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**How much does European integration disturb  
the political space of EU member states?**

**A French case**

Work in progress – do not quote – comments are welcome

These last twenty years, European integration has deeply reshaped the components of its members states' political lives. Jacques Delors' prophecy that more than 80% of the national legislative acts will, at the end of the nineties, be from EU origins was followed not only by the implementation of a large number of public policies in order to apply EU legislation, but also more generally by the Europeanization of national societies (i.e. Olsen, 2002; Featherstone & Radaelli, 2003; Palier & Surel, 2007). Despite these overwhelming transformations however, some accurate observers claim (almost) nothing has changed in the political space of the member states. Parties still tend to oppose each other on the same cleavages, citizens still tend to vote according to the same cognitive tools as they previously did. Struck by the gap between the importance of the transformations and the narrowness of their consequences on national parties and elections, we propose to question how much national political spaces are disturbed by European integration focussing on European citizens' opinions and attitudes rather than on parties and votes. The present paper shall be considered as a first answer to this question.

*From parties to citizens: why change the focus?*

Understanding how political parties adapt to the major changes introduced by European integration in the national political arena has recently aroused major interest (see for example : Marks & Wilson, 2000 ; Marks, Wilson & Ray, 2002 ; Gabel & Hix, 2002, 2004 ; Steenbergen, Edwards & de Vries, 2007 ; Crum, 2007 ; Gabel & Scheve, 2007 ; Hooghe, 2007 ; Marks, Hooghe, Steenbergen & Bakker, 2007 ; Ray, 2007). Dutiful observers describe parties as having both to adapt to the new rules imposed by the Europeanization of politics and to cope with its effects on citizens' evaluation of their political environment. European integration appears to be forcing them to reevaluate their place in the political system, both at the EU and at the national levels, and both in front of their electorate and in relations with other parties.

Whether European integration is the source of a new cleavage, as defined by Lipset and Rokkan, appears as one of the main questions which run through this literature (Roger, 2008). Several authors clearly argue against the existence of such a new cleavage and claim that the issue of European integration is absorbed in the pre-existing partisan structures (Sitter, 2003 ; Harmsen, 2005a ; De Vries, 2007 ; Poguntke & alii, 2007). Others however, taking a more extensive definition of the term "cleavage" in which cleavages are seen as polarized politics

anchored in the social structure, maintain that European integration appears as a new source of structural conflicts between political forces which adds itself or even substitutes itself to old sources of conflicts (Hix, 1999 ; Kopecky & Mudde, 2002 ; Rovny, 2004 ; Kriesi, 2007). For others however, the central question is not “is European integration the source of a new cleavage?” but “does European integration disturb the way old cleavages express themselves and on what scale?” The answer varies depending again on which definition of the term “cleavage” people relate to. When they stick to the Lipset and Rokkan’s definition, European integration is seen as an element which creates confusion but which does not deeply disturb the pre-existing cleavages (Mair, 2000). When they take the more extensive definition, European integration appears as potentially able to restructure old cleavages (Marks & Wilson, 2000; Hooghe, Marks & Wilson, 2002).

In spite of the variety of their conclusions, all studies share a common observation: European integration is without any doubt a disturbing element in the political space of the member states and a source of political conflicts (Marks & Steenbergen, 2004). Meanwhile these conflicts have not (yet) crystallized in the emergence of new political parties which compete at each European and national election, they are not (yet) institutionalized. As underlined by Harmsen (2005), it thus might be heuristically more relevant to question why European integration is not the source of a new cleavage rather than desperately looking for this cleavage to appear.

As far as parties are concerned, the answers are well known. Since Panebianco’s book (1988), parties have been described as adaptive actors that always try to protect their organizational stability; their tendency is thus to absorb new sources of conflicts into pre-existing cleavages (Harmsen, 2005)<sup>1</sup>. As European integration is a question that split up governmental parties, they as well tend to avoid competing on this dimension (Thomassen & alii, 2004). Therefore, studies tend to show that European integration does not play an overwhelming role in national elections. Nevertheless, if EU little matters as a direct issue in the political space, it could have indirect effects on the electoral competition. Parsons and Weber investigate what they call the “politics of muffling” (Parsons & Weber, 2007, p. 54): EU issues would have been deliberately excluded from electoral politics by internally (over the EU) divided parties because of their electoral costs.

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<sup>1</sup> At the European level, Harmsen notice that euroscepticism is an instrument for anti-establishment parties which denounce the EU as an elitist construction. However, for these parties, euroscepticism constitutes an added source of conflict, not a central one.

As parties do not compete on this dimension, citizens are not offered the choice to define their vote according to their attitudes toward European integration. We should not however conclude that this lack of competition at the party level reflects citizens' attitudes. To the contrary, studies tend to show that the congruence between parties' positions and citizens' attitudes is, as far as European integration is concerned, rather weak (Mattila & Raunio, 2006). As long as citizens do not consider European integration as playing a major role in the national political space, parties can consider this lack of congruence as meaningless. But can this much longer be true?

