'there is a distinctive 'European' approach to international politics that favours diplomacy, persuasion, negotiation and compromise', in contrast to the 'American approach, which is more prone to using military coercion' (p. 218). Lucarelli (2005, p. 55) claims that multilateralism has become a core principle of political interaction both within the EU and in EU external relations... while it seemed to be more a tool in the case of US foreign policy'. Leonard (2005, p. 38) states that the US exercises 'power as spectacle', which is 'always imposed on unwilling subjects from outside, rather than changing the wiring society from inside' through 'power as

surveillance' as practiced by the EU. In the meantime, the latter, in contrast to the former, is 'voluntary and mutual' (p. 46).

More specifically, Leonard says (2005, p. 68) that 'what makes the EU unique is that it can bring together its aid, trade and development assistance to prevent hotspots from collapsing into war'. He (p. 110) states that the EU 'can deploy 'transformative power' to shape the parts of societies that America cannot reach with the magnet of its neighborhood policy, and the link between market access and political reform'. In addition, the author claims that the US pursues short-term goals that are explicitly in its own interest', while 'the European response' has been to hold out the possibility of integration... to neighbouring countries and so attempt to bring them closer to the political norms and institutional practices of the EU' (p. 52). The latter entails long-term implications leading to in-depth transformation of these countries. With the US in mind, Leonard thinks that the EU can be successful with its reform agenda 'because it is not just another country telling the Arabs and Eastern Europeans how to run their affairs: it is a club with rules and benefits to hand out' (p. 103). According to Telo (2006, p. 185), the EU 'is perceived by partners as an alternative model to the US: more cooperative' and 'open'. In a nutshell, there is an omnipresent intention to attribute a special slot to the EU in global politics with mixed propositions some of which echo the reality, while others suggest wishful thinking.

By reaching beyond the denotational meaning of 'civilian/normative power' the major dilemmas will be disentangled and the characteristics retrieved from the literature. Doing this will afterwards help attain a more nuanced understanding of the differences and/or similarities of the two actors through an empirical scrutiny.

The **civilian/normative versus military power dilemma** pinpoints to the means deployed by the EU in its external relations. Smith (2000, p. 24) argues that 'the EU is simply not threatening' but she warns that 'this happy state of affairs may end if the EU proceeds with the development of a defense dimension'. Meanwhile, 'this is alarming especially for the EU's neighbors to the east and south'. Manners (2006, pp. 193-194) is afraid that the creation of the European Defense Agency in 2005 and, thus, 'the prioritization of military intervention over non-military conciliation' might undermine the EU's normativity. To prevent this, the author advises that 'the military tasks... should only be attempted under a UN mandate..., on a clear, normative basis' (p. 195).

Mauil (1990, pp. 92-93) conceives of the combination of the civilian and military means feasible as long as non-military, primarily economic means are used to secure one's goals, with military power merely serving 'to safeguard other means of international interaction'. Diez (2005, p. 616) states that the 'normative power can go alongside other forms of power..., notably, military and economic', as long as it is

'irreducible to economic and military power'. Consequently, the author (p. 624) argues that while normative and military power are not incompatible, they are in a tension. He further states that the difference between the US and the EU should be understood not as a distinction between a normative and a traditional power, but rather as a warning sign about a normative power in which military power is becoming increasingly important (Ibid, p. 622).

The discussion about **norms/values versus interests** alludes to the motivations of the actors employing foreign policy. Through the emphasis on the EU's identity rather than behavior the 'civilian/normative power Europe' is presented as a covert and/or overt norm-transmitter rather than interest-seeker. This assumption is, nonetheless, questioned by scholars-proponents of the conceptual framework. Diez (p. 625) states that 'strategic interests and norms cannot be easily distinguished, and that the assumption that of a normative sphere without interests is in itself nonsensical'. According to the author (p. 621), most of the US's international engagement has had 'strong normative under-, if not over-tones'. Additionally, Diez claims that not only the interests and norms of the US often go hand in hand but so do those of the EU. As argued by Youngs (2005, p. 4), 'the EU's use of norms and values has 'exhibited real strategic purpose' saturated with an 'interest calculus'.

Multilateralism can be seen as the 'environment' within which the EU is 'embedded' (cf. Whitman, 2007, p. 112). Almost all the scholars emphasize (both in descriptive and prescriptive sense) multilateralism as an asset of 'civilian/normative power Europe' (Manners, 2002, 2006; Smith, 2000; Telo, 2006; Twitchett, 1976; Maull, 1990; Sjursen, 2006b). To specify, Sjursen (2006b, p. 248) states that 'one might expect that a normative power would develop standards, mechanisms and policy instruments that might ensure that its own policies are consistent with such principles; the crucial point being that it would bind itself and not only others to common legal principles'. She (p. 236) goes a step further by suggesting that 'a core distinguishing feature of a 'normative' power might be that it seeks to overcome power politics through strengthening not only of international but cosmopolitan law, emphasizing the rights of the individuals in the international system'. Eriksen (2006, pp. 252-253) agrees claiming that 'it is only by subjecting its actions to a higher ranking law' that an actor can assert its civilianness/normativity (p. 253).

Inclusiveness can be construed as the 'process' (cf. Whitman, 2007, p. 112) of civilianness/normativity. By inclusiveness Bicchi (2006, p. 288) refers to 'the extent to which EU foreign policy-makers permit a role (in theory or in practice) in European

foreign policy (EFP) for external actors affected by EFP'. In other words, it is about 'involving non-members' in the decision-making. After all the objects of the policy are supposed to bear the consequences stemming from the latter.

Legitimacy

Legitimacy is mentioned as another feasible characteristic for judging the civilianness/normativity of a power. Smith (2005, p. 24) argues that conditionality can be effective 'if the target state wants the benefits on offer or fears losing them'. Meanwhile, the benefits should be 'desirable to the neighbors' (p. 28). Whitman (2005, p. 32) suggests that EU's global engagement should go hand-in-hand with public diplomacy through forging relationships with people, i.e. 'winning minds'. Only when enjoying 'widespread consent' and 'positive support' can the reforms be sustained (Youngs, 2005, p. 7). Leonard says that conditionality 'works most effectively on countries that are friendly' (2005, p. 55). Consequently, he calls for the 'European approach' to be 'a response to the local demands' (p. 103). This will 'create the incentives to drive reform without being imperial'. He believes that the 'Europeans certainly have a better image in the region than the US'.

Regionalization

Regional cooperation is defined as a key feature of the EU's identity and an objective and means of its external policy. Smith (2003, p. 69) claims that the EU promotes regionalization 'vindicating the regional approach'; In the meantime, 'the Union's support for regional cooperation could be viewed as a form of narcissism, a 'propensity to reproduce itself'' (p. 70). Regional cooperation is defined as one of the reasons for which 'the EU can realistically be defined as an at least incipient, collective civilian power' (Telo, 2006, p. 51). Regionalization is stated to be a 'means of securing peace, prosperity and democracy' (p. 55). Thus, it is viewed as a magnifier of the EU's civilianness/normativity.

Credibility

When analyzing the efficiency of the EU policy towards the Central and Eastern European countries Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004) tie credibility to conditionality. Meanwhile, by extending this logic of appraisal one can assume that for an actor to be a credible civilian/normative power it would also have to abide by the precondition of consistency as judged by the partners. Some authors, however indicate to observations implicitly warning to beware so that the latter do not become a trend. Smith (2005, p. 26) states that the EU's past historical record suggests that 'due mostly to calculations of the relative strategic and commercial importance of targeted countries' the EU has

behaved inconsistently. Youngs (2004, p. 426) also asserts that some of the EU policies 'betray a concern' because of their 'instrumental logic' and 'strategic utility' ramifications. Empirical investigation can help to juxtapose the EU and the US but cannot be done otherwise than by taking up the positivist quantity to the level of the ontological quality. Testing the policies of the two actors towards the South Caucasus will reveal to what extent the aforementioned assumptions hold as tackled through the identified civilian/normative challenges/dilemmas and characteristics. Even though such an effort would definitively dilute the conceptual stratification between 'civilian' and 'normative', it would refine the literature by tackling its drawbacks. Therefore, the policies of the US and the EU towards the South Caucasus should be meticulously analyzed.

The EU and the US in the South Caucasus

EU

Taken aback by the collapse of the Berlin Wall and anxious about its own fate the EU initially became politically introvert 'wrapped up in building its single currency and changing its institutions' (Leonard, 2005, p. 63). Its activity in the territory of the former Soviet Union in the 1990s primarily consisted of providing economic assistance and humanitarian aid. Having launched the grant-financed TACIS (Technical Assistance to the CIS) program in 1991, the EU emphasized technical assistance, information exchange and education. Under the auspices of TACIS the EU generated the TRACECA (Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia) program.¹ The latter was put into operation in 1993 in order to facilitate trade and economic relations by dealing with the development of transportation infrastructure (road, rail and telecommunications routes, as well as imposition of a single tariff system for railroad and sea transport through legal harmonization) and creation of a web thereof.²

In June 1999, however, the EU went a step further by offering Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) to, among others, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. In July 1999 the EU initiated the INOGATE (Inter-State Oil and Gas Europe) program.³ Through the latter the EU pursued a two-fold purpose: a) attracting private investors and financial institutions into the Caspian area and b) improving the security of Europe's energy supply by promoting a network of oil and gas pipeline systems and facilitating shipment of hydrocarbons to the West (Iyigunor, 2003, p. 81). Simultaneously, formulating the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in 1999, the EU decided to apply it, among others (the Balkans, the Mediterranean and Africa), to the territory of

¹ TACIS covers Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.

² The beneficiaries of TRACECA are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Romania, Tajikistan, Turkey, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, and Turkmenistan.

³ Twenty-one countries (Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Georgia, Greece, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Slovakia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Ukraine and the FRY) acceded to INOGATE Umbrella Agreement.

the former Soviet Union. By the time it already wished to 'export stability' with an attendant goal of increasing its prestige not only as an economic but also as a political player (Gorbatova, 2001).

In 2002 the European Commission started adopting Country Strategy Papers and Indicative Papers for Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, which would be in force until 2006. It, additionally, adopted the TACIS Regional Cooperation Strategy Paper and Indicative Program, which would apply to the countries of Eastern Europe, including the South Caucasian states. The reason behind them was that it was 'of the interest to the EU to support programs that reflect[ed] current and future needs of the countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia and encourage them to cooperate among themselves in addressing these needs' (European Commission, 2001). In the same year the European Council adopted the New Neighborhood Initiative, which was followed up by a White Paper published by the European Commission in March 2003. The latter called for the inclusion of the South Caucasian states in the Wider Europe Program in order to facilitate their closer economic and political integration with the EU. In July 2003 the EU made a decision to include the South Caucasus together with its door-to-door neighbors in 'A Secure Europe in a Better World' (European Council, 2003).

The diachronic analysis of the EU's external policy has shown that the EU primarily embarked on technical projects devoid of any political clout. This has marked the civilian/normative benefactor-style nature of the EU's policy. The latter were followed up with concrete interest-based programs aimed at creation of transportation and energy transfer links. Only after formulating the ESDP did the Union gradually consider the possibility of according a political momentum to its activities in the South Caucasus hereby casting a normative spell onto them. The policy was not sterile of rational stimuli, however, as will be shown later.

