

European Security Governance: NATO and EU

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Introduction

The end of the Cold War posed a challenge to the existing perception of security institutions in Europe. The intellectual and material collapse of the bipolar created a vacuum and left policy makers disarrayed to image and hesitant to act decisively in the construction of the new European security. The indecisiveness to reform the regional institutions was evident in the European inaction to avert the Balkan wars in the 1990s. However, once the lessons of such conflicts were learned, the North American Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) catalyzed the revision of their objectives and functions in order to face more efficiently the security threats in Europe. The transformations of both institutions were guided by the enlargement to the East and the creation of new instrument to respond appropriately. While both processes have been taking place since the beginning of the twenty-first century, NATO and the EU have on the other hand also found new difficulties in preventing and reacting in a timely manner to conflicts relevant to the transatlantic area such as terrorism, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the revival of the Russian aggression. Institutions play a key role in the European security architecture. While an enduring and credible security stability depends mostly on the commitment of the states, institutions perform a crucial role in both the creation of consensus among states and the use of their instruments and means to prevent conflicts and preserve peace in conflicting areas.

Despite pessimistic prognoses about NATO and the EU in the early 1990s, both organizations have proved resilient and have adapted themselves to the new challenges of European security. However, there is still a long pending agenda in the making of European security, in which the lack of coordination, sluggish transformation and often conflicting interests between NATO and the EU have undermined the capacity of Europe to act timely to dissolve conflicts. The policies and practices of both institutions indicate that they have developed different types of instruments to face regional crises and have also created channels of coordination between them. In this regard, the argument of this paper centers on these questions: Is Europe better equipped today than in the aftermath of the Cold War to deal with regional crises? If so, do the new instruments and practices of these two institutions compete or complement each other in the constructions of European security? Based on the Security

Governance approach, this paper explores the contributions of the North American Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) to European and international security. The basic argument maintains that NATO and the EU have redefined their functions as well as their territorial operational space as a result of the enlargements and the institutional transformations in both institutions since the mid-1990s. Thus, NATO and the EU have created a European security framework where there is a *de facto* division of labor where two dimensions of power are crucial: while the former provides the hard power, the later have created numerous instrument of soft power.

1. Analytical Framework: Security Governance

The analysis of NATO and EU security policies is essential to understanding the trends of European security. While both institutions are crucial in the making of regional security, the assessment of their respective contributions and their credibility will depend on the angle taken to evaluate them. In the case of the EU, the current scholarly debate is divided into two fronts. The first encompasses scholars who are skeptical about the substantial contribution of the EU to the European security and argue that the EU needs more coordination of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).¹ Likewise, the prevailing view among these scholars concerns the lack of a coherent structural approach in the coordination of European Security Strategy.² Conversely, the second group, which tends to prevail, claims that the EU is changing its structural capabilities and a new political will is emerging among member states.³ In this view, the materialization of the security role of the EU is reflected on the export of the internal security towards its neighbors,⁴ the emergence of a novel strategic security thinking,⁵ or the creation of a regime based on dialogue, norm promotion and trust building through civilian action.⁶

In the case of NATO, there are also two major debates. Some scholars argue that NATO will eventually become ineffective as a military security organization due to two events: first, as a result of enlargement, NATO has diluted standards to become all-inclusive⁷; and second, that the United States has last lost interest in NATO, making it a weaker Atlantic alliance.⁸ Alternatively, other scholars argue that this is not the case. Instead, they say that NATO has increased its military capabilities, making it more capable of handling security threats.⁹ Notably, they put forth the view that the United States has continued to dominate the NATO organization

¹ Jan Joel Anderson, 'The European Security Strategy and the Continuing Search for Coherence,' (paper presented at the annual convention of the International Studies Association, Istanbul, Turkey, 2005).

² Christian Moelling, 'Nice to Have, but what Creates European Capabilities? Answers from a Strategic and Security Studies Perspective,' (paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, 2007).

³ Susan E. Penska and Warren L. Mason, 'EU Security Cooperation and the Transatlantic Relationship,' *Cooperation and Conflict* 38, no. 3, (September 2003).

⁴ Wyn Rees, 'Inside Out: the External Face of EU Internal Security Policy,' *Journal of European Integration* 30, no.1, (March 2008).

⁵ Simon Duke and Hanna Ojanen, 'Bridging Internal and External Security: Lessons from the European Security and Defense Policy,' *Journal of European Integration* 28, no. 5, (December 2006).

⁶ Frederik Charillon, 'The EU as a Security Regime,' *European Foreign Affairs Review* 10, no.4, (Winter 2005).

⁷ Zoltan Barany, 'Nato's Peaceful Advance,' *Journal of Democracy* 15, no.1 (2004): 63-76.

⁸ Charles A. Kupchan, 'The Rise of Europe, America's Changing Internationalism, and the End of US Primacy,' *Political Science Quarterly* 18, no. 2 (2003): 225-6.

⁹ Alessandro Minuto-Rizzo, 'NATO's Transformation and New Partnerships: The Mediterranean,' *Mediterranean Quarterly* 18, no.3 (2007): 1-13.

and remains committed to extending its influence in Europe, as has seen with the Berlin Plus agreement.¹⁰ Similarly, while the EU is interested in creating its own collective security policy, it would be misleading to assume that this is altogether separate from NATO.¹¹ Along the same lines, other scholars ascertain NATO's role as an effective international security organization for two reasons. First, NATO's push for enlargement within Europe has had a democratization affect on post-communist countries.¹² Second, NATO has participated in the Mediterranean Dialogues, expanding security conversations to include Arab states, Israel and the EU.¹³

