A Spatial Analysis of Turkish Party Preferences

Professor Ali Çarkoğlu*

Sabancı University

Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences

Orhanlı Tuzla,

81474 Istanbul Turkey

(alicarkoglu@sabanciuniv.edu)

 

Professor Melvin J. Hinich

Department of Government

University of Texas at Austin

Austin TX 78712-1087 U.S.A.

(hinich@mail.la.utexas.edu)

*Corresponding author

A Spatial Analysis of Turkish Party Preferences

ABSTRACT

The paper focuses on party preferences of Turkish voters within the spatial model of voting that proved to be a successful explanatory framework in various other countries. The analysis is based on spatial theory of electoral competition and its statistical implementation using survey data. The paper aims at depicting the cognitive organization of voters’ attitudes about issues and evaluations of political parties that compete for their vote. The spatial map derived from a survey of urban settlers show that the dominant ideological dimension sets secularists vs pro-Islamists as expected from the center-periphery framework often used in Turkish electoral analyses. The second dimension reflects the impact of recent conflict involving the Kurdish minority on rising nationalist sentiments. Given a general depiction of the Turkish political space, we examine the impact of various demographic as well as issue evaluations on individuals’ ideal positions in the space.

A Spatial Analysis of Turkish Party Preferences

INTRODUCTION

Over the last decade, once marginal parties with ultra nationalist and pro-Islamist mandates rose to a dominant position in Turkish politics leading to a collapse of their center-right competitors. Together with ethnic Kurdish support of about five percent, parties of the extreme ends of the Turkish ideological space came to receive about 38 percent of electoral support in April 1999 elections. In November 2002 the non-centrist parties gathered a clear majority of electoral support for the first time in Turkish electoral history with about 59 percent of electoral support against the 38 percent of the centrist parties.

The limited number of voting analyses focusing on this recent electoral experience offers a diagnosis of demographic, socio-economic, cultural and ethnic bases of party support together with a dominant impact of religiosity on individual voting decision. However, these studies lack a coherent theoretical framework for explaining the individual decision of party choice. In consequence, a sui generis character of the Turkish electorate emerges and leaves the Turkish experience unlinked to a larger body of comparative and theoretical research on voting behavior.

Our analysis below adopts the theoretical framework of spatial voting models and offers a multi-dimensional analysis of the emerging ideological space in Turkey during the years preceding the general elections in November 2002. Kalaycıoğlu (1998) and Hale (2002) provide their own intuitive two-dimensional representations of the political space of Turkey without any formal voting theory or empirically based behavioral foundations. Our approach however is based on spatial theory of electoral competition and its statistical implementation using survey data. We offer a series of empirically based explanations as to the nature of the emerging and seemingly chaotic scene of electoral competition in the country. We thus provide a baseline measure for comparing future changes in the ideological structure. Using data from a nation-wide representative sample of the urban electorate in February-March 2001, nearly two years after the general election of 1999, we estimate the spatial positions of all major political parties along with respondent ideal points in a two-dimensional ideological space. We then show that these two dimensions capture the basic character of issue positions and social cleavages that shape the Turkish electoral scene. Very much in line with the center-periphery framework of Mardin (1973) our two-dimensional ideological map reflects pro-Islamist elements of the periphery as opposed to the secularist center as its dominant dimension.[1] Turkish nationalism defined largely in opposition to rising ethnic Kurdish identity of the late 1990s appears as a secondary dimension of ideological competition. We thus present party positions for the Sunni pro-Islamist as opposed to secularist parties in contrast to parties that differentiate from one another on the ethnically defined nationalistic perspectives. Our simple spatial exposition of party competition accounts not only for the specificity of Turkish ideological competition but it also offers a reflection of the same framework of the spatial voting theory developed in Enelow and Hinich (1984) and extended in Hinich and Munger (1994).

The Hinich-Munger theory of spatial ideology is superficially similar to the spatial ideological dimension of Downs (1957). Both theories treat the space as latent although Downs is not explicit about what can and cannot be observed in his theory. The major difference between the Downs and Hinich-Munger concepts of spatial ideology lies in how the ideological space is developed over time. Hinich and Munger (1994) assert that the dimension (or dimensions) arises out of competition for political power by politicians, parties, and their supporters. Parties and factions within parties attempt to gain power by creating arguments as to why they should displace the status quo.

The manifestos of the parties as well as their emotional appeals to voters are reflective of each other in the fog of political war as voters attempt to cut through the deceptions and confusions that are part of politics. The latent space is the underlying reality of a society’s politics even though it is not completely perceived by the politicians, their supporters, and the general public. Journalists will describe politicians and parties as if they are points on a left-right scale but the connections between these “points” and issues that the public is concerned about are either not stated or are at best fuzzy.

A scientific theory is a valid description of nature if its premises are well defined, a model consistent with the theory is measurable from data, and the theory can be empirically falsified. A latent ideological space can be estimated from data and the ideological space has been estimated by a variety of methods, some simple and some statistically more sophisticated. The striking finding from different studies of polities using various methods on perceptual and attitudinal data from public opinion surveys is that the latent spaces are low dimensional. They are either one dimensional Downs type spaces or more frequently they have two dimensions. The meaning of these dimensions require a linkage between positions on the latent dimension(s) and issues and public goods provisions as was done by Enelow and Hinich (Chapter 9, 1984) and Hinich, Khmelko and Ordeshook (1999).

A theoretical model of how the latent ideological space links with issues was first made by Hinich and Pollard (1981) and then extended by Enelow and Hinich (1984) and Hinich and Munger (1994). In contrast to exploratory analyses in various forms of discriminant and factor analysis, the empirical extension of the spatial voting theory offers a direct link to a formal mathematical model of preference formation and choice. Besides the American elections, these models have been tested in a variety of political contexts including Ukraine (Hinich, Khmelko and Ordeshook, 1999), Chile (Dow, 1998a, b), Russia (Myagov and Ordeshook, 1998) and Taiwan (Lin, Chu and Hinich; 1996). The empirical applications of the spatial voting model in different country contexts yield basically two valuable contributions to our understanding of the processes at work. First, is that they offer a test of generality of the spatial theory. What we observe in these works is a continuing support for the low dimensionality of political spaces. We also diagnose that the simple spatial theoretical framework accounts for much of the country specific questions at hand about coalition potential, stability of political rhetoric and the like. Second, is that these countries where electoral democracy is relatively young, go through a maturation process that bear considerable risks of instability and regression to non-democratic regimes. Our newly developed spatial techniques allow, for the first time, an opportunity to closely follow these developments in ideological spaces so that inherent problems can be diagnosed and potentially successful policy recommendations can be drawn. As to the specific questions about the Turkish experience, we first want to learn whether voters in Turkey possess a coherent perception of parties and issues. To what extent are voters able to form a coherent map of the policy predispositions of the parties that seek their support? Did the recent collapse of the center-right leave them in a political vacuum that makes them easily mobilized by a candidate’s or party’s appeal on various issues that may bear reflections of destabilizing extremism? Or alternatively, do they possess a stable centrist conceptual scheme that acts as a buffer to highly volatile short-term preference shifts?

Below, we first provide a background assessment of the electorate within the perspective of recent developments in Turkish politics prior to 2002 general elections. As such, our analysis not only offers clues for the developments leading up to the 2002 elections but also provides a basis of comparison for the emerging orientations during and after the 2002 campaign. Following an outline of the spatial voting model’s methodology of analysis, we describe our data and present our spatial mental map for the Turkish electorate in relation to attitudes concerning salient issues of self-ascribed identity of the voters. We then pursue a number of related matters, including an assessment of differences between the eastern and western halves of the country and parties’ positions in relation to those respondents who refuse to vote for any one of the existing parties. We conclude with an assessment of the prospects for stability in the party system before the general election of November 2002.

MOTIVATION FOR A SPATIAL ANALYSIS: AN OUTLINE OF RECENT TURKISH ELECTORAL HISTORY

The 1990s witnessed the emergence of a formidable electoral force for the pro-Islamist followed by the ultra-nationalist parties that had remained in the fringes of the electoral scene in the preceding decades.[2] Starting from a mere 7.2 percent electoral base in 1987, the pro-Islamist Welfare Party (Refah Partisi-RP) continuously raised its appeal to masses reaching about 17 percent in pre-election coalition with the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi-MHP) in 1991. In 1994 municipal elections, RP captured the largest metropolitan centers. In less than two years later, RP became the largest party in a fragmented party system with only 21.4 percent of the vote in December 1995 elections. RP has its roots in the National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi-MSP) founded in 1973, following the National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi-MNP) founded three years earlier. For most of the post-1960 period, electoral support for the pro-Islamist parties remained on the fringes of the system.[3] Never before the second half of the 1990s did the pro-Islamist tradition capture more than 12 percent of the popular vote alone.