US

Since the collapse of the USSR the US as a remaining superpower was to act in accordance with the New World Order, which was called for by President George Bush. The latter referred to the generation of a world order based on peace, security, freedom and the rule of law – in line with multilateralist agenda of the UN. This commitment found its material embodiment in the fact that starting from the 1990s the US – perceiving of itself as the bearer of these norms started acting with the objective of transmitting them to the outside world. To fulfill this objective in an adequate way it became the largest donor to the countries of the former Soviet Union, among others, the three South Caucasian countries of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, through provision of foreign aid - an essential component of American foreign policy. Seizing the opportunity to support economic freedom and galvanize democratic change, in 1992 the US Congress passed

the Freedom Support Act for Russia and the Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets (FREEDOM) Support Act – a piece of legislation authorizing funding for the former Soviet terrain. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) was charged with managing and implementing aid programs by engaging US governmental agencies, international and multilateral institutions, NGOs, as well as private donors. USAID programs focused on establishing market economy, fostering democracy, fighting corruption and promoting the rule of law, giving humanitarian assistance to conflict zones, protecting the environment, etc. (Rice, 2000). All of these together were meant to generate peace, prosperity and freedom. The general motive behind providing foreign aid was that the US would 'make a difference', i.e. enable the countries, which were recovering from the Soviet totalitarianism and centrally planned economy and had chosen to tread the path to democracy and market economy, to achieve a level of self-sustainability.

Nonetheless, according to Hill (2001), 'it was not until major oil contracts were signed between the US oil companies and the governments of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan in 1993-1994' that the South Caucasus and Central Asia 'began to register on the radar screens of the American public'. Oil and gas extraction represented venues for capital investment for the American multinational corporations. 'The commercial interests of US oil companies in exploiting new energy reserves' gave the American policymakers 'a specific interest to protect' in the South Caucasus and Central Asia (Ibid.). Thus, by 1996 the American policy towards the region became more assertive (Sherwood-Randall, 1998, pp. 3-5); the South Caucasus was announced 'vital' to the US (Hovsepian, 1999). In late 1997 the Clinton administration started a campaign for Baku-Ceyhan oil and Baku-Erzrum gas pipelines, which would guarantee transportation of the Caspian (Azeri, Turkmen, Uzbek and Kazakh) energy via a terminal on Turkey's Mediterranean coast to the Western markets (Valinakis, 1999). It stressed the strategic importance of the pipelines as part of the 'Eurasian Transport Corridor' (Baran, 2002, p. 221).

In 2001 the US became determined with its security mission in the South Caucasus as a 'region' with pending conflicts. House Resolution 2506 for the FY 2002, the Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill of July 2001, established a South Caucasus funding category, 15% of which was allocated to the peace settlement of the Abkhazian and Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts. Within the boundaries of the same Bill, congressional earmarks were provided to Armenia and Georgia (Jim & Kim, 2001). All these activities, however, were backed up by USAID funding to restructure all the spheres of public life in the three South Caucasian republics and help them improve their living standards.

In a nutshell, in the beginning of the 1990s the US's foreign policy stemming from perceiving of itself as a moral winner of the Cold War and the attendant obligation to project its image onto the outside world was civilian/normative. It was only afterwards

that the American rational interests came to the fore. The latter did not, however, harm the civilian resolve of the US to transform the South Caucasus in tandem with the dicta of democracy, prosperity and peace.

Despite the variations in the policies of the two actors, the EU policy, similar to the US policy, has been one whereby external assistance comprised a most essential component of its relations with the South Caucasian states. In the meantime, the EU's rationale of providing aid has been identical to that of the US – guaranteeing a self-sufficient existence for the three countries reviving from Soviet agony and moving towards democracy and economic liberalism. While the policies of both actors have been primarily civilian and normative, rational interests have come to top up on them by afterwards casting a political spell onto their policies. Comparison of the current EU and US policies towards the South Caucasus will offer a better picture in this respect.

The Current EU and US Policies towards the South Caucasus

The European Neighborhood Policy (ENP)

The ENP signifies the EU's most recent external policy towards the countries to its south and east. It is a political move on the part of the EU to establish good-neighborly relations by creating a 'ring of friends' around itself. Offering 'everything but institutions' (European Commission, 2002, 2003b) to the neighbors, the ENP encompasses all the spheres of public life in the neighboring countries and aims at fostering reform. It is, thus, ambitious and comprehensive (Khasson, Vasilyan & Vos, forthcoming).

In the meantime, the novelty of the ENP is attributed to the fact that it is based on a) 'partnership', which, in its turn, rests on 'joint ownership', b) 'differentiation' as a result of being 'tailor-made' for a specific neighbor and c) 'conditionality' (European Commission, 2006j, p. 1; 2006k, p. 1; 2006h, p. 1). These presumably defining characteristics are believed to distinguish the ENP from the previous EU policies towards the neighboring countries and from the policies of other actors, notably the US. Empirical analysis will help to unravel whether they correspond to reality in case of the EU and whether they are also typical of the US policy.

Ironically, partnership was not in place at the inception of the policy. Rather, the ENP was a unilaterally concocted policy to handle the challenges at the EU's new/potential borders even if this would also be to the advantage of the countries the EU labeled as 'neighbors'. When the European Commission drew up the Action Plan (AP) templates differentiation was hardly sought. Only after the draft APs were presented to the neighboring states could the latter introduce changes to them. As to conditionality,

distinction between its means and content can help to probe into this feature with all the thoroughness it deserves.

Means-wise, the ENP APs (APs) refer to 'monitoring' the implementation of the Priorities for Action in the bodies established by the PCAs, which remains the legal base for the relations between the EU and the neighbours (European Commission, 2006j, p. 38; 2006k, p. 41; 2006k, p. 39). The Commission in close cooperation with the Secretary-General/High Representative, as well as with IGOs, such as the Council of Europe, the OSCE, relevant UN bodies, and International Financial Institutions is supposed to issue a mid-term report in a two-year time-frame. On the basis of this report, the EU, together with the respective neighbour will review the content of an AP and decide on amending and renewing it. The Commission will issue a second report towards the end of five years and on the basis of the latter decisions may be taken on the next step in the development of bilateral relations, including the possibility of 'new enhanced contractual links'.

What concerns the content of conditionality, the APs incorporate some carrots in case of compliance and fulfilment of the set out Priorities for Action by the partner countries. Some of them are entrenched in the APs promising 'the perspective of moving beyond cooperation to a significant degree of integration, including through a stake in the EU's Internal Market, and the possibility... to participate progressively in key aspects of EU policies and programmes' (European Commission, 2006j, p. 2; 2006kb, p. 2; 2006l, p. 2). The AP for Georgia also promises 'gradual extension of four freedoms to Georgia (2006l, p. 2). Other carrots top up on these as a bonus. To specify, the Commission makes a pledge to increase the funding through the 'Governance Facility', 'which will reward those ENP countries, which show the best performance in relation to governance issues (European Commission, 2006e, p. 4; 2006g, p. 4; 2006i, p. 4). Moreover, 'depending on developments regarding the peaceful settlement of the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh' the Commission intends to 'provide specific assistance related to all aspects of conflict settlement and settlement consolidation' (European Commission, 2006e, p. 5, 2006g, p. 3).

The EU, however, also foresees the employment of a stick, even though there is no precision as to whether it will be a plastic, a wooden or an iron one. The APs state that 'for specific measures necessitating legally binding decisions, the Commission will recommend to the Council the adoption of the necessary negotiating directives' (Ibid.). Thus, the EU reserves the one-sided right to use a stick, while keeping silent about the possible cases or conditions when such a need may arise. Even if this could be attributed to the EU's organic softness, it transmits an obscure message to the partners. This said,

for the sake of comparison, it is now worthwhile to probe into the current US policy towards the South Caucasus.

The Millennium Challenge Account (MCA)

The Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) - an innovative US Government development fund established in January 2004 and administered by the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) - aims at tying aid to 'good governance', 'economic freedom' and 'investing in people'. The policy runs parallel to the USAID assistance, while being devoid of the political clout ingrained in the latter. To substantiate, 'the MCC focuses specifically on promoting sustainable economic growth to reduce poverty through investments in areas such as transportation, water and industrial infrastructure, agriculture, education, private sector development, and capacity building' (Millennium Challenge Corporation, 2007a).⁴

Although the MCA is branded as development assistance by the US, it is similar to the ENP. The fact that the European Neighborhood Policy and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) envisages funding in order to promote reforms makes the ENP a combination of foreign and development policy and, thus, in a sense, not different from the MCA. The MCA, like the ENP, stresses the 'partnership' criterion (Millennium Challenge Corporation, 2007a). Most importantly, the MCC's approach is based, among others, on 'country ownership' (Millennium Challenge Corporation, 2007d). In practice, the MCA has been as joint as the ENP. However, despite not singling out differentiation as a category peculiar to the policy, the MCA has left it to the partner to identify the specific areas for which the latter requested development aid and draft one's own proposal. In this sense, the MCA can be stated to be not just differentiated and 'tailor-made' but also generated by the recipient and, hence, 'designer-made', allowing the recipient to dictate his preferences and taste vis-à-vis the foreign/development policy of the donor.

As far as the feature of conditionality is concerned, in terms of means, in contrast to the ENP, which has opted for qualitative review of a recipient's progress, the MCA operationalizes the criteria used for selection and evaluation of the eligible countries through sixteen quantitative indicators. To qualify for the MCA a country has to 'score above the median on at least half' of those indicators 'used to measure country performance and above the median on the corruption indicator' (MCC, 2006). In the meantime, the latter are not measurements conducted by the US government but those of IGOs and NGOs. To specify, Freedom House and the World Bank Institute indicators are used to measure how a country receiving assistance performs on 'ruling justly', the

⁴ In comparison, the USAID 'supports long-term and equitable economic growth and advances U.S. foreign policy objectives by supporting: economic growth, agriculture and trade, global health and democracy, conflict prevention and humanitarian assistance' (USAID, 2007f).

World Bank, UN and national sources indicators - for 'investing in people' and the Institutional Investor Magazine, IMF, national sources, Heritage Foundation, World Bank Institute and World Bank indicators - to assess progress made with promoting 'economic freedom'. Meanwhile, progress reports are issued more often in comparison to the ENP, notably, on an annual basis.

What concerns the content of conditionality, the MCA does not mention additional carrots but it does extensively dwell on the clauses when sticks can be exercised. To verify, the MCA highlights the necessity to meet the indicated benchmarks, which are appraised periodically. Otherwise, disbursement-related actions or 'suspension and termination' of assistance may apply. Based on a disbursement agreement, the MCC holds the right 'not to disburse or to defer disbursement or take other actions in response to a particular disbursement request because one or more conditions precedent have not been met' (MCC, 2007b, p. 5). Suspension and termination may pertain 'in whole or in part... if the CEO determines that (1) the country or entity is engaged in activities which are contrary to the national security interested of the United States; (2) the country or entity has engaged in a pattern of actions inconsistent with the criteria used to determine the eligibility of the country or entity; or (3) the country or entity has failed to adhere to its responsibilities under its Millennium Challenge Compact'. In the meantime, this can be done unilaterally by the CEO 'after consultation with MCC's Board of Directors', although 'warning' can be issued to the partner (Ibid.). A partner is, nonetheless, given a chance to take corrective measures and have the Compact restored since the reasons for taking a particular action are to be identified (pp. 7-8). The MCA is, thus, very clear as far as its terms and conditions are concerned.