From the perspective of this paper, European security in the twenty-first century cannot be studied by focusing solely on NATO or the EU. The examination of international security crises in the past two decades indicates that both NATO and the EU have participated in several crises in diverse forms. In some cases, one institution replaced the task of the other in the field and in others both worked in the same conflict from different perspectives. In this regard, because of the characteristics of the recent evolution of the security scheme in Europe and the type of threats for the region, it is crucial to adopt an analytical framework that captures the uniqueness of the European security situation. Thus, the role of non-state actors and more diffused threats in recent times has prompted a broadening in the conceptualization of security. In this regard, whether it is Kenneth Waltz or Barry Buzan, there is extensive literature that reflects the evolution and disputes within security studies.¹⁴

In order to shed light on the complexity of security, new analytical instruments have been developed. In this context, global security governance attempts to disentangle the inherent intricacies of competing and complementing perspectives of international organizations that may impact regional stability. While security governance has been defined from a few different perspectives, most include the following elements: concerted efforts, coordinated management, distinct levels of authority and actors (private and public), formal and informal arrangements and common objectives to regulate and/or solve conflicts.¹⁵ Thus, the flexibility of conceptualization for security governance has allowed scholars to use the term from different perspectives such as a general theory, a theory of networks, a system of transnational regimes and as a heuristic devise.¹⁶ In simple terms, security governance allows people to understand the concept of security beyond the issue of defense, and above all, encompass the "more diverse, less visible and less predictable"¹⁷ nature of security in the twenty-first century. Likewise, governance "is

¹⁰ John R. Schmidt. 'Last Alliance Standing? NATO after 9/11,' *The Washington Quarterly* 30, no.1 (2006): 93-106.

¹¹ P. H. Liotta. 'Imagining Europe: Symbolic Geography and the Future,' *Mediterranean Quarterly* 16, no. 3 (2005): 67-85.

¹² Barany, 'Nato's Peaceful Advance'.

¹³ Norman Bowen, 'France, Europe, and the Mediterranean in a Sarkozy Presidency,' *Mediterranean Quarterly* 18, no.4 (2007): 1-16.

¹⁴ Michael Sheehan, *International Security. An Analytical Survey* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2005).

¹⁵ Matin Ortega, 'Building the Future. The EU's Contribution to Global Governance,' *Chaillot Paper* no. 100, Institute for Security Studies, Paris, (April, 2007).

¹⁶ Emil Kirchner and James Sperling, *EU Security Governance* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007): 18-19.

¹⁷ Emil Kirchner, 'The Challenge of European Union Security Governance,' *Journal of Common Markets Studies* 44, no. 5 (2006): 949.

concerned with understanding how the regulation of societies or the international system has come to involve political actors aside governments.”¹⁸

While the flexibility of the concept allows us to be more analytically inclusive of the complications within international relations, it is a substantial challenge to categorize and to gauge the contributions of international actors in the construction of a regional governance system. More concretely, this paper aims to analyze the case of NATO and the EU in the realm of regional security. This paper applies the security governance perspective in order to study the contributions of NATO and the EU to European security. Emil Kirchner has explained the role of the EU in regional security by identifying three applicable categories of security functions: conflict prevention, peace enforcement/peace keeping and peace building.¹⁹ Kirchner and James Sperling have further elaborated this initial analytical framework. In the case of the EU both scholars argue that security governance performs two functions –institution building and conflict resolution—and employs two sets of instruments, the persuasive and the coercive. Taken together, the following four policies of security governance, as defined by the authors, will be applied as a way to explain the contributions of NATO and the EU to regional and global security: a) assurance identifies the efforts aimed at post-conflict reconstruction and confidence building measures; b) prevention captures the efforts to prevent the conflict by building or sustaining domestic, regional or international institutions, which will contribute to the mitigation of international anarchy; c) compellence refers to the task of conflict resolution, particularly peacekeeping and peace enforcement, and, d) protection describes traditional functions to protect society from external threats.²⁰

NATO’s 26-member alliance and EU’s 27-member integration process have rapidly evolved in the past two decades in order to face the uncertainty stemming from the end of the Cold War. Both have transformed their strategies and policies in the past twenty years. By using Kirchner and Sperling’s analytical framework, this paper examines the extent to which the four categories can help to compare the contributions of NATO and the EU to regional and global security governance.

2. Prevention Policies

Prevention governance policies are a combination of institutional-building initiatives and persuasive instruments.²¹ Both NATO and the EU have developed policies in accordance to the principles of prevention governance. As such, the organizations have focused primarily on two main strategies: enlargement and special partnerships. The former has acted as a very powerful

¹⁸ Ibid., 949.

¹⁹ Ibid., 951-953. The first, conflict prevention, is understood as a situation in which a major violent conflict can be avoided; and it implies that the emphasis should be on financial and technical assistance. The second, peace-enforcement, refers to cases where a major conflict has occurred and where the emphasis should be on either reducing the conflict or preventing escalation. The last and third category is peace-building, which is concerned with post-conflict reconstruction and the reestablishment of peace. Likewise, three components of governance are considered: coordination, management and regulation: coordination relates to how actors interact and who drives and sets the agenda, management tasks refers to how policies are carried out or administered and regulations can be seen as the political outcome (impact and institutionalization).

²⁰ Kirchner and Sperling, *EU Security Governance*, 13-15.

²¹ Kirchner and Sperling, *EU Security Governance*, 15.

incentive for new members to transform their institutions, while the later has had a limited impact on new partners.²²

a. NATO

The PfP program, which was launched in 1994, aims to increase stability, *to diminish threats to peace* and *to build strong security* relationships among partner countries as well as between individual countries and NATO. Its legal framework also establishes a number of commitments between NATO and the individual partners, most of which can also be divided into two major groups. The first encompasses value-oriented alliances around the preservation of democratic societies, such as maintaining the principles of international law, fulfilling obligations under the UN Charter, abstaining from the threat or use of military force against other states, respecting existing borders and resolving disputes peacefully. The second pertains to transformations within the most sensitive domain of the *Westphalian* state: the military sector. Members of the PfP promote transparency in national defense planning and budgeting as a way to establish democratic control over the armed forces. This also allows for the development of joint action capabilities with NATO, especially in regard to peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. More specifically, many Partner countries are trying to address the reduced levels of personnel, equipment, and bases, but have limited resources to do so. In 2004, as an attempt to move forward with these objectives, the PfP formed the Partnership Action Plan on Defense with the intention of helping governments find means to re-use military bases and to destroy surplus munitions, such as anti-personnel mines, landmines and missiles.²³

²² See the analysis of EU prevention policies in Kirchner and Sperling, *EU Security Governance*, chapter 2.