Indeed, having to cope with new public policies, decided by authorities they are often unable to clearly designate, inside a regime criticized for its democratic deficit, citizens seem to be more disoriented than they previously were. The lack of participation at different elections - national and European - and the difficulty in making a choice when voting can be seen as different symptoms of this phenomenon. Citizens tend to be less self-assured of the political landmarks they use to make sense of the political space in which they live. That the changes should coincide with the end of the "permissive consensus" (Lindberg, Scheingold, 1970) could not be unnoticed. How much does European integration bear responsibility for these perturbations is however what needs to be better investigated.

The few studies devoted to the changes in the political arena of the member states from a citizens point of view end up with very different conclusions. Some authors argue many aspects of Europe are absorbed by existing political attitudes (Knutsen, 1995). Others however claim member states' political space are now structured around two dimensions: the left/right dimension, and the less/more integration dimension. For some authors these dimensions are orthogonal (, and therefore, Europe appears as a "sleeping giant" as far as citizens are concerned Van der Eijk & Franklin, 2004). Others assert they are related to each other (Gabel & Anderson, 2004). Studies tend as well to show that the two dimensions can be more or less related depending on the country, as citizens' attitudes towards European integration tend to differ according to the way they judge national politics (Ray, 2004). Taking these results as our starting point, we aim in this paper at understanding the current structure of the political space from a citizens' view focusing on one national case study: France.

*French citizens and European integration: what do we know?*

France occupies a singular position within the European Union by playing, over the course of its construction and in comparison with the other original European Community (EC) members, the role of both the motor and the brake. The initiatives of Robert Schuman (the Declaration of May 9<sup>th</sup>, 1950), Jean Monnet (instituting the CECA), and René Pleven (the French design of a European army that became the EDC Treaty, signed in Paris on May 27<sup>th</sup>, 1952) demonstrate the country's role (at least contribution) as a motor in the construction of the EU. France has also, however, played the role of the brake by complicating ongoing processes: with the refusal of the French national assembly to ratify the EDC Treaty on August 30<sup>th</sup> 1954, with the “politique de la chaise vide” initiated by the General de Gaulle beginning July 1965. At mass level, for a long time, French citizens were described as good supporters of European integration. Eurobarometer data reported high level of support for France's belonging to the EC then the EU. But the very slim majority (51% YES) in favour of the Maastricht Treaty by referendum in 1992 and the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by referendum (55% NO) in May 2005 gave hints on the fact that French citizens' attitudes towards European integration were more dubious than elites thought. This (too brief and hasty) chronology signifies not only a contradictory attitude based on a “stop and go” rhythm but also a general movement progressing from separatist (sovereignist) hesitations expressed by parts of the parliamentary representatives to a clear sanction expressed by the people.

In this regard, the rejection of the Constitutional treaty by referendum Mai 29<sup>th</sup> 2005 brought to light the ambiguous relationship between France and the EU. It put an end to “an illusion on which we too long lived on, the idea that French people were all devoted to European community building” (Gauchet & Rémond 2005, 5)<sup>2</sup>. As blogs and chats on Europe were flourishing on the internet, as groups of friends and families' members fought over the Treaty, as the socialist party (PS) teared to pieces - some of its elites defending the “no” vote against the will of the majority of its members -, Europe suddenly emerges as a possible bone of contention in French political space.

And yet a paradox seems to impose itself into the literature: despite an ever growing influence of European issues (themselves linked to the institutional development of the EU and its effects on domestic political life), it would seem that Europe exercises a very weak

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<sup>2</sup> « une illusion sur laquelle on a trop longtemps vécu selon laquelle les Français étaient tous acquis à l'idée de la construction européenne »

influence on the French political system. As Evans points out : “Europe presents nothing new” (2007, p.1112). Observers of French political parties and French political arena continue to observe “politics as usual”. Partisan secessions appearing on both the right and left due to Maastricht did not fundamentally alter the French “hyper-alternance” (Evans & Ivaldi, 2002). The revival of the secessions, particularly on the left of political parties’ spectrum, did not change the logic of bipartism (Grunberg & Haegel, 2007). Also the impact of the European integration on the French political institutions is scant: the scrutiny of European affairs has not given way to any substantial renegotiation of legislative-executive relations in France (Grossman & Sauger, 2007).

When one changes the focus to an analysis centred on the opinions of the citizens, the results are more suggestive and complex. This is especially the case as one asks whether or not Europe disrupts citizens’ self-positioning on a left-right axis. This dimension has been and continues to be a corner-stone of the French political space, despite questions about its diminishing or even its dying that have arisen over the last two decades (Michelat & Tiberj, 2007). When exposed to European issues, the left-right dimension is subject to “turbulences” for which authors give more than one interpretations.

Following the first assessments which seemed to show that adhesion and rejection of Europe was crossing the left-right dimension (Percheron, 1991), some recent analysis identify a “new cleavage, transversal with the left-right traditionnal cleavage”<sup>3</sup> (Grunberg & Schweisguth, 1997b, 195) opposing “universalist” and “anti-universalist” attitudes. Those attitudes are based on a scale of values combining questions about racism, equality, solidarity, opinion towards death penalty, and the relationship with Europe (Grunberg & Schweisguth, 1997a, 165). These authors claim this new dimension in French political space helps to explain the lasting singularity of the National Front (FN, Far right) (Grunberg & Schweisguth, 2003). Others authors as well demonstrate that the most important dimension structuring the French electorate in the 90’s is an open-closed axis (“axe ouvert-fermé”) that revolves around values related to the perception of the Other (immigrants, Europe, globalization) and which is completely independent from the left-right dimension (Chiche, Le Roux, Perrineau & Rouannet, 2000, 471). All in all, the interpretation concerns the inadaptation of the traditional existing political left-right dimension when faced with the emergence of new issues such as the European one. The latest electoral data have however suggested a new trend. From 2002

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<sup>3</sup> “clivage nouveau, transversal au clivage gauche-droite traditionnel”

onwards (at least), our research shows that citizens' attitudes towards Europe seem build around a bi-dimensional system which creates complex ties with the left-right axis (Belot & Cautrès, 2004; Cautrès & Strudel, 2007). Throughout this paper, we propose to develop the analysis of these two dimensions and their relations with the left-right axis.

