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Papers: |
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Figurative Language: |
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A short, roughly correct outline of my dissertation project. |
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Challenging the idea that paraphrases of metaphor are inadequate. |
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Judgments of Intentionality: |
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(With Hagop Sarkissian) Side effects thought to be intentional are not those thought of as trade-offs. |
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“Why You Didn’t Do It Intentionally, Thou It was Bad and You Knew It” Philosophical Studies, (2008), 138, 291-8 |
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(With Hagop Sarkissian) AKA “The Folk Strike Back”. The side effects which are thought to be intentional are not those which are bad and known about. |
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Context, Epistemic Concepts, and Compositionality: |
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We have rich, default meanings for our terms, which we are quick to renegotiate. Knowledge claims and other assertions are context sensitive. |
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Weak compositionality of thought is sufficient, and prototype theory can supply it. |
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“Evidence that Stakes Don’t Matter for Evidence” Under Review |
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(With Ram Neta) We should be skeptical about those of our intuitions which favor stakes sensitive invariantism about evidence. |
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My perlocutionary account of figurative language, and metaphor in particular. |