

## **PERSUASION VERSUS COERCION:**

HUMAN RIGHTS COMPLIANCE WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE  
LOMÉ AND COTONOU AGREEMENTS

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## Introduction

What factors induce sovereign states to comply with international standards concerning the treatment of their citizens? In particular, why do developing countries who receive foreign aid comply with the human rights, democracy, and good governance standards mandated by donor countries and organizations? In her article “Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements Influence Government Repression,” Emilie Hafner-Burton explores the use of trade agreements as a means of inducing human rights compliance.<sup>1</sup> Hafner-Burton posits that coercion is more effective than persuasion in influencing state compliance with international human right standards.<sup>2</sup> Specifically, she argues that preferential trade agreements (PTAs) that mandate ‘hard’ human rights standards produce better results than ‘soft’ human rights agreements (HRAs) and PTAs that do not contain compliance mechanisms.<sup>3</sup> Hafner-Burton tests the hypotheses drawn from her incentive-based theory through a statistical analysis of international HRAs and PTAs from the year 1972 through the year 2002.<sup>4</sup> Her analysis supports her hypothesis that “... hard PTAs encourage better human rights practices, while soft agreements and HRAs do not exert a strong influence on behavior.”<sup>5</sup>

The purpose of this paper is explore the coercion-persuasion debate within a specific institutional context, namely that of the trade and aid agreements between the European Union (EU) and the seventy-nine countries that comprise the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of developing nations.<sup>6</sup> These agreements were institutionalized through the Lomé Conventions (1975 – 2000) and more recently through the Cotonou Agreement (2000 – 2008). This paper asks to what extent to the arguments made regarding the effects of coercion and persuasion hold within the context of these particular trade and aid agreements. In her article, Hafner-Burton categorizes the Lomé and Cotonou agreements as PTAs with ‘hard’ human rights standards;<sup>7</sup> however, these agreements have not always contained human rights provisions and have only recently (within the last two decades) included sanctioning mechanisms for violations of human rights standards. Moreover, the relationship between the EU and the ACP countries differs from traditional PTAs (even amongst those pursued by the EU) in ways that make the Lomé and Cotonou Agreements rather unique: specifically, the historical length and the extensive institutionalization of the agreements are characteristics that many constructivists would argue provide an ideal venue for norm diffusion through persuasion.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Hafner-Burton, 2005.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, p. 595; 601.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid, p. 593.

<sup>4</sup> Hafner-Burton’s analysis utilizes ‘repression’, measured as an ordinal variable across five levels of behavior as the primary dependent variable; two alternative dependent variables ‘input’ and ‘civil liberties’ are also tested.

<sup>5</sup> Hafner-Burton, 2005, p. 621.

<sup>6</sup> See Annex IA. The inclusion of Cuba and East Timor brings the number of ACP member states to 79.

<sup>7</sup> Hafner-Burton, 2005, p. 606. According to Hafner-Burton, EU is the largest provider of hard PTA agreements, representing 88% of the cases in her study (p. 621). She controls for the EU agreements in her analysis and does not find it to be a significant.

<sup>8</sup> See Brown, 2002 and Arts, 1998 for a description of the history of the Lomé Conventions. Unlike many PTAs, the agreements between the EU and the ACP countries have lasted over thirty years, have created joint institutions for both the negotiation and implementation of the agreements, and have been progressively changed to incorporate increasing

Therefore, the particular evolution of the Lomé Conventions and the Cotonou Agreement provides an excellent opportunity to test the persuasion versus coercion argument for three important reasons. Firstly, ACP participation in the Lomé Conventions was based on colonial links to EU member states;<sup>9</sup> in its original form, the Convention dealt solely with trade and aid issues, and did not initially involve any provision regarding human rights.<sup>10</sup> In fact, eighty-four percent of ACP states were members of the Lomé before human rights language was introduced into the treaty, and eighty-seven percent were members before political conditionality was introduced in the Lomé IVB Convention.<sup>11</sup> As a result, participation in Lomé and Cotonou is not subject to the selection bias problem usually encountered in scholarship on state participation in international organizations.<sup>12</sup>

Secondly, the gradual incorporation of human rights, democracy and good governance standards into the Lomé Convention provides a historical situation, in which the effects of persuasion versus coercion can be tested independently while simultaneously controlling for institutional factors; this is because compliance with human rights standards within these agreements can be observed over time – both before and after human rights were integrated, and before and after coercion (in the form of political conditionality) were introduced into the agreements.<sup>13</sup> This is important, as most discussions of human rights within the context of international organizations suffer from an equifinality problem, since the logic of consequences and the logic of appropriateness frequently result in the same effect being observed, while the cause of that effect remains undetermined.<sup>14</sup>

Thirdly, the differentiated treatment of political standards in the Cotonou Agreement provides an additional opportunity to determine whether persuasion or coercion is motivating behavior within this international agreement. ACP states may be subject to sanctions for the violations of human rights, democracy and rule of law standards, but not for violations of good governance standards, even though all of these political standards are included in the text of Cotonou.<sup>15</sup> As a result, it is possible to observe behavior relating to norms subject to coercion and those only subject to persuasion simultaneously within the same agreement. This paper, therefore, attempts to add to our theoretical understanding of international organizations by testing the extent to

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conditionality based on the compliance of ACP recipient countries with human rights, democratic and good governance standards.

<sup>9</sup> Waites, 1999, p. 296 – 297. See also Farrell, 2005, p. 266. The transition from the Yaoundé Conventions of the 1960s was primarily inspired by the UK membership in the EEC in 1973, in order to include developing Commonwealth countries (but excluding the Indian sub-continent) (see Gibb, 2000, p. 461 and Holland, 2002, p. 32). Membership has continued to be extended to newly independent states, most recently East Timor (EU Commission, Decision No. 2003/404/EC). The date of accession to each member of the Treaty is listed in Annex IA.

<sup>10</sup> Gibb, 2000, p. 461; Farrell, 2005, p. 167; and Arts, 1998, p. 167 – 174. Gibb also notes that Lomé was also motivated by an EU desire to “... preserve its privileged access to [Third-World] commodities via its ex-colonial links.”

<sup>11</sup> See Annex IB.

<sup>12</sup> The selection bias problem is discussed by Downs, Rocke and Barsoon, 1996, p. 382-383, and von Stein, 2005, amongst others. While approximately 15% of ACP participants joined the agreements after human rights standards were introduced, this 15% is primarily comprised of the micro-states of the South Pacific. See Annex IA for details.

<sup>13</sup> Arts, 1998, Ch. 5.

<sup>14</sup> March and Olsen, 1998.

<sup>15</sup> Holland, 2004, p. 286.

which findings regarding the necessity of coercion in PTAs also hold in an international agreement, which should, according to constructivist logic, be an ideal venue for compliance through persuasion.

This paper proceeds as follows. Firstly, a brief review of the literature on the role of norms in international institutions will be provided in order to contextualize the persuasion-coercion debate. Secondly, the historical evolution of the relationship between the EU and the ACP will be outlined in order to demonstrate how this particular international organization provides a unique opportunity to independently access the effects of persuasion versus coercion. Thirdly, a statistical model for testing the possible effects of coercion versus persuasion within the specific context of the EU/ACP relationship will be delineated. The paper will conclude with some observations of the implications of the results of the statistical analysis, specifically for the case of the Lomé and Cotonou agreements, and also more generally for the role of coercion and persuasion in the study of compliance with international organizations

*Persuasion versus coercion: the role of norms in international organization scholarship*

Rationalist and constructivist approaches provide very different explanations for why sovereign states might be seen to comply with international standards of behavior that may contradict their economic and political interests. Rationalists focus on material explanations for such behavior that are either implicit or explicit related to coercion. Keohane, for example, posits that issue-linkage may induce states to comply with disadvantageous international standards imposed within the context of a regime in order to maintain the other material benefits associated with participation.<sup>16</sup> Moravcsik argues that the threat of exclusion can compel states to agree to disadvantageous institutional provisions in order to maintain membership in an otherwise beneficial or potentially beneficial IO.<sup>17</sup> These mechanisms do not change the underlying preferences of a state regarding these international standards, but rather affect their behavior with relation to that standard. Therefore, rationalists are skeptical that compliance behavior will take place in the absence of sanctioning mechanisms or other forms of coercion. Within the context of this analysis, therefore, coercion refers to the presence of explicit consequences for non-compliance within an institutionalized agreement.

In contrast, constructivists focus on explanations of compliance based on social factors related to persuasion. Finnemore argues that certain institutions can socialize states in a way that changes their “intersubjective understanding” of appropriate state behavior.<sup>18</sup> Checkel contends that in certain types of institutions, social interaction can induce actors to change their preferences “...in the absence of overt coercion.”<sup>19</sup> He indicates five conditions under which this type of persuasion is likely to result in changes in the behavior of actors; these include the context of institutional interaction and the relative positions of the

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<sup>16</sup> Keohane, 1998, p. 103

<sup>17</sup> Moravcsik, 1998, Ch. 5.

<sup>18</sup> Finnemore, 1993, p. 566; 593.

<sup>19</sup> Checkel, 2001, p. 562

persuader and the persuadee within the organization.<sup>20</sup> Therefore, constructivists are confident that the socialization that takes place in an international organization can persuade states to change their preferences, and in so doing, change their understanding of their own identity.<sup>21</sup> According to constructivist logic, this change in preferences thus drives compliant behavior. Within the context of this analysis, therefore, persuasion refers to the presence of explicit normative expectations within an institutionalized agreement.

Like many other rationalists, Hafner-Burton is skeptical that persuasion can affect change in actors' behavior. She argues that the "gains from repression" are likely to far outweigh the social advantages of compliance, if the costs of non-compliance are not material.<sup>22</sup> In other words, persuasion and the social benefits associated with compliant behavior provide insufficient incentives to change state behavior, and she provides four arguments as to why this is the case, particularly for the HRAs associated PTAs.<sup>23</sup> These arguments focus on the general limitations of these international trade regimes, including frequency of iterated interaction and duration of agreement.

While this characterization of international agreements might apply to most HRAs associated with PTAs, they are less applicable in the case of the Lomé Conventions and the Cotonou Agreement, for several reasons. Firstly, the agreements between the EU and the ACP countries have a long history, spanning over thirty years;<sup>24</sup> if persuasion is a question of time,<sup>25</sup> then these agreements might provide an institutional environment conducive to persuasion. Secondly, the extensive institutional structures implemented by these agreements create an environment that requires repeated interaction between political actors from both the EU and the individual ACP member states.<sup>26</sup> This interaction takes place during each renegotiation of the agreements and during the implementation of the trade and aid mechanisms associated with the agreement.<sup>27</sup> If repeated access or interaction is a prerequisite to effective persuasion,<sup>28</sup> then Lomé and Cotonou may contain the institutional design elements that allow for preference change through persuasion rather than coercion. Thirdly, since the Yaoundé Conventions<sup>29</sup>, the ACP states have by many accounts begun to demonstrate indicators of a group identity.<sup>30</sup> In his review of the Lomé Conventions, Peining notes that as a result of their interaction with the EU, the ACP group of countries has united to act jointly or in coordination when interacting with other international organizations.<sup>31</sup> According to many constructivist approaches, the creation of a group identity is a strong

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<sup>20</sup> Ibid., p. 562 – 563.