The comparison of the policies of the EU and the US renders that the acclaimed innovative nature of the ENP in the face of the identified distinct attributes is an exaggeration. Moreover, like the others, 'conditionality', too, is in no way peculiar to the ENP: it is equally characteristic of the MCA. This is so despite the variance in the means and content of conditionality: the EU has opted for soft measures of monitoring the progress made by a particular neighbor and has both carrots and sticks in store, while the US utilizes hard measures and announces that it has a stick at its disposal.

EU and US Funding

A clearer comparison between the two EU and the US can be yielded by uncovering the funding the two actors have allocated to Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia since their independence. Specifically, in the period between 1991 and 2006 TACIS assistance to Armenia has amounted to 386,390 million EUR, while the USAID assistance in 1997-2007 has been around 829,348 million USD. For Georgia, the figures are 505,09 million EUR

and 838,434 million USD, and for Azerbaijan – 429,694 million EUR and 406,153 million USD, respectively (USAID, 2007; European Commission, 2006m, 2006n; The European Commission’s Delegation to Georgia, 2007).⁵

Apart from unilateral contributions the US and the EU and its member states have also channelled funding through multilateral organizations. The Table below (even if not comprehensive) is illustrative since it offers a comparison of the EU and US multilateral donations to Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.⁶

Amount Pledged (in USD)	Armenia	Azerbaijan	Georgia	South Caucasus	Amount Paid (in USD)	Paid
US	6,580,648	7,475,504	17,976,411	32,032,563	10,448,700	= 33% ⁷
EU	1,379,708	1,560,021	13,436,282	16 376 011	1,240,471	= 7% ⁸
EU member-states	6,289,728	5,802,356	19,682,816	31 775 360	9,937,738	= 31% ⁹

The table shows that the amount provided by the current 27 EU member-states almost equals the US contribution. Moreover, the budgets promised by the member-states and the US are paid to the same extent, while the EU is lagging behind with making its promises and payments commensurate.

What concerns the current policies of the EU and the US, the following holds true. The ENPI funding for the four-year period of 2007-2010 promises 98.4 million EUR to Armenia, 92 million EUR to Azerbaijan and 120.4 million EUR to Georgia. Additional contribution is also foreseen through the ENPI Eastern Regional Program, the ENPI Interregional Program and, indirectly, the ENPI Cross-Border program, i.e. through the Black Sea and the Black Sea Synergy – a New Regional Cooperation Initiative (European Commission, 2006a, 2006c, 2007b).

The MCA budget is channeled through the MCA five-year Compacts for Armenia covering a sum of 235.65 million USD and Georgia – with an amount of 295.3 million

⁵ The USAID budget has been composed by looking at the annual Congressional Budget Justifications for Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia (USAID, 2007).

⁶ The donor contributions to Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia have been composed personally through the Financial Tracking Service (FTS): the Global Humanitarian Assistance Database (Reliefweb, 2006b, 2006c, 2006d, 2006e, 2006f, 2006g, 2006h, 2006i, 2006j).

⁷ A sum 2,400,000 USD (49%) was paid to Armenia, 3,217,800 USD (43%) – to Azerbaijan and 4,830,900 USD (27%) to Georgia.

⁸ The EU paid an amount of 890,471 USD (64%) to Armenia and 350,000 USD (3%) - to Georgia.

⁹ The EU member-states paid 1,338,724 USD (21%) to Armenia and 8,599,014 USD (44%) - to Georgia.

USD. The oil- and gas-rich Azerbaijan has been judged to be non-eligible for the MCA funding due to its poor political credentials (Millennium Challenge Corporation, 2004).¹⁰

By replacing the analysis back into the 'civilian/normative power Europe' frame, it becomes clear that all the five core norms, identified by Manners as EU-specific (2002, pp. 242-243), namely, peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, seem to be both equally peculiar to the US as much as the EU as far as their foreign policy conduct has demonstrated. Ironically, this discovery discredits another major delineation between the 'civilian' and 'normative' power Europe since it proves that these norms are as characteristic of institutions and policies, as of a state. Moreover, the US also fares well on account of norm-diffusion (Manners, 2002, pp. 244-245). This is owing to its 'actorness' and 'presence' in the South Caucasus through a myriad of initiatives (Bretherton & Vogler, 1999). Finally, the commensurability of the US's policy with civilianness/normativity is testified by the fact that a) it has been a pioneer in transmitting Western norms/values and b) it has supported its actions by allocating solid funding in order to make its norms and actions proportional.

Yet, the diachronic scrutiny of the EU and US policies should be complemented by examination the two challenges presented in the form of challenges/dilemmas: 'civilian' versus 'military' means and ends and 'norms/values' versus 'interests' motives. The keeping of the 'right' balance between civilian rather than military means and ends and normative rather than rational drives has been defined as crucial for the preponderance of EU as a 'civilian/normative power'.

'Civilian'/'Normative' versus Military Power Challenge/Dilemma

When applying the 'civilian' versus 'military' challenge/dilemma to the case one witnesses that the EU's activities in the conflict-ridden South Caucasus have been purely civilian. In 2001 the EU secured itself a seat in the Joint Control Commission (JCC) – a quadrilateral body composed of Georgian, Russian and North and South Ossetian, as well as OSCE representatives in charge of the mediation of the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict since 1992 - as an informal observer (International Crisis Group, 2006a, p. 20). In February 2005 the EU sent an assessment mission to Georgia's border with Russia where the North Caucasian Republics of Ingushetia, Dagestan and Chechnya are located and it delegated an EU Special Representative Border Team to facilitate the strengthening of Georgia's border management system. In July 2006 as a response to Georgia's request the European Council approved of launching a first one-year-long ESDP Rule of Law

¹⁰ Most importantly, by 2010 Azerbaijan plans to double its oil output making it reach 65 million tons annually and gas production - 30 billion cubic meters a year (Alexander's Gas and Oil Connections, 2007).

Mission, called EUJUST Themis, to Georgia. The latter was designed to support the Georgian authorities in reforming the criminal justice system through expert twinning and mentoring. While seemingly technical, the launching of these missions signaled the 'actorness' of the EU in the South Caucasus together with its 'presence' alongside other global actors.

Whether despite or because of the often-attested-to rivalry between the US and Russia, the US has not embarked on military activities in the 'region' even where their usage might be justifiable. Rather, since the beginning of 1990s the US has been involved in facilitating dialogue around the regional conflicts of Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. This has been done not only through the messages conveyed by the US Embassies but also through the platforms of the OSCE and the UN. Together with Russia and France, the US has acted as a co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group and as a representative (together with UK, Germany, France and Russia) of the Group of Friends of the UN Secretary General set up to contribute to the mediation of the Abkhazian conflict. Although the involvement of the US in the resolution of the South Ossetian conflict has been more limited, the US has had a voice via the OSCE and since 1997 in the ad hoc committee headed by the JCC co-chairs, with the participation of the OSCE and UNHCR.

In May 2002 as a response to Georgia's quest for assistance to enhance its counter-terrorist capabilities the US launched a 64 million USD-worth Train-and-Equip Program aiming to upgrade Georgia's military capabilities. The assistance program was meant to provide military equipment and training and to seal off Georgia's borders from the Russian southern regions of Chechnya and Dagestan where assumingly terrorist networks abounded. The latter came to an end in April 2004. It was, however, followed up by a renewal of the US support to the Georgian army through the 60 million USD-worth Sustainment and Stability Operations Program (SSOP) for another year with the purpose that the Georgian army would contribute to the Operation Iraqi Freedom (International Crisis Group, 2006b, p. 21).

The US has also pledged 10 million USD to Azerbaijan. The amount was supposed to be spent on strengthening border security, improving the communications infrastructure and training the Azeri naval fleet to protect the oil-rich state's offshore drilling platforms. Pentagon planners also negotiated with Baku about the establishment of a joint military program and basing their forces in Azerbaijan (AzerNews, 2004).

Thus, although the American means in the South Caucasus have been instrumentally civilian, its ends have implied a potential for military deployment. This variation differentiates the EU from the US. In short, the EU has used its civilian mission for

solving hard-security problems, while the US has conceived of the possibility of stretching its civilian means to military ends.

Norms/Values and Interests: Collision or Compatibility?

EU

The transposition of the 'norms/values' versus 'interests' challenge/dilemma to the case-study will help to find out whether the US and the EU have been different as far as their motives are concerned. The best way of investigating this is through analysis of a few key political statements where both values and interests loom large. According to Patten and Lindh (2001), peace and security should be fostered together with the goal of reaping material benefits, namely, energy resources:

'There is perhaps as much oil under the Caspian Sea as under the North Sea and a huge amount of gas there and in Central Asia - good news for energy-hungry Europe. The Caucasian corridor is the fastest way from southern Europe to central Asia and beyond; peace would help realize the potential for transporting goods and energy from the Caspian region and Central Asia. Peace in the Caucasus would also boost the security of the whole continent. This is why the EU is involved in helping all three governments to develop their economies and promote regional cooperation' (Ibid.).

As stated by the EU's External Relations Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner (2006):

'ENP has enabled us to tackle some of our citizens' most pressing concerns, like energy supplies, migration, security, and stability' (140). 'ENP also promotes economic and social reform, both for reasons of solidarity, but also because we want stability in our neighbourhood and thus added security for ourselves' (p. 142).

The combination of norms/values and interests is retained and reiterated in a plethora of the EU's documents referring, among others, to the South Caucasus:

'The EU promotes its values and interests by operating simultaneously as a continental power and as a global economic and political player, using various instruments ranging from the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), assistance and trade on the one hand to the external dimensions of the EU's internal policies on the other.' (European Commission, 2006a, 2006d, 2006f, 2006h).

This discourse helps to single out the following issues of 'mutual' or 'common' 'interest' between the EU and the Neighborhood: energy, transport, trade and investment relations, research and education, and regional cooperation (European Commission, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2007). It attests to the validity and simultaneous viability of both norms/values and interests in the EU's external policy towards the Neighbourhood and the South Caucasus, in particular. The discourse, thus, urges to incorporate the two as

complementary rather than conflictual elements of civility/normativity if the EU ought to qualify as one.

US

In contrast to the EU, which has been auspiciously characterized as a new kind of power with normative motivations, the US has often been criticized as one, which hides its sly intentions behind normative banners. In order to verify this accusation the same method should be applied to the discourse of the US.

According to the then Congresswoman Pelosi (1997),

The US 'national interest is served by an active US role in the world by means of promoting the transition to free markets and democratic societies, ensuring arms control, eradicating diseases, preventing and resolving conflicts, fostering basic human rights, fighting poverty, encouraging sustainable development, trade and investment, all of which would provide a return on US investment. Our national security, the strength of our economy, and the health of our environment are all inextricably linked to the success or failure of these programs.'

