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AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION

Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Mind and Psychology

AREAS OF COMPETENCE

Action Theory
Epistemology
Moral Psychology

EDUCATION

Ph.D., Philosophy, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 2009
Dissertation: Entertaining Metaphors (exp)
Committee: William Lycan (chair), Dorit Bar-On, Joshua Knobe, Ram Neta, Jesse Prinz

M.A., Philosophy, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 2005
Thesis: Recent Ruminations from a Dead Theory of Metaphor
Committee: William Lycan (chair), Fred Dretske, Ram Neta, Jesse Prinz

M.S., Philosophy, University of Utah (Salt Lake City, UT) 2003
Thesis: Where Oedipus Went Wrong (Accounts of Informational Individuation)
Committee: Ram Neta (chair), Lex Newman, Guy Rohrbaugh

B.A., English and Philosophy, Ouachita Baptist University (Arkadelphia, AR) 1999

REFEREED PUBLICATIONS

“Is the Trade-off Hypothesis Worth Trading For?” (with Hagop Sarkissian), *Mind and Language* (forthcoming)

“The Folk Strike Back; Or, Why You Didn’t Do It Intentionally, Though It Was Bad and You Knew It” (with Hagop Sarkissian), *Philosophical Studies* 138 (2008): 291-8.

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS

Andrew W. Mellon Foundation/ACLS Dissertation Completion Fellowship, 2008—2009
Graduate Student Outstanding Paper Prize, Pacific APA, 2008
UNC Department of Philosophy, Henry Horace Williams Fellowship, Fall 2007
Graduate Student Opportunity Fund Grant, UNC Graduate School, October 2007
Graduate Student Outstanding Paper Prize, Central APA, 2007
Graduate Student Outstanding Paper Prize, Pacific APA, 2006
UNC Department of Philosophy, Henry Horace Williams Fellowship, 2003—2004
University of Utah Department of Philosophy, Tanner Fellowship, 2002—2003

PRESENTATIONS:

“Evidence that Stakes Don’t Matter to Evidence” at the 1st annual Interdisciplinary Approach to Philosophical Issues Conference. Mobile, AL September 2008 (Invited Presentation).

“Only Intellectuals are Anti-Intellectualists” (with Ram Neta) at the Society for Philosophy and Psychology, 34th Annual Meeting. Philadelphia, PA June 2008 (Poster Presentation).

“Dirty Cheap Contextualism” at the Pacific Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association. Pasadena, CA March 2008 (Winner, Graduate Student Outstanding Paper Prize).

“The Explicit Perlocution and Metaphor” at the joint meeting of the North and South Carolina Philosophical Societies. Chapel Hill, NC March 2008.

“The Difficulty of Paraphrase is the Dogma of Metaphor” at the 3rd Int. Symposium of Cognition, Logic and Communication. Riga, Latvia December 2007.

“The Explicit Perlocution and Metaphor” at the University of Helsinki. Helsinki, Finland December 2007 (Invited Presentation).

“The Difficulty of Paraphrase is the Dogma of Metaphor” at the Society for Philosophy and Psychology, 33rd Annual Meeting. Toronto, ON June 2007.

“The Folk Strike Back; Or, Why You Didn’t Do It Intentionally, Though It Was Bad and You Knew It” (with Hagop Sarkissian), at the Central Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association. Chicago, IL April 2007 (Winner, Graduate Student Outstanding Paper Prize).

“The Red Herring of Compositionality and Beyond” at the Pacific Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association. Portland, OR March 2006 (Winner, Graduate Student Outstanding Paper Prize).

“The Red Herring of Compositionality and Beyond” at the Society for Philosophy and Psychology, 31st Annual Meeting. Winston-Salem, NC June 2005 (Poster Presentation).

“Two Types of Object of Perception” at the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology. New Orleans, LA April 2004.

“On Numerous Coincident Objects of the Same Kind” at the Pacific Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association. San Francisco, CA March 2003.

“Expanding the Higher-Order Representational Account to Perceptual Consciousness” at the University of Texas, San Antonio Philosophy Symposium. San Antonio, TX November 2002.