<sup>21</sup> Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1997, p. 186

<sup>22</sup> Hafner-Burton, 2005, p. 600.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., p. 600 – 601.

<sup>24</sup> The Lomé Convention, signed in 1975, was preceded by the Yaoundé Convention signed in 1963, and was replaced by the Cotonou Agreement, which has been designed to cover the 2000 – 2020 time period. (Brown, 2002, p. 210).

<sup>25</sup> Hafner-Burton, 2005, p. 600.

<sup>26</sup> For a description of the joint EU-ACP institutions, see Cosgrove-Sacks, 2001, p. 271 or visit the Secretariat of the ACP group of states: <http://www.acpsec.org/index.htm>.

<sup>27</sup> Holland, 2002, p. 35 – 36.

<sup>28</sup> Hafner-Burton, 2005, p. 601.

<sup>29</sup> The 1963 and 1968 Yaoundé Conventions were precursor agreements that led to the Lomé Conventions.

<sup>30</sup> As indicated by Holland, 2002, p. 33; Gibb, 2000, p. 462; and Cosgrove-Sacks, 2001, p. 277 – 278.

<sup>31</sup> Peining, 1997, p. 178.

indicator of an active socialization process. These institutional features indicate that, if the constructivist approach is correct, the Lomé and Cotonou agreements should provide a very conducive environment for persuasion to change preferences regarding compliance with human rights standards.

However, the fact that institutional environment may be conducive to persuasion does not necessarily indicate that the behavior observed is the result of persuasion. Since these agreements contain the institutional features that should facilitate persuasion, an analysis Lomé and Cotonou may provide leverage on the persuasion-coercion debate. At the same time, the late introduction of coercion into these agreements (as described below), provides an excellent means of simultaneously differentiating between effects of persuasion and coercion within a single institution.

### *From partnership to political conditionality: EU/ACP relationship*

In June 2000, the EU and the ACP signed the Cotonou Agreement in Benin.<sup>32</sup> The ratification of this agreement marks the end of a twenty-five year relationship between the EU and the ACP under the auspices of the Lomé Conventions, which originally were signed 1975 on the basis of equal partnership between members.<sup>33</sup> Of particular interest to many scholars has been the introduction into the Cotonou Agreement of Article 96 on political conditionality based on respect for human rights, democracy and rule of law.<sup>34</sup> EU pressure to introduce normative political goals within the context of these ‘aid and trade’ agreements had progressively increased since the first revision of the Lomé Convention in 1980.<sup>35</sup> In 1985, Lomé III was amended to include the first mention of human rights and other essential elements within the context of these agreements in an annex to the Convention.<sup>36</sup> Tomasevski notes: “Lomé III established the linkage between human rights, aid and trade; hence the ACP countries perceived themselves [sic] targeted. Their human rights record is subject to scrutiny by EEC partners.”<sup>37</sup> Since no sanctions were associated with these new political provisions, the pressure felt by the ACP countries starting in 1985 must be the result of the insertion of normative expectations into a previously normatively neutral institutional agreement. In other words, the inclusion of these normative expectations constitutes a type of persuasion, in which the persuader (the EU) outlines what constitutes appropriate behavior within the context of the institution to the persuadee (the ACP countries). Thus, Lomé III

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<sup>32</sup> Cosgrove-Sacks, 2001, p. 259.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 2001, p. 259.

<sup>34</sup> Holland, 2002, p. 202. See also Hurt, 2003; Babarinde & Faber, 2004; Santiso, 2003.

<sup>35</sup> Brown, 2002, p. 66. “The ACP did manage to rebuff EU demands for human rights to be included in [Lomé II] arguing that it would be an infringement of their sovereignty...” See also Hurt, 2003, p. 162.

<sup>36</sup> Cosgrove-Sacks, 2001, p. 268.

<sup>37</sup> Tomasevski, 1989, p. 42. A type of limited conditionality had been introduced in Lomé III in the form of ‘policy dialogue’, which was linked to the functioning of the National Indicative Programs (NIPs) through which EU aid was funneled. Policy dialogue could therefore be used as a *de facto* sanction, by delaying the disbursement of aid (p. 70 – 72), with similar effects to rolling programming (described below). However, this *de facto* sanction was not utilized, with the possible exception of the case of Togo in 1993 (see Portela, 2007, p. 47)

signals the starting-point from which one might expect to see the effects of persuasion on the ACP countries on issues related to human rights.

During the Cold War, geo-political security reasons precluded the global North from eliciting overt demands for political conditionality from sovereign nations in the developing world.<sup>38</sup> However, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, growing concerns regarding human rights violations in partner countries increased demands by EU member states to improve the credibility of external EU policies.<sup>39</sup> These concerns, first articulated in a 1991 Resolution by the EU Council of Ministers,<sup>40</sup> were subsequently reflected in Article 130 of the 1993 Treaty on European Union (TEU), which required development policy to reflect the political and economic policy objectives of the member states, including respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.<sup>41</sup> In addition, several factors weakened the bargaining position of the ACP during the negotiation of Lomé IV. The introduction of conditionality by the Bretton Woods institutions during the debt crisis in the developing world had set the precedence for political requirements to be inserted into economic and trade agreements.<sup>42</sup> The continued economic weakness of the ACP member states during the 1980s and early 1990s (including the depreciation of key commodities markets) increased ACP dependence of EU aid.<sup>43</sup> In addition, the prospective EU accession of the former Soviet block countries of Central and Eastern Europe had shifted EU development aid priorities away from the ACP countries.<sup>44</sup>

As a result, the ACP resisted but was unable to prevent the introduction of more explicit human rights provisions (which had formerly been only included in the annex of Lomé III) into Article 5 of Lomé IV in 1990.<sup>45</sup> Moreover, the EU was subsequently able to mandate the inclusion of explicit provisions on “... democratic principles, human rights and the rule of law...” into the heart of the Conventions during the mid-term review of Lomé IV (known as Lomé IVB) in 1995.<sup>46</sup> Specifically, mechanisms for suspending aid for political reasons were provided for in Article 336a;<sup>47</sup> these included specific steps to be taken “... in the event of serious and persistent human rights violations or interruptions in the democratic process.”<sup>48</sup> For the first time, non-compliance with the political requirements of the Conventions could result in the suspension of cooperation

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<sup>38</sup> Holland, 2002, p. 197. See also Brown, 2002, p. 123 and Brusco, 2001, p. 105.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 181. Farrell notes that, “... since 1995, a ‘human rights clause’ is standard for all EU treaties with third countries.” (2005, p. 275).

<sup>40</sup> Brusco, 2001, p. 104.

<sup>41</sup> Dearden & Salama, 2002, p. 900. See also Holland, 2002, p. 167.

<sup>42</sup> Brown, 2002, p. 77 – 78. As Brown notes, EU involvement in the developing world “...has not been independent of the World bank and IMF.”

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 88; 96.

<sup>44</sup> Holland, 2002, p. 168. Holland notes that in 1990, over 50% of EU development aid was tagged for the ACP countries; by 1995, only 33% of EU development aid was given to the ACP countries. See also Brown, 2002, p. 127 and Stevens, McQueen and Kennan, 1999, p. 49 – 51.

<sup>45</sup> Brown, 2002, p. 96. The 1990 revision of the Lomé Convention was later known as Lomé IVA, to distinguish it from the 1995 revision, known as Lomé IVB.

<sup>46</sup> Santiso, 2003, p. 158. See also Brown, 2002, p. 136 – 137.

<sup>47</sup> Brusco, 2001, p. 106.

<sup>48</sup> Santiso, 2003, p. 148, 158.

between the EU and the ACP.<sup>49</sup> However, at this point suspension was still considered to be a ‘measure of last resort’.<sup>50</sup>

Lomé IVB expired in 2000, and the publication of the 1996 EU Commission Green Paper<sup>51</sup> assessing the relationship between the EU and the ACP countries clearly indicated that the EU was unwilling to maintain the status quo through a renewal of Lomé. In addition, under increasing pressure from the WTO<sup>52</sup> (especially following the unsuccessful conclusion of the ‘Banana Wars’<sup>53</sup> in the 1990s), the Commission indicated in the Green Paper that the EU considered the progress made under Lomé toward improving the economic strength of the ACP countries insufficient.<sup>54</sup>

The impact of trade preferences has been disappointing ... the bulk of ACP countries have lacked the economic policies and the domestic conditions needed for developing trade ... the state of institutions and economic policy [sic] in the recipient country have often been a major constraint, making Community aid less effective in raising living standards and the level of development.<sup>55</sup>

The conclusion drawn by the Commission was that “... a strong political relationship was needed,” in order to ensure the continued viability of the EU-ACP relationship.<sup>56</sup> As Brown articulates, the new agreement was designed to reflect the social and political values of the EU, including respect for human rights, democratic principles, rule of law, and good governance.<sup>57</sup> As a result, strong provisions requiring ‘political dialogue’ between the EU and ACP countries were of central importance in the 2000 Cotonou Agreement.<sup>58</sup> These provisions form the basis of the conditionality mechanism outlined in Article 96, which creates a consultation procedure to adjudicate the measures to be taken in reaction to a violation of ‘essential elements’ of the Treaty.<sup>59</sup> While the text of the agreement repeatedly emphasizes that suspension of trade and aid under Cotonou would

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<sup>49</sup> Ibid., p. 158.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., p. 158. It should be noted that, according to Portela (2007, p. 47), there is only one case (Togo, 1993), in which the EU suspended aid prior to the insertion of explicit conditionality provisions in Lomé IVB

<sup>51</sup> COM (96)570, 20 November 1996.

<sup>52</sup> Stevens, McQueen and Kennan, 1999, p. 27 – 32. Article 37 of Cotonou specifically addresses the issue of WTO compatibility (Holland, 2004, p. 285). It should be noted that several authors are of the opinion that the EU used WTO provisions as an excuse to revise Lomé into an agreement that was more favorable to the EU (Faber and Orbie, 2007, p. 15). See also Hurt, 2003, p. 174 and McQueen, 1998, p. 686.

<sup>53</sup> Stevens, McQueen and Kennan, 1999, p. 7, 27. For a detailed account of the Banana Wars, see Stevens, 1999, pp. 325 – 349.

<sup>54</sup> Cosgrove-Sacks, 2001, p. 272 – 275. She notes that while Lomé delivered significant benefits to the ACP countries, the conventions rested on inadequate mechanisms for the safe-guarding of ACP market share and the diversification of ACP export. In the run-up to Cotonou, general assessments of Lomé tend to concur with the Green Paper. As Holland (2004) points out: “...consensus had begun to emerge on all sides that the previous Lomé regime had failed to arrest, let alone reverse, the economic decline of the ACP (280).

<sup>55</sup> COM (96)570, 1996, p. iv. Babarinde and Faber also note: “[t]he failure of the Lomé model to produce visible progress in standards of living had seriously undermined the credibility of the EU as a leading actor on development issues.” (2004, p. 45)

<sup>56</sup> Ibid., p. vi.

<sup>57</sup> Brown, 2000, p. 376 – 377.

<sup>58</sup> Agreement 2000/483/EC. Title II, Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement defines political dialogue as: “The Parties shall regularly engage in a comprehensive, balanced and deep political dialogue leading to commitments on both sides.” See also Cosgrove-Sacks, 2001, p. 280.