USAID/Armenia Strategy for 2004-2008 mentions the following 'areas of vital interest to the US Government: a strong economy, an accountable democracy, employment generation and poverty reduction, as well as human and institutional capacity development' (USAID, 2004). It further states that Armenia's 'progress towards becoming a stable, European-oriented and democratic country with a transparent, market-based economy is important to US security and economic interests in the region'. Overall, 'US national interests in Armenia, and in the larger Caucasus region' are said to 'revolve around security, conflict resolution, internal reform and energy security' (p. 1).

By shedding light on the challenge/dilemma between 'norms/values' versus 'interests' it has been shown that the US has honestly disclosed the simultaneous existence of its normative and rational aspirations and been ideology-wise as rationally and/or normatively inspired as the EU. The paper has tried to discredit the unacceptable bias towards the EU to the detriment of the US. Consequently, it has deduced that the only difference in discourse is that the US talks of 'national interest', while the EU – of 'mutual' and 'common' interest. As will be meticulously inspected in the part on legitimacy, however, the US policy towards the South Caucasus has also rested on mutual and common interests, even if the latter have not been framed as such.

While the two challenges/dilemmas testify that both the means and ends, as well as the motives of the EU and the US are rather alike than unlike, the shortcomings identified in

the 'civilian/normative power Europe' literature can be eradicated by retrieving the characteristics used by different authors for different cases. The compilation of the latter yields a checklist whereby both the EU and the US can be judged according to their pre-disposition towards multilateralism, propensity of acting in an inclusive way, enjoyment of legitimacy and their grievance for a regionalist order.

Multilateralism

EU's propensity towards multilateralism is singled out as a primary feature of its civilianness/normativity and juxtaposed with the US's unilateral preference for handling affairs. The Country Reports for Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia recognize the added value of the other donors in different sectors of development (European Commission, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c). Through the ENP APs the EU is buttressing not only the role of the multilateral institutions, such as the UN and its agencies, such as the UNHCR, WTO, ILO, WHO, ICC, OSCE, CoE, OECD, IMF, World Bank and IFC but also reemphasizing the commitments made by the partner countries to these IGOs (European Commission, 2006j, 2006k, 2006l).

The USAID, as a major agent of the US foreign policy towards the South Caucasus, has manifested true inclination towards multilateralism. Since 1990s it has funded a plethora of projects run by the UN agencies, namely, the UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR, WHO, WFP and FAO (WFP, 2007). Interestingly, most of the initiatives for which the USAID has earmarked funding relate to humanitarian and social matters, such as food, fuel, medical supplies, commodities, building permanent dwelling for refugees and IDPs, strengthening health care in response to Avian and Human Influenza and diphtheria, managing crises and emergency situations, supporting poverty reduction mechanisms, etc.¹¹ This is an indicator not just of 'civilianness' on the part of the US but a 'core' type of civilianness since it essentially covers the human dimension (Vasilyan, 2007). Moreover, most of the USAID's work has been carried out with a normative reasoning. Therefore, as seen from the field, the multilateralist disposition of the US, at least, in the South Caucasus should neither be neglected nor underestimated.

Inclusiveness

For conveying an accurate picture of the EU's and a US's possible civilianness/normativity, inclusiveness should be analyzed per policy-stage, namely, the policy-making, policy-implementation and policy-assessment ones. In the policy-making stage the negotiations over the APs with the South Caucasian states remained constrained to a few actors: they included the Commission officials, on the one hand, and

¹¹ Letters received from UN staff working in these agencies.

government representatives from respective neighbouring countries, on the other. On the EU side, the European Parliament was hardly consulted. On the side of the neighbours, neither the opposition, nor the civil society representatives and nor the public were properly engaged in the ENP AP negotiations (International Crisis Group, 2006a, pp. 13-15). So, the EU did not reach beyond the special governmental bodies to prove that it is a new type of a global actor.

In contrast to the ENP, the MCC requires that 'countries that receive assistance will be responsible for', among others, 'ensuring civil society participation' (Millennium Challenge Corporation, 2007a).¹² Above all, 'the MCC solicits and considers public comment regarding the country selection criteria and methodology for a period of 30 days' (Millennium Challenge Corporation, 2007b). Thus, the US has strived for inclusiveness.

Comparably, in the policy-implementation stage the EU's traditionalism was supplemented by a novel type of behaviour. The EU seems to be the only actor, which has managed to 'intervene' into the non-recognized *de facto* states in the South Caucasus, notably, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It has done so not only by providing assistance but also implementing its own projects with the help of its agencies, namely, the Commission, the EBRD, EIDHR and ECHO. Often, the EU has transferred money to the European NGOs, such as the Action Contra El Hambre, Article 19 Global Campaign for Free Expression, Premiere Urgence, Danish Refugee Council to implement specific programs in Abkhazia and to Secours Populaire Francais – in South Ossetia (Reliefweb, 2003, 2004a, 2004b, 2006a). Multilaterally, the EU has additionally financially supported the UN-mandated peace force, UNDP, UNOMIG, ICRC and WFP in Abkhazia and OSCE in South Ossetia in their endeavors. Such behaviour breaks the code of conduct established through international law and sets a new type of precedent. Hereby it ascertains its unconventional behaviour. In the meantime, the EU has done so with the endorsement of the respective governments and the recipient the non-recognized entities (International Crisis Group, 2006a, pp. 16-17).¹³

Primarily because of the resistance of Azerbaijan towards the EU's involvement in Nagorno-Karabakh, the Commission has stayed aloof from engagement. Still, in the

¹² In the field, when preparing its proposal for the MCA assistance, 'Armenia engaged itself in a consultative process that reached out to a broad range of constituents, including rural community members, NGOs and the private sector' (Millennium Challenge Corporation, 2007c). Moreover, some NGOs were selected to act 'as observers to the Government's MCA Board of Trustees – an inter-governmental body chaired by the Prime Minister and responsible for overseeing the Compact development process' (Ibid.). Additionally, a Stakeholders' Committee representing the beneficiaries of the Program would 'nominate voting members from Armenia's NGO sector to serve alongside the government's representatives on the Governing Council of MCA-Armenia' in order 'to oversee and implement the Compact' (Ibid.).

¹³ Tbilisi has been enthusiastic about the EU's engagement in the breakaway regions and contribution to their development believing that the improvement of life standards and given Georgia's declared ambition to join the EU both Abkhazia and South Ossetia will yield and remain autonomous parts of Georgia.

period of 1996-2000 the EU initiated five rehabilitation projects (International Crisis Group, 2006a, p. 6).¹⁴

A by-product of the ENP, the Erasmus Mundus Cooperation Window (a program similar to the US Department of State-funded Freedom Support Act (FSA) educational programs) makes the citizens of the non-recognized entities, as well as refugees and IDPs from, among others, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, eligible for academic programs in the EU. By doing so, it emphasizes regional inclusiveness, i.e. partners from the three countries will not qualify unless they are interested in joining the same project together.

Inversely, the US position towards the resolution of the Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts has been similar to that of the EU, namely, unequivocal endorsement of territorial integrity of Georgia. Notwithstanding this, the US has been mostly reluctant to get engaged in these breakaway regions and has been careful with its actions being construed as supporting the de facto structures.¹⁵ In this vein, the US has acted in compliance with the traditional format of international relations whereby the acceptable way of forging relations is with and for sovereign states. Still, the US, like the EU, has acted through the multilateral trajectory by giving additional funds to UNICEF in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and American non-state entities, like the United Methodist Committee on Relief, Academy for International Development, Carelift International, American Councils for International Education to run projects in Abkhazia and the Adventist Development Relief Agency, Mercy Corps and Save the Children operating in South Ossetia.

In the policy-assessment stage, the ENP AP progress reports are going to be developed together with the neighboring 'partner'. The MCA monitoring and evaluation is similar: 'MCC works with country counterparts' (Millenium Challenge Corporation, 2007, p. 20).

In a nutshell, the policy-making of both the ENP and the MCA is more inclusive than the previous policies of the EU and the US, respectively. Nonetheless, the comparative review of the EU and US current policies suggests that the US has fared well in the policy-making and -assessment stages and partially in the implementation stage, while the EU – in the policy-implementation and -assessment stages. Despite these differences, both have manifested favoritism towards third party participation rather than exclusion from their latest polices. Thus, both can rightly fall under the category of 'civilian/normative power'. Meanwhile, to become full-fledged inclusive actors both still have room for rectifying the corresponding policy-stages.

¹⁴ The latter were supposed to improve the living conditions of IDPs in Azerbaijan.

¹⁵ This has been more the case with respect to South Ossetia because of the US being unwilling to annoy Russia, which has been supportive of the South Ossetian cause.

Legitimacy

If the EU intends to remain a transformationist civilian/normative power it needs to guarantee legitimacy for itself. An inbound perspective from the South Caucasus will demonstrate whether the EU and the US are perceived as legitimate actors by the regional publics and elites.

a) Public Level

According to the public poll conducted by the International Republican Institute (IRI), 84% of the Armenian public believes that Armenia and the EU are on good terms as compared with 60% - for the relations between Armenia and the US. The EU, together with Iran, ranks third (33%) after Russia (88%) and France (74%) as a partner. In the meantime, only 17% of Armenians consider the US as a partner, while 13% think that it could pose a threat. 35% believe that Armenia should join the EU with 47% being inclined towards a 'yes'. 9% of those surveyed think that Armenia should join NATO and 34% hesitate towards a 'probably yes'. The confidence in the EU is up to 82% with a minor difference of 1% led by the CIS (83%), while only 45% of the population confides in NATO (International Republican Institute et al., 2006a).¹⁶ In the meantime, the survey conducted by the Armenian Centre for National and International Studies (ACNIS) in August 2004 has exposed that 51% of the Armenian public thinks that from the viewpoint of security Armenia's relations should be developed with the EU and 35.6% - with the US.

According to the IRI poll as of February 2007, the picture in Georgia is as follows: 85% of the population evaluates the relations between Georgia and the EU as 'good' with the US scoring 94%. 25% of the Georgians consider the EU a most important partner, while 49% think that the US is one (International Republican Institute et al., 2007). This could be explained by the American political 'presence' and 'actorness' in Georgia since the country's independence, whereas the EU did not intermingle in the affairs of others until its Big Bang enlargement of 2004. Moreover, the US is seen by Georgians to have sent the right signal to Russia and, thus, deferred the potential proactivity of the latter towards its 'near abroad'. This argument becomes clear once one sees that 65% of the Georgian population believes that the country, which has most influence in Georgia, is the US as opposed to 11% - believing that it is the EU (2006b). Some Georgians (42%) also think that the presence of US military personnel has had a positive influence on Georgian independence and stability in the country (2005). Ultimately, 46% of the Georgian population believes that Georgia should join the EU, 48% aspires for membership in NATO and only 7% conceives of a future in the CIS (Ibid., 2007).

¹⁶ It is worthwhile to mention that NATO is largely associated with the US rather than perceived as a Euro-Atlantic alliance. This perception could be attributed to the East-West divide underlined by NATO's military guardianship of the Western terrain and the Soviet domination in the East.