In the aftermath of the 1995 general election, the pro-Islamist policy agenda found significant reflection in the RP and the centrist True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi-DYP) coalition. The challenge of the pro-Islamists to secularist Republican principles led to a series of reactions. It polarized secularists against the anti-secularists, Sunnis against Alevis and even widened the existing cleavages between the Turkish and the rising Kurdish nationalists.

The peak of the tension was reached when the then ruling RP-DYP coalition was openly challenged by the military representatives of the National Security Council (NSC) in its meeting of the 28th of February 1997. After nine hours of deliberations, the declaration of NSC expressed uneasiness about attempts to harm and ultimately change the secular, Kemalist nationalist and democratic character of the Turkish constitution. Several precautionary measures, some of which were previously proposed by earlier civilian governments and/or bureaucracy but failed to be implemented, were brought once again to the agenda and demanded especially by the military branch of NSC, were also submitted to the cabinet. These included demands for stricter regulation of Koran courses, social and economic activities of various Islamic brotherhoods (tarikats) and a halt to the appointments of the government that are seen as aimed towards building an Islamic cadre within the state bureaucracy. RP leader and then the Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan tried to resist the impositions by the military but could not obtain much political support. Under pressure, he did sign the NSC decisions, and formally, the “28th of February process” had begun. Many in the media agreed that this was a new form of a coup by decree similar to the 1971 example.[4] Public opinion seemed to agree with this diagnosis (Milliyet daily newspaper, 7 March, 1997). Unable to legislate, encircled by popular resistance together with increasing resignations from DYP, the coalition partners agreed on going to early elections under the premiership of the DYP leader Tansu Çiller. Accordingly, Erbakan resigned. However, the President asked the centrist Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi-ANAP) leader Mesut Yılmaz to form the new government. Together with the center-left Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti-DSP) and the Democratic Turkey Party (Demokrat Türkiye Partisi-DTP) Yılmaz’ minority government obtained the vote of confidence with outside support from the center-left Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi-CHP). The new government also was pressured by the military for implementation of the “recommended” policies in the infamous NSC meeting, and consequently delivered especially on the education policy front by passing the controversial 8-year mandatory education law. The unofficial 28th of February process was de facto brought to an end only by the early general elections of April 1999.[5]

The months leading to the 1999 general election have witnessed the momentous capture of the leader of the separatist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partia Karkaren Kürdistan-PKK), widening corruption scandals, mass demonstrations against the religiously sensitive ban of headscarves at the universities, as well as the death of the ultra-nationalist Alparslan Türkeş, who was the founding leader of MHP, that led to an eventual reshaping of MHP’s image.[6] The capture of the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan and his trial, as well as the developments that led to NATO’s military action in Kosovo, helped increase the nationalist fervor in the country. DSP, which was in power for nearly, the last two years preceding the election either as a coalition partner, or as a single minority government, have greatly benefited from these developments. When the polls closed it became obvious that DSP was neither alone, nor was it the major benefactor from shifting electoral preferences. As expected, DSP became the largest party with 22.2 percent of the vote, up nearly 52 percent from 1995 election. The surprise came with MHP capturing the second largest vote share after DSP and reaching nearly 18 percent of support, up by about 120 percent from its share in 1995.[7]

The tenure of the coalition of DSP, MHP and ANAP in the aftermath of April 1999 elections was full of crises. While some of these crises came with natural disasters like the two massive earthquakes in August and November of 1999, the very coalition partners cast some others’ seeds. The perceived ineffectiveness of the organization of public relief efforts in the aftermath of the August 1999 crisis not only enervated the grieving public but also proved once again the inaptitude of public authorities to respond to the needs and demands of the Turkish public. However, the arithmetic of parliamentary seat distribution, together with the inability of the civic anger to pressure the coalition to take responsibility, helped the coalition to survive the political after-shocks of the earthquake.

The impact of the financial crisis that hit the country first in November 2000 and next in February 2001 had been much more severe on the political front. Political manipulations of fiscal policies leading to an unsustainable public debt were commonly diagnosed as the underlying reason for these crises, which resulted in unprecedented urban unemployment and a record depreciation of the Turkish lira against all foreign currencies. The crisis peaked on 21 February 2001 with an overnight devaluation of the Turkish lira by about 50%. By the end of the year, about 2.3 million people had lost their jobs and the economy had contracted in real terms as much as 8.5%. Together with the August 1999 earthquake, the devastating impact of the economic crises seems to have been reflected in the political arena in the form of alarmingly high alienation from the centrist political parties. The incumbent coalition partners were perceived as responsible for the economic crises and their clumsiness in responding to the earthquakes. Yet the centrist opposition could not also escape from blame for their perceived lack of credibility and willingness to cooperate in order to respond to people in crisis.

Perhaps the most significant finding in all surveys of the Winter and Spring of 2001 reported in newspapers is the large portion of the respondents (26.1%) who declare that they would not vote for any one of the existing parties and an equally surprising 10% who declare that they would cast an invalid protest vote.[8] In short, during at least the first part of 2001 when our survey was carried out, about one third of the electorate were not undecided, but rather decided not to cast their votes for any one of the present parties. Recurrent crises and lack of accountability in the party system seem to have pushed the Turkish electorate away from the presently available options in the party system. This alone was enough to bring uneasiness to the party system and thus possibilities of leadership changes together with electoral system change, as well as establishment of new parties under possibly fresh leadership.

Religiosity more than any other variable is found to determine Turkish voters’ choice among competing parties. In only two of the most recent surveys, researchers identify varying degrees of retrospective as well as prospective economic evaluations on party choice.[9] Yet, even when these effects are present, their magnitudes are small compared to religiosity effect. In the 1999 elections, when the ultra-nationalist MHP scored high gains, Çarkoğlu and Toprak (2000) indicate that both right-of-center parties, namely FP and MHP, as well as the center-right DYP appealed to pro-Islamist constituencies.[10] In line with the shift in ideological orientations of the voters, determinants of vote choice seem to have been influenced by increasing tension between pro-Islamists and the secularists. While three of the five parties that obtained representation in the 1999 Parliament appealed to pro-Islamist sentiments, the rest of the bunch seem to cater to secularist constituencies thus keeping religious issues a top priority in their respective agendas.

In short, the once marginal non-centrist segment of the Turkish ideological spectrum has grown both in size as well as in influence over the last decade. Policy mandates and electoral bases of the rising nationalist and pro-Islamist parties rely on potentially explosive social cleavages in the country. One such confrontation is between the secularist and pro-Islamist forces, which has always been one of the centerpieces of Turkish electoral politics. The rise of pro-Islamist electoral forces from a secondary to an undeniably important position in Turkish electoral politics has led many to worry that a deep-rooted schism has come to the forefront of Turkish politics. The rise of electoral support for MHP in 1999 presented yet another challenge since it clearly reflected growing ethnic cleavages in Turkish society that peaked as a result of PKK’s campaign of terror in the 1990s. The once encompassing and inclusive Turkish identity is now confronted by a growing Kurdish nationalism within the country.[11] Certainly aided by the rise of ethnic nationalism and consequent militarized conflicts in the Balkans and the Caucasus and fuelled by rising death toll in PKK related terror, the once insignificant ethnic nationalism of MHP rose to a dominant role in Turkish electoral politics of the late 1990s. The ethnic based conception of nationalism is also in stark contrast to religious Islamic community conception of the pro-Islamist movement that draws on the Ottoman heritage of millet (nation). As Kalaycıoğlu (1997, 8) notes, “Kurds and Turks may represent ethnic communities but since both are Sunni Muslims, they can coexist in the harmony of a religious framework. Besides, Islam sees all ethnic claims and differences as pre-Islamic, uncivilized, pagan forms. As devout Muslims both communities are to unite in a ‘supraethnic’ religious community of the ‘Sunni Millet’ of Turkey.” While MHP was thriving on rising exclusionist ethnic fervor due to Kurdish separatist movement, RP/FP was offering an inclusive Islamic unification with a clear tone of anti-secularism that aimed to appeal to especially sizeable Kurdish vote in the East and Southeastern provinces.

Rising pro-Islamist and nationalist appeal among the Turkish electorate can be taken as a reflection of strengthening peripheral forces within Şerif Mardin’s (1973) center-periphery paradigm. Following Mardin’s (1973) seminal work others have also argued that Turkish politics is built around a strong and coherent state apparatus run by a distinct group of elites dominated by the military and bureaucracy. The “center” is confronted by a heterogeneous and habitually hostile “periphery”, composed mainly of peasantry, small farmers and artisans. For all practical purposes, the periphery was seen as the complement of the center, which is built around Kemalist secular principles and follows a state run nationalist modernization program. The periphery reflects the salient features of a subject and parochial orientation. It is build around hostile sentiments toward centralist and coercive modernization project of the center and includes regional, religious and ethnic groups with often-conflicting interests and political strategies.