“On Numerous Coincident Objects of the Same Kind” at the Mountain and Plains Philosophy Conference. Las Vegas, NV October 2002.

“On Numerous Coincident Objects of the Same Kind” at the Northwest Philosophy Conference. Portland, OR October 2002.

COMMENTS

On George Schueler's "A Puzzle About the Humean Theory of Motivation" at the Pacific Meeting of the American Philosophical Association. San Francisco, CA March 2005.

On Saikat Guha's "Against Substantivalism" at Mountain-Plains Philosophy Conference. NV, 2002.

On Matt Haber's "The Applicability of Probability to Systematics" at the Northwest Philosophy Conference. Portland, OR October 2002.

Courses Prepared to Teach

Advanced Philosophy of Language
 Philosophy of Mind
 Philosophy of Cognitive Science (Experimental Methods)
 Language and Communication
 Concepts and Cognition

Intermediate Epistemology
 20th Century Philosophy
 Moral Psychology and Practical Reasoning

Introductory Bioethics
 Main Problems of Philosophy
 Introduction to Philosophy (Great Works)

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

UNC Bioethics, Summer 2008
 Full 20th Century Philosophy (Linguistic Philosophy), Spring 2008
Responsibility Bioethics, Summer 2007
 Experience and Reality (Philosophy of Language), Spring 2007
 Main Problems of Philosophy, Fall 2006
 Bioethics, Summer 2006
 Introduction to Philosophy (Great Works), Fall 2005
 Bioethics, Summer 2005

Assistant Main Problems of Philosophy (with Ram Neta), Spring 2005
 Introduction to Ethics (with Bill Lycan), Fall 2004

UTAH Introduction to Philosophy (with Bruce Landesman), Spring 2002
Assistant World Religions (with Dean Chatterjee), Fall 2001

Graduate Courses Taken

Philosophy of Mind	The Mind/Body Debate.....	Lycan, UNC
	Moral Psychology.....	Knobe, UNC
	Research Group: Consciousness.....	Lycan, UNC
	Philosophy of Mind (Survey).....	Lycan, UNC
	Mental Content.....	Prinz, UNC
	Perception and Introspection.....	Dretske and Güzeldere, Duke
	Philosophy of Mind.....	Ramsey, Utah (Visiting Prof)
Epistemology	Regress of Reasons.....	Neta, UNC
	Justification.....	Rosenberg, UNC
	Empiricism and Foundations.....	Lange, UNC
	Perception and Introspection.....	Dretske and Güzeldere, Duke
	Perception.....	Neta, Utah
Ethics	Moral Psychology.....	Knobe, UNC
	Practical Reasoning.....	Millgram, Utah
	Contemporary Ethics.....	Andreou, Utah
Logic	Symbolic Logic.....	Resnick, UNC
	Symbolic Logic.....	MacIntosh, Utah
	Deductive Logic.....	Black, Utah
History of Philosophy	Aristotle.....	Reeve, UNC
	Continental Rationalism.....	Nelson, UNC
	Hume.....	Newman, Utah
Philosophy of Science	Philosophy of Science (Survey).....	Roberts, UNC
	Philosophy of Biology (Survey).....	Lange, UNC and Rosenberg, Duke
	Psychobiology.....	Thalos, Utah
Philosophy of Language	Philosophy of Language (Survey).....	Bar-On, UNC
Metaphysics	Composition and Identity.....	Rohrbaugh, Utah
Neuroscience	Cognitive Neuroscience.....	Cabeza, Duke
Miscellaneous	Protoseminar.....	Long and Neta, UNC
	Proseminar.....	Downes, Utah
	Qualifying Exam taken in Phil. Mind	

PROFESSIONAL SERVICE

Referee, Mind and Language

Referee, The European Review of Philosophy

Organized Colloquium on Figurative Language for the joint meeting of the North and South Carolina Philosophical Societies (with Anne Bezuidenhout)

Referee, Society for Philosophy and Psychology, 33rd Meeting, Toronto, ON, 2007

Work-in-Progress Talk Coordinator, UNC, Philosophy Dept., Spring 2006
Speakers Committee Student Representative, UNC-Chapel Hill, Philosophy Dept., 2004-05
President, Graduate Student Philosophical Association, University of Utah, 2002-2003
President, Kumamoto Association of Japanese English Teachers 4/2000-4/2001

DISSERTATION ABSTRACT: Entertaining Metaphors

If Sally knows Sid to be a hard worker, she might make the point by asserting, "Sid is a hard worker." Or she might assert, "Sid is a Sherman tank." We all recognize the first as an instance of literal language and the second as an instance of figurative language, specifically, a metaphor. But what does this distinction amount to?

