

**Ideological Cleavage, Political Competition,
and Policy Making in the American States**

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Abstract

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Two features of American states' politics – the ideological tendencies of their citizens and the extent to which their politics are competitive – are featured consistently as explanations for differences in their public policies. Existing research demonstrates convincingly that opinion and competition matter, and it is now important to develop more nuanced understandings of how these phenomena help to decide “who gets what” from state governments. This research presents a model of state policy liberalism that departs from existing models in two ways. First, political competition is measured on three levels: ascriptive, attitudinal, and behavioral. This enables me to treat the extent of ideological difference as a form of political competition and thus to place ideology in a more dynamic context in models of policymaking in the states. Second, rather than focusing on the effects of ideological congruence, which states, e.g., that states with more liberal citizens will receive more liberal public policies, I model the effects of differences in ideology among citizens. This is based on the assumption that wider differences will produce more disparate demands for legislators, and those demands should have meaning for policymaking. This research enables us to think of ideology as part of a larger competitive milieu rather than as something that is distinct from political competition within the state.

The most frequent treatment of the effects of ideology on policy outputs in the states suggests a politics of agreement wherein the dominant ideological persuasion within any state elects a majority to the legislature and, as a direct consequence, gets the lion's share of rewards from state government. These rewards may be public policies, judicial decisions, and other products of the state (see, *e.g.*, Erikson, *et al.* 1993; Brace, *et al.* 2002; Langer 2002; Norrander and Rivera 2002). Even though that may be for the most part accurate, it is possible that the measure of ideology most often employed – the average liberalism or conservatism of a state's citizenry¹ – masks some important variation in public opinion that may exist. States whose citizens have an average ideological liberalism of 65 (on a scale of 0-100) with a standard deviation of 5 may exhibit different politics than a state whose citizenry reports a mean score of 65 but with a standard deviation of 2. How this matters is unclear; policies may be easier to enact in the first state and more conflictual in the latter, and this increasing conflict may temper the effects of opinion liberalism on public policy outputs. In short, differences of opinion may matter. In this chapter I consider not only the tendency of opinion within states as an influence on public policies, but consider as well the diversity of opinion.

Political scientists have largely settled the “politics versus economics” debate and have for nearly twenty years been developing increasingly nuanced models of the effects of variations in

¹ There are numerous methods for measuring opinion using various data sets. Nonetheless, survey data-based measures (*e.g.*, Erikson, Wright and McIver 1993; Norrander 2001; Brace, *et al.* 2002), measures that are based on extrapolations from demographic data (Munger, *et al.* 1970; Plutzer and Berkman 2002) and measures that are based on election outcomes (Berry, *et al.* 1998) depict ideology as an average tendency with small consideration of the extent to which scores are scattered around that mean.

political institutions and political attitudes and behavior on public policies in the states. Perhaps the most frequently invoked explanation of the effects of politics on policy outcomes is provided by Robert Erikson, Gerald Wright, and John McIver (1989). Building upon their demonstration of the effects of ideology (Wright, Erikson, and McIver, 1987) on public policies, they construct a model that elaborates the manner in which citizen preferences for liberal policy, expressed as mean liberal ideology, influence the ideological positions of state party elites and legislators. This selection of liberal legislators leads in turn to policy outcomes consistent with public preferences. In short, they describe a simple model of representation in which citizens more-or-less successfully identify and elect representatives whose views are consonant with their own, those legislators reward those citizens with policies that are consistent with their ideological preferences, and parties offer distinct choices for voters. Their research tells us that representative democracy, on average, works: citizens have ideological and policy preferences, they elect representatives who reflect those preferences, and those politicians produce policies that reflect citizen demands. Subsequent research largely validates their results; the link between opinion and policy has proved robust under a number of specifications and with different data, and is now part of the canon of state-level policy research.

Even though the Erikson, *et al.* model is largely accepted, some questions about the nature of policymaking in the states remain. Their model differs from some treatments of public policy in the states in that it for the most part leaves out considerations of political competition, which were featured in most early policy outputs studies and retain theoretical currency. This research tests the effects of three forms of political competition on state government policy making. If competition

matters, it suggests a slightly different politics than is implicit in the “politics of agreement” that is suggested by the prevailing explanation for the effects of ideology on policies.