²³ NATO, *Security Through Partnership* (Belgium: NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2005). See also NATO, 'NATO Topics: Enlargement' <http://www.nato.int/issues/enlargement/index.html> (accessed October 2nd, 2008.). The funding for the Partnership Action Plan (and for other projects) comes from the PfP Trust Fund Policy, which was established in September 2000. The Trust contributes to demilitarization activities through funding as is voluntarily provided by NATO members and Partner countries.

Table 1
A Broader Governance Area: Enlargement and Special Partnerships

Year	NATO Policy/members	EU Policy/members
1994	<i>PFP</i> : Ukraine, Albania, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Finland, Sweden, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Russian Federation, Uzbekistan, Armenia, Belarus, Austria, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Switzerland, Ireland, Croatia, Tajikistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia.	<i>Partnership and Co-operation Agreement</i> : EU- the Russia Federation
1999	<i>Enlargement</i> : Hungary, Czech Republic and Poland.	
2000		<i>Stabilization and Association Agreements</i> : EU - Western Balkans
2004	<i>Enlargement</i> : Romania, Lithuania, Estonia, Slovakia, Latvia, Bulgaria, and Slovenia <i>Bilateral Partnership, Istanbul Cooperation Initiative</i> : Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates*	<i>Enlargement</i> (May): Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus. <i>ENP</i> : Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine.
2007		<i>Enlargement</i> : Romania and Bulgaria.
2008	<i>PFP</i> : Malta.** <i>Enlargement</i> : Albania and Croatia were invited to start accession talks. Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was also invited as soon as reach an agreement on its official name with Greece.	

*Partnership with broader Middle East region for global and regional security and stability.

** On April 26, 1995 Malta became a member of PFP; it left on October 27, 1996 in order to keep its security intact. On March 20, 2008 Malta decided to reactivate its PFP membership; this was accepted by NATO at the Summit in Bucharest on April 3, 2008.

Comparable to the EU, NATO has continued to increase its membership and has many prospective candidates eager to join. In April 2008, during the NATO Summit in Bucharest, Albania and Croatia were invited to start accession talks; and it was determined that Macedonia's membership would be contingent on an agreement with Greece over the official name of the former Yugoslav republic. Notably, Ukraine's and Georgia's attempts for membership have been quite controversial because of strong opposition from partner countries such as Germany, which fears provoking Russia. Likewise, NATO members are even more reluctant to move forward with Georgia in light of the Russian intervention of August 2008

Additionally, NATO's Istanbul Cooperation Initiative is considered another mechanism of conflict prevention. Launched in June 2004 at the Alliance's Summit, the goal of the initiative is to promote long-term global and regional security, by offering countries within the Middle East practical and bilateral security cooperation with NATO. As of 2008 Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates had joined the Initiative.²⁴

b. The EU

With regard to the realm of prevention, the EU has a far more diversified toolkit than that of NATO. Two major waves of enlargement took place during 2004 and 2007; and after the initial surge, the EU launched the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) in an effort to contain new rifts between the expanding EU and its neighbors. The ENP has two key features: the first is the Bilateral Action Plan, which sets the agenda for both short and medium-term political and economic reforms. The second ensures EU assistance with the management of political and security issues, economic and trade matters, mobility, environment, integration of transport and energy networks, and scientific and cultural cooperation.²⁵ Although it is unclear whether or not the ENP can cause significant change,²⁶ the program allows the EU to present a common external strategic vision and it gives the EU an opportunity to both prove itself as a creditable international actor²⁷ and to strengthen the CFSP and ESDP.²⁸

The *European Security Strategy*, which was adopted in December 2003, identifies the global challenges and critical threats to Union security. It also clarifies the EU's strategic objectives in dealing with those threats, such as building security in the EU neighborhood and promoting an international order based on effective multilateralism. The security strategy points to five major threats: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime.²⁹

Additionally, other prevention policies include the *Civilian Crisis Management and Headline Goals*, which are focused on six priority sectors in civil crisis management: police, rule of law, civil administration, civil protection, monitoring missions and support for EU special representatives.³⁰ In the case of humanitarian aid, the European Commission **service, ECHO**, is

²⁴ Fernando del Pozo, 'The NATO Summit in Bucharest', *Real Instituto Elcano*, February 26, 2008, 1. Indeed, this mechanism is quite innovative prevention instrument. During the April 2008 summit in Bucharest, a meeting with the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative was not scheduled, because those involved were not considered prepared for Summit meetings.

²⁵ European Commission, 'ENP,' http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/welcome_en.htm (accessed March 23, 2008).

²⁶ Karen Smith, 'The outsiders: The European Neighborhood Policy,' *International Affairs* 81 (2005): 757-73.

²⁷ Michael Smith and Mark Webber. 'Political Dialogue and Security in the European Neighborhood: the Virtues and Limits of 'New Partnership Perspectives',' *European Foreign Affairs Review* 13 (2008): 73-95.

²⁸ Roberto Aliboni, 'The Geopolitical Implications of the European Neighborhood Policy,' *European Foreign Affairs Review* 10 (2005): 1-16. See also Sven Biscop, *The European Security Strategy: A Global Agenda for Positive Power* (Grand Rapids: Ashgate, Limited, 2005).

²⁹ Europe, 'Activities of the European Union, Summaries of Legislation,' <http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/vb/r00004.htm> (accessed April 22, 2008).