Theorists have often tried to explain the distinction in terms of different kinds of meaning or understanding. Grice and Searle claim that literal meanings are somehow composed out of the meanings of the pronounced words, whereas metaphorical meanings are implicatures arising when it would not be rational for the speaker to mean her words literally in the context in which she uttered them. Davidson claims that metaphors simply mean what they literally mean, but they could have various distinctive effects upon us, and understanding a metaphor consists in being affected in these ways. Sperber and Wilson contend that insofar as there is a metaphorical/literal distinction at all, it consists in the presence of various interpretations for a metaphor, no one of which is essential for understanding. I argue that attempts to explain the distinction between literal and metaphorical utterances in terms of distinctive kinds of meaning and understanding get the order of explanation backwards. Accounts of metaphorical meaning and understanding fall out of a prior account of what it is to speak figuratively (in general), and metaphorically (in particular).

By saying, "Sid is a Sherman Tank," Sally might mean to convey, for example, that Sid is one who cannot be deterred from achieving his goals. She might also mean to amuse her audience with the thought that Sid is an armored assault vehicle. Very roughly, the account I offer holds that if she intends to do both of those things, Sally speaks figuratively. That is, I contend that the distinction between figurative and literal utterances can only be explained through recourse to Austin's (1962) fundamental distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary speech acts. Figurative utterances involve two propositional contents. One's aim with one of these contents is essentially 'illocutionary'. One aims to make an assertion, or to ask a question, or to pronounce sentence, for example. But one's aim with the other content is essentially only 'perlocutionary.' With the other content, one aims to affect the psychology of one's hearer—perhaps to frighten her, or to shock her, or to cause her to be entertained. To understand a figurative utterance fully is to grasp both intended contents, as well as a speaker's intentions in expressing these.

With my account of figurative utterances in place, I can easily explain the differences between metaphors and other subclasses of figurative utterances using various resources, such as those of classic rhetoric theory. The subclass of metaphors are figurative classifications. Hyperboles are figurative overstatements, (encompassing a subset of metaphors). Metonymies are figurative utterances that work by contiguity (not similarity, as do metaphors). My view offers a nuanced account of how we understand artistic metaphors, such as those appearing in poetry, and the more pedestrian metaphors appearing often in ordinary conversation. The order in which we grasp the illocuting and perlocuting contents

reverses, depending on speakers' and hearers' distinctive goals in these kinds of cases. My view also suggests a continuous account for certain non-verbal actions which are similar to figurative utterances. Suppose, while listening to a boring talk, a colleague across the table catches your attention and, forming her hand into the shape of a gun, puts the 'barrel' to her head and lets the 'hammer' fall. Your colleague is meaning to inform you that she finds the talk boring, while amusing you with the idea that the talk is driving her to suicide. She is engaged in a figurative act.

REFERENCES

Joshua Knobe (knobe@email.unc.edu)
Assistant Professor of Philosophy
University of North Carolina

William G. Lycan (ujanel@email.unc.edu)
William Rand Kenan Professor of Philosophy
University of North Carolina

Edouard Machery (machery@pitt.edu)
Associate Professor, HPS
University of Pittsburgh

Ram Neta (neta@email.unc.edu)
Associate Professor of Philosophy
University of North Carolina

Shaun Nichols (sbn@email.arizona.edu)
Professor of Philosophy
University of Arizona

Jesse Prinz (jesse@subcortex.com)
John J. Rogers Professor of Philosophy
University of North Carolina

Marga Reimer (reimer@u.arizona.edu)
Associate Professor of Philosophy
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Geoff Sayre-McCord (sayre-Mccord@unc.edu)
Morehead Alumni Distinguished Professor
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