<sup>59</sup> Agreement 2000/483/EC, Part 6, Article 96.

only be considered a measure of last resort, the structure of the agreement provides a legitimate means through which the EU can sanction violators for human rights abuses.<sup>60</sup> Efforts by the ACP countries during negotiations of Cotonou to construct provisions for the joint determination of which violations would constitute an infringement were unsuccessful.<sup>61</sup> However, the ACP countries were able to prevent the inclusion of good governance provisions into the ‘essential elements’ of agreements. As a result, only the ‘essential elements’, which refer specifically to human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law, are subject to sanctioning under Article 96;<sup>62</sup> in contrast, good governance standards were included as ‘fundamental elements’ of the agreement, which (with the exception of serious cases of corruption), are not subject to the conditionality provisions.<sup>63</sup>

In addition, political dialogue is linked with a new process of ‘rolling programming’ for the provision of aid.<sup>64</sup> Under Lomé, aid had been agreed for the duration of each five-year convention; under Cotonou, aid became “...no longer an entitlement, but an indicative figure.”<sup>65</sup> Rolling programming allows the EU to utilize political dialogue as a means to monitor the way in which ACP use aid.<sup>66</sup> As a result, future allocations of aid can now be determined based on the effective use of previous funding.<sup>67</sup> As Brown points out, rolling aid effectively “...pushes conditionality upstream,”<sup>68</sup> providing the EU with an additional leverage for political conditionality.

The gradual introduction of human rights and other political norms into the Lomé Conventions, and the later incorporation of coercive measures (in the form of political conditionality) into Lomé IVB and the Cotonou Agreement provide an ideal case study for assessing the persuasion versus coercion debate. A historical analysis of the EU/ACP relationship might lead one to conclude that the introduction of coercive measures into Cotonou confirms the rationalist’s argument that coercion is necessary to ensure compliance with human rights. However, such a conclusion would be short-sighted, as cursory analysis of Annex II on recent consultation

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<sup>60</sup> Agreement 2000/483/EC, Part 6, Article 96(c): The “appropriate measures” referred to in this Article are measures taken in accordance with international law, and proportional to the violation. In the selection of these measures, priority must be given to those which least disrupt the application of this agreement. It is understood that suspension would be a measure of last resort. It should also be noted that ACP countries could, in theory, require political dialogue with an EU member country for failure to comply with the essential elements of the agreement; however, since the essential elements are based on EU norms, this is unlikely to take place.

<sup>61</sup> Santiso, 2003, p. 156 – 160. As Farrell notes, ACP institutional weaknesses and dependence on aid made the group unable to withstand the conditionality provisions imposed by the EU (2005, p. 271).

<sup>62</sup> Farrell, 2005, p. 272. See also Holland, 2002, p. 202 – 203.

<sup>63</sup> Santiso, 2003, p. 160. Article 97 of the agreements outlines special conditionality provisions for cases of corruption and bribery.

<sup>64</sup> Brown, 2000, p. 377; Holland, 2004, p. 282.

<sup>65</sup> Dearden & Salama, 2002, p. 904.

<sup>66</sup> Hurt, 2003, p. 172.

<sup>67</sup> Dearden & Salama, 2002, p. 904.

<sup>68</sup> Brown, 2000, p. 378. As Dearden & Salama note, however, rolling programming also increases the administrative burden on both the EU and ACP (908). Moreover, “[g]reater responsibility will now fall upon the ACP state [sic] themselves to identify and administer the funding for individual projects.”

procedures demonstrates. The ACP group is comprised of seventy-nine individual sovereign countries.<sup>69</sup> Since political conditionality has been introduced, only ten countries have been subject to a consultation procedure.<sup>70</sup> This means that over eighty percent of the ACP participants in Cotonou have not violated the human rights, democracy and rule of law conditionality to the extent that it warranted suspension of aid (or threat of suspension) through Article 96.<sup>71</sup>

Naturally, the EU's failure to suspend cooperation is by no means an adequate measure of ACP compliance with the 'essential elements' of Cotonou. However, as Chart 1 indicates, developing countries as a whole have gradually improved their compliance with international standards for political rights and civil liberties since 1975, and the ACP countries as a group have matched or exceeded the improvement in compliance with these indicators.<sup>72</sup> In the ACP countries, the average Freedom House score for political rights has improved by 1.7 points (from 1.8 to 3.5); the average score for civil liberties has improved by 1.3 points (from 1.8 to 3.2).<sup>73</sup> Interestingly, both political rights and civil liberties scores in African ACP countries improve by an entire point (from 1.4 to 2.4) between 1990 and 1995, after human rights and democracy standards were incorporated into Article 5 of the Lomé Convention, but before conditionality mechanisms were introduced into Lomé IVB. Have these states been coerced or persuaded into compliance? Are the Lomé/Cotonou agreements the medium through which compliance behavior is being changed? The analysis of the information presented thus far cannot distinguish between the effects of persuasion and coercion. It is for that reason that a statistical analysis of the effects of these agreements on the essential elements over time is necessary.

*Hypotheses: is human rights behavior in ACP countries driven by persuasion or coercion?*

The previous section outlined how the Lomé Conventions and Cotonou Agreement provide an institutional framework in which the effects of persuasion and coercion can be tested. Since over four-fifths of the ACP signatories to the Lomé Convention joined the conventions before human rights standards were

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<sup>69</sup> See Annex IB. Cuban membership is problematic.

<sup>70</sup> See Annex II. It should be noted that the EU Commission suggested the commencement of consultation with Comoros and Niger in 1999, but these suggestions were not taken up by the Council of Ministers. If these countries are taken into account, the percentage of violators equals sixteen percent of ACP countries. This metric does not include ACP states called to account by the European Parliament if this has failed to result in subsequent actions being taken by the Commission and the Council of Ministers. However, the discrepancy between these two numbers is not very large.

<sup>71</sup> It should be noted that several authors, and particularly Arts, have catalogue many cases of de facto sanctioning of ACP countries by the EU, well before the official mechanisms were put in place by Lomé IVB (1998, Ch. 8). However, these authors also note that this type of sanctioning was explicitly distanced from Lomé through 1985 and was inconsistently applied (as was the case with Ethiopia) (Tomasevski, 1989, p. 72). This paper, therefore, concentrates on official coercion, rather than the ad hoc sanctioning undertaken before human rights provisions were inserted into the text of the agreements.

<sup>72</sup> Chart 1 data from Freedom House, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw/FIWAAllScores.xls>. "Political Rights and Civil Liberties are measured on a one-to-seven scale, with one representing the highest degree of Freedom and seven the lowest." In order to assist with a more intuitive understanding of these figures, these scores have been transformed to a zero to six scale, with zero indicating the lowest degree of freedom and six indicating the highest.

<sup>73</sup> See Chart 1 for details.

introduced in into the text of the agreement,<sup>74</sup> an analysis of the EU/ACP relationship avoids many of the problems associated with selection bias. The reticence of the ACP countries to accept political conditionality highlights the fact that these states had not accepted these international standards as ‘part and parcel’ of the agreement when they joined Lomé. In other words, the ACP countries did not agree to Lomé because they had already planned to comply with the human rights and other political standards that would later be introduced into the agreements. Yet their resistance to the introduction of these standards has been tempered by economic dependency on EU aid and preferential trade status, which made post-hoc denunciation<sup>75</sup> of the agreement difficult.

The evolution of human rights standards in these agreements, therefore, provides the means to test the persuasion-coercion within a strong institutional context. Importantly, the introduction of human rights standards into the Convention in 1985 and 1990 before the inclusion sanctioning measures in 1995 (through Lomé IVB) provides a window of time during which the effects of persuasion can be observed in relative isolation. Moreover, the differentiation between essential and fundamental elements in Cotonou allow for the parallel observation of behavior that should be affected by coercion, along side that of behavior that could only be affected (if at all) by persuasion. Therefore, in order to test the persuasion-coercion debate within the context of the EU/ACP trade and aid relationship, it is necessary not only to distinguish between time periods before and after the introduction of political conditionality (e.g. Lomé IVA versus Lomé IVB) and periods when some but not all political elements are subject to political conditionality (e.g. the Cotonou Agreement), but also between the effect of political conditionality on different types of political standards.

These considerations frame the construction of the hypothesis which will be tested in this paper. The first hypothesis examines the effect of the introduction of political conditionality into the Lomé Conventions in 1995. The coercion argument can be argued as follows:

H1a: If compliance behavior is determined by coercion, then compliance with human rights, democracy and rule of law standards *should not* be effected by participation in Lomé following the introduction of these standards into the text of Lomé IVA.

H1b: If compliance behavior is determined by coercion, then compliance with human rights, democracy and rule of law standards *should only* be positively associated with participation in Lomé after the inclusion of political conditionality in Lomé IVB (if at all);

H1c: If compliance behavior is determined by coercion, then compliance with human rights, democracy and rule of law standards *should* be positively associated with Cotonou to a greater degree than it is with Lomé IVB, since Cotonou strengthens the political conditionality provisions in the trade/aid agreements.

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<sup>74</sup> See Annex IB for statistics.

<sup>75</sup> Article 99 of the Cotonou Agreement provides an exit clause.

For Hypothesis H1 to hold, compliance behavior should not be associated with participation in Lomé until after 1995. On the other hand, if socialization and norm diffusion is taking place within the context of these conventions, then this alternative persuasion-based hypothesis is possible:

H2a: If compliance behavior is determined by persuasion, then compliance with human rights, democracy and rule of law standards *should* be positively associated with participation in Lomé after the introduction of these standards into the text of Lomé III and Lomé IVA, and before the introduction of political conditionality in Lomé IVB.

H2b: If compliance behavior is determined by persuasion, then, the association between compliance with human rights, democracy, and rule of law standards and participation in the agreements *should not* be affected by the changes in the strength of the political conditionality between the Lomé and Cotonou agreements.

For Hypothesis H2 to hold, compliance behavior should be associated with participation in Lomé after 1990. In other words, the timing of any change in behavior regarding human rights, democracy and rule of law (before or 1995) should indicate which of these factors (coercion or persuasion) is playing a larger role in determining compliance behavior with these standards.<sup>76</sup> The exclusion of good governance from sanctioning under Cotonou provides another opportunity to observe the possible effects of persuasion and coercion on compliance behavior. The following hypothesis is derived from coercion argument:

H3: If compliance behavior is determined by coercion<sup>77</sup>, then compliance with essential elements<sup>77</sup> of the Cotonou Agreement *should* be positively associated with participation in Cotonou, while the compliance with good governance standards (excluding corruption) should remain unaffected.

For Hypothesis H3 to hold, compliance behavior in terms of human rights, democracy and rule of law standards would be associated with participation in Cotonou, but good governance behavior would not be. Since the Cotonou sanctioning mechanism is more precisely defined than that in Lomé IVB, a strong relationship between compliance and participation in the agreements may be expected after 2000.<sup>78</sup> The fact that good governance

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<sup>76</sup> It may also be the case that a gradual improvement in compliance behavior will be observed; this could be the result of the gradual increase in human rights concerns since the end of the Cold War, or the increasing use of political conditionality by international aid organizations. In such a case, the statistical analysis would not allow for the differentiation between these causal mechanisms.

<sup>77</sup> The essential elements of Cotonou (human rights, democracy, and rule of law) are subject to sanctioning under Article 96 of the agreement; fundamental elements refer primarily to good governance standards, which are not subject to sanctioning under Article 96 of the agreement; however, “serious cases of corruption” are subject to sanctioning under Article 97.