### *Data*

To measure and understand if and how much European integration has disturbed the political space of French citizens, we are using post-electoral data related to the presidential elections of 2002 and 2007<sup>4</sup>. The indicators of people's attitudes towards European integration are a set of variables questioning what citizens fear about Europe. As a multi-level and multi-oriented scene Europe compels us not to consider any longer global attitudes to Europe but rather to investigate from now on specific attitudes related to detailed specific issues raised by Europe. As in the long run opinions towards Europe in France have always been rather positive, we indeed believe it may be more relevant to track the current and potential source of resistance or conflict. Thus in our data, more than 50% of the French electorate claim France's belonging to the EU is a good thing when less than 10% maintain it's a bad thing (about 40% declare it's neither a good think, nor a bad think). Moreover, 68% declare to have a positive opinion on the EU. However, when asked about what they fear as far as Europe is concerned, attitudes tend to appear more ambivalent than what this first indicator would tend to show. Thus, in 2002 and 2007, almost 70% of the French citizens fear the building of Europe may cause the loss of social benefits, and around 50% fear the loss of their national identity and culture and the increase of immigrants' numbers due to European integration.

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<sup>4</sup> In 2002, datas were collected by a consortium of researchers (CEVIPOF (SciencesPo Paris), CIDSP (Sciences Po Grenoble, CECOP). The data collected were partly panelized datas. The questions related to European integration were included in the second phase of the panel (presidential post-electoral survey) . In 2007, the datas were collected by the CEVIPOF. The questions related to European integration were included in the presidential post-electoral survey.

Table 1: French negative opinions towards European integration (%)

	2002	2007
Fear that with the building of Europe there will be a loss of social benefits	69	68
Fear that with the building of Europe there will be more unemployment in France	-	68
Fear that with the building of Europe we may lose our national identity and culture	53	50
Find they have no common interest with other European countries	-	49
Fear that with the building of Europe the number of immigrants will increase	55	48
Fear that with the building of Europe France will pay for other countries	53	-
Fear that with the building of Europe, France's role in the world will be less important	33	36
Agree that people from Eastern Europe should not be authorized to immigrate in Western Europe	-	36
Negative opinion on the European Union	-	31
France's membership to the EU is a bad thing	5	9

Statistical analysis of the links between these “fear” variables shows they all participate in the measurement of the same phenomenon<sup>5</sup>. High correlations between these variables indicate that negative (or positive) answers are cumulative and unveiled the existence of underlying dimensions which we propose to identify through multiple correspondence analysis (MCA)<sup>6</sup>. It indeed allows us to sum up the common dimensions in which the answers to these questions participate. As only four items are common to the 2002 and 2007 sets of data, we use only these items in our analysis. As expected, the first two factors of this analysis are the same in 2002 and 2007. The first factor (48.59% of the inertia) clearly opposes the more confident answers towards European integration to the more fearful whatever the subject. This analysis shows thus that our four items all propose different facets of the same structured attitude oriented positively and negatively towards European integration. The fears towards the loss of social benefits tend however to participate less to the building of this first factor than the three other items. At the same time, they appear essential in the edifice of the second factor. Clearly this second factor (21.06% of inertia) opposes those who fear that with European integration they would lose social benefits (but who do not fear that there will be an increasing immigration) to those who do not fear it (but fear that there will be an increasing immigration due to EU integration developments). The first factor

<sup>5</sup> One of the five « fear » indicators is not the same in 2007 as in 2002.


<sup>6</sup> Known as well as “optimal coding multivariate analysis”.

constitutes thus a general dimension towards European integration, not so far from the traditional measurement of a diffuse support toward EU, when the second participates in a more particular attitude towards European integration centred on the social protection of individuals and their fears towards the consequences of EU integration on immigration<sup>7</sup>. Eventhough fears towards immigration in relation to EU contribute to the second dimension, that one is anyway mostly dominated by the fears towards social protection consequences of more EU integration : the two items corresponding to fears or lack of fears about EU integration consequences on social protection contribute to 75% of the variance of the second dimension.

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
<sup>7</sup> Our 2007 data includes also a fifth indicator of fears towards EU, namely fears about the consequences of EU on unemployment. We've decided not to incorporate it since we wanted to keep comparativeness with the same indicators as in 2002. We've obviously controlled for that in running our 2007 analysis on the five items of fears, which does not change anything to our two-dimensional factorial solution, neither in eigenvalues or factor loadings.