Political Competition, Political Parties, and Public Policy

The relationship between political competition and public policy appears to be straightforward. The common wisdom, rooted in work by Schattschneider (1942), Key (1949), and others, holds that more competition between political parties leads politicians and parties to reward (through public policy) more groups. More inclusive policy typically contains more rewards for the have-nots and is expressed as more liberal public policy. The majority of quantitative research addressing the role of competition in policy determination concerns the effects of party control and competition on policy. Some authors report evidence of substantial party-policy linkages (Budge and Hofferbert 1990; Dye 1984; Garand 1985; Jennings 1979; Plotnick and Winters 1990; Barrilleaux 1997; Barrilleaux, Holbrook and Langer 2002; Wright and Schaffner 2002), contrasting with earlier reports of no significant effects of party competition or control on policy outputs (Dye 1966; Winters 1976; Ringquist, *et al.* 1998). The preponderance of evidence now suggests that parties make a difference under some conditions, but the attention placed upon parties obscures consideration of other facets of political expression and competition. Erikson, Wright and McIver (1993) add a novel result to this skein of research: they show a strong link between liberal party strength and policy, but it is a negative effect, just the opposite of what would be expected theoretically.

Concepts of political competition are often restricted to the competition between parties in elections. A number of features of American state politics, such as incumbency advantages and the

former dominance of Democrats in the South and Republicans in parts of New England and the West, make electoral competition a weak measure of political competition (Chubb 1987; King 1989; Stonecash 1987; Fiorina 1994). Even if electoral competition were not diminished by institutional developments, a single indicator cannot adequately measure so complex a phenomenon. Consider, e.g., V.O. Key's description of the politics of some of the then one-party dominated southern states in Southern Politics (1949). Although the South was avowedly one-party during that time, dominated by Democrats, Key describes several states as hosting fierce political competition between and among factions despite their being uncompetitive so far as two-party conflicts are concerned. Louisiana is probably the best documented among the southern states, although others had similar, but less flamboyant, situations. In his account of Earl Long's 1959 run for the Louisiana statehouse, A.J. Liebling described Louisiana's politics as being "...of an intensity and complexity that are matched...only in the republic of Lebanon" (Liebling, 1961, 18). Liebling describes a political system that involves multiple factions, rampant side payments, and otherwise less-than-standard arrangements, all of which suggest tumultuous and highly competitive politics. Despite all of this, a person basing his or her understanding of that state's politics on standard measures of competition would learn that Louisiana's politics in the era Liebling describes were uncompetitive (see, e.g., Ranney 1965). Surely politically relevant competition is manifest in arenas other than elections. Since we know that electoral competition affects outcomes at least some of the time (see, e.g., Jennings 1979), it follows that other forms of competition may also influence public policy outcomes.

The view of political competition employed in this research is drawn from Douglas Rae and Michael Taylor's research on political cleavages (1970). Rae and Taylor identify three dimensions of cleavage, or competition, within political systems: citizen ascriptive traits, citizen attitudes, and citizen behaviors. Ascriptive traits include race, religion, ethnicity, nationality, and other politically relevant personal characteristics that are determined at birth. Attitudinal cleavages are opinion based and may include ideology or preferences. Behavioral cleavages include voting or organizational membership (Rae and Taylor 1970, p. 1). Rae and Taylor argue that each form of competition has meaningful independent effects on governmental policies (1970, pp. 36-44).

Ascriptively based competition is, as the term implies, innate in a polity. It may spring from population diversity, as more diverse populations should contain more differences of opinion regarding appropriate government actions. Although factional conflicts are unsettling, one view holds that their ultimate effect in a democracy is to expand the budget so that more individuals and groups receive rewards (see, e.g., Sullivan 1973; Olson 1982). In this line of reasoning, and assuming relatively open access to channels of political expression and demand as would be found in contemporary democracies, politicians respond to diverse demands with policies that encompass larger blocs of interests, leading states with more diverse populations to have more liberal public policies as a byproduct of the admittedly not directly observable competition for benefits among contesting ascriptive groups.