³⁰ The Civilian Headline Goal is being developed under the auspices of the Council and will be overseen by the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and supported by the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management

responsible for these activities. Its major task is to ensure that goods and services are promptly delivered to crisis zones. Since 1992 ECHO has funded humanitarian aid in more than 85 countries and has continued to grant emergency and food assistance as well as aid to refugees and displaced persons worth more than € 700 million per year.³¹

The EU also created the *Rapid Reaction Mechanism* as a way to urgently respond to the needs of countries threatened with or undergoing severe political instability or suffering from the effects of a technological or natural disaster. The main added value of the RRM is its ability to expedite the actions of the Commission when a third country faces a crisis. The total budget for 2005 was €30 million.³² With regard to human rights, the EU established the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), which aims to promote and support human rights and democracy worldwide.³³ Several EU missions have also strengthened the realm of prevention policies. The *EUSEC RD Congo* mission supplied guidance and assistance to the Congolese authorities in charge of security, while also ensuring the policies promoted were compatible and in observance with the rule of law. The mission began on 8 June 2005 and will continue to run until 30 June 2009.³⁴

In April 2008, in an effort to address the complicated situation in Kosovo, the Council established a EU planning team to discuss the possibility of a EU crisis management operation. This team could potentially assist Kosovo in a number of areas, but especially with respect to the rule of law. EUPT Kosovo functions in a complex political environment where a parallel status process will now determine the overall framework for every successor organization in Kosovo.³⁵ Finally, the EU has also launched a police advisory team (EUPAT) in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which includes around 30 police advisors. EUPAT also supports the

(CIVCOM) according to a systematic approach. Europe, 'Civilian Headline Goal 2008,' <http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l33239.htm>, (accessed March 15, 2008).

³¹ Goods may include essential supplies, specific foodstuffs, medical equipment, medicines and fuel. Services may include medical teams, water purification teams and logistical support. Goods and services reach disaster areas via ECHO partners. European Commission, 'Humanitarian Aid,' http://ec.europa.eu/echo/about/what/history_en.htm (accessed July 3, 2008).

³² There are five essential conditions of deployment: urgency, political priority, opportunity, effectiveness, follow-up. The RRM will provide flexible Community assistance in: assessment of possible Community responses to a crisis, preventive action during emerging crises, acute crisis management, post-conflict reconciliation, post-crisis reconstruction. European Commission, EU External Relations, http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/cfsp/cpcm/rrm/index.htm (accessed June 23, 2007)

³³ European Commission, 'EIDHR Strategy Paper 2007-2010,' http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/worldwide/eidhr/documents/eidhr-strategy-paper-2007_en.pdf (accessed May 24, 2008).

³⁴ Council of the EU, 'EUSEC DR Congo,' http://consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=909&lang=en (accessed July 22, 2008). This mission also plays a part in the efforts made by the EU Special Representative (EUSR) for the African Great Lakes Region in the work being done to implement the statements of commitment for the Kivus.

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Ecobusiness, 'European Union Planning Team for Kosovo – EUPTK,' 17 February 2008. <http://www.eubusiness.com/Kosovo/euptk-eu-kosovo> and www.eupt-kosovo.eu but the latter one is temporarily closed (accessed August 22, 2008).

development of an efficient and professional police service based on European standards of policing.³⁶

3. Compellence Policies

Compellence policies entail both coercive instruments and conflict resolution functions; and key elements of compellence revolve around peacekeeping and peace enforcement actions. Certainly, NATO has implemented several compellence policies in a number of different scenarios, as seen with its involvement in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan. Additionally, the policies of the European Union show significant progress, with member states reaching a consensus on the future goals of instrument development and capabilities in the area of compellence; this was observed in at least four operations.³⁷

a. NATO

An increasing trend in NATO's compellence policies is the fact that operations are conducted both in Europe and around the world. In the past decade, at least two models have emerged pertaining to these operations. The first model is what Ronald Asmus and Richard Holbrooke call NATO-led operations *à la* Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan. The second model refers to those situations where NATO provides limited, yet critical, assets for success, without offering the assistance of forces. An example of this would be NATO's involvement in Darfur.³⁸ Markedly, the most relevant peacekeeping operation in Europe is NATO-KFOR.³⁹ Despite Kosovo's declaration of independence on February 17, 2008, NATO avowed that KFOR would remain in Kosovo on the basis of UN Security Resolution 1244,⁴⁰ unless the Security Council decided otherwise.⁴¹

As mentioned previously, NATO's involvement in Sudan is another example of a compellence operation. In 2005 U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice suggested that NATO should participate with peacekeeping operations in Darfur, Sudan. The response within NATO

³⁶ The operational phase of EUPAT began on 15 December 2005. The launch of EUPAT follows the termination on 14 December 2005 of the mandate of the EU Police Mission PROXIMA, launched on 15 December 2003. Council of the EU, 'EU Police Advisory Team in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUPAT)' http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=994&lang=en, (accessed March 26, 2008).

³⁷ See the analysis of EU compellence policies in Kirchner and Sperling, chapter 5.

³⁸ Ronald D. Asmus and Richard C. 'Holbrooke, Re-Reinventing NATO,' *Riga Papers* (Washington D.C.: The German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2006): 6.

³⁹ Since June 1999, NATO has led a peacekeeping operation in Kosovo in order to support wider international efforts to maintain stability in the region. Unfortunately, the KFOR operations have faced critical issues. For instance, in March 2004, NATO peacekeeping troops and UN police officers were unable to stop interethnic riots. Thus, it was inferred that NATO troops and police "failed catastrophically" to protect minorities, when ethnic Albanian mobs rioted across the province, leaving nineteen people dead and forcing more than 4,000 Serbs and other minorities to flee their homes. *New York Times*, 'Peacekeepers criticized in Kosovo riots,' (July 28, 2004).