Graph 1 : Multiple correspondence analysis of four indicators measuring attitudes towards European integration in 2002



Considering European attitudes as two dimensional appears essential to the understanding of people’s opinions and behaviours towards European integration. Most of the time, when looking for an indicator that sums up attitudes towards Europe authors tend to use trend Eurobarometer indicators, for example opinions’ towards country’s membership to the EU. In the light of this single issue indicator, the results of the 2005 French referendum appear quite incomprehensible as almost half of French people (46%) declare at the time of the referendum “France’s membership to the EU is a good thing” and only a tiny minority claim “it’s a bad thing” (15%). Our analysis tends to show that this indicator appears as a “not too bad” summary of the general dimension of French attitudes towards European integration. However, its power to sum up the second dimension, the specific social dimension of attitudes towards European integration, is - as graph 3 illustrates - rather weak. Now, as shown elsewhere (Cautres & Strudel, 2007) this second dimension is particularly relevant when trying to explain the 2005 Referendum votes.

Graph 2 : How much Europhiles fear Europe in 2007 (% Fear/not fear among people believing France's membership to the EU is a good thing (50,6% of the respondents))



To examine the logics underlying these two dimensions, we have created two new variables that sum up people's positions on the first and second factors of our analysis. Considering each factor as a graduated continuum, electors are gathered from their factorial coordinates on this first axe in four classes from about the same size. We thus define four ranked groups according to the degree they are favourable or not to European integration in general (first factor) or in particular (second factor) as compared to the rest of the French society. Looking at the sociological logics of the two dimensions of attitudes towards European integration, the 2007 data partly replicates for both dimensions the usual oppositions produced in the French society by European integration as identified by previous works (Percheron 1991, Denni 1993, Brechon, Cautres & Denni 1995, Cautres 2000, Belot & Cautres 2004). There are however slight differences between the two dimensions which need to be investigated to understand French citizens' attitudes towards European integration better. As table 2 and 3 show more education and high professional status tend to favour pro-European attitudes both in general and in particular. Different explanations - around which cognitive mobilisation and attitudes towards innovation - have been developed by scholars to explain these logics<sup>8</sup>. Our results show these logics function for both dimensions of attitudes towards European integration. However, they tend to function more for the general dimension

<sup>8</sup> For a state of the art of sociological logics of attitudes towards European integration see Belot 2002 and 2006.

than for the social one<sup>9</sup>. These results tend to confirm that the two dimensions of European attitudes are linked to each other but derive partly from different logics which would need further investigations.

Table 2: General dimension of attitudes towards European integration / socio-demographical indicators in 2007

	++	+	-	-
<b>Sex</b>				
Men	37,2	24	22,1	16,6
Women	26,6	23,1	23,7	26,6
<b>Age</b>				
18-24	43,5	28	19,3	9,2
25-34	41,2	23,6	21,6	13,6
35-49	31,5	25	21,8	21,7
50-64	27,3	23,2	22,6	26,8
65 and more	21,3	19,5	28,1	21,2
<b>Age end of school</b>				
16 and less	18,8	21,2	26,3	33,7
17-19	25,7	24	26,7	23,6
20 and more	47,6	24,7	17,5	10,2
still studying	50,5	27,3	15,7	6,6
<b>Professional status</b>				
Farmers	15,3	12,4	33,6	38,7
Tradesmen, head managers	35,3	27,7	21,9	15,2
Managers, professional people	52,6	21,3	16,2	9,9
Teachers, professors	67,9	19,4	9	3,7
Middle managers	42,7	24,2	21,5	11,7
employees	21	25,2	24,1	29,7
Workers	22,1	23	26,1	28,8
Students	49,2	28,4	15,7	6,6
Never worked	21,8	19,2	30	29
<b>Total</b>	<b>31,7</b>	<b>23,5</b>	<b>22,9</b>	<b>21,8</b>

<sup>9</sup> Correlation coefficients between time of education and professional status on one hand and the first and second dimensions of European integration on the other hand are much higher for the first dimension (0,19 & 0,20) than for the second (0,11 & 0,13).

Table 3: Social dimension of attitudes towards European integration /socio-demographical indicators in 2007

		++	+	-	--
<b>Sex</b>	Men	24,4	25,5	23,2	27
	Women	26	26,6	25,7	21,7
<b>Age</b>	18-24	25,4	17,3	23,7	33,6
	25-34	22,8	21,9	24,6	30,6
	35-49	22,5	27,6	24	26
	50-64	26,8	28,2	23,2	21,7
	65 and more	29,3	30,2	27	13,5
<b>Age end of school</b>	16 and less	28,1	29,3	27,5	15,1
	17-19	24,6	26,1	27	22,3
	20 and more	22,3	24,5	20,7	32,5
	still studying	25,3	17,5	17,8	39,4
<b>Professional status</b>	Farmers	35,8	32,8	23,4	8
	Tradesmen, head managers	39,1	24	21,3	15,6
	Managers, professional people	22,8	30	17,4	29,7
	Teachers, professors	19,3	20,7	14,1	45,9
	Middle managers	20,3	22,2	26	31,5
	employees	26	28,1	25,7	20,2
	Workers	25,2	26,3	27,8	20,7
	Students	23,8	18,1	18,7	39,5
	Never worked	23,6	30,2	29,9	16,4
<b>Total</b>		<b>25,1</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>24,6</b>	<b>24,4</b>