But from another view, differences breed illiberal public policies, especially when those ascriptive differences are between or among races (Hero and Tolbert 1996). Hero and Tolbert's conclusion is drawn from evaluation of a series of models in which measures of public policy are

regressed on two variables – racial diversity and white ethnic diversity. They find racial diversity to be linked negatively to all of the measures of policy liberalism, which leads them to the conclusion that race is a driving factor in state policy decisions. Hero (1999) conducts a series of similar analyses and, from those results, expands the claim to argue that racial differences are the single most important factor influencing American state politics, and that racial differences breed antipathy rather than understanding as is suggested by the prior diversity hypothesis. Hence we have two contending arguments about ascriptive diversity: that it leads to increased understanding, log rolling and eventually to more generous policies; and the opposite, that it leads to disagreements and limits public spending. The estimates presented here, which test the two hypotheses specified by Hero in his work with Tolbert (1996) and alone (1999), also contain controls for other plausible influences and as result may provide a more stringent test of the hypotheses.

Attitudinal competition springs from competing ideas: as the abundance of opinions regarding a policy or other government act increases, so does attitudinal competition. Attitudinal competition may work to the detriment of democratic outcomes. Most notably, it may result in individuals or groups' intensely held positions being given undue weight and reward by officeholders (Dahl 1956). In the more general case, the spread of opinion within a state should influence legislative outputs. That is, two states may be equally "liberal" as indicated by some measure of mean ideological positions among their citizens. However, the spread of opinion may be greater in one than another, *i.e.*, identical means can be calculated from distributions that are shaped quite differently. Presumably, legislators making decisions in a state in which the opinion

distribution is clustered fairly tightly are confronted with a different set of decisions than are legislators making decisions from one with widely disparate ideological positions.

Behavioral competition is that most typically considered in policy outputs research. It refers to acts such as organization membership, electoral competition, and other phenomena that require citizen action. The most frequently invoked indicator of behavioral competition is that between or among political parties or between candidates. Where parties compete, policies should be tailored to appeal to a broader spectrum of the populace and, as result, to be more closely attuned to public opinion. Where opinion leans toward the liberal end of the spectrum, this should result in more liberal policies (*i.e.*, policies that are more redistributive in their intent) inasmuch as the poor are more likely to be included in politicians' calculations of demand where have-nots exercise political voice (Barrilleaux, Holbrook and Langer 2002).

Competition for office in the states may be conceived as competition between parties for seats in government, or it may be thought of irrespective of party strength and in light of electoral competition, which refers to how difficult it is to gain election in a state. Interparty competition is comparatively easy to measure; existing measures typically consider electoral support of parties, e.g., percentage voting for one of the two parties, party control, or both (Patterson and Caldeira 1983; Bibby and Holbrook 2003). A clear distinction may be drawn between interparty competition and electoral competition, where the latter measures the difficulty of gaining election in a state (Holbrook and Van Dunk 1993). The two have distinct and important effects on policymaking in the states (Barrilleaux 1997). Each is important but neither captures the full import of competition within a state; the effects of liberal party strength on public policies vary according to the

competitiveness of elections within a state (Barrilleaux, Holbrook and Langer 2002). Electoral competition is conceived here differently, as the diversity of partisanship among citizens. The sorts of competition measured in previous research focuses on outcomes – either turnout or results. Here it focuses instead on inputs, the extent to which a state’s citizens show allegiance to different parties.

Indicators of State-Level Competition

Four measures of competition are employed in this research. First, a measure of ideological competition is constructed to capture the probability that two citizens of a state differ in their ideological self-identification. The measure is calculated using the formula for diversity provided by Stanley Lieberman (1969):

$$A_w = 1 - \left[\frac{\sum_{k=1}^p Y_k^2}{V} \right] \quad \text{Eq. 1}$$

A_w = the diversity of the item in question, Y_k = the proportion of the population that falls into a category of within each of the variables, V =the number of variables, and p = the number of categories within all the variables (Sullivan 1973). Calculation for units of analysis in which there is zero diversity on some qualitative trait yields a diversity score of 0. Units where there is total diversity yields a value of 1.0. The measure is interpreted as the likelihood that two subjects, sampled randomly with replacement, differ on some category of interest. Lower scores represent lower population diversity. The Lieberman measure has been used in state politics in the past and the application is often described as the Sullivan index, following John Sullivan’s (1973) application of the method to measure diversity in state-level population and political characteristics.