While no similar surveys have been conducted in Azerbaijan, the picture drawn from Armenia and Georgia shows that there is no common South Caucasian perception either of the EU or the US or the EU versus the US. Rather, the Armenians and Georgians have different perceptions of the two actors. To sum up, Armenians seem to have more favoritism towards the EU than the US; Georgians rank the US higher. It should, however, be kept in mind that for Armenians Russia is key strategic partner with the others only following the lead. In the meantime, NATO and EU go hand in hand for Georgians with the former being considered as the stepping-stone to the latter in light of the precedent set by the countries of the Central and Eastern Europe, which became EU member-states.

b) Elite Level

The importance of analyzing the elite stance in the neighboring countries and specifically, the South Caucasus stems from the necessity for the EU to remain truthful to the principle of 'partnership' and adhere to the motto of 'joint ownership'. Most importantly, the future relations between the EU and a neighboring country (after the expiration of the APs) will be conditioned by the presence and the level of intensity of the commitment of a particular elite. So, how does the EU fare in comparison to the US as seen through the eyes of the Armenian, Georgian and Azeri diplomats?

To Armenia, the EU is not significantly different from other actors in the South Caucasus – the US or Inter-governmental organizations (IGOs), like the Council of Europe, OSCE, NATO, etc.; just like others, it pursues 'its own institutional interests'.¹⁷ It is a crucial market having a stake in which will boost Armenia's economic growth and help the country prosper. Armenia remains faithful to its foreign policy of 'complementarity' (which even if seen as 'dependency' (Weinstein, 2004)) is both a motor and a reflection of the position of the Armenian government (Vasilyan, 2006). However, Armenia has declared that its path is one of European integration, implying adoption of European standards, which permeate its political, economic and value system. Closer relations between Armenia and the EU would entail good disposition by the latter towards the former – a small country in need of such an attitude.¹⁸

The Georgian diplomats conceive of the EU as a power, which has been gradually gaining political impetus in the South Caucasus. Today, Georgia appreciates the EU's civilian capacity and the latter's readiness to safeguard its borders and broker its relations with Russia. 'We are grateful to the US for the assistance it has given to Georgia since the country stepped on the path of democracy. Provided the common values and interests, the US helped Georgia in its transition process.' 'In contrast to the EU, the

¹⁷ Interview with a diplomat at the Mission of Armenia to the EU

¹⁸ Ibid.

relations between Georgia and NATO are more balanced since the latter has declared that its doors are open on condition of fulfillment of the mutually agreed obligations. The EU has not mentioned this'. Consequently, it does not seem to be a determined actor. Nonetheless, Georgia seeks to join the EU primarily because it perceives of itself as having a European identity.¹⁹

To Azerbaijan, the EU demonstrates less 'density' in the negotiation process than other state actors. Moreover, during the negotiation process over the AP the Azeri side realized that the ENP was being steered by the EU member-states. In short, Azerbaijan perceives of the EU as an institutional amalgam comprising national interests, which are often conveyed to its disadvantage. For the time being, wary of the EU's practice of double-standards, Azerbaijan stays aloof from the aspiration to step on the path of potential EU membership.²⁰ For Azerbaijan the EU is simply 'a valuable partner'.²¹

Georgia looks up to the EU as a club comprising membership of the most successful and admirable states. Therefore, belonging to it would satisfy Georgia's self-confidence and help the country flourish. The fact that Georgia is an energy transit state has had an influence on Georgia's orientation towards the EU but it is not the major determinant of the fact that Georgia looks up to the EU. Armenia's inclination is more of a pragmatic nature: the country wishes to embark on reforms for the sake of general progress. In the meantime, the EU, as the bearer of the best attributes of the developed world inspires Armenia and helps it steer itself in the right direction. Yet, for Azerbaijan the EU is primarily an economic power – a wealthy customer of its energy resources with a dubious political clout. In a nutshell, the Georgian elite is more prone to gradually strengthen its ties with the EU than the Armenian one, with Azerbaijan falling all the way behind.

Regionalization

Initially, the EU treated the three countries separately and differently: not only did it launch its missions to Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan at different time intervals but the nature of the tasks dealt by the Commission Delegations varied.²² Being relatively active

¹⁹ Interview with a diplomat at the Mission of Georgia to the EU

²⁰ Two examples were brought up by the Azeri diplomats at the Mission of Azerbaijan to the EU. Firstly, the negotiation over the ENP AP was stalled when Cyprus expressed its indignation at the fact that Azerbaijan flew a commercial flight to the Northern Cyprus. Secondly, the Azeri officials think that it is not right on the part of the EU not to have instilled the principle of 'territorial integrity', which has the identical force in international law as the competing 'right of people to self-determination' also in the AP for Armenia, as in the EU/Azerbaijan AP). In comparison, the EU took such a standpoint with respect to Georgia. The Azeri diplomats attribute this stance to the Armenian Diaspora presence in EU member-states.

²¹ Interview with a diplomat at the Mission of Azerbaijan to the EU

²² To specify, the European Commission mission to Georgia was launched in 1993, to Armenia - in 1994 and to Azerbaijan - in 1995. Moreover, while the Delegation of the European Commission to Georgia and Armenia has been hosted in Tbilisi since 1998 with a branch-office in Yerevan, Baku, despite its request for a full-fledged delegation, received only a Europa House in 2002. The Commission Special Envoy in Azerbaijan was limited in his mandate, being responsible only for technical support, i.e. planning, programming and implementing TACIS projects.

in Georgia, the EU kept a lower profile in its relations with Armenia and yet a lower one with Azerbaijan.

Today, the South Caucasus represents the only 'region' in the EU's Neighborhood where the EU wants to fabricate a Euroregion (European Commission, 2006i, p. 16). To trace back the process of the EU's regionalization of the South Caucasus, TRACECA and INOGATE Programs aimed at regionalization through creation of transport and energy arteries. The PCAs for Armenia (European Commission 1999a, p. 2), Azerbaijan (1999b, p. 3) and Georgia (1999c, p. 2) refer to the desirability of regional cooperation as an objective in their Introductory parts. In July 2003 after the appointment of a Special Representative for the South Caucasus by the European Council the EU decided to create a political profile for itself in the 'region'. The ENP APs went much further singling out 'regional cooperation' as a separate Priority for Action (European Commission, 2006j, 2006k, 2006l).

Besides that, the regional approach was pertained to by the Commission as a means by starting and finishing the negotiations with the three South Caucasian states over the ENP APs simultaneously. The EU, thus, has actively sought to regionalize the South Caucasus.

Since 1997 when the US stressed the strategic importance of the pipelines as part of the 'Eurasian Transport Corridor' 'regional cooperation in the South Caucasus' became a part of the American ideology. In Omnibus Appropriations for FY 1999 (P. L. 105-277) the Silk Road Act authorized enhanced US policy and aid for economic development and transport linkages in the South Caucasus and Central Asia (Jim & Kim, 2001).

Today, the USAID Armenia Strategy for 2004-2008 underscores the importance of regional cooperation with neighboring countries (USAID, 2004, p. 19), and, notably, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Turkey 'through information sharing, exchange visits, conferences, joint studies, and partnerships, focusing on potential trans-boundary projects in water, energy or biodiversity conservation' (Appendix V - 3). It highlights that 'regional cooperation should be established between Armenia and its neighbors 'from energy, economic, and political standpoints' (p. 26). Further, 'regional trade' (Appendix VI - 27) and 'development of a regional energy market' (p. 22) are endorsed in a trilateral format. In short, regionalization has been fostered by the EU both as a means and objective, while only as an objective by the US.

Furthermore, Georgia has been EU's favourite in the South Caucasus. Since 1991 it has received funding for democratization and human rights. In June 2004 after the Rose Revolution the EU organized a donors conference raising 1 billion USD to support Georgia's reform process. On June 28, 2004 the ESDP Rule of Law Mission (EUJUST-THEMIS) was launched. The latter aimed at supporting the Georgian justice process, including policing and civilian administration. On July 2, 2004 the EU earmarked 4,65 million EUR under Rapid Reaction Mechanism (International Crisis Group, 2006a, p. 5). No such moves were made neither towards Armenia nor Azerbaijan.

Common Donorship

The 'civilian/normative power Europe' literature has disregarded that a) the EU in the process of 'learning' its foreign policy role has had the US as a teacher, b) the US has backed up the EU in its external endeavors and that c) the EU and the US often perform similarly in the field. Meanwhile, against the background of the conducted research advancement of 'common donorship' to the 'civilian/normative power Europe' research agenda can hardly be excessive. In this regard, some examples from inside the South Caucasus stand out.

While there are donor-coordination meetings taking place in the field testifying to the complementarity of work, among others, of the EU and the US, the EU calls for more cohesive work on the part of the donors (European Commission, 2005a, p. 19, 2005c, p. 21). Coordination could help to divide labour and avoid duplication of tasks and donor competition. The USAID, in its turn, sees donor coordination as vital for efficiency and effectiveness (USAID, 2007b). The USAID documents acknowledge the role of both the EU, its institutions and member-states as donors supporting Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia (USAID, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c, 1998a, 1998b, 1998c, 1999a, 1999b, 1999c, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c, 2001a, 2001b, 2001c, 2001d, 2001e, 2001f, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c).²³ The EU documents acknowledge the role of US (European Commission 2006a, p. 14; 2006d, p. 15; 2006e, p. 16; 2006f, p. 18; 2006g, p. 22; 2006h, p. 19; 2006i, p. 17). Most importantly, commitment to the civilian/normative activities stands out through the following examples.

The HALO Trust "accelerated demining programme" in Abkhazia has been largely dependent on donor-contributions.²⁴ In its fiscal year 2001, the US was the biggest donor providing 1 million USD to the Trust for clearance operations in Abkhazia. Germany gave a sum of 146,119 USD (Landmine Monitor, 2002). In 2002 1,1 million USD was allocated by the US to HALO Trust (Ibid.). In 2004 the US was still leading as the largest benefactor with a contribution amounting to 1.5 million USD out of the total 2 million USD followed by the UK (272,026 USD), the Netherlands (123,543 USD) and the Tokyo Broadcasting System (in cooperation with the Japanese Association for Aid and Relief) – (200,000 USD) (Landmine Monitor, 2005). In 2005 the HALO operations amounting to

²³ Two examples can be specifically singled out.

It is stated in the USAID Azerbaijan FY 2001 Program Description and Activity Data Sheets that since within the frames of TACIS the EU is planning 'a similar training project that will be able to work with all banks, USAID is discontinuing this program' (USAID, 2001).

Another example is that the EU and the US seem to have embarked on distribution of tasks in the South Caucasus: USAID is partner of UNICEF Georgia, while the EU – of UNICEF Azerbaijan (UNICEF, 2007).

²⁴ A mine clearance NGO, HALO has been founded in 1997. Since the establishment of the Abkhazian Mine Action Center (AMAC), which deals with data collection, drawing maps of mined areas and mine risk education, in 1999, HALO has funded, staffed and supported it.

3,253,162 USD were mostly funded by the US (3 million USD) and the Netherlands (253,162 USD) (Landmine Report 2006).²⁵ While in May 2006 HALO Trust reported a 'funding crisis' in its 2005-2007 mine action strategy, the European Commission has pledged to provide assistance (Ibid.).