Table 4 : General dimension of attitudes towards European integration / political indicators in 2007


		++	+	-	-
<b>Interest in Politics</b>	Beaucoup et assez	37,9	23,6	21,2	17,3
	Peu et pas du tout	21,4	23,5	25,9	29,2
<b>Judgement on the functioning of Democracy</b>	Function well	37	24,5	21,3	17,2
	Do not function well	22,1	21,8	28	30
<b>Proud to be French</b>	Proud	31,4	24,1	22,6	21,9
	Not proud	33,8	18	27,1	21,2
<b>Left-right self positioning</b>	Far left	56,8	22,3	10,8	10,1
	Left	42,9	22,7	18,4	16
	Centre	37,4	24,3	20,5	17,8
	Right	24,5	25,3	27,5	22,8
	Far right	6,4	11,8	37,3	44,5
	Neither left nor right	23,3	23,5	24,8	28,4
<b>Proximity to party</b>	Far left parties	29,8	21,4	24,6	24,2
	Left parties	41,7	23,3	18,7	16,3
	Other ecological parties	26,8	25	23,2	25
	CNPT	18,7	20	37,3	24
	right parties	30	25,4	24	20,6
	Far right parties	3,2	8,9	36,3	51,6
	none	26,1	25,4	22,5	26,1
<b>Total</b>		<b>31,7</b>	<b>23,5</b>	<b>22,9</b>	<b>21,8</b>

Table 5 Social dimension of attitudes towards European integration / political indicators in 2007


	++	+	-	--
<b>Interest in Politics</b>				
Beaucoup et assez	25	26	23	27
Peu et pas du tout	24	26	27	23
<b>Judgement on the functioning of Democracy</b>				
Function well	24	25	22	29
Do not function well	25	27	27	21
<b>Proud to be French</b>				
Proud	25	26	24	25
Not proud	20	24	27	29
<b>Left-right self positioning</b>				
Far left	9	13	16	61
Left	15	21	24	40
Centre	24	28	22	26
Right	35	29	25	11
Far right	42	29	28	1
Neither left nor right	23	26	27	23
<b>Proximity to party</b>				
Far left parties	21	22	28	29
Left parties	16	22	23	39
Other ecological parties	17	31	19	33
CNPT	28	13	36	22
right parties	33	29	23	15
Far right parties	24	38	32	6
none	24	26	24	25
<b>Total</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>24</b>

Looking at the political logics of these dimensions, we can observe that interest in politics is quite a good predictor of general attitudes toward European integration (general dimension / V de Cramer 0,20). The more people are interested in politics the more pro-European they are. Interest in politics is however a rather poor predictor of specific attitudes towards European integration (social dimension / V de Cramer 0,09). Similarly, judgement on the functioning of democracy is quite a good predictor of general attitudes toward European integration (first dimension / V de Cramer 0,14). The more people believe the democracy works fine, the more pro-European they are (as measured by the first dimension). It is however a bad predictor of specific attitudes (social dimension / V de Cramer 0,04). To the contrary, left-right self-positioning and proximity to political parties are a little bit better predictors of scores on the social dimension than on the general dimension. All these results make clear that when trying to understand people's attitudes towards European integration we should consider them as bi-dimensional.

Graph 3: Multiple correspondence analysis of four indicators measuring attitudes towards European integration in 2007 (with projection of left-right self-positioning)



Graph 4 : Multiple correspondence analysis of four indicators measuring attitudes towards European integration in 2007 (with projection of vote at the first round of the presidential election, party proximity and left-right scale)



If one now turns back to the central interrogation which is ours (how much has European integration disturbed French political space, and particularly its most frequently used shortcut, the left-right axis ?) the projection of citizens' left-right positions on the MCA built with European variables gives striking results : the more the voters declare themselves leftists, the more they are favourable to European integration (as measured by the first factor), but also the more they fear its consequences as regards social protection (second factor). To the contrary, the more the voters declare themselves as belonging to the far right, the more they are against Europe on the general dimension of the analysis and the less they fear that more EU integration will damage social protection in France. Clearly, these results show that the left-right axis is still not a heuristical shortcut to help French people make their opinions on European integration as a whole. Saying that Europe is an issue which is progressively dissolved in pre-existing cleavages is thus still far from being proved as far as the French political space is concerned. The fact that our two dimensions do not restore party positioning on a left-right axis could be interpreted as a result of Parsons and Weber's "politics of muffling" : when choosing a party or when voting people are not able to activate the

European dimension of their political attitudes as parties tend not to compete on this issue. Parties thus tend to mask attitudinal dimensions towards Europe which work on the political space as far as citizens are concerned. Therefore, European integration still potentially appears as a “sleeping giant” which once reactivated - in the framework of a European referendum for example, or during a national election campaign, as leaders of one governmental party could put the issue on top of the agenda to jeopardize its challenger which they in the present situation know to be less cohesive on European integration than their party – may once again tears into pieces the French party system. How long will this party system survive to “European” crisis is of course a hundred dollars question!