I measure the diversity of four characteristics of states: ideology, population ethnicity and religion, race, and partisanship. Following Rae and Taylor's formulation, ideological diversity measures attitudinal diversity, and population and racial diversity measure ascriptive differences. Diversity in partisanship is measured similarly, and captures the probability that two citizens differ in their partisan allegiance. A fourth measure, the strength of organized interest groups in the states, is included in the test of competition as a further measure of behavioral competition.

Values for each of the measures are displayed in Table 1, below. Data for the ideology measure are drawn from Erikson, Wright and McIver (1985) and represent ideology in about 1980.² Oklahoma, with a value of .696, is the median state. The most ideologically diverse states are Arkansas and Kentucky, where there is a 73% chance that two citizens will profess different ideological leanings. The least ideologically diverse state is Idaho, where citizens differ only about 63% of the time. The measure of ideological diversity is correlated weakly and negatively (-.32) with Erikson, Wright and McIver's (1993) measure of ideological polarization in the states, which is the difference in the mean liberal and mean conservative scores for their ideology measure in each state. The diversity measure captures whether citizens in a state differ in their ideological leanings but includes moderates along with liberals and conservatives and as result does not capture polarization.

² Erikson, *et al.* (1993) provide ideology and other data that "center" on the mid-1980s but not an updated dependent variable, which they describe (Wright, Erikson, and McIver 1987) as representing state policy in about 1980. I use the earlier ideology data because they are contemporaneous with the measurement of the dependent variable while the mid-80s data actually follow the dependent variable temporally, which makes it difficult to draw causal inferences.

Population diversity is measured using indicators of ethnic and religious group membership, following Sullivan (1973). Specifically, the index contains information about population diversity in six areas – education, income, occupational status, housing, ethnicity and religion (Sullivan 1973, 71). Data presented here represent state-level population diversity circa 1980. The most diverse state is New York, where citizens differ in these terms about 55% of the time. The least diverse state is Alabama, where ethnicity and religion differ only about 38% of the time. Maryland is the median state, with a score of about .45. Sullivan (1973) links population diversity to more generous public spending for welfare, leading to the expectation that it will lead to more liberal policy enactments. Sullivan’s measure does not include information about race, and the addition of race reverses the signs of the observed relationships. Racial diversity is measured using 1980 U.S. Census of Population data that identify white, black, native American, and other races by state. Because some categories are so small, they are lumped into an “other” category for purposes of this analysis. Also seen in table 1, the most racially diverse states are spread across the country rather than being clustered in one region. New York is the most racially diverse state ($A_w = .542$), followed by Louisiana (.522), Hawaii (.517), New Jersey (.517) and Illinois (.509). The least racially diverse state is Utah (.386), followed closely by Idaho (.396), and West Virginia (.395). Racial diversity is expected to be linked to less liberal public policies.

Diversity in partisanship is measured using the Erikson, Wright and McIver data as well, for the mid-1980s. The data contain information about respondents’ reports of allegiance to the Democratic or Republican parties, or of being Independents. The most diverse state in terms of partisan identification is Virginia, where there is a greater than 70% chance that two people selected

with replacement will differ in their partisan allegiance. The least diverse state in terms of partisan affiliation is Alabama, where people differ only about 55% of the time. The median state is Colorado ($A_w = .678$). Consistent with prevailing theories of the effect of interparty competition on policy outputs, I expect policies to become more liberal, i.e., to offer more rewards for voters, as diversity in partisan allegiances increases.

The measure of interest group influence is drawn from Hrebenar and Thomas (1990). They amassed information on the organization and function of organized interests in the states and array the states on a continuum of interest group influence, with states scored one being dominated by organized interests and states scored four having weak interest group influence. The liberalism of state public policies is expected to increase as the dominance of organized interests wanes. Given the coding of the measure I expect a negative coefficient.

Testing the Rae and Taylor Competition Model

A simple cross-sectional model of policy liberalism is estimated, using Erikson, Wright and McIver's index of state party liberalism (SPL) in about 1980 as the dependent variable.³ The model is expressed:

$$\text{SPL} = b_0 + b_1 \text{population diversity} - b_2 \text{racial diversity} + b_3 \text{ideological diversity} + b_4 \text{partisan diversity} + b_5 \text{group influence} \quad \text{Eq. 2}$$

³ The Erikson, Wright and McIver measure is "a grand index of state policy" (1993, p. 75) constructed using information about state policies in eight areas: education, Medicaid, Aid to Families with Dependent Children, consumer protection, criminal justice, legalized gambling, support for the Equal Rights Amendment, and tax progressivity (Erikson, Wright and McIver 1993, pp. 75-77.)