The Regional Environmental Center for the Caucasus (REC), a non-profit foundation registered in the spring of 2000 and devoted to tackling environmental problems and facilitating sustainable development has been supported by the EU. Through engagement of all the stakeholders in the decision-making relating environmental issues, REC aims at engendering regionalism. Following an agreement signed between REC Caucasus and the US, the latter became a key donor. Financial and technical assistance has also been provided by the EU member-states Denmark, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Liechtenstein, as well as Switzerland and the Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund (CEPF). Thus, in comparison to the previously cited example, where the US has made a pledge to take over the donorship from the EU, in this case the transfer of the core responsibilities has been from the EU to the US.

An important example is the closure of Armenia's Soviet nuclear power plant, Metsamor, which is the primary supplier of electricity. The latter does not meet Western safety requirements, as it lacks a containment facility. It also suffers from chronic cash shortages, resulting in basic maintenance and operational difficulties. Thus, it has been assumed that it can endanger a humanitarian and an environmental catastrophe (USAID, 2004, p. 22). Not only an efficiently functioning replacement capacity is needed to take over the burden of Metsamor but the expenses related to the closure make it inconceivable for Armenia to undertake such a responsibility. In 2001 the EU promised to contribute up to 100 million EUR if a binding agreement could be concluded on a closure date for Metsamor. The EU/Armenia AP singles out the issues as a specific Priority Area demanding, among others, to 'develop and adopt legal and technical measures including a decommissioning plan with time schedules and cost evaluation for each measure' necessary for the closure of the Metsamor, starting in 2006 and ending in 2007 (p. 8). Thus, both the US and the EU have been putting pressure on Armenia to decommission the plant.

Thus, not only does the US act together with other donors, but it appreciates collaboration with the EU and its member-states acting as other top donors to the South

²⁵ Benefactors, like the EU member-states Finland, the UK and the Diana, Princess of Wales Memorial Fund, as well as Canada, the Tokyo Broadcasting System and the private foundations Pro Victimis and Anti-Landmyn Stichtung have also contributed to the HALO Trust.

Caucasian countries.²⁶ Therefore, it is essential to give due regard to the issue of 'common donorship' in the 'civilian/normative power Europe' literature by taking up the inbound perspective into account provided their almost identical (if not US-led) civilian/normative approach to the South Caucasus.

Credibility - a By-Product of Consistency versus Double-Standards

While credibility is the envisaged output according to which civilianness/normativity can be judged, one should still wait for the EU and the US to manifest themselves (especially in a comparative sense) in the South Caucasus. Indeed, it seems that the EU would have more work to do in that direction than the US. This is justified by the relatively low political profile of the EU in the South Caucasus, the ambiguity rendered by soft conditionality, the previous record of insufficiently living up to the funding pledges and the Azeri perception of the EU as employing double standards. For now, time is not ripe yet for drawing conclusions in this regard.

Epilogue

The paper has aimed at contributing to the 'civilian/normative power Europe' literature and policy discourse by building on the existing propositions, meeting the scholarly calls for filling in the existing gaps, as well as raising and addressing new ones. By conceiving that it is insufficient to justify EU's civiliannes/normativity by constraining oneself to the EU's specificities, it has tried to offer a holistic account by conducting an empirical investigation. The paper has resorted to identification of the drawbacks which potentially hinder the 'blossoming' of the 'civilian/normative power Europe' academic and political discourse to the utmost possible extent. To conquer those shortcomings, it has placed both the EU and the US under the civilian/normative guise and examined their policies towards the South Caucasus. By seeking to uncover the connotational meanings of civilianness/normativity , this endeavour has helped to distil variations in the approaches of the two actors, although observing that both can be rightfully qualify for the title 'civilian/normative power'. A diagram of the current policies can make this clear:

Current Policies	ENP	MCA
partnership	Y	Y
differentiation	Y (low)	Y (high)
conditionality as a) instrument	Y (soft)	Y (hard)

²⁶ While I did not manage to obtain systematic data about the overall funding of the US and the EU to the UN agencies due to a number of problems indicated by the UN staff in its field agencies, further research intends to unravel this.

b) content	Y (carrot + stick)	Y (stick)
------------	--------------------	-----------

Moreover, by identifying and judging the two actors with respect to the 'civilian/normative' versus 'military' means and 'norms/values' versus 'interests' dilemmas, as well as the characteristics of civilianness/normativity, namely, multilateralism, legitimacy, inclusiveness, regionalization, conditionality and credibility, the study has yielded the same conclusion. The research has helped to single out the intricacies of the EU and the US qua their policy rationale and instruments, as well as their environment, input, process, objective, means and output from an inbound perspective. The two-dimensional diagrams below summarizes how the EU and the US fit the various attributes of civilianness/normativity as seen from the South Caucasus.

Challenges/Dilemmas	EU	US
'Civilian/Normative' versus 'Military' Means	Y with civilian ends	Y but military ends possible
'Norms/Values' versus 'Interests'	Both	Both

Characteristics	EU	US
Multilateralism - environment	Y	Y
Inclusiveness - process	policy-making - N policy-implementation - Y policy-assessment - Y	policy-making - Y policy-implementation - N policy-assessment - Y
Legitimacy - input	Y	Y
Regionalization		
a) objective	Y	Y
b) approach	Y	N
Credibility - output	potentially N	potentially Y

Overall, the research has suggested that a non-biased, comparative, inbound perspective is vital to assure the viability of the 'civilian/normative power Europe' literature and discourse. In the meantime, differences wielded by the policies and challenges/dilemmas and characteristics of the two actors in no way prepare the grounds for qualifying the EU as a benevolent and the US as a malevolent actor. Thus, this difference is not a marker of the EU as a 'civilian/normative power' in contrast to the US. On the contrary, qua some characteristics and, especially, the output, the US fares even better than the EU.

Therefore, there is a necessity to indulge into the issue of common donorship by adding to the row of projects whereby the EU has received moral support from the US in

its external actions. The examples range from the Marshall Plan to the support of the candidacy of the Central and Eastern European states and Turkey into NATO and the EU, regionalization of the Balkans, the Euro-talk in the former Soviet countries, etc. Quite often the EU has had the luxury of doing the white-collar work since the blue-collar one has already been done by the US. The Union's challenges have been milder because of having had the chance to replicate the US. This raises the question as to whether the 'civilian/normative power Europe' should omit the word Europe.

Were the 'civilian/normative power Europe' literature to remain EU-centric, it could be ameliorated through covert (if not overt) comparison at least with the US. Through such an attempt the EU policy-makers could ensure credibility for the Union and sustain its added-value abroad. The conducted research has yielded that multilateralism is an attribute the EU acts in accord with – whether due to its natural constitution and/or its civilianness/normativity. Inclusiveness should still be worked on as far as the policy-making stage is concerned. The ENP's proclivity towards low differentiation might be a direct outcome of this shortcoming. Nonetheless, the EU does not suffer from an external legitimacy crisis – no matter whether seen as an amalgam of its member-states or a polity. EU's pursuit of regionalization also seems to be naturally driven and will most likely be in place as long as the EU itself. To sum up, it has been suggested that coherence between the outbound and inbound perspectives, as well as more comparative research is in need instead of merely putting forth generic propositions in the style "Long live the EU!" by taking the latter's civilianness/normativity for granted.

References

Books, Articles, Research Works

- Baran, Z. (2003). *South Caucasus: Making the Best Use of External Assistance for Stability Building and for Co-operation with NATO*. Advanced Research Workshop, Vinius, Lithuania. Retrieved February 17, 2005 from the Nixon Center Web Site:
<http://www.nixoncenter.org/publications/Baran%20Lithuania%20Speech.htm>
- Bicchi, F. (2006, March). 'Our Size Fits All': Normative Power Europe and the Mediterranean. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 13 (2), 286-303.
- Bretherton, C. & Vogler, J. (1999). *The European Union as a Global Actor*. London: Routledge.
- De Waal, M. & Matveeva, A. (2007, February). *Central Asia and the Caucasus: a Vulnerable Crescent*. Coping with Crisis: Working Paper Series, International Peace Academy.
- Diez, T. (2005). Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering 'Normative Power Europe'. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 33 (3), 613-636.
- Duchêne, F. (1973). The European Community and the uncertainties of interdependence. In M. Kohnstamm & W. Hager (Eds.). *A Nation Writ Large? Foreign-Policy Problems Before the Community* (pp. 1-21). London: Macmillan.
- Eriksen, E. O. (2006, March). The EU – a Cosmopolitan Polity? *Journal of European Public Policy*, 13 (2), 252-269.
- Ferrero-Waldner, B. (2006). The ENP: The EU's Newest Foreign Policy Instrument. *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 11 (2), 139-142.
- Gorbatova, Y. E. (2001). *Development of Foreign Policy and Security Policy of the EU in the Modern Period and Russian Interests*. In Materials of Convention '10 Years of the Russian Foreign Policy', Russian Association of International Studies. Retrieved December 15, 2004, from [Е. Э. Горбатова. Развитие общей внешней политики и политики безопасности ЕС на современном этапе и интересы России. Материалы конвента «10 лет внешней политики России». Российская ассоциация международных исследований. 15-е декабря 2004 г., источник]
<http://www.risa.ru/publications/convent/gorbatova.rtf>
- Hill, F. (2001). *A Not-So-Grand Strategy: U.S Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia since 1991*. Retrieved December 5, 2004, from the Brookings Institution Web site:
<http://www.brook.edu/views/articles/fhill/20010200.htm>
- Hovsepyan, A. (1999). *Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia: Historical Overview and Geopolitical Analysis* (MA thesis, University of Oxford, 1998-1999). Retrieved February 20, 2005, from British Alumni Association of Armenia Web site:
<http://www.baa.am/TCEC/TCEC-1.html>
- Hyde-Price, A. (2006, March), 'Normative' Power Europe: a Realist Critique. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 13 (2), 217-234.
- International Crisis Group (2005, April 19). *South Ossetia: Europe Briefing N°38*.
- _____ (2006a, March 20). *Conflict Resolution in the South Caucasus: Europe Report N°173*.
- _____ (2006b, September 15). *Abkhazia Today: Europe Report N°176*.
- Iyigunor, A. (2003). EU's Assistance Program to Armenia: A Political Economy Critique. *Review of Armenian Studies*, 1 (2), 75-87.
- Jim, N., & Kim, J. (2001). *Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia: Political Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests* (CRS Issue Brief for Congress, Order Code IB95024).

Retrieved on December 10, 2004, from Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service Web site:

<http://www.fas.org/man/crs/IB95024.pdf#search='Azerbaijan%20and%20interests>

Khasson, V., Vasilyan, S. & Vos H. (forthcoming). "Everybody Needs Good Neighbours": The EU and its Neighbourhood. In J. Orbie (Ed.). *Europe's Global Role: External Policies of the European Union*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Nicolaidis, K. & Howse, R. (2002). "This is my EUtopia...": Narrative as Power. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40 (4), 767-792.

Leonard, M. (2005). *Why Europe will Run the 21st Century*. London and New York: Fourth Estate.

Lucarelli, S. (2006). Interpreted Values: a Normative Reading of EU Role Conceptions and Performance. In O. Elgstrom & M. Smith (Eds.). *The European Union's Roles in International Politics* (pp. 47-66). London and New York: Routledge.