Now, saying that, we have proved that Europe is an underlying dimension in people’s political attitudes but we do not say if and how it has disturbed the left-right cleavage. Coming back to our previous result the fact that the second dimensions of attitudes towards European integration restore the left-right cleavage is far from surprising. This dimension would tend to confirm in fact the results of authors who claim the issue of European integration is progressively dissolved into pre-existing dimensions of the national political space. Europe, as a social issue, reactivates the social dimension of the left-right cleavage. Turning now on the general dimension of attitudes towards European integration it is worth noting that it reminds a broader dimensional attitude which has shown to have significant impact on French politics, the so-called “open/closed” or “universalistic/anti-universalistic” dimension (Grunberg, Schweisguth 1997a, 1997b, 2003).

Since this broader dimension of attitudes has had significant political consequences in the French political space over the last two decades, namely to play as a key factor in the “tripartition” of this space (let/right/extreme right), there may be an important set of questions for us : is it the case that attitudes of French towards EU are a facet of this broader dimension? If they contribute to it, does it mean that attitudes of French public toward EU is nothing but a specific attitudinal dimension ? We have used our 2007 data to replicate a “universalistic/anti-universalistic” dimension including some of the EU attitudes items, precisely the more general ones to tap for diffuse support towards EU and to get measurement not contaminated by the specificities of some of the available items (so we’ve decided not to incorporate in this analysis the items related to the fears towards EU in terms of social benefits, immigration and national identity).

We conducted a multiple correspondence analysis of a set of indicators capturing the “universalism/anti-universalism” dimension on a set of indicators of authoritarian and xenophobic attitudes : opinion about death penalty, about feeling than in France ‘nowadays

you don't feel like before', about causes of insecurity and delinquency : loose of sense of authority and discipline, lack of severity of judges, presence of a significant number of immigrants in France. We also included in this MCA analysis three indicators of attitudes towards EU, the "broader" ones that are available in the 2007 post-election study and tapping the more diffuse component of support towards EU and not contaminated by a left-right orientation : opinion about if France membership to EU has been a "good thing" or not (same indicator as in Eurobarometer studies), positive/negative connotation of the word "European union", fears that with more EU integration France will pay more for. The first dimension of this categorical data factor analysis, shows an opposition between "open/universalistic" and "closed/antiuniversalistic" attitudes. But the most important point is that attitudes towards EU are contributing more than on average to the first dimension. In other words, the factor analysis shows that indeed, there is an EU (significant) effect in the "universalistic/anti-universalistic" dimension, a dimension that has expressed its strong political implications in the "tripartition" of the French political space (Grunberg, Schweisguth). As already mentioned by Grunberg and Schweisguth, (2003) anti-universalistic latent construct, articulate ethnocentric, authoritarian and anti-EU attitudes. The loadings of our EU indicators with the first dimension, shows that they contribute specifically to that dimension.

Based on this analysis, as on our previous ones, we may conclude that EU plays a specific role in the French political space and specifically in the redefinition of its structuring dimensions : it contributes, indeed, to the structuration of a dimension (universalistic/anti-universalistic attitudes) which has shown to have very significant impact of the French political space. In doing so, EU contributes to the emergence of specific issues. Now , one of the next questions for us to observe and investigate would be : is there any place for political parties to translate those conflicting dimensions, on looking at the left-right axis, into the electoral space ? After the time for "politics of muffling" could a time for "politics of "amplifying" come ?

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## Methodological appendix

The factor analysis used to demonstrate the bi-dimensionality of our 4 items related to fears about EU, is a multiple correspondence analysis (categorical data factor analysis). It has been conducted by using the SPAD software.

The results of this factor analysis are presented below, as well as the results of projection in the factorial space of supplementary points. For those readers having an interest in multiple correspondence analysis, see : Michael Greenacre, Jorg Blasius. *Multiple correspondence analysis and related methods*. Boca-Raton, Chapman-Hall, 2006.

CORRESPONDANCES MULTIPLES AVEC CHOIX DES MODALITES

APUREMENT DES MODALITES ACTIVES

SEUIL (PCMIN) : 2.00 % POIDS: 80.12  
 AVANT APUREMENT : 4 QUESTIONS ACTIVES 12 MODALITES ASSOCIEES  
 APRES : 4 QUESTIONS ACTIVES 8 MODALITES ASSOCIEES  
 POIDS TOTAL DES INDIVIDUS ACTIFS : 4006.00  
 TRI-A-PLAT DES QUESTIONS ACTIVES

IDENT	MODALITES	AVANT APUREMENT		APRES APUREMENT		HISTOGRAMME DES POIDS RELATIFS
	LIBELLE	EFF.	POIDS	EFF.	POIDS	
-----						
	406 . fears of EU : less social protection					
FE01 - fears : social prote		2720	2720.00		2720	2720.00 *****
FE02 - no fears : social pr		1283	1283.00		1283	1283.00 *****
FE03 - dk		3	3.00		=== MOD. ILL.===	
-----						
	407 . fears of EU : loss of national identity and culture					
FE01 - fears : loss of nati		1933	1933.00		1933	1933.00 *****
FE02 - no fears : national		2067	2067.00		2067	2067.00 *****
FE03 - dk		6	6.00		=== MOD. ILL.===	
-----						
	409 . fears of EU : raising immigration					
FE01 - fears : immigration		1850	1850.00		1850	1850.00 *****
FE02 - no fears : immigrati		2152	2152.00		2152	2152.00 *****
FE03 - dk		4	4.00		=== MOD. ILL.===	
-----						
	410 . fears of EU : France playing a less important role					
FE01 - fears : role of Fran		1414	1414.00		1414	1414.00 *****
FE02 - no fears : role of F		2580	2580.00		2580	2580.00 *****
FE03 - dk		12	12.00		=== MOD. ILL.===	
-----						