Results of the estimation are provided in table 2. The model explains about sixty two percent of the variation in the dependent variable ($\text{adj. } R^2 = .62$) and is statistically significant ($F = 18.56, p = .000$). The two measures of ascriptive diversity influence policy liberalism as expected. A one unit increase in population diversity increases SPL by 167.64 units ($t = 5.30; p < .01$). As expected, diversity in race reduces the liberalism of policies: a one unit increase lessens policy liberalism by 86.66 units ($t = -2.88; p < .01$).

The measure of attitudinal competition, ideological diversity, has a positive influence on state policy liberalism, as was expected. Increasing ideological diversity by one unit increases SPL by 68.86 units ($p < .05$). Finally, the two measures of behavioral competition exert positive influences on SPL. Increasing the diversity of citizens' partisan attachments by one unit increases SPL by nearly 30 units ($t=1.78; p < .05$). The measure of groups is scaled differently than each of the other measures in the model – from 1 to 4 (see appendix table 1) – so yields smaller coefficients. A one unit movement in the measure, which captures the extent to which groups are influential in a state's politics, increases SPL by 1.29 units ($t = 1.70; p < .05$).

Because four of the five measures are scaled identically, as diversity measures that range between 0 and 1, it is possible to compare the relative effects of each variable on the dependent variable. Population diversity is by far the strongest influence on policy liberalism, with a coefficient nearly twice that of racial diversity, which comes in second in the “race of the variables.” This calls into question Hero's (1999) contention that race is the single strongest force affecting state politics; at least insofar as the liberalism of policies is concerned, race is a distant second to broader population diversity.

More importantly, these results show ascriptive competition to exert a much stronger influence on policies than attitudinal or behavioral differences. The sole measure of attitudinal competition, ideological diversity, exerts a positive influence as expected and is fairly close to the magnitude of the racial diversity measure. The diversity in partisanship measure is much weaker. Together, this suggests that competition may be most important in the sorts of demands it creates rather than in its manifestations in political behavior.

An Elaborated Model

The model presented above is fairly naive. Here, I test the competition model more rigorously by including additional variables that are presented elsewhere as an explanation for variations in state policy liberalism. The best-known model is that initially presented in Erikson, Wright and McIver (1989), which explains state policy liberalism as a function of three independent variables -- citizen ideology, legislative liberalism, and Democratic legislative strength -- and explains over 80% of the variation in state policy liberalism. It contains no direct observation of political competition. Instead, competition is treated implicitly in the inclusion of a measure of Democratic legislative strength in state legislatures inasmuch as that indicates something about party control of the legislature, a byproduct of political competition. The measure's meaning is unclear: a party that has full control of the legislature upon winning a series of landslide elections can behave much differently than one that is in full control upon winning a number of closely contested races. Presumably, the former has more latitude to stray from public opinion than the latter. This contention has been explored elsewhere (Barrilleaux 1997; Barrilleaux 2000; Barrilleaux, Holbrook and Langer 2002), and the preponderance of evidence suggests that consideration of both the

strength of parties and the competitiveness of election is warranted. Hence, I use a model that contains measures of both party strength and electoral competition as a baseline model for comparison. The model is expressed:

$$\text{SPL} = b_6 + b_7 \text{ ideology} + b_8 \text{ legislative liberalism} - b_9 \text{ Democratic Legislative Strength} + b_{10} \text{ Electoral Competition} \quad \text{Eq. 3}$$

The first three terms are drawn directly from Erikson, Wright and McIver (1989) and the fourth term is a measure of the average competitiveness of legislative races in the states (Holbrook and Van Dunk 1993). Thus the model expresses state policy liberalism as a function of shared ideological liberalism, the mean ideological position of state legislators, the percentage of Democrat legislators in each state, and the difficulty of winning election in each state. Estimates for the model are contained in column I of table 3, below.

The model explains about 82% of the variation in the dependent variable and is statistically significant. The results are consistent with those reported in Erikson, *et al.* (1989; 1993) and in Barrilleaux (1997). Each predictor enters the equation significantly and in the expected direction. SPL increases with increases in electoral competition, ideological liberalism, and electoral competition, and declines with increases in the strength of Democrats in the state legislature.