⁴⁰ As agreed by Foreign Ministers in December 2007

⁴¹ NATO Topics, 'NATO in Kosovo,' <http://www.nato.int/issues/kosovo/index.html>. Last updated 28 February, 2008, (accessed March 1, 2008). See also Robin Shepherd, 'Fears for the Future,' *The World Today*, (April 2008). As of March 2008, NATO had approximately 15,900 KFOR troops deployed in the area to help maintain security and stability for all citizens, irrespective of their ethnic origin.

was divided.⁴² It was later determined that NATO would provide air transport, training, and other support to the African Union (AU) forces in Darfur. The countries also approved to have NATO report to the AU-led military cell in Ethiopia, rather than take sole responsibility of the mission.⁴³ On December 31, 2007, following the transfer of AMIS to the UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), NATO's support to the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) came to an end.⁴⁴

Alternatively, NATO's participation in Afghanistan has been the most challenging operation for the 26-member alliance. NATO is a key part of the Afghanistan Compact, a five-year plan between the Afghani government and the international community, which dictates several goals relating to security, governance and economic development.⁴⁵ In April 2003 the ISAF, which is currently under joint German-Dutch command – it began under British leadership and was previously handled by the Turks -- quickly became a NATO operation with full NATO command and control.⁴⁶

Notably, the invasion of Iraq has diverted the urgent attention needed in Afghanistan and in fact, this situation has continued to deteriorate since late 2002. In 2007 more than 8,000 people died in Afghanistan, which made it the most violent year since the invasion. Likewise, the perennial disagreements within NATO over its commitment have made it difficult to cultivate further cooperation. First, while NATO has around 43,000 troops in Iraq, the coalition is in need of more combat forces in the areas of southern Afghanistan. Moreover, while the United States contributes a third of NATO forces, it also has more than 12,000 troops operating independently.⁴⁷ Second, participation among allies is quite limited. Whereas Poland may add more than 1,000 soldiers, France sent extra aircraft of troops. Additionally, a parliamentary edict has confined German soldiers to the safest area in the north, while Canada has threatened to withdraw its 2,500 troops, unless another ally contributes at least 1,000 troops to help secure Afghanistan's restive southern area. Lastly, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates infuriated both Britain and the Netherlands by suggesting that European troops in the south failed to carry out counter-insurgency campaigns effectively.⁴⁸

In Afghanistan NATO faces a critical problem in that it was brought in too late and under false pretenses, as is argued by Sarah Chayes. NATO moved peacekeeping forces into Kabul and

⁴² Daniel Dombey, 'NATO to provide support in Darfur mission,' *Financial Times*, 28 April 2005.

⁴³ Daniel Dombey, 'NATO defends deal on Darfur airlift,' *Financial Times*, 10 June 2005; Daniel Dombey, 'NATO-EU spat hits airlift to Darfur,' *Financial Times*, 08 June, 2005; 'Africa: Sudan: NATO to Support African Union Forces in Darfur,' *New York Times*, 25 May, 2005. This is despite some problems, such as slipping military expenditures and disagreements over whether NATO and EU should airlift the troops from the country. While France wanted the airlifts to be led by the EU, Canada and the United States preferred NATO to coordinate such actions.

⁴⁴ NATO Press Release (2008)018, 'NATO supporting African Union's missions,' <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-018e.html> (accessed November 2, 2008). Since the mission began in June 2005, NATO coordinated air transport for over 31,500 troops and civilian police personnel from African countries, out of some 37,500 total airlifted during this period. NATO also trained and mentored over 250 AMIS officials at the three major AMIS Headquarters in Addis Ababa, Khartoum and El Fasher.

⁴⁵ NATO Topics, 'NATO in Afghanistan,' <http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/index.html> (accessed November 2, 2008).

⁴⁶ Laura Naeck, 'Peacekeeping, bloody peacekeeping,' *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist*, (July-August 2004):44.

⁴⁷ Debe Riechmann, 'Cheney reaffirms pledge to Afghans,' *Boston Globe*, (March 21, 2008).

⁴⁸ *Economist*, 'Where the Sniping has to stop,' (February 7, 2008).

parts of northern Afghanistan in 2003. But it was not until 2005 -- when it was clear that the United States was deeply involved in Iraq and lacked sufficient resources to fight a two front war -- that Washington belatedly turned to NATO to handle southern Afghanistan. Then the United States went on to misrepresent the situation in Afghanistan to its allies. The mission was basically sold as a collective effort, where NATO would simply maintain the order already established by United States and to help with reconstruction and security.⁴⁹ This was far from the reality on the ground.

b. The EU

In comparison to NATO, compellence instruments have developed sluggishly in the EU. However, some progress has been made in this area, as is reflected in the Helsinki Headline Goals. In order to develop European capabilities, EU member states had set a headline goal that by the year 2003 they would be able to rapidly deploy and then sustain forces capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks as set out in the Amsterdam Treaty. This included the most demanding operations, up to corps level (up to 15 brigades or 50,000-60,000 persons).⁵⁰ Along the same lines, the EU developed the Battlegroup concept primarily as a means of encouraging continued improvements in deployable European capabilities -- thus widening the scope for burden sharing among European partners. The Battlegroup initiative sets a new level of ambition for the EU, alongside those that existed from the previous 1999 Helsinki Headline Goal. This will impact the new 2010 Headline Goal, which adds a clearer focus to the original aims with regard to the quality of EU capabilities, such as the ability to deploy forces rapidly, sustain them at distance and operate multi nationally.⁵¹

There are four EU operations that are significant in the area of compellence. From June to September 2003, *Operation Artemis (DR Congo)* aimed to contribute to the overall stabilization of the security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia. The EU has been involved in peaceful settlement efforts in the DRC since 1996, at least through its Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region⁵²

The second event, *Operation Concordia*, was a military operation launched in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (fYROM) on March 31, 2003. The operation made use of NATO assets and capabilities, which was only possible with the completion of the EU-NATO arrangements. The core aim of Concordia -- at the explicit request of the fYROM government --

⁴⁹ Sarah Chayes, 'NATO didn't lose Afghanistan,' *New York Times*, (July 10, 2007).