<sup>78</sup> Deviation from this prediction might indicate several other explanations, which are more difficult to differentiate using statistical methods. For example, simultaneous improvement in both the essential and fundamental elements of Cotonou could indicate that compliance on good governance standards is the result of persuasion (through inclusion in the

provisions are not inserted into these agreements until Cotonou<sup>79</sup> also allow for an alternative means of testing the persuasion argument, as demonstrated in the following hypothesis:

H4: If compliance behavior is determined by persuasion, then compliance with good governance standards *should* be positively associated with participation in Cotonou, but not with participation in the Lomé Conventions.

For Hypothesis H4 to hold, compliance behavior in terms of good governance standards would be associated with participation in Cotonou starting in 2000. If, as some argue, good governance behavior has been effected by IMF and World Bank conditionality on programming,<sup>80</sup> then a relationship between participation Cotonou and good governance predicted in Hypothesis H4 should not be detected. That said, Schimmelfennig and Scholtz provide evidence indicating that, outside of accession negotiations, EU political conditionality does not appear to promote democratic change.<sup>81</sup> Therefore, the null hypothesis, in which Lomé and Cotonou have no effect on human rights standards, must explicitly be included in the analysis in relation to all of the proposed hypotheses:

H0: If participation in Lomé and Cotonou has no effect on compliance behavior, then compliance with political standards *should not* be associated with the introduction of political standards into these agreements.

Moreover, recent observations of the suspension mechanism in practice indicate that it may be important to differentiate between the individual standards under analysis. As Portela argues, "...suspensions are applied predominantly in cases of interruptions of the democratic process;"<sup>82</sup> if this pattern of suspension is recognized by the ACP recipient, then it may lead them to differentiate their responsiveness to political conditionality. In other words, recipient countries may respond differently when conditionality is applied to democratic standards (violations of which are readily identifiable) than when they are applied to human rights and rule of law. For this reason, it is necessary to test for compliance with human rights standards separately from democratic, rule of law and good governance standards. The structure of the statistical analysis takes this consideration, as is demonstrated below.

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agreement); simultaneously, it might indicate that coercion has a 'spillover' effect, making ACP states wary of engaging in any behavior that may be used as the grounds for future sanctioning.

<sup>79</sup> Article 336a of Lomé IVB only listed human rights, democracy and rule of law as essential elements of the convention (Arts, 1998, p. 190).

<sup>80</sup> See Brown, 2000 and 2002.

<sup>81</sup> Schimmelfennig and Scholtz, 2007.

<sup>82</sup> Portela, 2007, p. 38.

This paper uses an OLS regression<sup>83</sup> to investigate the effects of persuasion versus coercion in the Lomé and Cotonou Agreements between the EU and the 79 ACP countries based on an analysis of compliance with international standards for political behavior between 1991 and 2006 using a dataset of both ACP and non-ACP developing countries (n = 148).<sup>84</sup> In order to test compliance behavior with regard to human rights standards in Lomé and Cotonou, this analysis uses measures similar to those employed in scholarship on the effects of human rights agreement embedded in PTAs.<sup>85</sup> However, the statistical analysis differs from previous scholarship in several ways.<sup>86</sup> Firstly, instead of focusing on repression, this analysis focuses on compliance with these international standards for political behavior; given the nature of the dependent variables (described below), an OLS regression is used to test the model.<sup>87</sup> The analysis also differentiates between different types of political standards, in order to test Hypothesis H3 and H4, and to allow for differentiated responses to political conditionality for different political standards. As a result, the analysis examines six dependent variables related to the essential and fundamental elements of Cotonou: two measures of human rights, and one measure each of democracy and rule of law (to test the essential elements) as well as two measures of good governance (to test the fundamental elements). The level of compliance with these elements is determined for each developing country in the dataset.

Secondly, the hypotheses proposed are concerned with different levels of compliance with the political conditionality during Lomé IVA, Lomé IVB and Cotonou. Therefore, the time period 1990 – 2005 is divided into three five-year time periods: 1992 – 1996 (Time 1), 1997 – 2001 (Time 2), 2002 – 2006 (Time 3).<sup>88</sup> These time periods reflect the fundamental changes occurring in the EU/ACP agreements, have been constructed to facilitate the analysis of changes in behavior that may be expected with the introduction of human rights standards into the text of the conventions in 1990 (Lomé IVA), the introduction of political conditionality in 1995 (Lomé IVB), as well as the strengthening of conditionality and the inclusion of good governance standards in 2000 (Cotonou). The periods have been lagged by twelve to eighteen months in order to allow for changes in behavior to become evident in the dependent variables.<sup>89</sup> In order to test the five proposed hypotheses, the

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<sup>83</sup> The statistical model is articulated in detail in Annex III.

<sup>84</sup> Specifically, the G8, the EU-27, and the BRICs as well as few others have been excluded from the dataset due to their level of economic development. The list of countries included and excluded from the study can be found in Annex IV.

<sup>85</sup> See for, example, Hafner-Burton, 2005, p. 615 – 618.

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 615 – 618. Hafner-Burton's model, for example, tests repression in 176 states over 25 years.

<sup>87</sup> The statistical model is delineated in Annex III. Since n = 180 and all dependent variables as continuous, OLS should be an appropriate method by which to test these models.

<sup>88</sup> These time periods have been used for the dependent variables. For the independent variables, the time periods are as follows: Time 1 = 1991 – 1995, Time 2 = 1996 – 2000, Time 3 = 2001 – 2005. In addition, Time 0 (1986-1990 for IVs; 1997-2001 for DVs) was tested to determine the affect of the end of the Cold War on the dependent variables of interest.

<sup>89</sup> Because EU-ACP agreements are often signed late in the year (with the exception of Cotonou, which was signed in June 2000), it is unlikely that changes in human rights behavior will take place immediately after signature. Moreover, the initiation of sanctioning procedures also takes time. By providing a 12 – 18 month delay for changes to appear, both the effects of persuasion and coercion are more adequately tested.

change in the coefficients associated with the independent variables between each time periods are analyzed. The dependent and independent variables used in the regression analysis are described in detail below.<sup>90</sup>

*Dependent variables – ‘Essential’ and ‘Fundamental’ elements of Cotonou*

According to Article 9(2), the ‘essential elements’ of Cotonou refer to the universal respect for human rights, democracy and rule of law.<sup>91</sup> It is these elements that are subject to political dialogue and sanctions under Article 96 in cases where infringement is suspected. Measures of these three elements comprise the first set of dependent variables in the statistical analysis.

- *Human rights* – because of the difficulty associated with measuring human rights<sup>92</sup>, two indices are used: the Freedom House Dataset and the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset.
- *Democracy* – the Polity IV project provides a well-recognized measure of democracy over time.<sup>93</sup>
- *Rule of law* – the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project provides governance scores for 212 countries on six distinct indicators;<sup>94</sup> one of these is the Rule of Law (ROL).<sup>95</sup>

Article 9(3) of Cotonou defined good governance as a fundamental element of the agreement, yet one which is not subject to the sanctioning provisions in Article 96.<sup>96</sup> This article does make an exception for serious cases of corruption, which are subject to sanctioning under Article 97.<sup>97</sup> Therefore, two measures of good governance, provided by the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project,<sup>98</sup> are used in the second set of dependent

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<sup>90</sup> More detailed information regarding the operationalization of these variables is available in Annex III.

<sup>91</sup> European Communities, 2000, Decision No. 2000/483/EC.

<sup>92</sup> The composite Freedom House scores and the composite CIRI scores have a relatively strong correlation of -.8416. The negative correlation is an artifact of the nature of the Freedom House scale.

<sup>93</sup> The Center for Systemic Peace provides the Polity IV scores in their publication *Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2006*, available at: <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm>. According to the project website, the Polity 2 variable “... This variable is a modified version of the POLITY variable added in order to facilitate the use of the POLITY regime measure in time-series analyses. It modifies the combined annual POLITY score by applying a simple treatment, or “fix,” to convert instances of “standardized authority scores” (i.e., -66, -77, and -88) to conventional polity scores (-10 through +10). Hafner-Burton uses the Polity scores as an independent variable in her analysis.

<sup>94</sup> The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project, available at: <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/home.htm>. According to the website, “The six dimensions of Governance are: Voice and Accountability; Political Stability and Absence of Violence; Government Effectiveness; Regulatory Quality; Rule of Law; and Control of Corruption.”

<sup>95</sup> ROL measures “... the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.”

<sup>96</sup> European Communities, 2000, Decision No. 2000/483/EC. According to Article 9(3): “good governance is the transparent and accountable management of human, natural, economic and financial resources for the purposes of equitable and sustainable development.”

<sup>97</sup> For this reason, corruption, if included in this analysis, should be tested as an ‘essential element’ rather than a fundamental element.

<sup>98</sup> The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project, available at: <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/home.htm>.

variables representing the ‘fundamental elements’ of the Cotonou Agreement: Government Effectiveness (GE) and Regulatory Quality (RQ).<sup>99</sup>

*Independent variables – Lomé/Cotonou and other explanations*

While the participation of the ACP countries in these agreements with the EU certainly provides one venue for influencing human rights behavior, the effects of both persuasion and coercion on compliance with human rights standards may stem from other sources. The ACP countries participate in many international organizations and agreements; they receive aid from various sources, and interact with the world through trade and foreign direct investment. The independent variables listed below control for the effects of these elements on the behavior of these actors in terms of the dependent variables being tested in the model.

- *ACP membership* – participation in the Lomé and Cotonou agreements provides incentives for positive change in the political standards highlighted in these agreements.
- *Trade*– EU/ACP trade constitutes a major aspect of the Lomé and Cotonou agreements, and the decline in North/South trade was one of major motivating factors behind the creation of Cotonou.<sup>100</sup> Therefore, an analysis of the effects of trade provides a means through which the effects of economic factors on compliant behavior can be determined.
- *Foreign Direct Investment* – external investment can also affect compliance behavior, as investors are often interested in respect for the rule of law, and regime stability.
- *Population density* – population pressures can affect government behavior.
- *Participation in international economic organizations* – participation in IOs such as the World Bank, United Nations (UN) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) provide an additional venue through which behavior with regard to human rights, democracy, rule of law and good governance may be affected, either through persuasion or coercion.<sup>101</sup>
- *International human rights agreements* – while signature and ratification of human rights treaties by no means guarantees compliance, it does indicate that a country is aware of these standards of behavior and understands the benefits (both material and social) of being associated with these treaties.<sup>102</sup>

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<sup>99</sup> According to the WGI website, GE “... measures the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies.” In contrast, RQ “... measures the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development.”

<sup>100</sup> Hurt, 2003, p. 165

<sup>101</sup> In particular, participation in World Bank and IMF programs has long been subject to conditionality effecting rule of law and good governance.

<sup>102</sup> The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights maintains a list of the ratification of the protocols and conventions on human rights by signatory states. These documents, which were most recently updated in 2008, include the date of ratification for each country.

- *Human development* – the Human Development Index (HDI)<sup>103</sup> is often used to determine the effects of wealth and development on compliance with human rights. This index includes not only income, but also literacy and life expectancy; all three factors arguably contribute to compliance behavior in terms of human rights.
- *Civil unrest* – government instability can affect compliance behavior on international political standards.