Adding each of the measures presented in Eq. 2 to the baseline model (table 3, column II) results in neither model standing fully to additional specification. None of the “new” diversity measures enters the full-fledged model significantly, and the Democratic legislative strength measure also drops out. Ideological liberalism, legislative liberalism, and electoral competition continue to exert statistically significant influences on SPL. In addition, the magnitudes of the

coefficients for liberalism and electoral competition change little between the two specifications. This result, overall, is not especially surprising; the data set is limited inasmuch as it is small (N=45) and a number of the measures have minimal variation. Given this, and upon evaluation of the collinearity diagnostics, a trimmed model is presented in the third column of table 3.

Table 3 about here.

Ultimately two of the measures of competition introduced in this paper enter the model fruitfully: the measure of diversity of opinion and the measure of population diversity. The opinion diversity measure's sign is reversed so that it now is negative, which may make sense in the presence of a control for mean opinion. It simply says that the diversity of opinion is a mediating influence on the effect of mean ideology, dampening its effect. The model displayed in column III makes some intuitive sense; ideology of citizens and legislators matters, as does the competitiveness of a state's politics. Further, the diversity of a state's citizens – ascriptive competition – appears to have a lasting effect on state politics, with more liberal policies being enacted in response to a presumed diversity of demand. However, the measures of racial diversity, diversity in partisanship, and interest group influence do not enter fruitfully into a fully specified model.

This suggests a final model specification in which the relationship between ideology and policy outputs is expressed as being conditioned by the extent of ideological diversity within a state. This specification is shown in table 4. The model explains about 84% of the variation in the dependent variable, is statistically significant, and provides a theoretically satisfying explanation for the effect of ideology on policy making in the states. When the net effect of ideology and ideological liberalism is calculated ($525.57 + 59.89 - 327.09 = 258.37$) it yields a positive but

moderated effect of citizen ideological liberalism on SPL. This comports well with political reality; it suggests that mean liberalism's effects on the liberalism of policies are tempered by the extent of difference of opinion within a state. Also worth noting is that the measure of population diversity persists as a significant influence, albeit at a fairly generous threshold of statistical significance. Again, this indicates a lasting effect of ascriptively-based competition on policy choices.

Table 4 about here.

Conclusion

These results provide additional evidence of the basic health of representative democracy in the states. The intent in this paper was to test the effects of varying forms of political competition on the ideological predisposition of states' public policies. Using the Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1989) model of state policy liberalism as a point of departure, these results suggest that the three forms of competition identified by Rae and Taylor (1970) matter. The population diversity measure taps ascriptive competition and survives fairly rigorous tests to remain in a model of state policy liberalism. Similarly, a measure of electoral competition, which taps into Rae and Taylor's notion of behavioral competition, also remains in a model. Finally, attitudinal competition, in the form of a measure of the diversity of opinion within the states, has a meaningful effect as a moderator of the influence of policy liberalism in the states. It suggests that legislators, even where faced with large majorities who embrace a liberal ideology, moderate their behavior to account for differences of opinion within polities.

This provides a slightly more nuanced understanding of how ideology affects decisions than has been available in the past. Erikson, Wright and McIver (1993) present a model in which the

effects of ideology are not only pronounced, but in which they are not tempered by the competitiveness of elections or other moderating factors. Their model suggests that agreement, rather than competition, is largely what forms the basis of American states' policy decisions. This research underlines the singular importance of ideology, but also shows that differences may moderate ideology's effects. In sum, it suggests that representatives pay attention to differences of opinion as well as to majority demands, and that speaks well for the state of state democracy.