⁵⁰ Council of the European Union, 'Helsinki Headline Goal,' <http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Helsinki%20Headline%20Goal.pdf> (accessed November 3, 2008). These forces should be militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and additionally, as appropriate, air and naval elements. Member States should be able to deploy in full at this level within 60 days, and within this to provide smaller rapid response elements available and deployable at very high readiness. They must be able to sustain such a deployment for at least one year. This will require an additional pool of deployable units (and supporting elements) at lower readiness to provide replacements for the initial forces.

⁵¹ Global Security Organization, 'EU Battle Group,' <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/eu-battlegroups.htm> (accessed November 3, 2008).

⁵² Council of the European Union, 'EU Military Operation in Democratic Republic of Congo,' http://consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=605&lang=en (accessed November 3, 2008).

was to assist with the creation of a stable secure environment and to facilitate the implementation of the August 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement. As of December 15 2003, this operation was completed.⁵³

To date *EUFOR-Althea (Bosnia and Herzegovina)* is the third and largest military operation that the EU has embarked upon.⁵⁴ Within the framework of Operation ALTHEA, the EU has deployed 7,000 troops, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This was an effort to ensure continued compliance with the Dayton/Paris Agreement and to contribute to a safe and secure environment in BiH. Under the "Berlin Plus" arrangements, Operation ALTHEA is carried out with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities.

The last operation is that of *EURFOR RD Congo*, which was launched in support of the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). On April 25, 2006, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1671 (2006), authorizing the temporary deployment of a EU force to support MONUC during the election period in the DR Congo. The military operation was conducted in full agreement with the authorities of the DRC and in close coordination between them and MONUC. This autonomous EU-led operation, which was conducted in the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) framework, successfully concluded on November 30, 2006.⁵⁵

4. Protection Policies

Protection policies focus on a combination of coercive instruments and institutional building functions, namely, the traditional task of protecting society from an external threat. In this arena the EU have designed and implemented more policies than NATO, as the EU has a greater emphasis on institutional building.⁵⁶

a. NATO

In the context of the PfP it is particularly relevant to mention the *Framework Document*, which maintains that the NATO Allies have made a commitment to consult with a partner country if that country perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence or security. During the Kosovo crisis, both Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia used this mechanism.⁵⁷ Additionally, NATO has three relevant areas of protection policies for those instances that go beyond situations of crises. The first is the *Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism*, which involves both cooperation and sharing of expertise to prevent

⁵³ Council of the European Union, 'EU Military Operation in Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia,' http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=594&lang=EN (accessed November 3, 2008).

⁵⁴ European Union Force, 'Operation ALTHEA,' http://www.euforbih.org/eufor/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=13&Itemid=29 (accessed November 4, 2008).

⁵⁵ Council of the European Union, 'EUFOR RD Congo,' http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=1091&lang=en (accessed November 3, 2008).

⁵⁶ See the analysis of EU protection policies in Kirchner and Sperling, chapter 4.

⁵⁷ NATO Topics, 'The Partnership for Peace,' <http://www.nato.int/issues/pfp/index.html> (accessed November 8, 2008).

terrorist attacks. The second area concerns proliferation, where alliance members work to prevent the use of WMDs through the use of workshops, which discuss the risks of chemical and biological weapons, intelligence-sharing on WMD proliferation, and briefs partner countries on NATO's activities in chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense. Finally, there is an Ad Hoc Working Group with regard to arms control, which provides information on how to manage the transfer of weapons across national borders.⁵⁸

b. The EU

Alternatively, in the case of the EU, a relevant protection policy is that of Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, which was created in October 1999.⁵⁹ The main objective of this policy is to strengthen the common values of the EU and secure peace and development prosperity. It has become quite significant within the context of the EU enlargement process. In this regard, the area advocates the development of common policies on asylum and immigration, while taking into account the need for consistent control of external borders in order to stop illegal immigration and to combat those who organize and commit related international crimes. Essentially, the aim is to create an open and secure EU, while continuing its obligation to the Geneva Refugee Convention and other relevant human rights instruments.⁶⁰

A second policy to consider is the Hague Program, an ambitious five-year strategy to strengthen freedom, security, and justice within the 27 Member States of the EU. Following these objectives, the European Commission launched its five-year Action Plan for Freedom, Justice and Security in 2005, with detailed proposals for EU actions on terrorism, migration management, visa policies, asylum, privacy and security, the fight against organized crime and criminal justice. The Action Plan is now a major policy initiative and the cornerstone of the Commission's Strategic Objectives for 2010.

Two additional policies are important to the arena of protection. The first is called the Millennium Strategy on Organized Crime, which attempts to bring together the Europe's proposed agenda for the prevention and control of organized crime, including additional details such as target dates, order of priority and the bodies responsible for implementation. As organized crime is seen as a serious threat at both national and international level, it is believed that a coordinated response is necessary in which the Member States, the Council, the Commission, Europol and the European Judicial Network all play a role.⁶¹

Another policy is the Chemical, Biological and Radiological and Nuclear Risks Program (*CBRN*), which has been in place since 2004. It is essentially a political instrument that sets out a strategy for the member states in four main areas: strengthening risk assessment, reducing risk to population, the environment, food chain through protective measures, quick detection,

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ State Watch Organization, 'The Story of Tamper,' <http://www.statewatch.org/news/2008/aug/tampere.pdf> (accessed October 22, 2008).

⁶⁰ European Council Presidency Conclusions, 'Tamper European Council,' http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/00200-r1_en9.htm (accessed September 8, 2008).