Manners, I. (2002). Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40 (2), 235-258.

_____ (2006). Normative Power Europe Reconsidered: beyond the Crossroads. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 13 (2), 182-199.

Mauil, H. (1990). Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers. *Foreign Affairs*, 69 (5), 91-106.

Patten, C., & Lindh, A. (2001, February 20). *Resolving a Frozen Conflict - Neither Russia nor the West Should Try to Impose a Settlement on the Southern Caucasus*. Retrieved on December 3, 2004 from the European Commission Web site:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/patten/ft_20_02_01.htm

Sherwood-Randall, E. (1998, Spring). US Policy and the Caucasus. *Contemporary Caucasus Newsletter*, 5, 3-5.

Schimmelfennig, F. & Sedelmeier, U. (2004, August). Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 11 (4), 661-679.

Sjursen, H. (2006a). What Kind of Power? *Journal of European Public Policy*, 13 (2), 169-181.

_____ (2006b). The EU as a 'Normative' Power: How Can This Be? *Journal of European Public Policy*, 13 (2), 235-251.

Smith, K. E. (2000). The End of Civilian Power EU: A Welcome Demise or Cause for Concern? *The International Spectator*, 35 (2), 11-28.

_____ (2003). *European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

_____ (2005). Engagement and Conditionality: Incompatible or Mutually Reinforcing? In R. Youngs (Ed.). *Global Europe Report 2: New Terms of Engagement* (pp. 23-30). Brussels: The Foreign Policy Centre, British Council.

Telo (2006). *Europe: A Civilian Power? European Union, Global Governance, World Order*. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Twitchett, K. (Ed.) (1976). *Europe and the World: the External Relations of the Common Market*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Valinakis, Y. (1999, July). *Chaillot Paper 36: The Black Sea Region: Challenges and Opportunities for Europe*. Retrieved February 17, 2005, from Institute for Security Studies Web site:
<http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chai36e.html>

Vasilyan, S. (forthcoming). EU Regionalizing the South Caucasus. In P. De Lomaerde & M. Schulz (Eds.). *The 'Makability' of Regions. An Evaluation of EU Monitoring and Support to Regional Integration Worldwide*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

_____ (2007). *The "Civilian"/'Normative' Power EU' and the Social Issues in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) Action Plans"* In Conference Proceedings, Research Workshop titled "The EU and the Social Dimension of Globalization", Lisbon, Portugal, 2-3 March, 2007.

Youngs, R. (2004). Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EU's External Identity. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 42 (2), 415-35.

_____ (2005). Engagement: Sharpening European Influence. In R. Youngs (Ed.). *Global Europe Report 2: New Terms of Engagement* (pp. 1-15). Brussels: The Foreign Policy Centre, British Council.

Whitman, R. (2005). Winning Hearts and Minds for Europe. In R. Youngs (Ed.). *Global Europe Report 2: New Terms of Engagement* (pp. 30-37). Brussels: The Foreign Policy Centre, British Council.

_____ (2007). Muscles from Brussels: The Demise of Civilian Power Europe? (101-118). In O. Elgstrom, & M. Smith (Eds.). *The European Union's Roles in International Politics: Concepts and Analysis*. London & New York: Routledge.

Official Documents

Committee on Foreign Relations, Committee on International Relations. *Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 2001, Volume I-A of Volumes I-A and I-B. S. PRT. 107-65.*

European Commission (1999a). *The European Union and the Republic of Armenia.*

_____ (1999b). *The European Union and the Republic of Azerbaijan.*

_____ (1999c). *The European Union and the Republic of Georgia.*

_____ (2001, December 27). *Tacis Regional Co-operation: Strategic Consideration 2002-2006 (updated) & Indicative Programme 2004-2006.* European Commission, DG External Relations.

_____ (2002, December 5-6). *Speech by Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission: A Wider Europe - A Proximity Policy as the Key to Stability, SPEECH/02/619. "Peace, Security and Stability International Dialogue and the Role of the EU" Sixth ECSA-World Conference. Jean Monnet Project, Brussels.*

_____ (March 2, 2005a). SEC (2005) 285/3, Commission Staff Working Paper. Annex to: "European Neighbourhood Policy". Country Report, Armenia, COM (2005) 72 final.

_____ (March 2, 2005b). SEC (2005) 286/3, Commission Staff Working Paper. Annex to: "European Neighbourhood Policy". Country Report, Azerbaijan, COM (2005) 72 final.

_____ (March 2, 2005c). SEC (2005) 288/3, Commission Staff Working Paper. Annex to: "European Neighbourhood Policy". Country Report, Georgia, COM (2005) 72 final.

_____ (2006a). *European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument: ENPI Eastern Regional Programme Strategy Paper 2007-2013.*

_____ (2006b). *European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument: ENPI Eastern Regional Indicative Programme 2007-2010.*

_____ (2006c). *European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument: ENPI Interregional Programme Strategy Paper 2007-2013 and Indicative Paper 2007-2010.*

_____ (2006d). *European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument: Armenia Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013.*

_____ (2006e). *European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument: Armenia National Indicative Programme 2007-2010.*

_____ (2006f). *European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument: Azerbaijan Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013*.

_____ (2006g). *European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument: Azerbaijan National Indicative Programme 2007-2010*.

_____ (2006h). *European Commission, European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument: Georgia Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013*.

_____ (2006i). *European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument: Georgia National Indicative Programme 2007-2010*.

_____ (2006j). *EU/Armenia Action Plan*.

_____ (2006k). *EU/Azerbaijan Action Plan*.

_____ (2006l). *EU/Georgia Action Plan*.

_____ (2007a). *Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Black Sea Synergy – a New Regional Cooperation Initiative*.

_____ (2007b). *European Neighbourhood & Partnership Instrument, Cross-Border Cooperation: Strategy Paper 2007-2013, Indicative Programme 2007-2010*.

European Council (2003a, June 20). *A Secure Europe in a Better World*. Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy. European Council, Thessaloniki.

_____ (2003b). *Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbourhood*, COM(2003)104, 11 March.

Millennium Challenge Corporation (2006, November). *Frequently Asked Questions about the Threshold Program*.

_____ (2007a). *Chapter 29: Guidelines for Monitoring and Evaluation Plans*.

_____ (2007b). *Chapter 7: Policy on Suspension and Termination*.

USAID (2004, March 19). *USAID Armenia Strategy for 2004-2008*.

Internet Resources

Alexander's Gas and Oil Connections (2007, March 28). *Azerbaijan Plans to Double Oil Output by 2010*. Retrieved from <http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/news/ntc71722.htm>

Armenian Center for National and International Studies (ACNIS) (2004, August). *Armenia's National and International Security in the Next Decade: Presentation of Expert and Public Opinion Poll Results*. Retrieved October 25, 2006 from: <http://www.acnis.am/pr/security/Socio07eng.pdf>

AzerNews (2004, August 19). *US Intends to Deploy Forces in Azerbaijan*. Retrieved December 3, 2005 from <http://www.myantiwar.org/view/25827.html>

European Commission (2006m). *The EU's Relations with Armenia*. Retrieved December 15, 2006 from http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/armenia/intro/index.htm

_____ (2006n). *The EU's Relations with Azerbaijan*. Retrieved December 15, 2006 from http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/azerbaijan/intro/index.htm

_____ (2007b). European Neighbourhood Policy. Retrieved March 5, 2007 from http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/index_en.htm

Freedom House (2006a). Country Report: Armenia (2006). Retrieved December 15, 2006 from <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2006&country=6912>

_____ (2006b). Country Report: Azerbaijan (2006). Retrieved December 15, 2006 from <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2006&country=6915>

_____ (2006c). Country Report: Georgia (2006). Retrieved December 15, 2006 from <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2006&country=6967>

International Republican Institute (IRI), Baltic Surveys Ltd./The Gallup Organization, Armenian Sociological Association with funding from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (November 2006a). *Armenia National Voter Study*. Retrieved March 5, 2007 from the IRI Web site: <http://www.iri.org/otherregions/news/pdfs/2006-11-06-armenia-poll.ppt>

_____ (February 2007). *Georgian National Voter Study*. Retrieved March 5, 2007 from the IRI Web site: <http://www.iri.org/eurasia/georgia/pdfs/2007-04-04-Georgia-Poll.ppt>

_____ (April 2006b). *Georgian National Voter Study*. Retrieved March 5, 2007 from the IRI Web site: <http://www.iri.org/eurasia/georgia/pdfs/2007-05-03-Georgia-Poll.ppt>

_____ (October 2005). *Georgian National Voter Study*. Retrieved March 5, 2007 from the IRI Web site: <http://www.iri.org/eurasia/georgia/pdfs/2007-05-03-Georgia-Poll2.ppt>

Landmine Monitor (2002). *LM Report 2002: Abkhazia*. Retrieved February 3, 2007 from the International Campaign to Ban Landmines Web site: <http://www.icbl.org/lm/2002/abkhazia.html>

_____ (2005). *LM Report 2005: Abkhazia*. Retrieved February 3, 2007 from the International Campaign to Ban Landmines Web site: <http://www.icbl.org/lm/2005/abkhazia.html>

_____ (2006). *LM Report 2006: Abkhazia*. Retrieved February 3, 2007 from the International Campaign to Ban Landmines Web site: <http://www.icbl.org/lm/2006/abkhazia.html>

Millennium Challenge Corporation (2004). *2004 Country Scorecards: Azerbaijan*. Retrieved February 3, 2007 from: http://www.mcc.gov/selection/scorecards/2004/score_fy04_azerbaijan.pdf

_____ (2007a). *About MCC*. Retrieved February 3, 2007 from: <http://www.mcc.gov/about/index.php>

_____ (2007b). Step 2: Publish Country Selection Criteria & Methodology and Accept Public Comment. Retrieved February 3, 2007 from: <http://www.mcc.gov/selection/step02-publish.php>

_____ (2007c). Countries: Armenia. Retrieved February 3, 2007 from: <http://www.mcc.gov/countries/armenia/index.php>

_____ (2007d). Threshold Country Plan Guidance for Fiscal Year 2007: Principles of the Millennium Challenge Account. Retrieved February 3, 2007 from: <http://www.mcc.gov/countrytools/threshold/principles.php>

Pelosi, N. (1997, April 16). *Representative Nancy Pelosi Freedom House Forum on Foreign Aid*. Retrieved on March 1, 2007 from the US House of Representatives Web site: <http://www.house.gov/pelosi/freedom.htm>

Reliefweb (2001). *Current Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Programmes in South Ossetia. Compiled by OCHA on the basis of information provided by the respective agencies, March 2001.* Retrieved February 3, 2007
<http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2001/ocha-geo-15marc.pdf>

_____ (2002a). *Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Assistance Programmes in Abkhazia in 2002. Compiled by OCHA with information provided by the respective agencies, September 2002 (version 1.1).* Retrieved February 3, 2007 from:
<http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2002/ocha-abk-13sep.pdf>

_____ (2002b). *Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Assistance Programmes in South Ossetia in 2002. Compiled by OCHA with information provided by the respective agencies, September 2002.* Retrieved February 3, 2007 from:
<http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2002/ocha-oss-17sep.pdf>