SOMME DES VALEURS PROPRES .... 1.0003

EIGENVALUES HISTOGRAM

NUMERO	VALEUR PROPRE	POURCENTAGE	POURCENTAGE CUMULE	
1	0.4870	48.68	48.68	*****
2	0.2111	21.11	69.79	*****
3	0.1659	16.59	86.38	*****
4	0.1359	13.59	99.97	*****
5	0.0003	0.03	100.00	*
6	0.0000	0.00	100.00	*
7	0.0000	0.00	100.00	*
8	0.0000	0.00	100.00	*

COORDONNEES, CONTRIBUTIONS ET COSINUS CARRÉS DES MODALITES ACTIVES (factor scores, contributions and squared cosinus)

AXES 1 A 5

MODALITES			COORDONNEES					CONTRIBUTIONS					COSINUS CARRÉS					
IDEN	LIBELLE	P.REL	DISTO	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
406 . fears of EU : less social protection																		
FE01	- fears : social prote	16.99	0.47	0.38	0.55	-0.13	-0.10	-0.01	5.1	24.0	1.6	1.3	2.7	0.31	0.63	0.03	0.02	0.00
FE02	- no fears : social pr	8.02	2.12	-0.81	-1.16	0.26	0.21	-0.01	10.8	51.0	3.4	2.7	1.3	0.31	0.63	0.03	0.02	0.00
				CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE = 16.0					75.1					5.0 4.0 4.0				
407 . fears of EU : loss of national identity and culture																		
FE01	- fears : loss of nati	12.08	1.07	0.81	-0.14	-0.22	0.59	-0.01	16.3	1.2	3.6	30.7	5.5	0.61	0.02	0.05	0.32	0.00
FE02	- no fears : national	12.92	0.93	-0.76	0.13	0.21	-0.55	-0.01	15.2	1.1	3.3	28.8	6.0	0.61	0.02	0.05	0.32	0.00
				CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE = 31.4					2.2					6.9 59.4 11.5				
409 . fears of EU : raising immigration																		
FE01	- fears : immigration	11.55	1.16	0.77	-0.47	-0.34	-0.48	-0.01	14.2	12.1	8.2	19.2	4.7	0.51	0.19	0.10	0.19	0.00
FE02	- no fears : immigrati	13.46	0.86	-0.66	0.40	0.29	0.41	-0.01	12.2	10.4	7.0	16.6	5.6	0.51	0.19	0.10	0.20	0.00
				CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE = 26.4					22.6					15.3 35.8 10.3				
410 . fears of EU : France playing a less important role																		
FE01	- fears : role of Fran	8.84	1.83	0.97	-0.04	0.94	-0.09	0.03	16.9	0.1	47.2	0.5	26.2	0.51	0.00	0.48	0.00	0.00
FE02	- no fears : role of F	16.13	0.55	-0.53	0.03	-0.51	0.05	0.03	9.3	0.1	25.7	0.3	48.0	0.51	0.00	0.48	0.00	0.00
				CONTRIBUTION CUMULEE = 26.2					0.1					72.8 0.8 74.2				

Factor scores for the illustrative political variables : voting recall, party proximity and left-right scale