⁶¹ European Union, 'Organized Crime: Strategy for the prevention and control of organized crime,' <http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l33125.htm> (accessed November 9, 2008).

information exchange and coordination of response and mitigation of consequences.⁶² Lastly, there is another initiative under negotiation in this arena, as seen with the EU Program for the Protection of Critical Infrastructures.⁶³

5. Assurance Policies

Assurance policies combine the function of conflict resolution with more persuasive methods. The EU and NATO present obvious contrasts in this area, which underpins the thesis that the EU-NATO alliance embraces a soft power-hard power orientation. With this in mind, it can be concluded that while the EU has deployed several operations under this rubric, NATO has barely developed policies in this regard.⁶⁴

a. NATO

The closest NATO has come to the assurance policy mentioned above is with its participation in the Iraq conflict. While NATO does not have a direct role in the International Stabilization Force that has been in Iraq since May 2003, the Alliance is helping Iraq with its own security by training Iraqi military personnel, supporting the development of the country's security institutions, and coordinating the delivery of equipment. The decision to establish a NATO training mission in Iraq was made in 2004 as a response to an Iraqi Interim Government request. Every NATO member country is contributing to this training effort from both within and outside Iraq, through financial contributions or donations of equipment.⁶⁵

a. EU

In 1999, the *Stability Pact* for South Eastern Europe was launched as the first comprehensive conflict prevention strategy of the international community. It aimed at strengthening the efforts of the countries in South Eastern Europe by fostering peace, democracy, respect for human rights and economic prosperity. While it served primarily as a platform to channel funds for reconstruction and to co-ordinate donors' activities, it later evolved into a forum where regional actors and international actors could equally approach the issue of identifying common problems and the shared strategies necessary to tackle them.⁶⁶ Within the umbrella of the Stability Pact, the Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization (CARDS) program was created to support the economic development of the Western Balkans countries through both effective protection and the enforcement of intellectual property rights as a way to bring the countries in line with the requirements of the World Trade

⁶² European Union Information Website, 'EU Unprepared for bioterror threat,' <http://www.euractiv.com/en/security/eu-unprepared-bioterror-threat/article-135340> (accessed November 9, 2008).

⁶³ The European Union On-Line, 'Vice President Franco Frattini Declaration on Terrorism,' <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/05/487> (accessed November 8, 2008).

⁶⁴ See the analysis of EU assurance policies in Kirchner and Sperling, chapter 3.

⁶⁵ NATO Topics, 'NATO's assistance to Iraq,' <http://www.nato.int/issues/iraq-assistance/index.html> (accessed November 9, 2008).

⁶⁶ Stability Pact for the Southeastern Europe, 'About the Stability Pact,' <http://www.stabilitypact.org> (accessed November 10, 2008). The countries of the region: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Moldova, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia and The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

Organization (WTO).⁶⁷ In the long term -- and through programs like CARDS -- the Stabilization and Association process offered these countries the prospect of full integration into EU structures.⁶⁸

The EU has implemented several operations in an attempt to persuade actors to build or maintain peaceful arrangements. In the European area, there are three such relevant operations. The first is the *EUPM- Bosnia*, which was a continuation of the UN's International Police Task Force (IPTF). In part, this was a broad effort undertaken by the EU and other actors to address a whole range of aspects pertaining to the rule of law. In line with the general objectives of the Paris/Dayton Agreement, EUPM seeks to establish sustainable policing arrangements under BiH ownership and in accordance with best European and international practice.⁶⁹

The second mission in Europe in the field of assurance is EUPOL PROXIMA-Macedonia, which was launched on December 15, 2003. EU police experts were monitoring, mentoring and advising the country's police; and thus, helping to fight organized crime as well as promoting European policing standards. PROXIMA was part of the EU's overall commitment to assisting the efforts of the Government of former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia with its move towards EU integration.⁷⁰ The third endeavor is the EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine, which improved standards for the delivery of border and customs services to the citizens and companies of Moldova, Ukraine and the EU. Over 200 staff members of the Mission work along the 1222 km Moldovan-Ukrainian border. This includes more than one hundred customs and border guard experts from 22 EU Member States, representatives of several CIS countries in the UNDP contingent, and staff from Moldova and Ukraine.⁷¹

The EU has also launched operations in Africa. From April 2005 to June 2007, the EU conducted the first civilian ESDP police mission in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo. This mission played a key role in helping the Congolese National Police maintain order during the DRC's transition to democracy, particularly during the 2006 electoral period. The mission also acted as a training program where the Congolese National Police were advised on its need to reform and reorganize.⁷²

Additionally, *EUROJUST Themis* mission in Transcaucasia was launched in order to assist the Georgian Government in drafting a national strategy for criminal law. It also set up necessary tools as a way to support the new leadership's reforms in the aftermath of the Rose Revolution. According to Helly, Themis was nonetheless more of a test case for Rule of Law

⁶⁷ The participants in the program are Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro and the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia.

⁶⁸ SD Petosevic, 'EU Cards Program to Support ID Development,' <http://www.petosevic.com/resources/news/2004/10/000019> (accessed November 9, 2008).

⁶⁹ European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 'Overview of the Mission,' <http://www.eupm.org/Overview.aspx> (accessed November 10, 2008).

⁷⁰ Council of the European Union, 'European Union Police Mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,' http://consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=584&lang=en (accessed November 11, 2008).

⁷¹ European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine, 'What EUBAM does,' <http://www.eubam.org> (accessed November 10, 2008).