During the formative years of competitive party system in Turkey the Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti-DP) brought together the heterogeneous peripheral forces and dominated the polls. The peripheral coalition was broken by the 1961 coup. Although the electoral domination of the periphery continued in all post-1960 elections with the only exception of 1977 elections when the centrist CHP garnered an exceptional 41.4 percent support, ideologically the peripheral tradition was divided into three groups, one representing moderate right-wing, the others ultra-nationalist and pro-Islamist constituencies. The centrist tradition was also broken by the 1980 coup. Until the general elections of 2002 CHP and DSP remained as the two major representatives of this tradition. CHP was stricter on the secularist dimension while DSP, remained less strict on secularism, leaned more toward nationalist positions in the 1990s. This picture became more complicated with the rise to power of AKP in the 2002 general elections. Our ensuing analysis is based on data preceding the founding of AKP in the summer of 2001. However, our findings provide clues as to the reasons for their remarkable success in November 2002. 

The main tenets of electoral competition in recent Turkish politics remains however predominantly unchanged. Clearly in conflict with each other, both the pro-Islamists as well as the nationalists are posing a serious challenge to the stability of the party system by adding to its fragmentation. The fact that the pro-Islamists of AKP have won the premiership of the 2002 general election and eliminated MHP from the parliament does not mean that the nationalists are totally out of the Turkish electoral picture. The nationalists could regain their power if for example Turkey gets involved in an international conflict such as the one in neighboring Iraq. Our ensuing analysis however, is based on data from early 2001 and specifically asks the following questions: What is the underlying ideological structure of Turkish voters’ preferences of political parties? Or in other words, what is the shape of Turkish political space? Is Turkish politics being shaped by the rising salience of religious and nationalist movements reflecting traces of the center-periphery cleavage? More specifically, what has been the impact of the most recent economic crisis? Did the crisis of 2001 leave the Turkish voters in a political vacuum that makes them easily swayed by charismatic and populist leadership? Or alternatively, do we observe a robust and coherent cleavage structure in voters’ perceptions? Are the apparently divisive issues of headscarf ban and education in Kurdish being reflected in the perception maps of the political space in Turkey in a coherent manner?

We now turn to the methodology and data used in our analysis of these issues.

METHODS AND DATA

The methodology requires a set of assumptions relating the data to a spatial model. First, the scores given to each party is assumed to be a monotonically decreasing function of the Euclidian distance between the position of the party in the space and the most preferred ideological position of the respondent. This position is called the ideal point. The respondent is not required to articulate that position but rather it is a latent position in the latent space. Second, the constellation of the party positions in the latent space is assumed to be the same across all respondents. The only thing that differs from respondent to respondent is their personal ideal points. From the scores that we get from the respondents we first determine the dimensionality of the political space. Next we estimate the party positions and lastly we estimate the ideal points for the individuals.[12]

Our data comes from a nation-wide representative survey of urban population conducted during the chaotic weeks of the second economic crisis of February 2001. A total of 1201 face-to-face interviews were conducted in 12 of the 81 provinces. The questionnaires were administered, between 20th February and 16th March 2001, by using a “random sampling” method with an objective to represent the nation-wide voting age urban population living within municipality borders, in which the urban population figures of 1997 census data were taken as the basis.[13] Since the new pro-Islamist parties, that is SP and AKP were formed in the aftermath of the closure of FP in June 2001, our data only reflects the evaluations concerning FP and not SP and AKP.

The wording of the questions used in our analyses to obtain an estimate of each respondent’s cardinal evaluation of parties is given in the Appendix. For each question the same set of evaluations for the seven major parties were asked. These parties obtained 94.8 percent of the urban vote in 1999 elections (Table 1). However, as of February-March 2001, these parties comprise only the preferences of 42.3 percent of our urban sample. Similar to opinion poll results reported in the media, our findings also indicate that while 6 percent of the respondents report that they will not cast their vote and about 5 percent are undecided as to which party to vote for. More significantly, nearly 33 percent of the respondents indicate that they will not cast their vote for any one of the existing parties. Given the continual crisis atmosphere in the country, the erosion of electoral support for the coalition partners, which amounts to a total of about 39 percentage points in the urban areas, is not surprising. Among the opposition only the left leaning CHP and pro-Kurdish HADEP seem to maintain their urban constituencies. The rest of the opposition parties are also found to have lost their supporters.[14]

[Table 1 about here]

Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of the thermometer scores for all major parties, three hypothetical leaders and an evaluation of the coalition performance of DSP-MHP-ANAP. The highest mean score is given to our hypothetical labour leader closely followed by a prominent businessman. As a reflection of the above underlined alienation of masses from the political parties respondents perceive the potential benefit of our hypothetical working class or business leaders’ tenure in the executive office to be significantly higher than those of the known major political parties. Among the political parties CHP obtains the highest score followed by ANAP, DYP and MHP. HADEP, FP and DSP have the worst performance among the parties. A very religious leader is rated better than HADEP. However, most striking is the observation that the present DSP-MHP and ANAP coalition is rated with the lowest scores.

[Table 2 about here]

A SPATIAL MAP OF ISSUE DIMENSIONS IN TURKISH POLITICS

As a first step in our analysis we estimate the spatial positions of the seven parties evaluated by our respondents. Figure 1 presents the two-dimensional estimates of these party positions together with the voters’ ideal points in this space. Looking at Figure 1, we observe that parties are clearly differentiated on the two dimensions explaining about 61% of the variance. The variance explained by the first eigenvalue is 38.5% whereas the second one accounts for 22.9%.

[Figure 1 about here]

The x-axis appears to posit the pro-Islamist FP in one extreme as opposed to the secularist left leaning CHP. The relative positions of the rest of the parties fit our expectations about the religious cleavage in Turkish politics. The nationalist MHP turns out to be the closest one to the position of the pro-Islamist FP on this axis. Among the centrist parties DYP is slightly closer to the pro-Islamist end. DSP and CHP are clustered together on the opposing end of this dimension placed to the left of ANAP’s centrist position. It is noticeable that HADEP’s position on this dimension is closer in the perceptions of our respondents to the secularist left of DSP and CHP.

The y-axis places the Kurdish HADEP on one extreme and the nationalist MHP and DSP on the other. While ANAP, CHP and FP’s positions come close to the center on this dimension, DYP is placed closer to the nationalist MHP and DSP’s opposing end. It has been suggested that FP’s strong showing in the East and Southeastern provinces where the bulk of Kurdish population lives is evidence of FP’s appeal to the Kurdish electorate. Ideologically as well, the all-inclusive concept of millet advocated by FP is seen to target the Kurdish vote. Similarly, the religiously conservative Kurdish constituency was seen by many as a cause for ideological closeness of HADEP and FP. Our spatial map however, clearly shows that in the perceptions of the urban population, HADEP is nowhere close to the position of FP on the two-dimensional political space we derive.

HADEP’s isolation on the two-dimensions is not an exception. FP is equally isolated from the rest of the parties. Opposing FP on the x-axis, CHP also stands apart from the rest of the parties. While the centrist positions on the x-axis does not allow for much of differentiation among the MHP, DYP and ANAP, the y-axis representing the nationalist cleavage in Turkish politics clearly separates the centrist ANAP from the more nationalist DYP and MHP. It is worth noting also that according to the perception in the minds of the urban voters, DSP stands on the opposing extreme of the Kurdish HADEP.

Together with the seven major parties we also asked evaluations of hypothetical candidates. Given the alienation of voters from the political establishment, inclusion of only the parties already in existence does not provide enough information about the spread of choices in the political space. Clearly, these hypothetical personalities cannot be treated as political parties. However, their estimated positions are to be interpreted with reference to their closeness to real parties already in existence at the time of our fieldwork. A very religious leader for example, is estimated very close to FP while a prominent businessman stands close to ANAP. Interestingly, a labor leader is positioned very close to HADEP and apart from the rest of the parties, especially of the left. However, given HADEP’s extremist left-wing rhetoric on many issues such a positioning is not surprising. In short, the information provided by the hypothetical leaders helps us identify the meaning of the dimensions of the political space.

The ideal point estimates for each individual in our sample is also shown on Figure 1. The striking observation from these ideal point estimates is the centrist tendencies of a large segment of the voters. Although we observe voters dispersed towards the end points of the two dimensions, the bulk of the voters are found close to the center of the two dimensions.

When we calculate the mean positions of constituencies across different parties we observe the relative standings of the parties with respect to their supporters.[15] From this perspective, Figure 2 reveals several interesting patterns. The mean ideal points of CHP, DSP, FP and HADEP voters are more towards the center on both dimensions than their respective party positions. The estimated location of DSP, for example, lies at the most extreme point on the second dimension revealing a strong Turkish nationalist standing as opposed to the Kurdish nationalist standing of HADEP on the other end of the dimension. However, the mean ideal point estimates of those who declared their intention to vote for DSP is quite distant from this party location estimate and lie closer to the center of the two dimensions. Similarly, for both HADEP and FP constituencies we observe that they stand relatively at a more centrist position on both dimensions compared to the estimated party stand. In contrast, we observe that for both DYP and MHP the mean ideal positions of their constituencies tend more toward the pro-Islamist end of the first dimension. In other words, the pro-Islamist constituency in Turkey is no longer dominated by the MNP/MSP/RP and FP tradition. This is in line with Çarkoğlu and Toprak (2000, 23) who, using a measure of religiosity they develop, note that, besides the FP constituency, the DYP and MHP constituencies also tend toward religious conservatism. Equally interesting in our findings is the observation that while the party stands of DYP and MHP reflect an excess Turkish nationalist element in their positions, they both incur a significant degree of deficit on the pro-Islamist stand along the first dimension compared to the mean ideal positions of their constituencies. Similar excess nationalist stands are observed for DSP and to a lesser extent for CHP.