_____ (2003). *Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Assistance Programmes in Abkhazia in the second part of 2002 and 2003. Compiled by OCHA with information provided by the respective agencies, September 2003.* Retrieved February 3, 2007 from:
<http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2003/ocha-geo-16sep.pdf>

_____ (2004a). *Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Assistance Programmes in South Ossetia in 2003. Compiled by OCHA with information provided by the respective agencies, January 2004.* Retrieved February 3, 2007 from:
<http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2004/ocha-geo-15jan.pdf>

_____ (2004b). *Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Assistance Programmes in Abkhazia in 2003. Compiled by OCHA with information provided by the respective agencies, January 2004.* Retrieved February 3, 2007 from:
<http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2004/ocha-geo-20jan.pdf>

_____ (2006a). *Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Assistance Programmes in Abkhazia in 2006. Compiled by UNDP with information provided by the respective agencies, April 2006.* Retrieved February 3, 2007 from:
<http://www.undp.org.ge/news/AbkhaziaUpdateMatrix-April.pdf>

_____ (2006b). *Appeals & Funding. Donor Country(ies): United States, Destination country(ies): Armenia.* Retrieved February 3, 2007 from:
http://ocha.unog.ch/fts2/pageloader.aspx?page=search-reporting_display&CQ=cq140607164834bptAacnztS

_____ (2006c). *Appeals & Funding. Donor Country(ies): United States, Destination country(ies): Azerbaijan.* Retrieved February 3, 2007 from:
http://ocha.unog.ch/fts2/pageloader.aspx?page=search-reporting_display&CQ=cq140607164641YSFeSHXkPP

_____ (2006d). *Appeals & Funding. Donor Country(ies): United States, Destination country(ies): Georgia.* Retrieved February 3, 2007 from:
http://ocha.unog.ch/fts2/pageloader.aspx?page=search-reporting_display&CQ=cq1406071647491EIa02COIs

_____ (2006e). *Appeals & Funding. Donor Country(ies): European Commission, European Commission (ECHO), Destination country(ies): Armenia.* Retrieved February 3, 2007 from:
http://ocha.unog.ch/fts2/pageloader.aspx?page=search-reporting_display&CQ=cq140607164915ucTcCRRkps

_____ (2006f). *Appeals & Funding. Donor Country(ies): European Commission, European Commission (ECHO), Destination country(ies): Azerbaijan.* Retrieved February 3, 2007 from:
http://ocha.unog.ch/fts2/pageloader.aspx?page=search-reporting_display&CQ=cq140607165012QvC4IPsOU

_____ (2006g). *Appeals & Funding. Donor Country(ies): European Commission, European Commission (ECHO), Destination country(ies): Georgia.* Retrieved February 3, 2007 from:
http://ocha.unog.ch/fts2/pageloader.aspx?page=search-reporting_display&CQ=cq140607165122Uh6L7qMnmJ

_____ (2006h). *Appeals & Funding. Donor Country(ies): Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, Destination country(ies): Armenia.*
http://ocha.unog.ch/fts2/pageloader.aspx?page=search-reporting_display&CQ=cq140607165510Lp7yfJMIJO

_____ (2006i). *Appeals & Funding. Donor Country(ies): Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, Destination country(ies): Azerbaijan.*
http://ocha.unog.ch/fts2/pageloader.aspx?page=search-reporting_display&CQ=cq140607165645uJndZn7OoZ

_____ (2006j). *Appeals & Funding. Donor Country(ies): Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, Destination country(ies): Georgia*
http://ocha.unog.ch/fts2/pageloader.aspx?page=search-reporting_display&CQ=cq140607165712IcjjZ4LCuY

Rice, C. (January/February 2000). *Campaign 2000: Promoting the National Interest.* Retrieved December 21, 2006, from Foreign Affairs Web site:
<http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20000101faessay5/condoleezza-rice/campaign-2000-promoting-the-national-interest.html>

The Council of the European Union (2004). *EU Rule of Law Mission to Georgia (EU-JUST THEMIS).* Retrieved October 15, 2006 from
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=701&lang=en

The European Commission's Delegation to Georgia (2007a). *EU Cooperation with Georgia.* Retrieved December 15, 2006 from
http://www.delgeo.cec.eu.int/en/eu_and_georgia/cooperation.html

USAID (1997a). USAID Congressional Presentation FY 1997: Armenia. Retrieved December 15, 2007 from
<http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/cp97/countries/am.htm>

_____ (1997b). USAID Congressional Presentation FY 1997: Azerbaijan. Retrieved December 15, 2007 from
<http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/cp97/countries/az.htm>

_____ (1997c). USAID Congressional Presentation FY 1997: Georgia. Retrieved December 15, 2007 from
<http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/cp97/countries/ge.htm>

_____ (1998a). The USAID FY 1998 Congressional Presentation: Armenia. Retrieved December 15, 2007 from
<http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/cp98/eni/countries/am.htm>

_____ (1998b). The USAID FY 1998 Congressional Presentation: Azerbaijan. Retrieved December 15, 2007 from
<http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/cp98/eni/countries/az.htm>

_____ (1998c). The USAID FY 1998 Congressional Presentation: Georgia. Retrieved December 15, 2007 from
<http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/cp98/eni/countries/ge.htm>

_____ (1999a). USAID Congressional Presentation: Armenia. Retrieved December 15, 2007 from
<http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/cp99/eni/am.htm>

_____ (1999b). USAID Congressional Presentation: Azerbaijan. Retrieved December 15, 2007 from <http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/cp99/eni/az.htm>

_____ (1999c). USAID Congressional Presentation: Georgia. Retrieved December 15, 2007 from <http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/cp99/eni/ge.htm>

_____ (2000a). Congressional Presentation FY 2000: Armenia. Retrieved December 15, 2007 from <http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/cp2000/eni/armenia.html>

_____ (2000b). Congressional Presentation FY 2000: Azerbaijan. Retrieved December 15, 2007 from <http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/cp2000/eni/azerbaij.html>

_____ (2000c). Congressional Presentation FY 2000: Georgia. Retrieved December 15, 2007 from <http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/cp2000/eni/georgia.html>

_____ (2001a). Budget Justification FY 2001: Armenia. Retrieved December 15, 2007 from <http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/bj2001/ee/am/>

_____ (2001b). Armenia FY 2001 Program Description and Activity Data Sheets. Retrieved December 15, 2007 from http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/bj2001/ee/am/am_ads.html

_____ (2001c). Budget Justification FY 2001: Azerbaijan. Retrieved December 15, 2007 from <http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/bj2001/ee/az/>

_____ (2001d). Azerbaijan FY 2001 Program Description and Activity Data Sheets. Retrieved December 15, 2007 from http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/bj2001/ee/az/az_ads.html

_____ (2001e). Budget Justification FY 2001: Georgia. Retrieved December 15, 2007 from <http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/bj2001/ee/ge/>

_____ (2001f). Georgia FY 2001 Program Description and Activity Data Sheets. Retrieved December 15, 2007 from http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/bj2001/ee/ge/ge_ads.html

_____ (2002a). Budget Justification FY 2002: Armenia. Retrieved December 15, 2007 from <http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/cbj2002/ee/am/>

_____ (2002b). Budget Justification FY 2002: Azerbaijan. Retrieved December 15, 2007 from <http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/cbj2002/ee/az/>

_____ (2002c). Budget Justification FY 2002: Georgia. Retrieved December 15, 2007 from <http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/cbj2002/ee/ge/>

_____ (2003a). Budget Justification FY 2003: Armenia. Retrieved December 15, 2007 from <http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/cbj2003/ee/am/>

_____ (2003b). Budget Justification FY 2003: Azerbaijan. Retrieved December 15, 2007 from <http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/cbj2003/ee/az/>

_____ (2003c). Budget Justification FY 2003: Georgia. Retrieved December 15, 2007 from <http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/cbj2003/ee/ge/>

_____ (2004a). Congressional Budget Justification FY 2004 Europe & Eurasia: Armenia. Retrieved December 15, 2007 from http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2004/europe_eurasia/Armenia.pdf

_____ (2004b). Congressional Budget Justification FY 2004 Europe & Eurasia: Azerbaijan. Retrieved December 15, 2007 from http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2004/europe_eurasia/Azerbaijan.pdf

_____ (2004c). Congressional Budget Justification FY 2004 Europe & Eurasia: Georgia. Retrieved December 15, 2007 from http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2004/europe_eurasia/Georgia.pdf

_____ (2005a). Congressional Budget Justification - FY 2005 Europe & Eurasia: Armenia. Retrieved December 15, 2007 from <http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2005/ee/am.html>

_____ (2005b). Congressional Budget Justification - FY 2005 Europe & Eurasia: Azerbaijan. Retrieved December 15, 2007 from <http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2005/ee/az.html>

_____ (2005c). Congressional Budget Justification - FY 2005 Europe & Eurasia: Georgia. Retrieved December 15, 2007 from <http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2005/ee/ge.html>

_____ (2006a). *Budget Justification to the Congress Fiscal Year 2006: Europe & Eurasia: Armenia. Retrieved December 15, 2007 from*

<http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2006/ee/am.html>

_____ (2006b). Budget Justification to the Congress Fiscal Year 2006: Europe & Eurasia: Azerbaijan. Retrieved December 15, 2007 from <http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2006/ee/az.html>

_____ (2006c). Budget Justification to the Congress Fiscal Year 2006: Europe & Eurasia: Georgia. Retrieved December 15, 2007 from <http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2006/ee/ge.html>

_____ (2007a). *Budget Justification to the Congress Fiscal Year 2007: Europe & Eurasia: Armenia. Retrieved December 15, 2007 from*

<http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2007/ee/am.html>

_____ (2007b). Budget Justification to the Congress Fiscal Year 2007: Europe & Eurasia: Azerbaijan. Retrieved December 15, 2007 from <http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2007/ee/az.html>

_____ (2007c). Budget Justification to the Congress Fiscal Year 2007: Europe & Eurasia: Georgia. Retrieved December 15, 2007 from <http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2007/ee/ge.html>

_____ (2007d). USAID Policy: Budget. Retrieved December 15, 2007 from <http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/>

_____ (2007e). *USAID Policy: International Donor Coordination. Retrieved December 15, 2007 from* <http://www.usaid.gov/policy/coordination/donor.html>

_____ (2007f). About USAID: This is USAID. Retrieved December 15, 2007 from http://www.usaid.gov/about_usaid/

Vasilyan, S. (2006, November 17). Opened Eyes - Overcome Stereotypes. *Ukraine and the World Today*. [Г. Шәәәñð. Ред. Розплющені очі, подолані стереотипи. Україна і світ сьогодні, 17-я ійүääÿ, 2006 г., источник] Retrieved December 1, 2007 from <http://www.uwtoday.com.ua/article.asp?Lid=1&NID=3177&CG=3&SCG=88>

Weinstein, M. A. (2004, September 27). *Armenia: The Dream of Complementarity and the Reality of Dependency*. Retrieved May 5, 2007 from the Power and Interest New Report Web site:
http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=212&language_id=1

World Food Program (2007, June 21). *Resourcing Update: Armenia*. Retrieved February 3, 2007 from:
http://www.wfp.org/operations/current_operations/ResUpdates/100531.pdf