46 . Voting recall : 1st round of the 2007 presidential election													
VO01 - Gérard SCHIVARDI	14	14.00	-0.2	1.8	-0.4	-0.1	0.1	-0.06	0.49	-0.12	-0.03	0.02	284.31
VO02 - Arlette LAGUILLER	61	61.00	2.3	1.0	0.2	-0.3	0.3	0.29	0.13	0.02	-0.04	0.03	64.48
VO03 - Olivier BESANCENOT	186	186.00	0.5	4.5	-1.1	0.6	0.3	0.04	0.32	-0.08	0.04	0.02	20.47
VO04 - José BOVE	53	53.00	-0.7	3.0	-0.5	0.3	-3.1	-0.10	0.42	-0.07	0.04	-0.42	74.36
VO05 - Marie-George BUFFET	75	75.00	0.3	5.9	0.6	1.5	0.1	0.04	0.67	0.07	0.17	0.01	52.26
VO06 - Ségolène ROYAL	991	991.00	-5.8	12.1	1.6	0.4	-0.7	-0.16	0.33	0.04	0.01	-0.02	3.03
VO07 - Dominique VOYNET	49	49.00	-4.4	2.7	-0.1	0.8	1.3	-0.63	0.39	-0.02	0.11	0.18	80.52
VO08 - Frédéric NIHOUS	35	35.00	0.2	0.0	-0.9	1.2	0.2	0.04	-0.01	-0.14	0.20	0.03	113.12
VO09 - François BAYROU	724	724.00	-6.4	1.2	1.6	0.4	1.2	-0.22	0.04	0.05	0.01	0.04	4.52
VO10 - Nicolas SARKOZY	1100	1100.00	2.4	-16.0	-1.0	-1.9	-2.1	0.06	-0.41	-0.03	-0.05	-0.05	2.63
VO11 - Philippe de VILLIERS	50	50.00	4.4	-3.2	-0.6	-0.1	-2.9	0.62	-0.46	-0.08	-0.02	-0.41	78.89
VO12 - Jean-Marie LE PEN	204	204.00	11.8	-5.1	-2.9	-0.6	1.0	0.80	-0.34	-0.20	-0.04	0.07	18.58
VO13 - (A voté nul)	9	9.00	2.1	-0.4	0.7	0.4	0.1	0.69	-0.14	0.24	0.15	0.04	442.81
VO14 - (A voté blanc)	52	52.00	0.5	1.7	-1.5	0.0	2.2	0.07	0.23	-0.21	0.00	0.31	75.81
VO15 - (S'est abstenu)	0	0.00	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
VO16 - (Refus)	132	132.00	1.5	0.0	-1.2	0.0	1.3	0.12	0.00	-0.10	0.00	0.11	29.26
VO17 - (Nsp)	23	23.00	2.1	0.1	0.3	0.8	0.2	0.44	0.02	0.07	0.18	0.04	172.67
46_ - *Reponse manquante*	248	248.00	1.8	0.5	1.9	0.1	-1.7	0.11	0.03	0.12	0.01	-0.10	15.11
411 . Partisan proximity													
PA01 - Lutte ouvrière	193	193.00	6.3	-0.2	-0.1	-0.9	-1.1	0.44	-0.02	-0.01	-0.07	-0.08	19.70
PA02 - Ligue Communiste rév	78	78.00	-4.8	7.1	-1.2	-0.4	0.0	-0.54	0.79	-0.13	-0.05	0.00	50.21
PA03 - Parti Communiste	114	114.00	0.8	6.8	0.1	1.7	1.0	0.08	0.63	0.01	0.16	0.09	34.04
PA04 - Mouvement Républicain	28	28.00	2.7	-0.6	1.3	-0.3	0.2	0.50	-0.12	0.24	-0.06	0.04	141.65
PA05 - Parti socialiste	996	996.00	-5.0	11.0	2.5	-0.6	-2.2	-0.14	0.30	0.07	-0.02	-0.06	3.01
PA06 - Radicaux de Gauche	29	29.00	-2.2	1.2	0.4	-0.5	0.1	-0.41	0.22	0.08	-0.09	0.01	136.74
PA07 - Les Verts	189	189.00	-2.3	3.9	-1.8	2.3	-0.2	-0.16	0.28	-0.13	0.16	-0.01	20.13
PA08 - Autres Ecologie	58	58.00	1.3	1.1	1.0	0.7	0.2	0.17	0.14	0.13	0.10	0.03	67.87
PA09 - Chasse, Pêche, Natur	67	67.00	3.1	0.3	-1.9	0.5	0.4	0.38	0.03	-0.23	0.07	0.05	58.62
PA10 - UDF (Mouvement Démoc	434	434.00	-6.1	-0.4	1.4	1.6	-0.9	-0.28	-0.02	0.06	0.07	-0.04	8.20
PA11 - UMP	1095	1095.00	-0.2	-15.7	-0.4	-1.5	-1.4	0.00	-0.40	-0.01	-0.04	-0.04	2.65
PA12 - Mouvement pour la Fr	44	44.00	4.5	-2.3	0.4	-0.8	0.4	0.67	-0.35	0.06	-0.13	0.06	89.78
PA13 - Front National - Mou	120	120.00	9.5	-3.5	-1.3	-2.4	1.6	0.85	-0.32	-0.12	-0.22	0.15	32.29
PA14 - Aucun	546	546.00	3.2	0.0	-2.3	1.0	2.0	0.13	0.00	-0.09	0.04	0.08	6.32
PA15 - (Autre)	4	4.00	-1.2	2.5	-0.7	0.3	0.0	-0.60	1.24	-0.37	0.17	-0.01	997.58
PA16 - (NSP)	11	11.00	1.9	-0.5	2.6	-1.0	0.1	0.57	-0.14	0.78	-0.30	0.03	362.12
413 . Left-Right scale													
LR01 - Very left	152	152.00	-4.2	9.2	-0.9	0.3	0.8	-0.33	0.73	-0.07	0.03	0.06	25.28
LR02 - Left	1070	1070.00	-4.8	13.5	1.1	0.1	-1.5	-0.13	0.35	0.03	0.00	-0.04	2.73
LR03 - Centre	684	684.00	-4.2	-0.6	2.1	0.5	-0.1	-0.15	-0.02	0.07	0.02	0.00	4.84
LR04 - Right	1106	1106.00	1.2	-16.0	-1.6	-1.7	-1.3	0.03	-0.41	-0.04	-0.04	-0.03	2.61
LR05 - Very right	79	79.00	5.0	-5.5	-0.4	-0.9	0.6	0.56	-0.61	-0.04	-0.10	0.07	49.56
LR06 - Neither Left or Righ	890	890.00	7.6	0.8	-1.2	1.4	0.4	0.22	0.02	-0.04	0.04	0.01	3.49
LR07 - dk	25	25.00	1.5	0.9	1.6	0.1	0.1	0.31	0.18	0.31	0.01	0.02	158.77