[Figure 2 about here]

Given the high percentage of respondents refusing to vote for any one of the existing parties, the positioning of those voters on our ideological map becomes quite interesting. As Figure 2 shows, those who assert that they will not cast a vote (abstainers) as well as those who assert that they will not vote for any of the presently available parties lie on average very close to the center of our map. The extreme ends of our map are not particularly attractive to these voters and they seem to lie on average close to ANAP and our hypothetical prominent businessman rather than any of the other major parties. Two immediate implications of this observation is first that despite apparent tensions in Turkish political scene arising from secularist versus pro-Islamist issue differences or recognition of Kurdish ethnic identity, the average alienated voter is in the center of the political space. Secondly, despite minimal voter support it apparently receives at the time of our fieldwork, ANAP more than any other major party lies closer to the preferences of those urban voters who are yet to make up their minds about their party of choice in the future. One shortcoming of the survey design was that no questions were asked about competence, credibility or honesty of the parties or hypothetical leaders. This prevented us from developing a valence dimension that could have allowed us to predict voters’ party switching driven by the valence dimension. In short, the key question about the future of Turkish party competition remains to be fought over the centrist constituency of voters.

So far our diagnosis about the nature of the two dimensions remained primarily on our a priori expectations and knowledge about the nature of different parties’ positions with respect to one another rather than on the content of argumentation that shape these two dimensions. When we turn to various other issue positions of the urban respondents in conjunction with their estimated ideal points, we obtain a much more meaningful picture of the simple dimensionality of ideological competition in the Turkish party system.

Several questions about the self-ascribed identity of our respondents help us further clarify the nature of both dimensions (See Figure 3). When we look at self-evaluation of religiosity we see that those respondents who consider themselves to be very religious on a 0 to 10 scale of religiosity tend to be placed on the extreme right end side of the first dimension. Those who consider themselves to be non-religious are placed on the opposite side. Those who primarily consider themselves to be Muslims rather than Turks, Turkish citizens, Kurds or Alevis are situated very close to the same extreme right end of the first dimension. Similarly, those who prefer Turkey to be part of the Islamic world are to be found at the same right-end of the first dimension. We also observe that the respondents whose ideal points lie at the right-end of the first dimension also tend to have a very liberal stand on the issue of headscarves and turban in universities advocating for no restrictions on religiously meaningful attire in universities (See Figure 4). In contrast, those who support banning of headscarves and turban at the universities are to be found on the opposing side of the first dimension.

[Figure 3 and 4 about here]

An interesting and not so surprising observation is about the ideal points of those respondents who consider themselves to be primarily Alevis. The mean of the ideal points of those lies on the complete opposite end of the first dimension suggesting that the religiosity of the pro-Islamist end reflects mainly the Sunni school. The first dimension thus mirrors Sunni Hanefi religiousness as opposed to Alevi’s, which appear closer to not only the centrist left CHP a la Mardin (1973) but also those who do not consider themselves to be religious at all.

Looking at the first dimension from the perspective of simple demographic attributes of the urban respondents we also observe several interesting characteristics (see Table A.1 in the Appendix). First of all, the pro-Islamist respondents tend to come from the Eastern rather than the Western provinces. The education level of the respondents at the pro-Islamist end tends to be quite low compared to those on the opposing end of the first dimension. Primary school and junior high graduates are on average to be found near the pro-Islamist end whereas those with a university degree or higher level of education lie on the opposing end. Relatively younger voters between the ages of 18 and 24 are closer on average to the pro-Islamist end whereas older voters tend to lie on the opposing end. Finally, on the pro-Islamist end we observe that shantytown dwellers are more likely to be found whereas those respondents who live in luxurious dwellings are located near the opposing end of the first dimension.

We have also asked the respondents to take a position on the controversial issue of education in Kurdish. Positions of respondents on this issue help clarify the nature of the second dimension (See Figure 4). Those respondents who take a conservative stand and support complete banning of education in Kurdish are to be found on the lower end of the second dimension whereas those who support education in Kurdish are on average to be found on the opposing end. Very much in line with expectations, those respondents who consider themselves to be primarily Kurds lie towards the upper end of the second dimension opposing those respondents who primarily consider themselves to be Turks or Turkish citizens (See Figure 3). Similarly, those who can speak Kurdish are at the upper end of the second dimension whereas those who cannot speak Kurdish lie on the opposing end. Those respondents who prefer Turkey to be part of the “Turkish world” lie on the Turkish end of the second dimension whereas those who prefer membership in the EU lie towards the centrist positions on both the first and second dimensions.

The most distinguishing demographic characteristic of the second dimension is observed in education levels of the respondents (See Table A.1 in the Appendix). On the ethnic Kurdish end we observe low levels of education whereas on the Turkish end we observe relatively high levels. Not surprisingly, low levels of income are associated with the Kurdish end whereas higher income levels are to be found among the respondents that are closer to the Turkish end. Western and relatively older respondents are also closer to the same Turkish end.

In short, the two dimensions derived from the data correspond closely to the fundamental cleavages that shaped the recent political scene in Turkey. The first dimension posits the secularists coalescing with the Alevis as opposed to the Sunni Hanefi and significantly religious pro-Islamists. The policy reflections of the first dimension appear in the contrast of those who see European Union as opposed to the Islamic world for the country to be closer to and in the contrasting positions concerning the turban ban in universities. Those who prefer Turkey to be part of the European Union (Islamic world) tend to be closer to the secularist (Sunni pro-Islamist) end of the first dimension closer to the Alevis (religious Sunnis). The second dimension separates the ethnic Kurdish from the ethnic Turkish nationalists. Those who can speak Kurdish are closer to those who have a liberal position on education in Kurdish opposing those who cannot speak Kurdish and who are opposed to lifting of the restrictions on education in Kurdish. As such, we observe that not only do we get a meaningful placement of the parties along these two dimensions but we also obtain very much expected issue stands of the respondents at the opposing ends of the two dimensions.

Our estimated map also provides clues as to the nature of ideological competition in the Turkish party system as reflected in the preferences of the urban voters. On our map there is no party that is placed on the pro-Islamist and Kurdish nationalist quadrant (Q.1 on Figure 2). The Kurdish nationalism of HADEP is clearly placed in the minds of the Turkish electorate on the secularist end of the first dimension (Q.4 on Figure 2). While HADEP is the only party on quadrant four, the secularist CHP and DSP dominate the Turkish nationalist end of the second dimension. It is clear in the minds of the Turkish electorate that the centrist right wing of the Turkish party system is not taking any position near the secularist end of the first dimension and rather leaning toward the Turkish nationalist and pro-Islamist rhetoric. Four major parties (MHP, DYP, FP and ANAP) at the time of our survey compete on the same quadrant that is the pro-Islamist and Turkish nationalist quadrant 2, where the toughest competition is expected to take place.

The CHP and DSP voters therefore are estimated to lie close to those that consider themselves not religious and supportive of the ban on headscarves and turban at the universities. Interestingly, the left secularist-end of the first dimension does not seem to have a clear primary identity preference other than Alevi. The secularist end is also not very close to being supportive of the EU membership while its opposing end is quite close to being supportive of Turkey to take part in the “Islamic world” and clearly considering themselves to be primarily Muslim. ANAP and DYP voters tend to have a moderate view on turban and headscarf ban at the universities as well as on education in Kurdish. However, FP voters are closer to the most liberal end of the turban issue while the MHP voters occupy the extreme positions on the education in Kurdish. As such, the issue space derived from the preferences of the urban voters fits our expectations almost perfectly.