⁷² Council of the European Union, 'European Union Police Mission in Kinshasa (DRC),' http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=788&lang=en (accessed November 12, 2008).

missions found under the second pillar of EU policies, than an explicit conflict prevention policy in the country.⁷³

The EU is also present in the Middle East as is seen with the *EUPOL COPPS*, which is the EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories under the jurisdiction of the ESDP. The operational phase of this mission began on 1 January 2006 with plans to remain on location for the duration of three years. With long-term reform in mind, the mission provides enhanced support to the Palestinian Authority in establishing sustainable and effective policing arrangements.⁷⁴ In same geographical area and in the line with the November 15th 2005 “Agreement on Movement and Access” between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority, EU assisted with the reopening of the Rafah Crossing Point. This also established the European Union Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point (EUBAM Rafah), in order to provide a neutral 3rd Party Monitoring Mission that would be tasked with providing assistance and monitoring the custom operations and the security, thereby building confidence between the Parties.⁷⁵

Following an invitation by the then Prime Minister of the elected Iraqi Interim Government, Ibrahim al-Jaafari, the EU commenced training activities for Iraqi rule of law professionals. The operational phase of the EUJUST LEX Mission officially began on July 1, 2005. This mission provides professional development opportunities to senior Iraqi officials within the criminal justice system. The core aim of the mission is to foster confidence, mutual respect and operational cooperation between the different branches of the Iraqi criminal justice system (police, judiciary and penitentiary).⁷⁶

Finally, in South East Asia, the EU with Norway, Switzerland and the members of ASEAN, deployed the *AMM Monitoring Mission* in Aceh, Indonesia. This mission was designed to monitor the implementation of the peace agreement set by the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that was signed by the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) on August 15, 2005. The AMM became operational as of September 15, 2005, which is the day that the decommissioning of GAM armaments and the relocation of non-organic military and police forces began. The AMM was successfully concluded on December 15, 2006 following local elections in Aceh held earlier on December 11, 2006.⁷⁷

⁷³ Damien Helly, ‘EU’s Influence in its Eastern Neighborhood: The Case of Crisis Management in the Southern Caucasus,’ *European Political Economy Review*, no.7, (Summer 2007): 102-117 <http://eper.fhtw-berlin.de/no7/helly.pdf> (accessed November 11, 2008).

⁷⁴ Council of the European Union, ‘EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COOPS),’ http://consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=974&mode=g&lang=en (accessed November 11, 2008).

⁷⁵ European Union Border Assistance Mission in Rafah, ‘Welcome to the Head of Mission,’ <http://www.eubam-rafah.eu/portal/en/node/49> (accessed November 12, 2008).

⁷⁶ Council of the European Union, ‘EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq,’ http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=823&lang=en (accessed November 12, 2008).

⁷⁷ Council of the European Union, ‘Aceh Monitoring Mission – AMM,’ http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=961&lang=en (accessed November 13, 2008).

Final Thoughts on NATO and EU Security Governance

The use of these four categories to analyze NATO and the EU's contribution to regional governance sheds some light on the division of labor when maintaining security in Europe. The pervasive view of 'NATO throwing the party and the EU doing the dishes' is an oversimplification of the challenges facing Europe today. After a study of these elements, a snapshot of the current status of European security indicates the following conclusion: while NATO's policies are defined by a hard power oriented approach, the EU has developed a more diversified range of policies to enhance security stability in Europe. In order to clarify better this conclusion, an overview of these security governance policies can be observed in table 2.

The most effective prevention policy for NATO and the EU was that of enlargement. Candidate members felt the urgent need to meet membership prerequisites due to the power that comes with being a NATO or EU member state. Even special partnership policies have created a stronger relationship among partners, despite being a weaker alternative to enlargement. Additionally, in case of the EU, the design and implementation of prevention policies in both human rights and aid and civilian operations have been relevant to this area.

As for compellence, NATO has displayed its military power in several operations. This occurred despite problems with commitment from NATO members, which have seemingly hindered its ability to be effective in conflict areas, such as Afghanistan. Alternatively, unlike the common perception that the EU is devoid of any military might, a recent trend has revealed that the organization will participate or lead modest, but important, peace enforcement operations. Additionally, both NATO and the EU are carrying out compellence operations in Africa and Central Asia, which has initiated a debate about the global role of the organizations.

Lastly, it is important to note that NATO has not emphasized protection policies, particularly with regard to institutional building functions, whereas the EU has developed several policies to strengthen security within the borders of its 27 members. Similarly, while NATO members have not embraced assurance policies, the EU has performed a number of operations within and beyond Europe.

Table 2
Security Governance Policies: NATO and EU

	NATO Key Policies	EU Key Policies*
<p>Prevention</p> <p>Combination of institutional-building policies and persuasive instruments</p>	Partnership for Peace, Enlargement, Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.	Enlargement, European Neighborhood Policies, European Security Strategy, Civilian Crisis Management and Headline Goals, ECHO, Rapid Reaction Mechanism, <i>EIDHR</i> , EUSEC RD Congo, EUPT Kosovo, EUPAT/ FYRM
<p>Compellence</p> <p>Peacekeeping and peace enforcement actions</p>	NATO-KFOR, <i>Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan</i> , NATO operation in Sudan	<i>Helsinki Headline Goals</i> , the Battlegroup, <i>Operation Artemis, Operation Concordia, EUFOR-Althea, EURFOR RD Congo</i>
<p>Protection</p> <p>Combination of coercive instruments and institutional building functions</p>	PfP Framework Document	<i>Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, Hague Program, Millennium Strategy on Organized Crime, CBRN</i>
<p>Assurance</p> <p>Combination of the function of conflict resolution with persuasive methods in post-conflict situations.</p>	NATO training missions in Iraq.	Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, CARDS, EUPM- Bosnia, EUPOL PROXIMA-Macedonia, EUPOL Kinshasa, EUBAM Ukraine and Moldova, EUPOL COPPS, EUJUST LEX, AMM Monitoring Mission

* The policies selected for the case of the EU are based on the detailed analysis made by Kirchner and Sperling in *EU Security Governance* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007).

In conclusion, Europe is better equipped to deal with regional crises in the first decade of the 21st century than it was at the end of the Cold War. In the early 1990s NATO and the EU went through a reassessment period and as a result, new instruments and practices emerged, indicating a functional differentiation between them. Indeed, while there is no formal division of labor, there is an informal method of coordination based on the instruments and policies both institutions have created in order to face security threats. In the end, the variety of institutional instruments available to both NATO and the EU reveal that a system of regional security governance is currently in progress in Europe.