In addition, since initial analysis of the Freedom House data indicated that Africa tends to systematically differ from other regions in the ACP group,<sup>104</sup> a dummy variable for geographic location will also be included in the model.

### *Results of Statistical Analysis*

As indicated above, the six dependent variables which serve as proxies for human rights, democracy, rule of law and good governance, were regressed against nine independent variables for each of the three five-year time periods using an ordinary-least squares (OLS) regression. By creating one score for each country on each measure for each of the three time period, and running the regression for each time period separately, it was possible to avoid the autocorrelation problems associated with time-series data.

Given that dependent variables were averaged composites, each regression was tested for heteroscedasticity using Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test. The heteroscedastic distribution of residuals in several of the models led to the use of robust standard errors in all models. The highest levels of correlation are found between the variable indicating participation in Lomé/Cotonou, the geographical Africa designation dummy variable, and the Human Development Index (HDI) variable.<sup>105</sup> Given the composition of the ACP membership, the strength of these correlations was not unexpected. More importantly, perhaps, is the relatively strong correlation between the HDI variable and the World Development Indicator variables for rule of law, government effectiveness and regulatory quality<sup>106</sup>, which was also reflected in the results of the regression analysis.

The results of the regression analysis indicate several interesting findings related to the postulated hypothesis. Participation in Lomé/Cotonou is positively associated with both human rights variables and the democracy variable in all three time periods at a significant level.<sup>107</sup> In other words, the statistical analysis

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<sup>103</sup> HDI scores provided by Human development index trends (Table 2) from 2007/2008 Report (<http://hdrstats.undp.org/indicators/10.html>)

<sup>104</sup> See Chart 1 for details.

<sup>105</sup> Correlation between Lomé/Cotonou variable and HDI variable = -.56 – -.68 (depending on model); correlation between Lomé/Cotonou variable and Africa dummy variable = .68 – .78 (depending on model); correlation between Africa dummy variable and HDI variable = -.70 – -.72 (depending on model).

<sup>106</sup> Correlation between HDI variable and World Development Indicators (RoL, GE, RQ) = .53 – .62 (depending on model).

<sup>107</sup> Respect for human rights, expressed as both Freedom House and CIRI variables, and well democratic standards, is positively associated with participation in Lomé/Cotonou (p) = 0.000 level or better in all time periods

shows that countries participating in this particular PTA are observed to behave better, in terms of human rights and democratic standards, than those countries not participating in these agreements; moreover, the positive association between participation and good behavior begins before the introduction of coercion into these agreement (in the form of political conditionality). As a result, these finding supports Hypothesis 2 indicating the effect of persuasion, and find no support for any element of Hypothesis 1 in favor of coercion.

With regard to the rule of law variable, however, participation in Lomé/Cotonou has no apparent effect in any of the time periods assessed. The variable most strongly associated with the rule of law variable in all time period is the human development index. This might reflect the fact that rule of law is more related to the social well-being of a society than trade agreements. Moreover, the rule of law variable is also significantly and negatively associated with the armed conflict variable, supporting recent work conducted by North, Wallis, and Weingast<sup>108</sup> on the affect of violence on the development of rule of law.<sup>109</sup> Therefore, the results of the statistical analysis on this variable provide support for neither the coercion (Hypothesis 1) nor the persuasion (Hypothesis 2) argument, in this institutional context.

In terms of a comparison between the essential and fundamental elements of the Cotonou Agreement, the results of the statistical analysis for the essential elements of the agreement (human rights, democracy and rule of law) provide no support for Hypothesis 3 in favor of coercion, which predict that the association between these factors and participation in the ACP agreements will increase over time, as the level of conditionality introduced into the agreements increases. Interestingly, however, the same must be said for Hypothesis 4 in favor of persuasion, with regard to the fundamental elements of the agreement. Similarly to the Rule of Law variable, these two indicators of good governance (government effectiveness and regulatory quality) are most consistently associated with the human development index variable, which may reflect the way in which all three indicators (government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and rule of law) were developed.<sup>110</sup> Alternatively, these results may provide support for the null hypothesis, namely that political conditionality in PTAs does not affect recipient behavior, at least in terms of rule of law and good governance standards.

Taken as a whole, the statistical analysis provides partial support for constructivist assertions regarding the power of persuasion within certain types of institutionalized international agreements – at least in terms of their effects on human rights and democratic standards. That said, the results of the statistical analysis leave us with a significant question: why does participation in Lomé Conventions/Cotonou Agreement seem to affect compliance with some political standards, but not others? It is possible to posit several explanations. One explanation relates the nature of EU conditionality within the context of these agreements. It can be argued that

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<sup>108</sup> North, Wallis, and Weingast, 2009.

<sup>109</sup> However, the fact that this dependent variable (as well as all of the variables based on World Development Indicators) contains limited information for the first and second time periods, in comparison with the more complete data available for the third time period, which may have affected this variable as operationalized in this study. See Annex III for details.

<sup>110</sup> Interestingly, the fundamental elements are also positively associated with the variable for membership in international organizations.

political conditionality with these agreements (but especially after the 1996 Green Paper<sup>111</sup> on the effectiveness of the trade/aid relationship between the EU and the ACP countries) has more to do with internal EU perceptions of legitimate EU action than concerns regarding the political situation in trading partners. The political conditionality introduced into the Lomé Convention in 1995 parallels in many ways the political conditionality being applied to applicant countries in Central and Eastern Europe following the Copenhagen IGC in 1993. The expectation of the EU-15<sup>112</sup> with regard to the political, economic and societal standards of the accession countries reflected the level of political, economic and social development achieved by the current member states. While it may be argued that such conditionality is appropriate for potential member states, it is less clear that this conditionality would be appropriate for ACP trading partners.

Secondly, in the mid-1990s, the legitimacy of EU actions was being questioned by an increasingly skeptical EU public. It is possible that political conditionality was introduced into Lomé IV in order to legitimate EU development initiatives. If this is the case, then the nature of the political conditionality may have been shaped more by internal EU political concerns, than by reasonable and practical consideration of the feasibility of applying this type of conditionality to the ACP countries.

Thirdly, suspension of aid has mainly been in reaction to easily identifiable violations of political conditionality – namely failure to comply with democratic standards and large scale violence.<sup>113</sup> It remains much more difficult for donor countries to monitor compliance with rule of law and good governance standards. As a result, these elements of political conditionality are less likely to provide the basis for the suspension of aid. Recipient countries, therefore, have less incentive to comply with the standard set for these elements of political conditionality, since violations are unlikely to be detected.

#### *Conclusions: compliance behavior in the ACP countries*

This paper has attempted to test the persuasion-coercion debate by examining compliance with political standards within the context of the Lomé Conventions and Cotonou Agreements. The structure of statistical analysis attempt to address the difficulty in differentiating between the effects of coercion and persuasion. Hypothesis H1 and H2 attempts to determine if changes in human rights, democratic and rule of law standards are the result of persuasion or coercion, by examining the strength of the association between participation in Lomé IVA and Lomé IVB. Surprisingly, perhaps, the results of the statistical analysis provide more support for the persuasion hypothesis, insofar as human rights and democratic standards are strongly and positively associated with participation in all three time periods, before political conditionality is introduced in the second time period.

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<sup>111</sup> See Footnote 51.

<sup>112</sup> The EU-15 refers to the European Union during the period between 1995 and 2004.

<sup>113</sup> See Annex II and Portela, 2007.

Once conditionality is introduced into the agreements, it becomes more difficult to discern possible independent effects of persuasion given the possibility of coercion. The exclusion of good governance provisions from the sanctioning mechanisms provided a means to differentiate the motivation behind compliance behavior through a comparison of different types of political standards during the same time period. Hypothesis H3 attempts to determine if coercion through the threat of sanctions elicits improved compliance behavior on certain standards while controlling for the presence of soft provisions on other standards, and Hypothesis H4 attempts to determine if improved compliance behavior is observed in the absence of coercive measures. Unfortunately, the results of the statistical analysis of these two hypotheses do not allow us to draw firm conclusions. However, the overall analysis does raise new questions about the difference between the Lomé Conventions and the Cotonou Agreement.

While the results of the statistical analysis are ambiguous, they do provide some insights. In particular, the results call into question rationalist's generalizations regarding the influence of PTAs on political behavior, indicating that causal mechanisms in Lomé Conventions and Cotonou Agreement may be different than those found in other types of PTAs, perhaps due to long-term institutionalization. Moreover, it may be that the more transparent human rights and democratic standards are more sensitive to persuasion in this institutionalized setting than others, such as rule of law and good governance, which are more difficult to monitor.<sup>114</sup>

The introduction of human rights standards into Lomé and Cotonou has elicited much academic interest; however, much of this focuses on the appropriateness of applying European liberal values on sovereign nations of the global South,<sup>115</sup> or the failure of the EU to provide sufficient positive incentives for compliance.<sup>116</sup> This study asks whether or not participation in Lomé and Cotonou affects compliance behavior, and to what extent this behavior has been affected by the introduction of political conditionality into the agreements. Moreover, this study attempts to explore the implication of an anomaly within the universe of PTAs, namely a highly institutionalized and long-term trade agreement. The Lomé Conventions came into being in reaction to decolonization, internal EU politics, and rising commodity costs in the 1970s.<sup>117</sup> As a result, these agreements represent a unique opportunity to analyze the compliance behavior of states whose initial agreement to participate in the organization did not include the human rights standards being tested in the model. While many IR scholars would certainly argue that PTAs and aid provide material incentives for compliance, regardless of

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<sup>114</sup> There are naturally several other difficulties with this analysis. By testing compliance rather than repression, Hafner-Burton's model is not replicated; in addition, by studying a group of states dominated by the participation of a large number of African countries, this analysis may not accurately represent the effects of coercion or persuasion in other settings. While the dummy variable for geographic location assists in determining that this is not consistently the case within the context of most of the models, it is more difficult to determine the effects that this might have on the socialization process within the organization. It is possible that the heterogeneity of the ACP states is advantageous in terms of norm diffusion; however, the alternative is just as likely to be true. The inability to control for other factors that affect socialization within the organization, including colonial histories and language issues, weakens the robustness of the analysis as it pertains to persuasion.

<sup>115</sup> For example, Farrell, 2005.

<sup>116</sup> For example, Arts, 1998.

<sup>117</sup> See Brown, 2002.

the existence of conditionality, the Lomé and Cotonou agreements do provide a stronger case study for the examination of constructivist arguments than is usually available. While the results of this study are not conclusive, they do raise questions about the veracity of the rationalist generalizations regarding human rights standards in certain specific PTAs. Moreover, the results of this study indicate that different types of political standards may be more or less responsive to the introduction of political conditionality, depending factors not explicitly examined in this paper, including the extent to which it is possible for the donor nation(s) to monitor a recipient's compliance with a political standard. These insights will hopefully provide leverage for further examinations of the persuasion-coercion debate, as well as analysis of compliance within international relations.