Having validated our interpretation of the two dimensions one important question that remains to be answered concerns the factors that explain the urban voters’ ideal positions on the two dimensions by relating them to relevant demographic as well as attitudinal variables. Tables 3 and 4 show the results of multiple regression analysis for the two dimensions, respectively. We expect substantial noise to be present in our estimated ideal positions for individual respondents. However, since these estimated ideal points are used as dependent variables in our equations and since our independent variables are mainly demographic variables in which measurement error can be reasonably assumed to be small, the coefficient estimates should be consistent. Nevertheless, the standard errors of our estimates are likely to be quite large rendering statistical significance difficult to achieve. [16]

Tables 3 and 4 show that despite expected inflation of standard errors of estimates we obtain quite successful fits in our equations (adjusted R-square values are 0.33 for the first and 0.22 for the second dimension). For the first dimension primary identity as Muslim, degree of religiosity and liberal attitudes towards turban and headscarf ban in universities all have significant impact on ideal positions of individuals in the expected positive direction. Those who primarily identify themselves as Muslims tend to be placed significantly toward the pro-Islamist end of the first dimension. As individuals’ degree of religiosity, their degree of support for the lifting of the ban on turban and headscarves in universities increase their position on the first dimension moves closer to the pro-Islamist end of the first dimension. Similarly those who are unemployed and who actively seek a job tend to be more towards the pro-Islamist end of the first dimension. As we noted before, the geographic divide continues to play a significant role in separating respondents on the first dimension. Those who live in Western provinces are more likely to be placed on the secularist end of the first dimension. Age, sex and the number of people living in the household of the respondent all appear to have insignificant impacts on the first dimension ideal point estimates.

[Table 3 about here]

While the attitudes on education in Kurdish does not appear to have a significant impact on the first dimension ideal point estimates, we observe that left-right self-placement scores are positively related to it. That is when urban respondent tend to place themselves on the right end of the left-right spectrum, they also tend to be located toward the pro-Islamist end of our first dimension. The fact that left-right self-placement is significantly related to our first dimension suggests that it partially acts as a surrogate to the left-right ideological divide in Turkey.

Primary identity choice appears to be much more effective in shaping the second dimension ideal point estimates. While those who consider themselves to be primarily Turk or Turkish citizens tend to be placed towards the Turkish end of the dimension, those who consider themselves primarily as Kurds rather than ethnically defined Turks tend to lie toward the Kurdish end of the second dimension. Muslim identity however, appears insignificant in determining positions on this dimension. Level of education also appears to differentiate positions of individuals on the second dimension. The degree of religiosity and liberal attitudes towards turban and headscarf ban both have small but significant impacts. As expected, increasing liberal attitude toward education in Kurdish push individuals towards the Kurdish end. Left-right self-placement of individuals is positively correlated with positions on the Turkish end of the second dimension.

[Table 4 about here]

CONCLUSIONS

Our analysis presents several important results. The first result is the low dimensionality of the Turkish political space. As such, the Turkish case is yet another evidence of the low dimensional nature of ideological spaces in modern democracies. We show that two dimensions dominate the ideological competition in the Turkish party system. The first and the relatively more dominant dimension is the secularist vs. pro-Islamist cleavage. It is noteworthy that this cleavage largely overlaps with the center versus periphery formations in Turkish politics and also the left and the right wing orientations similar in many respects to the Western European traditions. The second dimension is the ethnic based nationalist cleavage placing the Turkish and Kurdish identities as opposed to one another. Our analyses show that perceptions of the voters clearly differentiate all major parties along these two dimensions.

The second major conclusion from the spatial map of Turkish ideological orientations is the overwhelmingly centrist character of the electorate. For all parties, the party placements are more extremist than their corresponding constituencies’ estimated positions. Despite the existence of relatively more extremist constituencies of the pro-Islamist as opposed to secularist orientations and Kurdish versus the Turkish nationalists in the ideological space, the overwhelming majority of the Turkish electorate is located in the centrist positions of these two dimensions.

The rising disenchantment of the electorate from the existing parties is also evident in this picture. While the voter ideal points are in the center of the two-dimensional space, the measured party positions are at the relatively more extreme ends. In other words, in the minds of the Turkish voter, there exists a centrifugal force that pushes the parties to the margins of the ideological space. The alienated voters, who assert that they are not going to cast a vote to any one of the existing parties or simply abstain from voting, comprised the largest segment of the electorate at the time of our fieldwork. This alienated segment lie at the center of the two dimensions close to a hypothetical business leader who could lead a political movement and ANAP. Perhaps surprisingly, but certainly relieving from the perspective of potential conflict implications, this segment of voters who refuse to vote for the existing parties are not close to hypothetical leaders from the potentially extremist labor or pro-Islamist movements. Equally importantly this segment is also just as distant to the nationalist MHP positions. In short, there seems limited ground for a politically extremist movement to be born out of this group of disenchanted segment of voters.

We should note here one predictive success of our findings for the November 2002 elections. Cem Uzan who leads the Young Party (Genç Party-GP) is a prominent businessman with a blemished record. ANAP’s close positioning in our map to the centrist majority of undecided voters appears to contradict the observed results of November 2002 elections. We believe that this is primarily a reflection of the fact that we had no measure of credibility of parties in our survey. Vote choice is not only a function of spatial proximity but rather it is a combination of proximity as well as credibility evaluations. If in other words, a party lacks credibility then its closeness to an individual ideal point may not predict the actual vote choice for that individual. The person might vote for a party further away that seem to be more credible and competent.[17] We believe that lack of credibility and low competence evaluations are responsible for the poor electoral performance of ANAP in 2002 elections rather than its positioning on the political space. What remains to be seen in further studies of the Turkish political space is whether or not AKP, which came out to be the largest party from the most recent elections, has had high credibility, honesty and competence evaluations and/or is placed, as expected from our maps above, somewhere close to the center where most voters are.

Thirdly, we observe that simple identity questions help to differentiate different electoral groups from one another. While religiosity and country targets with which Turkey should develop closer ties in the minds of the urban Turkish electorate help differentiate the parties and their electorate on the first dimension, Alevi and Kurdish primary identification as opposed to Turkish primary identities differentiate voters on the second dimension. Those who self-identify themselves as non-religious are clearly closer to the secularist left-leaning CHP and DSP. The Kurdish nationalist dimension has those respondents whose primary identity is Alevi and Kurdish in its extreme while those who consider themselves primarily as Turks are located at the opposing extreme.

Demographic characteristics also help identify several distinct patterns. Pro-Islamist constituencies for example are more likely to be found in the Eastern rather than on the Western provinces. The Kurdish nationalist orientations are more closely associated with groups with relatively low education as opposed to highly educated groups identifying with the Turkish nationalist end of the second dimension. As to the dividing issues of education in Kurdish and turban and headscarves in the universities, we observe a clear differentiation along the two dimensions of the ideological space. Those who take up liberal stands on education in Kurdish are to be found on the relatively more extremist positions on the second dimension, whereas the conservative positions tend to be placed closer to the other end and closer to the pro-Islamist end of the first dimension. Liberal stands on the turban and headscarves issue are to be found on the right end of the first dimension as opposed to conservative positions closely identified with the secularist left end of the first dimension. 

The future of Turkish democracy at the time of our survey in early 2001 seems to depend on the preferences of a large group of disenchanted voters. This group has centrist orientations and is unattached to any of the potentially extremist parties. Neither the nationalist end of the ideological space nor the pro-Islamist nor secularist ends are attractive to these voters. A new party or a party that can inherit the moderate centrism of ANAP of the 1980s seem to be better suited for future success in the Turkish electoral scene. The heart of political competition seems to be shaped around Turkish nationalism blended with varying dozes of pro-Islamism. The overwhelming majority of the Turkish electorate is located around ideological orientations that reflect these issues. The traditionally state centered Turkish left is still quite distant to such argumentation and occupies positions on the ideological space that predominantly reflects secularist stands opposing the pro-Islamist movements that seem to have captured the motivation of the Turkish right. It is also note worthy that the two important minority groups that overlap in some geographic locations of the country, that is the Alevi and the Kurdish communities are isolated on the Turkish ideological map. CHP, who in 1991 unsuccessfully brought the Kurdish representatives into the Parliament, is still the closest party to both of these groups. The pro-Islamist FP is the most distant party to both of these constituencies. Such a distant position of FP to both Alevis and Kurds leave the pro-Islamist and ethnic Kurdish space totally unoccupied in the Turkish ideological space.

Given the potentially chaotic economic crisis in the country, the inherent stability of the Turkish ideological orientations could change. Where to, in that case, would the alienated masses move? Would a leader having some business credentials mobilize them or would they be attracted by a traditionally centrist party or an alternative that aim to replace it? Would the cumulative disenchantment of the masses with the inability of the parties to respond to basic needs and expectations of the electorate lead to an abandonment of the centrist tendencies? How fast would this movement to one of the extreme ends be? How would the existing parties and the powerful state bureaucracy react to these developments? Answers to these questions remain to be answered with further analysis of data from the pre-election period of November 2002 as well as the future developments during the AKP government that was formed in its aftermath. However, the framework of analysis presented above offers a simple, theoretically sound and policy wise useful diagnosis tool that can be used to trace these developments.

References

Ağaoğulları, M. Ali (1987) “The Ultranationalist Right”, in Irvin C. Schick and E.A.Tonak (Eds), Turkey in Transition, pp. 177-217. Oxford University Press, New York.

Ahmad, Feroz (1991) “Politics and Islam in Modern Turkey”, Middle Eastern Studies, 27(1) 3-21.