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Table 1. State Ideological, Population, Racial, and Partisan Diversity Scores and Ranks, and Group Strength Scores

STATE	Ideological Diversity		Population Diversity		Racial Diversity		Partisan Diversity		Groups
	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	
Alabama	.717	6*	.386	48*	.446	29*	.547	48*	1.00
Alaska	.	.	.397	39	.444	31	.	.	1.00
Arizona	.675	43	.439	22	.468	17	.676	26	2.00
Arkansas	.728	1	.375	50	.420	45	.657	33	2.00
California	.701	16	.482	6	.503	7	.684	18	2.00
Colorado	.683	41	.426	28	.444	30	.678	24	3.00
Connecticut	.703	13	.491	5	.495	8	.671	28	4.00
Delaware	.701	15	.442	19	.482	14	.656	35	4.00
Florida	.694	29	.458	11	.471	15	.673	27	1.00
Georgia	.717	7	.406	38	.469	16	.611	45	2.00
Hawaii	.	.	.479	7	.517	3	.	.	2.00
Idaho	.627	48	.391	43	.396	48	.678	25	2.00
Illinois	.689	34	.478	8	.509	5	.691	12	3.00
Indiana	.693	31	.410	36	.432	36	.690	14	3.00
Iowa	.687	38	.420	32	.419	46	.694	7	3.00
Kansas	.691	32	.412	35	.430	39	.692	10	3.00
Kentucky	.728	2	.406	37	.430	38	.650	39	2.00
Louisiana	.694	30	.459	10	.526	2	.570	47	1.00
Maine	.688	35	.438	23	.429	40	.679	23	3.00
Maryland	.697	20	.435	25	.484	13	.654	36	3.00
Massachusetts	.696	22	.496	4	.488	10	.619	44	3.00
Michigan	.696	21	.439	21	.468	18	.696	5	3.00
Minnesota	.681	42	.439	20	.440	35	.667	30	4.00
Mississippi	.719	4	.388	45	.463	21	.648	40	1.00
Missouri	.712	8	.428	27	.458	24	.679	22	3.00
Montana	.699	18	.420	31	.431	37	.689	16	2.00
Nebraska	.696	26	.431	26	.440	34	.695	6	2.00
Nevada	.683	40	.435	24	.451	25	.701	2	2.00
New Hampshire	.673	44	.452	16	.441	32	.681	21	3.00
New Jersey	.695	27	.500	2	.517	4	.688	17	3.00
New Mexico	.698	19	.456	13	.505	6	.654	37	1.00
New York	.702	14	.525	1	.542	1	.700	4	3.00
N. Carolina	.704	11	.392	41	.450	26	.669	29	3.00
N. Dakota	.664	45	.446	17	.450	27	.701	3	3.00
Ohio	.690	33	.442	18	.466	19	.694	8	2.00
Oklahoma	.696	25	.390	44	.426	43	.632	42	2.00
Oregon	.687	37	.418	33	.421	44	.684	19	2.00

Pennsylvania	.700	17	.466	9	.486	12	.690	13	3.00
Rhode Island	.696	24	.497	3	.486	11	.584	46	3.00
S. Carolina	.704	12	.392	42	.458	23	.689	15	1.00
S. Dakota	.655	47	.424	29	.441	33	.657	32	3.00
Tennessee	.726	3	.386	46	.428	41	.681	20	1.00
Texas	.695	28	.455	14	.495	9	.661	31	2.00
Utah	.659	46	.381	49	.386	50	.692	11	2.00
Vermont	.719	5	.458	12	.448	28	.622	43	4.00
Virginia	.696	23	.415	34	.461	22	.703	1	2.00
Washington	.688	36	.421	30	.427	42	.651	38	2.00
West Virginia	.708	9	.386	47	.395	49	.656	34	1.00
Wisconsin	.684	39	.454	15	.464	20	.694	9	3.00
Wyoming	.706	10	.394	40	.402	47	.638	41	2.00

* Numbers to the right of scores are ranks, where 1 is the most diverse.

Table 2. Influences of Ascriptive, Attitudinal and Behavioral Competition on State Policy Liberalism.

Independent Variables	<i>b</i> (<i>s_b</i>)	<i>t</i>	Prob <i>t</i> (one-tail)
Intercept	-103.764 (28.00)	-3.705	.0005
Population Diversity	167.64 (31.62)	5.302	.000
Racial Diversity	-86.66 (3.12)	-2.877	.003
Ideological Diversity	68.863 (32.67)	2.108	.02
Partisan Diversity	29.652 (16.79)	1.766	.04
Interest Groups	1.289 (.76)	1.697	.05
Adj. $R^2 = .62$; s.e.e. = 3.22; $F = 18.75$, prob. $F = .000$ N = 47			