*The author would like to thank Dr. Emilie Hafner-Burton for her generous assistance in understanding the operationalization of several variables in her study; Dr. Jaap Dronkers and Dr. David Weimer for their assistance with several methodological questions; and the European Union Center for Excellence at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, for their sponsorship of the visiting student exchange program with the European University Institute, where this research was undertaken.*

## Annex IA – Basic Statistics on the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries

Country	Area (sq. km)	Population (2003 est.)	Year of Accession	Geographic Designation
Angola	1,246,700	10,766,471	1985	Africa
Benin	112,620	7,041,490	1975	Africa
Botswana	600,370	1,573,267	1975	Africa
Burkina Faso	274,200	13,228,460	1975	Africa
Burundi	27,830	6,096,156	1975	Africa
Cameroon	475,440	15,746,179	1975	Africa
Cape Verde	4,033	412,137	1980	Africa
Central African Republic	622,984	3,683,538	1975	Africa
Chad	1,284,000	9,253,493	1975	Africa
Comoros	2,170	632,948	1980	Africa
Congo	342,000	2,954,258	1975	Africa
Cote d'Ivoire	322,460	16,962,491	1975	Africa
Democratic Republic of Congo	2,345,410	56,625,039	1975	Africa
Djibouti	23,000	457,130	1980	Africa
Equatorial Guinea	28,051	510,473	1975	Africa
Eritrea	121,320	4,362,254	1995	Africa
Ethiopia	1,127,127	66,557,553	1975	Africa
Gabon	267,667	1,321,560	1975	Africa
Gambia	11,300	1,501,050	1975	Africa
Ghana	239,460	20,467,747	1975	Africa
Guinea	245,857	9,030,220	1975	Africa
Guinea-Bissau	36,120	1,360,827	1975	Africa
Kenya	582,650	31,639,091	1975	Africa
Lesotho	30,355	1,861,959	1975	Africa
Liberia	111,370	3,317,176	1975	Africa
Madagascar	587,040	16,979,744	1975	Africa
Malawi	118,480	11,651,239	1975	Africa
Mali	1,240,000	11,626,219	1975	Africa
Mauritania	1,030,700	2,912,584	1975	Africa
Mauritius	2,040	1,210,447	1975	Africa
Mozambique	801,590	17,479,266	1985	Africa
Namibia	825,418	1,927,447	1990	Africa
Niger	1,267,000	11,058,590	1975	Africa
Nigeria	923,768	133,881,703	1975	Africa
Rwanda	26,338	7,810,056	1975	Africa
Sao Tome and Principe	1,001	175,883	1980	Africa
Senegal	196,190	10,580,307	1975	Africa
Seychelles	455	80,469	1980	Africa
Sierra Leone	71,740	5,732,681	1975	Africa
Somalia	637,657	8,025,190	1975	Africa
South Africa*	1,219,912	42,768,678	1995	Africa
Sudan	2,505,810	38,114,160	1975	Africa
Swaziland	17,363	1,161,219	1975	Africa
Tanzania	945,087	35,922,454	1975	Africa
Togo	56,785	5,429,299	1975	Africa
Uganda	236,040	25,632,794	1975	Africa
Zambia	752,614	10,307,333	1975	Africa
Zimbabwe	390,580	12,576,742	1980	Africa

Antigua & Barbuda	443	67,897	1985	Caribbean
Bahamas	13,940	297,477	1975	Caribbean
Barbados	431	277,264	1975	Caribbean
Belize	22,966	266,440	1985	Caribbean
Cuba*	110,860	11,263,429	2000	Caribbean
Dominica	754	69,655	1980	Caribbean
Dominican Republic	48,730	8,715,602	1990	Caribbean
Grenada	344	89,258	1975	Caribbean
Guyana	214,970	702,100	1975	Caribbean
Haiti	27,750	7,527,817	1990	Caribbean
Jamaica	10,991	2,695,867	1975	Caribbean
St. Kitts and Nevis	261	38,763	1985	Caribbean
St. Lucia	616	162,157	1980	Caribbean
St. Vincent & the Grenadines	389	116,812	1985	Caribbean
Suriname	163,270	435,449	1980	Caribbean
Trinidad and Tobago	5,128	1,104,209	1975	Caribbean
Cook Islands	240	21,008	2000	Pacific
East Timor	15,007	997,853	2003	Pacific
Fiji	18,270	868,531	1975	Pacific
Kiribati	811	98,549	1980	Pacific
Marshall Islands	181	56,429	2000	Pacific
Micronesia	702	108,143	2000	Pacific
Nauru	21	12,570	2000	Pacific
Niue	260	2,145	2000	Pacific
Palau	458	19,717	2000	Pacific
Papua New Guinea	462,840	5,295,816	1980	Pacific
Samoa	2,944	178,173	1975	Pacific
Solomon Islands	28,450	509,190	1980	Pacific
Tonga	748	108,141	1975	Pacific
Tuvalu	26	11,305	1980	Pacific
Vanuatu	12,200	199,414	1985	Pacific

\* According to DG Development, Cuban and South African ACP membership status is somewhat unique: "Cuba was admitted into the ACP group in 2000, although did not sign the Cotonou Agreement ... relations with Cuba and South Africa are different in the sense that they do not benefit from the European Development Fund (EDF), although South Africa is also a signatory of Cotonou."

[http://ec.europa.eu/development/index\\_en.cfm](http://ec.europa.eu/development/index_en.cfm)

## Annex IB – ACP Membership by Geographic Designation and Year of Accession

	No.	%
Total number of ACP states in 2008	79	100%
% of African ACP countries	48	61%
% of Caribbean ACP countries	16	20%
% of Pacific ACP countries	15	19%
% of members after political conditionality introduced (after Lomé IVB)	10	13%
% of members before political conditionality introduced (before Lomé IVB)	69	87%
% of member before introduction of human rights language into agreements (Lomé I - III)	66	84%

Source: Secretariat of the ACP Group of States: <http://www.acpsec.org/index.htm>, Brown (2002) Annex 1, p. 210, DG Development: [http://ec.europa.eu/development/index\\_en.cfm](http://ec.europa.eu/development/index_en.cfm).

## Annex II – Consultation on violation of ‘essential elements’ under Lomé IVB and Cotonou

ACP country	Commission proposal for consultation	Consultation Opened	EU decision closing consultation	Sanctions	Relations Resumed as of May 2008	Geographic Designation
Fiji	COM/2000/0460	19 October 2000	Decision 2001/334/EC	Yes	Partial	Pacific
	COM/2007/0014	18 April 2007	Decision 2007/641/EC	Yes (minor)		
Niger	COM/99/0204	No action taken by Council				Africa
Comoros	COM/99/0295	No action taken by Council				Africa
Guinea-Bissau	COM/99/0361	No action taken by Council	Decision 2004/680/EC	Yes (minor)	Yes	Africa
	COM/2003/0824	19 January 2004				
Côte d'Ivoire	COM/99/0899	15 February 2001	Decision 2001/510/EC	Yes (minor)	Yes	Africa
	COM/2004/0547	No action taken by Council				
Haiti	COM/2000/0486	26 September 2000	Decision 2001/131/EC, 2002/131/EC, 2003/53/EC 2003/916/EC 2004/681/EC 2005/756/EC	Yes	Yes	Caribbean
Zimbabwe	N/A	11 January 2002	Decision 2002/148/EC, 2003/112/EC, 2004/157/EC, 2005/139/EC, 2006/114/EC 2007/127/EC, 2008/158/EC	Yes	No	Africa
Central African Republic	COM/2003/0222	12 June 2003	Decision 2003/837/EC	Yes	Partial	Africa
Republic of Guinea	COM/2003/0517	20 July 2004	Decision 2005/321/EC	Yes (minor)	No	Africa
Liberia	N/A	9 November 2001	Decision 2002/274/EC, 2003/631/EC 2003/631/EC 2006/450/EC	Yes	Yes	Africa
Togo	COM/2003/0850	14 April 2004	Decision 2004/793/EC 2006/863/EC	Yes (minor)	Partial	Africa
Mauritania	COM/2005/0546	30 November 2005	Decision 2006/470/EC	Yes (minor)	Partial	Africa

Source: EurLex legislative search engine, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm>. Own calculations/interpretation.

## Annex III – Statistical Model

**Variable Construction:** each dependent and independent variable represents the average score for that variable during five year time period under examination. For example, DEMOCRACY in Time 2 is the average of the yearly Polity 2 democracy scores for the years 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2000). For some variables (see in particular POPDENSITY and the scores provided by the Worldwide Governance Indicators, a yearly score was not always available for all periods. In such cases, the average of the available scores for that period was used. Because the effects of changes to the independent variables being tested (and in particular to the predictor variable (ACP)) cannot affect the dependent variable immediately, the dependent variable is lagged by 24 months after the change to the Lomé/Cotonou Agreements, and the independent variables (including membership in the ACP) are lagged by 12 months. Thus, Time 1: Lomé IVA (DV = 1992 – 1996, IV = 1991 – 1995), Time 2: Lomé IVB (DV = 1997 – 2001, IV = 1996 – 2000); and Time 3: Cotonou (DV = 2002 – 2006, IV = 2001 - 2005)

### Dependent Variables:

FH	=	Freedom House, combined political rights and civil liberties score (scale 1 – 7, 1 = best score)
CIRI	=	Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Database, combined physical integrity rights index (PIRI) and Empowerment Rights Index (ERI) score (scale 1 – 10, 10 = best score)
DEMOCRACY	=	Polity IV project, Polity 2 score (scale -10 – + 10, +10 = best score)
RULE OF LAW	=	Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project Rule of Law score (scale -2.5 – + 2.5, +2.5 = best score)
GE	=	Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project Government Effectiveness score (scale -2.5 – + 2.5, +2.5 = best score)
RQ	=	Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project Regulatory Quality score (scale -2.5 – + 2.5, +2.5 = best score)

### Independent Variables:

ACP	=	participation in Lomé or Cotonou agreements (dichotomous variable)
TRADE	=	merchandise trade as percentage of gross domestic product (GDP)
FDI	=	the natural log of the net FDI inflows
POPDENSITY	=	population of country divide by square kilometers
IEO	=	participation in the GATT/WTO, World Bank and/or UN (additive ordinal variable)
HRA	=	ratification of eleven UN human rights conventions (additive ordinal variable)
HDI	=	UNDP human development index
UNREST	=	instances of civil unrest provided by PRIO/UCDP database (dichotomous variable)
AFRICA	=	geographic designation (dichotomous variable)

### Detailed Operationalization of the Variables:

Human Rights (FH and CIRI)	Freedom House publishes annual comparative assessments of political rights (PR) and civil liberties (CL) levels; assessments are available for 193 countries and fifteen territories each year from 1972 through 2006. <sup>118</sup> The assessments are operationalized on a seven point scale, with one indicating the highest level of political freedom/civil liberties, and seven indicating the lowest levels. <sup>119</sup> The CIRI dataset provides annual assessments of thirteen individual human rights for 195 countries from 1981 through
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<sup>118</sup> *Freedom in the World* (annual publication), available at: <http://www.freedomhouse.org>

<sup>119</sup> *Ibid.* It should be noted that, given the way in which this variable is scaled, a “positive association” between the Freedom House score and participation in Lomé/Cotonou will be indicated by a negative coefficient in the statistical regression.