Arıkan, Burak E. (1998) “The Programme of the Nationalist Action Party: An Iron Hand in a Velvet Glove?”, Middle Eastern Studies, 34(4) 120-134.

Ayata, Sencer (1993) “The Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism and Its Institutional Framework”, in A.Eralp, Muharrem Tunay and Birol Yesilada (Eds) The Political and Socioeconomic Transformation of Turkey, Praeger Publishers.

--------------------- (1996) “Patronage, Party, and State: The Politicization of Islam in Turkey”, Middle East Journal 50(1) 40-56.

Barkey, Henri J. (1996), “Turkey, Islamic Politics and the Kurdish Question”, World Policy Journal, Spring (1996), 13(1) 43-52.

Barkey, Henri J. and Fuller, Graham E. (1998) Turkey’s Kurdish Question, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc.

Berkes, Niyazi (1964) The Development of Secularism in Turkey, McGill University Press.

Berry, William D. and Feldman, Stanley (1985) Multiple Regression in Practice, Sage Publications, Newbury Park, California.

Cahoon, L., Hinich, Melvin J. and Ordeshook, Peter C. (1978) “A Statistical Multidimensional Scaling Method Based on the Spatial Theory of Voting”, Graphical Representation of Multivariate Data, P. C. Wang (ed.), Academic Press, New York, 243-278.

Çarkoğlu, Ali (1998) “The Turkish Party System in Transition: Party Performance and Agenda Transformation”, Political Studies, 46(3) 544-571.

--------------------- (2000) “Geography of April 1999 Turkish Elections”, Turkish Studies, Spring, 1(1) 149-171.

Çarkoğlu, Ali and Binnaz Toprak (2000) Türkiye’de Din, Toplum ve Siyaset (Religion, Society and Politics in Turkey), in Turkish, Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) Publications. Istanbul.

Dow, Jay (1998a) “A Spatial Analysis of the 1989 Chilean Presidential Election” Electoral Studies, 17, 1:61-76.

--------------------- (1998b) “Directional and Proximity Models of Voter Choice in Recent US Presidential Elections”, Public Choice, 96:259-270.

Downs, Anthony (1957) An Economic Theory of Democracy, New York, NY:Harper and Row.

Endersby, James W. and Hinich, Melvin J. (1992) “The Stability of Voter Perceptions: A Comparison of Candidate Positions Across Time Using The Spatial Theory of Voting”, Mathematical and Computer Modeling, Special Issue, P. Johnson (ed.), 16(8/9), 67-83.

Enelow, James and Hinich, Melvin J. (1984) The Spatial Theory of Voting, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Enelow, James and Hinich, Melvin J. (eds.) (1990) Advances in the Spatial Theory of Voting, Cambridge University Press.

Enelow, James and Hinich, Melvin J. (1990) “The Theory of Predictive Mappings”, in Advances in the Spatial Theory of Voting, J. Enelow and M. Hinich (eds.), Cambridge University Press, 7.

Ergüder, Üstün (1980-81) “Changing Patterns of Electoral Behaviour in Turkey”, Boğaziçi Universitesi Dergisi (Bogazici University Journal), vols.VIII-IX 45-81.

Ergüder, Üstün, Esmer, Yılmaz and Kalaycıoğlu, Ersin (1991) Türk Toplumunun Değerleri (Turkish Values) in Turkish, Istanbul: TUSIAD.

--------------------- (1995) “Parties and the Electorate: A Comparative Analysis of Voter Profiles of Turkish Political Parties”, in Balım, Ç., Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, Cevat Karataş, Gareth Winrow and F. Yasamee (Eds) Turkey: Political, Social and Economic Challenges in the 1990s, pp. 74-89. Leiden, New York, Köln: E.J. Bril:

Esmer, Yılmaz (1999) Devrim, Evrim, Statüko: Türkiye’de Sosyal, Siyasal, Ekonomik Değerler (Revolution, Evolution, Status-quo: Social, Political and Economic Values in Turkey), in Turkish, Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) Publications. Istanbul.

--------------------- (2001) “At the ballot box: determinants of voting behaviour in Turkey”, in Y. Esmer and Sabri Sayarı (Eds) The Democratic Challenge: Elections, Parties, and Voters in Turkey. Lynn Rienner.

Göle, Nilüfer (1996) “Authoritarian Secularism and Islamist Politics: The Case of Turkey”, in Augustus, Richard N. (ed.) Civil Society n the Middle East, vol. 2, pp. 17-44. E. J. Brill,

--------------------- (1997) “Secularism and Islamism in Turkey: The Making of Elites and CounterElites”, Middle East Journal, 51(1) 46-58.

Gunter, Michael (1990) The Kurds in Turkey: A Political Dilemma, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado.

Gülalp, Haldun (1999) “The Poverty of Democracy in Turkey: The Refah Party Episode”, New Perspectives on Turkey, 21(2) 35-59.

Hale, William M. (1994) Turkish Politics and the Military, London: Routledge.

--------------------- (2002) “Democracy and the Party System in Turkey”, in Turkish Transformation, New Century New Challenges, Brian W. Beeley (ed.), The Eothen Press, pp.165-197.

--------------------- (2003) “Human Rights, European Union and the Turkish Accession Process”, Turkish Studies, 4(1) 107-126.

Heper, Metin (1997) “Islam and Democracy in Turkey: Toward a Reconciliation?”, Middle East Journal, 51(1) 32-45.

Hinich, Melvin, J (1978) “Some Evidence on Non-Voting Models in the Spatial Theory of Electoral Competition”, Public Choice, 33(2), 83-102.

Hinich, Melvin, J. and Khmelko, Valeri and Ordeshook, Peter C. (1999) “Ukrain’s 1998 Parliamentary Elections: A Spatial Analysis”, Post-Soviet Affairs, 15, 2:149-185.

Hinich, Melvin, J. and Munger, Michael, C. (1994) Ideology and the Theory of Political Choice, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Hinich, Melvin, J. and Munger, Michael, C. (1997) Analytical Politics, Cambridge University Press.

Hinich, Melvin, J. and Pollard, W. (1981) “A New Approach to the Spatial Theory of Electoral Competition”, American Journal of Political Science, 25:323-341.

Kalaycığlu, Ersin (1998) “Türkiye’de Siyaset (Politics in Turkey)”, in Turkish, in Sivil Tooplum için Kent, Yerel Siyaset ve Demokrasi Semnerleri (Seminars in City, Local Politics and Democracy for Civil Society), Istanbul: World Academy for Local Government and Democracy Publications (WALD).

--------------------- (1994a) “Elections and Party Preferences in Turkey, Changes and Continuities in the 1990s”, Comparative Political Studies, 27(3) 402-424.

--------------------- (1994b) “Türkiye’de Köktenci Sağ Partiler ve Seçmen Tercihleri (Radical Right Parties and Voter Preferences in Turkey)”, in Turkish, Dünü ve Bugünüyle Toplum ve Ekonomi, 7(October) 65-84.

--------------------- (1997) “The Logic of Contemporary Turkish Politics”, Middle East Review of International Affairs (MARIA) Journal, vol. 1 September (www.biu.ac.il/soc/besa/meria)

--------------------- (1999) “The Shaping of Political Preferences in Turkey: Coping with the Post-Cold-War Era”, New Perspectives on Turkey, 20(1) 47-76.

Kirişci, Kemal and Winrow, Gareth (1997) The Kurdish Question and Turkey, Frank Cass.

Landau, Jacob M. (1995) Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation, London: Hurst.

Lin, Tse-Min, Chu, Yun-Han and Hinich, Melvin J. (1996) “Conflict Displacement and Regime Transition in Taiwan: A Spatial Analysis”, World Politics, 48: 453-481.

Mango, Andrew (1994) “Turks and Kurds” (Review Article), Middle Eastern Studies, 30(4) 975-997.

Mardin, Şerif (1973) “Center Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?”, Deadalus, 2(1) 169-190.

--------------------- (1981) “Religion and Secularism in Turkey”, in Ali Kazancıgil and Ergun Özbudun (Eds.), Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State, pp.191-219. London:C. Hurst.

--------------------- (1989) Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey: The Case of Bediüzzaman Said Nursi, Albany: State University of New York Press.

Myagov, Misha and Ordeshook, Peter C. (1998) “The Spatial Character of Russia’s New Democracy”, Public Choice, 97, 3:491-523.

Öniş, Ziya (1997) “The Political-Economy of Islamic Resurgence in Turkey: The Rise of the Welfare Party in Perspective”, Third World Quarterly, 18(4) 743-766.

Özcan, Gencer (2001), “The Military and the Making of Foreign Policy in Turkey” in Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirişci (eds.) Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, pp.13-30.

Poulton, Hugh (1997) Top Hat Grey Wolf and Crescent, Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic, London: Hurst and Company.

Robins, Philip (1995) “Political Islam in Turkey: The Rise of the Welfare Party”, JIME Review, no.28.

Sakallıoğlu, Ümit C. (1996) “Parameters and Strategy of Islam-State Interaction in Republican Turkey”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 28(2) 231-251.