Table 3: Baseline, Overidentified, and Reduced Models of State Policy Liberalism

Independent Variables	I Baseline Model		II Overidentified Model		III Reduced Model	
	<i>b</i> (<i>s_b</i>)	<i>t</i> (one-tail <i>p</i>)	<i>b</i> (<i>s_b</i>)	<i>t</i> (one-tail <i>p</i>)	<i>b</i> (<i>s_b</i>)	<i>t</i> (one-tail <i>p</i>)
Intercept	-1.73 (1.93)	-.90 (.19)	13.44 (29.27)	.46 (.33)	32.27 (23.43)	1.38 (.09)
Ideological Liberalism	32.29 (7.77)	4.16 (.000)	36.22 (10.12)	3.58 (.000)	38.67 (8.94)	4.33 (.000)
Legislative Liberalism	2.52 (.74)	3.39 (.001)	1.49 (.92)	1.62 (.06)	1.44 (.62)	2.35 (.01)
Democratic Legislative Strength	-7.35 (3.04)	-2.42 (.01)	-.93 (4.69)	-.20 (.42)	NA	NA
Electoral Competition	.10 (.055)	1.79 (.04)	.09 (.05)	1.54 (.07)	.12 (.04)	2.76 (.01)
Population Diversity	NA	NA	32.74 (33.52)	.98 (.34)	21.59 (14.76)	1.46 (.08)
Racial Diversity	NA	NA	-14.43 (28.74)	-.50 (.32)	NA	NA
Ideological Diversity	NA	NA	-39.49 (33.34)	-1.19 (.12)	-58.18 (27.16)	-2.14 (.02)
Partisan Diversity	NA	NA	10.42 (16.40)	.64 (.26)	NA	NA
Interest Groups	NA	NA	.48 (.61)	.79 (.22)	NA	NA
Baseline Model Adj. $R^2 = .82$; s.e.e. = 2.58; F = 49.65, prob. F = .000, N = 45						
Overidentified Model Adj. $R^2 = .82$; s.e.e. = 2.58; F = 22.95, prob. F = .000, N = 45						
Reduced Model Adj. $R^2 = .83$; s.e.e. = 2.48; F = 43.98, prob. F = .000, N = 45						

Table 4. Model of State Policy Liberalism with the Conditional Effect of Ideological Diversity

Independent Variables	<i>b</i> (<i>s_b</i>)	<i>t</i>	Prob <i>t</i> (one-tail)
Intercept	-49.56 (48.11)	-1.03	.15
Population Diversity	20.47 (14.29)	1.43	.08
Legislative Liberalism	1.79 (.62)	2.89	.003
Ideology	-327.09 (189.07)	-1.72	.05
Ideological Diversity	59.89 (66.63)	.90	.19
Ideology X Ideological Diversity	525.57 (272.54)	1.93	.03
Electoral Competition	.12 (.04)	2.80	.004
Adj. $R^2 = .84$; s.e.e. = .40; $F = 39.76$, prob. $F = .000$ $N = 45$			

Appendix Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

Variables	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Democratic Legislative Strength ⁱ	46	-.69	-.01	-.3651	.19441
Ideology ⁱ	47	-.33	-.01	-.1490	.07901
State Policy Liberalism ⁱ	47	-9.25	12.69	-.0572	5.95472
Ideological Diversity ⁱ	48	.63	.73	.6946	.01873
Racial Diversity ⁱⁱ	50	.39	.54	.4570	.03547
Population Diversity ⁱⁱⁱ	50	.38	.52	.4331	.03618
Partisan Diversity ⁱ	48	.55	.70	.6660	.03462
Interest Groups	50	1.00	4.00	2.3600	.87505
Ideology X Ideological Diversity ⁱ	47	-.22	.00	-.1030	.05320
Electoral Competition ^{iv}	49	9.26	56.58	39.0390	11.40219
Interest group influence ^v	50	1	4	NA	NA
Valid N	45				

Data Sources:

ⁱ Data provided by Gerald Wright; originally published in Wright, *et al.* 1985, 1987; Erikson, *et al* 1989, 1993.

ⁱⁱ Author's calculations from data provided by U.S. Bureau of the Census, Decennial Census of the United States, 1980.

ⁱⁱⁱ Author's calculations from data provided by U.S. Bureau of the Census, Decennial Census of the United States, 1980,

^{iv} Holbrook and Van Dunk 1993.

^v Thomas and Hrebenar 1990.