<sup>120</sup> CIRI data set, available at: <http://ciri.binghamton.edu/index.asp>

	2007. <sup>120</sup> CIRI contains two composite indices, Physical Integrity Rights Index (PIRI) and the original Empowerment Rights Index (ERI). <sup>121</sup> The PIRI and ERI indices are additive, and range from zero to eight and zero to ten, respectively, with zero representing no respect for the rights under assessment. In order to create two measures of democracy, the two Freedom House indices and the two CIRI indices are averaged separately. <sup>122</sup> The average country score over each five year period for both combined indices are used to test compliance with international human rights norms in each of the three assessment periods.
DEMOCRACY	The Revised Combined Polity Score, known as Polity 2, which provides a composite measure of democracy for 162 countries, is used to test for the level of democracy; the scores range from -10 (full autocracy) to +10 (full democracy). <sup>123</sup> The average country score over five years for this indicator is used for each of the three assessment periods.
World Governance Indicators (RULE OF LAW, GE and RQ)	The scores for these indicator range from -2.5 to + 2.5, with positive scores indicating better governance. <sup>124</sup> However, the WGI project only provides data starting in 1996, and only one score every two years from 1996 through 2002. <sup>125</sup> For this reason, while the average country score over five years for this indicator is used for the last assessment period, only the 1996 score is used for the first assessment period, and the 1998 and 2000 score is averaged for the second assessment period.
ACP	Participation in Lomé/Cotonou is coded as a dichotomous variable <sup>126</sup> for the three time periods. As indicated in Annex IB, only 12 countries <sup>127</sup> joined the agreements after 1990. As countries could only join the agreements upon the renewal of the agreement, participation equal membership during the entire time period.
TRADE	The World Bank provides data on the magnitude of individual country imports from and exports to the rest of the world, in a variety of formats. Given the differences in magnitude of trade between developing countries, merchandise trade as percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) averaged over five years is used for each of the three periods under investigation. <sup>128</sup>
FDI	Given the differences in magnitude of FDI between developing countries, the natural log of the net FDI inflows averaged over five years is used for each of the three periods under investigation. <sup>129</sup>
POPENSITY	The five-year summary statistic population density (defined as number of people per square kilometer) provided by the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs for each of the three assessment periods is used in the regression analysis. <sup>130</sup>
IEO	Therefore, an additive variable for participation in these three organizations <sup>131</sup> is used,

<sup>121</sup> The PIRI measures Torture, Extrajudicial Killing, Political Imprisonment, and Disappearance; the old ERI measures Freedom of Movement, Freedom of Speech, Workers' Rights, Political Participation, and Freedom of Religion. The revised version of the ERI index, available in 2009, was not used in analysis. A full CIRI coding guide is available at: [http://ciri.binghamton.edu/documentation/ciri\\_coding\\_guide.pdf](http://ciri.binghamton.edu/documentation/ciri_coding_guide.pdf)

<sup>122</sup> Given the different scales used by the PIRI and ERI index, it was necessary to normalize the PIRI index scale before this score was averaged with the ERI index score.

<sup>123</sup> A full user's manual is available at: <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm>.

<sup>124</sup> Further information on scoring is available at: <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/resources.htm>.

<sup>125</sup> The historical dataset for the WGI project is configured in such a way that while the average country score over five years for each of these indicators are used for the last assessment period, only the 1996 score are used for the first assessment period, and the 1998 and 2000 score are averaged for the second assessment period. Further information on scoring is available at: <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/resources.htm>.

<sup>126</sup> 0 = no participation in Lomé/Cotonou, 1 = participation in Lomé/Cotonou.

<sup>127</sup> If Cuba is not included. See note regarding Cuba on Annex IA.

<sup>128</sup> Data obtained from the World Bank's World Development Indicators. See also: Source: <http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org>

<sup>129</sup> The particular FDI indicator used is designated within this dataset as: Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows (BoP, current \$US).

<sup>130</sup> Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, *World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision and World Urbanization Prospects: The 2005 Revision*, <http://esa.un.org/unpp>

<sup>131</sup> Membership information for these organizations is available by year at the following websites: World Bank <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,contentMDK:20103870~menuPK:1697011~pagePK:51123644~piPK:329829~theSitePK:29708,00.html>, GATT/WTO

	with values ranging from zero (no participation) to three (participation in all three organizations). Participation in the organization within any year during the five-year period under consideration is coded as participation.
HRA	An additive variable indicating number of conventions and protocols ratified by each country, with values ranging from zero (no participation) to eleven (ratification in all eleven of the protocols under consideration) <sup>132</sup> . Ratification of an agreement in any year during the five-year period under consideration is coded as participation.
HDI	The yearly HDI score, ranging between zero (least developed) and one (most developed), averaged for each five-year period, is used for each of the three assessment periods. <sup>133</sup>
UNREST	The armed conflict database constructed by the Centre for the Study of Civil War at the International Peace Research Institute (PRIO) and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research <sup>134</sup> is used to create a dichotomous variable indicating whether or not the country experienced such conflict during each of the five-year periods examined
AFRICA	0 = non-African country, 1 = African country

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[http://www.wto.org/English/thewto\\_e/whatis\\_e/tif\\_e/org6\\_e.htm](http://www.wto.org/English/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm), UN <http://www.un.org/members/list.shtml>. It should be noted that, according to the World Bank website “Under the Articles of Agreement of IBRD, to become a member of the Bank a country must first join the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Membership in IDA, IFC and MIGA are conditional on membership in IBRD.” For this reason, IMF membership was not also calculated as part of this variable.

<sup>132</sup> The ratification lists maintained by the UN High Commission for Human Rights is available at:

<http://www2.ohchr.org/english/>. The composite variable described above indicates participation in Convention/Protocol 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 11, 13, 15, and 16. Participation in addendums to previous conventions/protocols was not included in this variable. In all cases, except for those of Protocols 15 and 16, the date of ratification was used; for Protocols 15 and 16, both of which were drafted in 2006, signature of the protocol was considered equivalent to ratification, since not enough time has elapsed to allow for ratification at the national level.

<sup>133</sup> HDI scores provided by Human development index trends (Table 2) from 2007/2008 Report

(<http://hdrstats.undp.org/indicators/10.html>) The HDI measures the average achievements in a country in three basic dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, knowledge and a decent standard of living.

<sup>134</sup> PRIO and UCDP armed conflict database, available at: <http://new.prio.no/CSCW-Datasets/Data-on-Armed-Conflict/UppsalaPRIO-Armed-Conflicts-Dataset/>.

## Annex IV - Countries in Dataset

Developing Countries (included in dataset)			Developed/Semi-developed Countries (excluded from dataset)
Afghanistan	Georgia	Palau	Andorra
Albania	Ghana	Panama	Australia
Algeria	Grenada	Papua New Guinea	Austria
Angola	Guatemala	Paraguay	Belgium
Antigua and Barbuda	Guinea	Peru	Brazil
Argentina	Guinea-Bissau	Philippines	Bulgaria
Armenia	Guyana	Qatar	Canada
Azerbaijan	Haiti	Rwanda	China
Bahamas	Honduras	Saint Kitts and Nevis	Cyprus
Bahrain	Indonesia	Saint Lucia	Czech Republic
Bangladesh	Iran	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	Denmark
Barbados	Iraq	Samoa	Estonia
Belarus	Jamaica	Sao Tome and Principe	Finland
Belize	Jordan	Saudi Arabia	France
Benin	Kazakhstan	Senegal	Germany
Bhutan	Kenya	Serbia	Greece
Bolivia	Kiribati	Seychelles	Hong Kong
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Kuwait	Sierra Leone	Hungary
Botswana	Kyrgyzstan	Solomon Islands	Iceland
Brunei	Laos	Somalia	India
Burkina Faso	Lebanon	South Africa	Ireland
Burundi	Lesotho	Sri Lanka	Israel
Cambodia	Liberia	Sudan	Italy
Cameroon	Libya	Suriname	Japan
Cape Verde	Macedonia	Swaziland	Latvia
Central African Republic	Madagascar	Syria	Liechtenstein
Chad	Malawi	Tajikistan	Lithuania
Chile	Malaysia	Tanzania	Luxembourg
Colombia	Maldives	Thailand	Malta
Comoros	Mali	Timor-Leste	Monaco
Congo	Marshall Islands	Togo	Netherlands
Cook Islands	Mauritania	Tonga	New Zealand
Costa Rica	Mauritius	Trinidad and Tobago	Norway
Côte d'Ivoire	Mexico	Tunisia	Poland
Croatia	Micronesia	Turkey	Portugal
Cuba	Moldova	Turkmenistan	Romania
Djibouti	Mongolia	Tuvalu	Russian Federation
Dominica	Montenegro	Uganda	San Marino
Dominican Republic	Morocco	Ukraine	Singapore
DPR Korea	Mozambique	United Arab Emirates	Slovakia
DR Congo	Myanmar	Uruguay	Slovenia
Ecuador	Namibia	Uzbekistan	South Korea
Egypt	Nauru	Vanuatu	Spain
El Salvador	Nepal	Venezuela	Sweden
Equatorial Guinea	Nicaragua	Viet Nam	Switzerland
Eritrea	Niger	Yemen	Taiwan
Ethiopia	Nigeria	Zambia	United Kingdom
Fiji	Niue	Zimbabwe	USA
Gabon	Oman		
Gambia	Pakistan		

## Annex V – Statistical Regression Results

*NB: bolded results indicate significance; Lomé/Cotonou results have been italicized as the variable of interest.*

### Essential Elements

Human Rights - Freedom House	Lomé IVA			Lomé IVB			Cotonou		
	Coefficient	SE	(p)	Coefficient	SE	(p)	Coefficient	SE	(p)
African Dummy	<b>-1.954</b>	<b>0.368</b>	<b>0.000</b>	<b>-1.549</b>	<b>0.415</b>	<b>0.000</b>	-0.790	0.428	0.068
Membership in IOs	<b>0.721</b>	<b>0.323</b>	<b>0.028</b>	<b>1.190</b>	<b>0.341</b>	<b>0.001</b>	<b>1.353</b>	<b>0.290</b>	<b>0.000</b>
Armed Conflict	-0.340	0.297	0.256	<b>-0.611</b>	<b>0.263</b>	<b>0.023</b>	<b>-0.692</b>	<b>0.272</b>	<b>0.012</b>
lnFDI	-0.085	0.084	0.315	-0.063	0.085	0.458	-0.017	0.054	0.749
Merchandise Trade	<b>-0.010</b>	<b>0.004</b>	<b>0.007</b>	<b>-0.008</b>	<b>0.003</b>	<b>0.025</b>	<b>-0.013</b>	<b>0.004</b>	<b>0.001</b>
Population Density	0.000	0.001	0.873	0.000	0.001	0.638	-0.001	0.001	0.145
UN Treaties on HR	<b>0.173</b>	<b>0.055</b>	<b>0.002</b>	<b>0.201</b>	<b>0.080</b>	<b>0.014</b>	0.091	0.077	0.238
Human Development Index	<b>3.927</b>	<b>1.494</b>	<b>0.010</b>	<b>4.332</b>	<b>1.585</b>	<b>0.008</b>	<b>6.281</b>	<b>1.190</b>	<b>0.000</b>
<i>Participation in Lomé/Cotonou</i>	<i>2.161</i>	<i>0.315</i>	<i>0.000</i>	<i>2.059</i>	<i>0.345</i>	<i>0.000</i>	<i>1.935</i>	<i>0.328</i>	<i>0.000</i>
Constant	-0.474	1.434	0.742	-2.762	1.703	0.108	-4.632	1.210	0.000
No. of Observations	95			97			122		
F-score	13.36			13.04			24.51		