Sayarı, Sabri (1996) “Turkey’s Islamist Challenge”, Middle Eastern Quarterly, September, No:3, pp. 35-43.

Sunar, İlkay. and Toprak, Binnaz (1983) “Islam in Politics: The Case of Turkey”, Government and Opposition, 18(4) 421-441.

Tanör, Bülent (1994) “Türkiye’de Dış İlişkilerin İç Hukuk Rejimi (Legal Regime of Foreign Relations in Turkey)”, in Faruk Söylemezoğlu (ed.), Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi, İstanbul: Der Publications, pp.317-332.

Toprak, Binnaz (1981) Islam and Political Development in Turkey, Leiden: Brill.

--------------------- (1984) “Politicisation of Islam in a Secular State: The National Salvation Party in Turkey”, in Said Amir Arjomand (Ed) From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam, Oxford: MacMillan, pp.119-133.

--------------------- (1986) “The Religious Right”, Irvin C. Schick and Ertuğrul Ahmet Tonak (Eds) Turkey in Transition:New Perspectives, Oxford:Oxford University Press, pp. 218-235.

--------------------- (1988) “The State, Politics and Religion in Turkey”, in Heper, Metin and Evin, Ahmet (eds.), State, Democracy and the Military, Turkey in the 1980s, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin.

Turan, İlter. (1991) “Religion and Political Culture in Turkey”, in R. Tapper (ed.), Islam in Modern Turkey: Religin, Politics and Literature in a Secular State, pp. 31-55. London: I. B. Tauris.

Yavuz, Hakan (1997) “Political Islam and the Welfare (Refah) Party in Turkey”, Comparative Politics, 30(1) 63-82.

Appendix A

Questions Used in Dimensionality Analyses

We used the following items to secure an estimate of each respondent’s cardinal evaluation of parties that were assumed to be strongest contenders in an election context. Each respondent was asked the following questions in the order given below. For each question the same set of evaluations were asked.

Question wording:

In the questions I’m going to read to you now we want to learn your attitudes concerning a number of different political issues. We will ask about your position on these issues as well as the positions as you perceive them of the major political parties, institutions and the government in power. We will use a 0 to 10 point scale we used before in similar evaluations. 0 will denote one extreme position on the issue while 10 will denote the opposite extreme position on the same issue.

On one of the most discussed issues in Turkey concerning the headscarf and turban in universities, some people assert that there should be no regulation on the attire of students and that everyone should be able to wear what ever they want at the universities. Others claim that wearing headscarves and turban at the universities should be strictly forbidden. What is your position between these two extremes?

 

0  -------1  -------  2  -------  3  -------  4  -------  5  -------  6  -------  7  -------  8  ------  9  ------  10

Headscarves/turban                                                                                              There should

 should be banned                                                                                                              be no

at the                                                                                                                      regulation on

 universities                                                                                              attire at the universities

On another debate in recent Turkish politics on the use of different languages in education, some people assert that Turkish is the official language of the country and that education in schools should only be in Turkish. Others claim that education in one’s native language is a basic right and that everyone should be able to pursue education in whatever language they wish. What is your position between these two extremes?

 

0  -------1  -------  2  -------  3  -------  4  -------  5  -------  6  -------  7  -------  8  ------  9  ------  10

Education in Kurdish                                                                                                           Everyone

Should be banned                                                                                                   should be able

 to be educated in

  whatever language

        he/she desires

The following question has a slightly different set of evaluations:

How would your family’s welfare be affected in case the following parties, institutions and hypothetical leaders were to come to power? 0 denotes the worst possible impact, 5 represents no change from the current condition and 10 denotes the best possible impact. Increasing scores from 0 to 10 denote improving impact on your family’s condition.

 

0  -------1  -------  2  -------  3  -------  4  -------  5  -------  6  -------  7  -------  8  ------  9  ------  10

Worst possible                                                                                                                   Best possible

 impact                                                                                                                               impact

 

A very religious leader?

 

…ANAP?

 

…CHP?

 

…DSP?

 

…DYP?

 

…FP?

 

…MHP?

 

…HADEP?

 

…the military?

 

…a prominent businessman?

 

…a labor union leader?

 

How about the present DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition, how did it impact your family’s conditions in general?

 

 

The primary identity question is worded as follows:

When asked to make a choice, would you consider yourself to be primarily a Turk, a Muslim, a citizen of Turkish Republic, a Kurd or an Alevi? Or alternatively would you define yourself primarily with different identity?

[Table A 1 about here]

Notes:

 


[1] Islam comes in various guises in Turkey and in general connotes Sunni as well as Alevi denominations. The Turkish society is divided into two major sects of Sunnis and Alevis, among the Sunnis into Hanefi and Shafi schools of law (mezhep), and then between those who take Sunni Islam seriously in organising their lifestyles and those who take a secular or anti clerical (laik) view of life. However, the Alevis historically being in a minority position have tended to support the secularist policies of the Republican era, which provided protection against Sunni infringements in their religious freedoms. Hence the term pro-Islamist here refers to Sunni reactionism to secularist Republican establishment that in many policy areas coalesced with the Alevi minority. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the Republican regime in its efforts to control and regulate Islamic movements in general through, among other means, the use of the Directorate of Religious Affairs, which oversees the administration of preachers and chaplains (imams), have always had a Hanefi orientation and thus kept the Alevi sect almost totally outside of the Republican administrative circles of influence.

[2] See Çarkoğlu (2002) for a detailed analysis of the Turkish political parties in late 1990s, their policy stands and support constituency characteristics.

[3] For being against the secular regime, both MNP and MSP had been banned by the military regimes of 1971 and 1980 respectively. See Ahmad (1991), Ayata (1993, 1996), Barkey (1996), Berkes (1964), Çarkoğlu and Toprak (2000), Göle (1996, 1997), Gülalp (1999), Heper (1997), Mardin (1981, 1989), Öniş (1997), Robins (1995), Sakallıoğlu (1996), Sayarı (1996), Sunar and Toprak (1983), Toprak (1981, 1984, 1986, 1988), Turan (1991), Yavuz (1997) on Islam and politics in Turkey.

[4] See Hale (1994, 184-214) on Turkish military regimes and especially on the 1971 coup by decree.

[5] In the mean time the Constitutional Court closed down RP in January 1998 on the grounds that the speeches of several party leaders were against the secular constitution. The Court also banned the former Prime Minister Erbakan and 5 other prominent members of the party from political activity for five years. By the end of April the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi-FP) became the new address of almost all of the unbarred RP deputies. The Constitutional Court eventually closed down FP in June 2001 on similar grounds to those of the RP case. Following FP’s closure the inner party struggle within the pro-Islamist camp led to the founding of two separate parties; one for the old-guard in the pro-Islamist movement the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi-SP) and the other for the young generation the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi-AKP) which eventually came to power after the November 2002 elections. See Çarkoğlu (2002) for a review of these developments.

[6] MHP has its roots in the Republican Peasant Nation Party (Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi-CKMP) that was founded in the aftermath of the 1960 military coup. Alparslan Türkeş was its leader until his death in 1997. Türkeş was an active colonel in the coup of 1960 and a member of the ruling junta, the National Unity Council. He eventually got sidelined within the radical Group of 14 and got elected to the leadership of CKMP in 1965, which was renamed in 1969 as MHP. MHP remained in the fringes of the Turkish party system from the very beginning, up until the last election. MHP was also closed down by the military regime of 1980 but eventually found its way back into the party system participating in the 1987 election as Nationalist Work Party (Milliyetçi Çalışma Partisi-MÇP) obtaining 2.9 percent. In 1991 it participated in the general elections as a coalition with the pro-Islamist RP sharing a total of about 17 percent of electoral support. MHP participated in the 1995 elections alone and remained below 10 percent nationwide support threshold, and thus gained no seats in the parliament. See Ağaoğulları (1987), Arıkan (1998), Landau (1995), Poulton (1997), Salt (1995) on the nationalist tradition in Turkish politics.

[7] The remarkable electoral success by pro-Islamists and nationalists is less surprising when the movement of the Turkish electorate along the conventional left-right ideological spectrum is taken into account. Throughout the last, nearly two decades, for which we have data, most of the Turkish voters remained around centrist positions along the left-right continuum (Ergüder, 1980-81; Kalaycıoğlu, 1994a; Çarkoğlu, 1998; Esmer, 1999; Çarkoğlu and Toprak, 2000). While a slight plurality of the electorate placed itself to the left of the centre in late 1970s, by the end of 1990s a majority placed itself at the right of the centre. Especially striking is the fact that in 1999 about 15 percent of the Turkish electorate had placed itself at the extreme right-end of the ideological spectrum.

[8] Radikal Daily newspaper, 14 May, 2001.

[9] See Esmer (1995, 2001); Kalaycıoğlu (1994a,b, 1999) and Çarkoğlu and Toprak (2000) on religiosity and voting behaviour.

[10] Çarkoğlu and Toprak’s (2000) research on political Islam finds that FP, MHP and DYP’s electorate are significantly more religious than the other parties. The other three centrist parties’, namely ANAP, DSP and CHP, voters are of significantly lower level of religiosity thus favouring secularist stands on salient issues. See Çarkoğlu (2000) and Kalaycıoğlu (1999) on the claim that MHP has effectively appealed, by using the undelivered promises of religious significance, to the alienated constituencies of the now closed Pro-Islamist RP.

[11] See Gunter (1990), Kirişci and Winrow (1997), Mango (1994), Barkey (1996) and Barkey and Fuller (1998) on the rise of Kurdish conflict and identity politics in Turkey.

[12] See Enelow and Hinich (1984), chapter 9; Endersby and Hinich (1992), Hinich (1978); Hinich and Munger (1994).

[13] The distribution of the sample to the 12 provinces are as follows: 77 interviews in Adana, 172 in Ankara, 54 in Antalya, 59 in Bursa, 58 in Diyarbakır, 66 in Erzurum, 359 in İstanbul, 146 in İzmir, 62 in Konya, 24 in Manisa, 74 in Samsun and 50 in Trabzon. Within each city, all neighbourhoods were selected randomly according to probability proportionate to size (PPS) principle on the basis of their registered voting age population figures as given by the 1999 election. Given the total sample size of 1200, and 6 interviews to be conducted per neighbourhood, 200 neighbourhoods were chosen. Given two interviews to be conducted in each street, we selected from the already chosen neighbourhoods 600 streets. Street names were obtained from the Ministry of Finance’s publication (for tax collection purposes) on current representative property values on the basis of streets. All streets in the selected neighbourhoods were then divided into three strata, as “rich”, “medium” and “poor”, according to their current property values. One street was selected from each of these strata. Households from each street were selected randomly. A respondent over the age of 18 within each household was chosen for the interview. Under the restrictive assumption of simple random sampling, a sample size of 1201 is expected to have a confidence interval of 95% with an error margin of ħ2,8%.

[14] In all of our questions the non-response rate remained quite low for all our parties at about 5 to 7 percent.

[15] See Table A.1 in the Appendix for details.

[16] See Berry and Feldman (1985) for a discussion of the consequences of measurement error in multiple regression.

[17]  See chapter 9 in Enelow and Hinich (1984).

 

Table 1. Party preferences after distributing the undecided respondents*

 

Urban Sample (N=1201) %

Urban vote share in 1999 %

Rural vote share in 1999 %

Country total in 1999 %

ANAP

4,9

13,2

13,4

13,2

CHP

9,6

9,4

7,7

8,7

DSP

3,5

24,5

18,3

22,2

DYP

5,9

9,3

16,5

12

FP

5,9

16,1

14,3

15,4

MHP

7,5

17,1

19,3

18

HADEP

5,0

5,2

4,0

4,7

Seven party total

42,3

94,8

93,5

94,2

Will not vote

6,0

 

 

 

Will vote for none of the existing parties

32,6

 

 

 

Undecided

4,8

 

 

 

Will vote for one of the existing minor parties

5,8

 

 

 

No answer

8,4

 

 

 

Total

100

 

 

 

* Respondents were first asked “which party they would vote for if an election were to be held today”. Those who indicated that they are undecided (10.8% in our sample) were then asked “whether they feel closer to voting for a party”. The results in the table are obtained after distributing the choices indicated in this second question to the their respective parties in the first question. The reported 4.8% undecided respondents are those who remained undecided in the second question.

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Thermometer Scores

 

Party/ (Hypothetical Politician)

Mean

Std. Deviation

A labor leader

4,88

2,67

A prominent businessman

4,59

2,74

CHP

4,44

2,32

ANAP

4,43

1,97

DYP

4,24

2,17

MHP

3,89

2,70

DSP

3,88

2,30

FP

3,81

2,78

A very religious leader

3,74

2,96

HADEP

3,06

2,85

The present coalition of DSP-MHP-ANAP

2,66

2,40

Valid N (listwise)

1148

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table 3. Explaining the Ideal Points on the Secularist vs Pro-Islamist cleavage

 

 

Dependent Variable: Ideal point estimates on the first dimension (Secularist vs pro-Islamist cleavage)

Unstandardized Coefficients

 

Level of Significance

 

 

B

t-scores

 

 

(Constant)

-3,13

-3,81

0,00

 

Sex (=1 for Female, =0 for Male)

-0,04

-0,17

0,86

 

Age

-0,01

-1,46

0,14

Primary identity

Dummy for Turk

0,58

1,38

0,17

Dummy for Muslim

0,94

2,09

0,04

Dummy for Turkish Citizen

0,20

0,52

0,61

Dummy for Kurd

-0,05

-0,07

0,95

Education

Dummy for Illiterate

-0,52

-0,70

0,48

Dummy for Literate but no schooling

-0,28

-0,41

0,68

Dummy for Primary school graduate

0,77

1,81

0,07

Dummy for Junior Highschool graduate

0,44

0,87

0,38

Dummy for Highschool graduate

0,49

1,16

0,25

 

Number of people living in the household

0,05

0,67

0,51

 

Degree of religiosity (0 to 10 scale)

0,21

3,98

0,00

 

Attitudeabout headscarve/turban in universities (0 to 10 scale)

0,13

4,09

0,00

 

Attitude about education in Kurdish (0 to 10 scale)

-0,04

-1,49

0,14

 

Left-Right self-placement (1 to 10 scale)

0,38

7,04

0,00

 

Dummy for unemployed

0,75

2,11

0,04

 

Dummy for western provinces

-0,62

-2,39

0,02

 

 

 

 

 

 

Ajusted R-square

0,33

 

 

 

N

555

 

 

 

 

Table 4. Explaining the Ideal Points on the Kurdish vs Turkish Nationalism cleavage

 

 

Dependent Variable: Ideal point estimates on the second dimension (Kurdish vs Turkish nationalism)

Unstandardized Coefficients

 

Level of Significance

 

 

B

t-scores

 

 

(Constant)

-0,19

-0,32

0,75

 

Cinsiyet

-0,05

-0,30

0,77

 

Sex (=1 for Female, =0 for Male)

0,01

0,98

0,33

 

Age

-0,91

-3,02

0,00

Primary identity

Dummy for Turk

-0,44

-1,37

0,17

Dummy for Muslim

-0,91

-3,25

0,00

Dummy for Turkish Citizen

1,48

2,56

0,01

Dummy for Kurd

1,49

2,85

0,00

Education

Dummy for Illiterate

1,18

2,39

0,02

Dummy for Literate but no schooling

0,71

2,35

0,02

Dummy for Primary school graduate

0,58

1,62

0,11

Dummy for Junior Highschool graduate

0,94

3,12

0,00

Dummy for Highschool graduate

0,01

0,29

0,77

 

Number of people living in the household

-0,11

-2,90

0,00

 

Degree of religiosity (0 to 10 scale)

0,08

3,35

0,00

 

Attitudeabout headscarve/turban in universities (0 to 10 scale)

0,07

3,27

0,00

 

Attitude about education in Kurdish (0 to 10 scale)

-0,20

-5,06

0,00

 

Left-Right self-placement (1 to 10 scale)

0,17

0,67

0,50

 

Dummy for unemployed

-0,22

-1,20

0,23

 

Dummy for western provinces

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Ajusted R-square

0,22

 

 

 

N

555

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table A.1 Mean ideal points of relevant variables across two dimensions

 

 

First Dimension

Second Dimension

N

Place of Residence                                                       With official permit-Luxurious

0,13

-1,06

95

Shanty town dwelling

1,38

-0,23

122

With official permit-Medium

0,93

-0,71

937

Region                                                                                                 Eastern Provinces

1,70

-0,54

378

Western Provinces

0,53

-0,76

776

Age                                                                                                                         18-24

1,18

-0,53

311

 25-34

1,11

-0,53

345

 35-44

0,46

-0,86

231

 45-54

0,69

-0,86

147

 55+

0,78

-1,03

120

Education                                                                                                          Illiterate

0,08

0,65

41

Literate but no schooling

0,67

-0,13

34

Primary school

1,40

-0,75

316

Junior high

1,56

-0,77

143

Highschool

0,84

-0,51

425

University graduate+

0,02

-1,30

195

Which of the following best describes your family's financial situation over the past year?

 had to barrow money

0,94

-0,42

379

 spent from our past savings

0,73

-1,03

198

 could make ends meet

0,96

-0,69

532

 could save some money

0,88

-1,47

44

Self Reported Primary Identity                                                                            Turk

1,05

-1,12

266

Muslim

2,34

-0,70

256

Citizen of Turkey

0,50

-0,94

453

Kurd

-0,07

1,60

41

Alevi

-0,95

1,44

19

Language                                                                                  Cannot speak Kurdish

1,02

-0,91

1000

Kurdish speaker

0,19