Human Rights - CIRI	Lomé IVA			Lomé IVB			Cotonou		
	Coefficient	SE	(p)	Coefficient	SE	(p)	Coefficient	SE	(p)
African Dummy	<b>-2.209</b>	<b>0.416</b>	<b>0.000</b>	<b>-1.832</b>	<b>0.596</b>	<b>0.003</b>	<b>-1.053</b>	<b>0.460</b>	<b>0.024</b>
Membership in IOs	0.781	0.458	0.092	<b>1.473</b>	<b>0.491</b>	<b>0.004</b>	<b>1.618</b>	<b>0.371</b>	<b>0.000</b>
Armed Conflict	<b>-1.358</b>	<b>0.400</b>	<b>0.001</b>	<b>-1.606</b>	<b>0.433</b>	<b>0.000</b>	<b>-1.885</b>	<b>0.362</b>	<b>0.000</b>
lnFDI	-0.220	0.137	0.113	<b>-0.315</b>	<b>0.139</b>	<b>0.026</b>	<b>-0.217</b>	<b>0.080</b>	<b>0.007</b>
Merchandise Trade	-0.005	0.005	0.328	-0.005	0.006	0.407	-0.008	0.005	0.107
Population Density	-0.001	0.001	0.431	-0.001	0.001	0.281	<b>-0.001</b>	<b>0.000</b>	<b>0.002</b>
UN Treaties on HR	0.162	0.087	0.066	0.171	0.114	0.139	0.066	0.084	0.433
Human Development Index	2.113	2.036	0.303	<b>4.979</b>	<b>2.190</b>	<b>0.025</b>	<b>7.260</b>	<b>1.415</b>	<b>0.000</b>
<i>Participation in Lomé/Cotonou</i>	<i>2.340</i>	<i>0.422</i>	<i>0.000</i>	<i>2.469</i>	<i>0.519</i>	<i>0.000</i>	<i>2.537</i>	<i>0.347</i>	<i>0.000</i>
Constant	5.960	1.890	0.002	3.902	2.505	0.123	0.054	1.526	0.972
No. of Observations	87			97			122		
F-score	12.21			9.97			36		

Democracy	Lomé IVA			Lomé IVB			Cotonou		
	Coefficient	SE	(p)	Coefficient	SE	(p)	Coefficient	SE	(p)
African Dummy	<b>-8.942</b>	<b>1.645</b>	<b>0.000</b>	<b>-8.111</b>	<b>1.697</b>	<b>0.000</b>	<b>-5.883</b>	<b>1.958</b>	<b>0.003</b>
Membership in IOs	2.460	1.315	0.065	<b>4.670</b>	<b>1.535</b>	<b>0.003</b>	<b>5.823</b>	<b>1.462</b>	<b>0.000</b>
Armed Conflict	-0.046	1.290	0.971	-0.416	1.056	0.695	-1.477	1.063	0.168
lnFDI	0.009	0.373	0.981	0.051	0.382	0.893	0.295	0.308	0.340
Merchandise Trade	<b>-0.041</b>	<b>0.020</b>	<b>0.044</b>	-0.025	0.017	0.141	<b>-0.041</b>	<b>0.019</b>	<b>0.029</b>
Population Density	0.000	0.005	0.951	-0.002	0.005	0.725	-0.001	0.004	0.883
UN Treaties on HR	0.622	0.322	0.057	0.703	0.386	0.072	<b>0.781</b>	<b>0.385</b>	<b>0.045</b>
Human Development Index	5.567	7.235	0.444	2.931	7.385	0.693	6.118	6.827	0.372
<i>Participation in Lomé/Cotonou</i>	<i>7.135</i>	<i>1.458</i>	<i>0.000</i>	<i>6.031</i>	<i>1.493</i>	<i>0.000</i>	<i>6.535</i>	<i>1.594</i>	<i>0.000</i>
Constant	-9.361	6.766	0.170	-15.738	7.543	0.040	-26.348	5.376	0.000

No. of Observations	90		92		106			
F-score	10.21	0.000	9.78	0.000	10.91	0.000		

	<b>Lomé IVA</b>			<b>Lomé IVB</b>			<b>Cotonou</b>		
<b>Rule of Law</b>	<b>Coefficient</b>	<b>SE</b>	<b>(p)</b>	<b>Coefficient</b>	<b>SE</b>	<b>(p)</b>	<b>Coefficient</b>	<b>SE</b>	<b>(p)</b>
African Dummy	0.047	0.193	0.807	0.298	0.184	0.110	<b>0.398</b>	<b>0.144</b>	<b>0.007</b>
Membership in IOs	0.225	0.131	0.090	0.138	0.150	0.358	<b>0.273</b>	<b>0.133</b>	<b>0.042</b>
Armed Conflict	-0.244	0.134	0.072	<b>-0.317</b>	<b>0.110</b>	<b>0.005</b>	<b>-0.241</b>	<b>0.105</b>	<b>0.023</b>
lnFDI	-0.009	0.037	0.799	-0.008	0.038	0.835	-0.037	0.028	0.189
Merchandise Trade	0.002	0.002	0.418	-0.001	0.002	0.547	-0.001	0.002	0.337
Population Density	0.000	0.000	0.503	0.000	0.000	0.197	<b>0.000</b>	<b>0.000</b>	<b>0.020</b>
UN Treaties on HR	-0.015	0.033	0.652	-0.033	0.034	0.346	<b>-0.071</b>	<b>0.032</b>	<b>0.028</b>
Human Development Index	<b>2.564</b>	<b>0.614</b>	<b>0.000</b>	<b>3.346</b>	<b>0.588</b>	<b>0.000</b>	<b>3.926</b>	<b>0.430</b>	<b>0.000</b>
<i>Participation in Lomé/Cotonou</i>	<i>0.102</i>	<i>0.182</i>	<i>0.576</i>	<i>0.147</i>	<i>0.186</i>	<i>0.430</i>	<i>0.164</i>	<i>0.165</i>	<i>0.323</i>
Constant	-2.418	0.725	0.001	-2.640	0.764	0.001	-2.799	0.700	0.000
No. of Observations	94		97			122			
F-score	9.14	0.000	7.57	0.000	18.1	0.000			0.000


#### *Fundamental Elements*

	<b>Lomé IVA</b>			<b>Lomé IVB</b>			<b>Cotonou</b>		
<b>Good Governance - Govt. Effectiveness</b>	<b>Coefficient</b>	<b>SE</b>	<b>(p)</b>	<b>Coefficient</b>	<b>SE</b>	<b>(p)</b>	<b>Coefficient</b>	<b>SE</b>	<b>(p)</b>
African Dummy	0.206	0.139	0.143	0.131	0.163	0.425	<b>0.289</b>	<b>0.134</b>	<b>0.034</b>
Membership in IOs	<b>0.222</b>	<b>0.117</b>	<b>0.060</b>	<b>0.261</b>	<b>0.118</b>	<b>0.030</b>	<b>0.394</b>	<b>0.123</b>	<b>0.002</b>
Armed Conflict	-0.184	0.118	0.122	<b>-0.254</b>	<b>0.089</b>	<b>0.005</b>	-0.143	0.087	0.104
lnFDI	0.039	0.036	0.275	0.045	0.030	0.135	0.024	0.025	0.335
Merchandise Trade	0.001	0.002	0.575	-0.002	0.002	0.267	-0.001	0.001	0.371
Population Density	0.000	0.000	0.187	0.000	0.000	0.247	0.000	0.000	0.073
UN Treaties on HR	-0.022	0.032	0.491	-0.013	0.027	0.623	<b>-0.062</b>	<b>0.031</b>	<b>0.046</b>
Human Development Index	<b>1.564</b>	<b>0.509</b>	<b>0.003</b>	<b>3.097</b>	<b>0.497</b>	<b>0.000</b>	<b>3.417</b>	<b>0.410</b>	<b>0.000</b>
<i>Participation in Lomé/Cotonou</i>	<i>-0.145</i>	<i>0.159</i>	<i>0.365</i>	<i>0.279</i>	<i>0.177</i>	<i>0.119</i>	<i>0.129</i>	<i>0.158</i>	<i>0.415</i>
Constant	-2.547	0.609	0.000	-3.844	0.655	0.000	-3.930	0.766	0.000
No. of Observations	95		97			122			
F-score	8.49	0.000	12.55	0.000	15.43	0.000			0.000

	<b>Lomé IVA</b>			<b>Lomé IVB</b>			<b>Cotonou</b>		
<b>Good Governance - Regulatory Quality</b>	<b>Coefficient</b>	<b>SE</b>	<b>(p)</b>	<b>Coefficient</b>	<b>SE</b>	<b>(p)</b>	<b>Coefficient</b>	<b>SE</b>	<b>(p)</b>
African Dummy	-0.220	0.125	0.082	-0.039	0.141	0.785	0.098	0.136	0.472
Membership in IOs	<b>0.833</b>	<b>0.142</b>	<b>0.000</b>	<b>0.617</b>	<b>0.141</b>	<b>0.000</b>	<b>0.605</b>	<b>0.128</b>	<b>0.000</b>
Armed Conflict	-0.003	0.158	0.986	<b>-0.284</b>	<b>0.104</b>	<b>0.007</b>	<b>-0.202</b>	<b>0.092</b>	<b>0.031</b>
lnFDI	0.033	0.044	0.449	<b>0.064</b>	<b>0.029</b>	<b>0.028</b>	0.029	0.024	0.227
Merchandise Trade	-0.002	0.002	0.433	-0.003	0.002	0.086	-0.002	0.001	0.107
Population Density	0.000	0.000	0.924	0.000	0.000	0.326	0.000	0.000	0.103
UN Treaties on HR	0.010	0.027	0.715	0.000	0.028	0.995	-0.033	0.027	0.220
Human Development Index	<b>2.011</b>	<b>0.608</b>	<b>0.001</b>	<b>2.332</b>	<b>0.561</b>	<b>0.000</b>	<b>3.035</b>	<b>0.441</b>	<b>0.000</b>
<i>Participation in Lomé/Cotonou</i>	<i>0.094</i>	<i>0.156</i>	<i>0.547</i>	<i>0.242</i>	<i>0.159</i>	<i>0.131</i>	<i>0.238</i>	<i>0.141</i>	<i>0.095</i>
Constant	-4.156	0.719	0.000	-4.539	0.656	0.000	-4.422	0.673	0.000

No. of Observations	95		97		122	
F-score	13.57	0.000	12.49	0.000	18.74	0.000

**Chart 1: Historical ACP compliance with political rights and civil liberties**



Five Year Average of Freedom House Scores	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005
Developing Country Political Rights Score (PR)	1.8	2.1	2.3	2.6	2.6	3.1	3.2
Developing Country Civil Liberty Score (CL)	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.8	2.8	2.9	3.2
ACP Political Rights Score (PR)	1.8	2.3	2.3	2.5	3.4	3.3	3.5
ACP Civil Liberties Score (CL)	2.4	2.4	2.2	2.8	3.2	3.4	3.7
African Countries Political Rights Score (PR)	1.1	1.5	1.1	1.4	2.4	2.5	2.8
African Countries Civil Liberties Score (CL)	1.7	1.6	1.2	1.9	2.4	2.6	3.0

Source: Freedom House, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw/FIWAAllScores.xls>. Developed countries excluded from analysis: US, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Japan, South Korea, EU-15, EFTA states. Freedom House scale transformed to a zero to six (0-6) scale, with zero indicating poor human rights score, and six indicating excellent human rights score. Own calculations.

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