Anthropology and Colonialism

by Diane Lewis

INTRODUCTION

Anthropology is in a state of crisis. This is demonstrated, in the field and in the classroom, by the marked estrangement between anthropologists and the nonwhite people they have traditionally studied. The prospective fieldworker, for example, may find that he is banned by the government or rejected by the intellectuals of the country he seeks to enter; or he may be forced to pose as an economist or sociologist in order to gain acceptance. Frequently he encounters resentment from the group he has chosen to study. A willingness to tolerate the anthropologist has been replaced by outright distrust and suspicion. Finally, when the fieldworker returns home to write and lecture about "his" people, he is increasingly confronted by representatives of the group who challenge the validity of his findings.

Disillusionment with the discipline from outside is paralleled by growing criticism from within. Most of this criticism, appearing increasingly in the United States since the second half of the 1960s, has focused on the failure of anthropologists to come to terms with and accept responsibility for the political implications of their work. The establishment of a Committee on Ethics by the American Anthropological Association (1969) and the publication of articles which explore the social and moral responsibilities of the anthropologist (e.g., Diamond 1966; Berreman 1968, 1970; Gough 1968; Jorgensen 1971) are recent attempts to define the problem.

It is significant that this critical self-examination among anthropologists has appeared concomitantly with the growing self-awareness of nonwhite people. The two are not unrelated, and both should be brought to bear on an attempt to analyze the current crisis. This paper attempts to pull together insights gained from the ferment of criticism emerging from both sources. Since it examines anthropology from the viewpoint of Third World people, the emphasis is necessarily on those negatively viewed aspects of the discipline which will provide a better understanding of the current behavior and attitudes of many nonwhite people toward anthropologists. This is not to deny the positive contributions of anthropology nor to imply either that anthropology can be explained only in these terms or that the situation and conscious motives of all anthropologists parallel those described here. Similarly, since anthropology, until recent decades, has had a unique development and impact on the non-Western world, it has been singled out from the other social sciences for discussion. Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that many of the criticisms stated here apply as well to the other social sciences. Thus, this paper focuses on anthropology, rather than the social sciences in general, and it purposely highlights those factors in the development of the discipline which now alienate anthropologists from their subject matter and which in the past unquestionably affected their work.

The paper considers the traditional relationship between anthropology and its nonwhite subject matter. It explores some of the historical conditions and assumptions upon which this relationship was based and examines their effect on theory and method in anthropology. Finally, it suggests an alternative to the present approach as a means of establishing a viable social science.

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The present paper, submitted in final form 17 iv 72, was sent for comment to 50 scholars, of whom the following responded: Xavier Albo, Gerald Berthoud, David Brokensha, Edward M. Bruner, Richard Frucht, Helmut Fuchs, Gutorm Gjesing, Jitka Junková, Gilbert Kushner, Khalil Nakhele, Xto G. Okojie, Maxwell Owusu, Roman Racyński, Hubert Reynolds, Takao Sofue, Milan Souchik, Arthur J. Vidich, and Renate von Gieycki. Their comments are printed after the text and are followed by a reply from the author.

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1 This estrangement has also been dramatically portrayed for the past three years at the annual American Anthropological Association meetings, in the various symposia and panels on the topic organized by nonwhite anthropologists.
THE ROLE OF ANTHROPOLOGY IN THE WEST

A long-range goal of anthropology was the discovery of general laws and propositions about the nature of mankind. The circumstances of its founding, that is, Western expansion and the discovery of the non-Western world, meant that these laws and propositions were based on a close study of the newly discovered “ primitives.” However, an immediate and practical purpose of anthropology was to fill in the gaps of Western man’s knowledge about himself (Diamond 1964:432; Worsley 1964:11; for a parallel point of view, see Jones 1970:256).

Given the significance of anthropology as a tool in Western man’s search for self-understanding, it was an important methodological assumption that the study of the “primitive” or non-Western world could take place only from the vantage point of the Westerner or outsider. Anthropology, as Lévi-Strauss (1966:126) puts it, “is the science of culture as seen from the outside.” Diamond (1964:433, my emphasis) describes the anthropological process as one whereby “we snap the portrait . . . it is only a representative of our civilization who can, in adequate detail, document the difference, and help create an idea of the primitive which would not ordinarily be constructed by primitives themselves.” Thus, if the natives were to study themselves, they were said to produce history or philology, not anthropology (Lévi-Strauss 1966:126). The questions asked, the problems posed, and the construct of the “primitive” formulated tended to reflect interests external to the groups studied. This was, in a manner to be explained below, as true of applied as of “pure” anthropology.

Since the anthropologist worked amid the profound economic and political changes which accompanied the confrontation between the West and the rest of the world, he was often called upon to provide information and advice to the West in its efforts to manipulate and control the non-Western world. He provided the information either directly or indirectly and became, thereby, implicated in the process of colonization. When the anthropologist thought of himself at all as an actor in this confrontation, however, it was generally as a detached scientific observer, objectively recording “primitive” lifeways before they disappeared or became Westernized, or else as a buffer between two worlds, serving to soften the blow of Western political domination and economic exploitation. He rarely questioned or studied the process of confrontation itself or considered the way this milieu affected his “laboratory conditions.” This oversight is apparent in the numerous studies of culture contact and culture conflict which ignored the effects of colonization on the cultures studied and on the conditions under which fieldwork was conducted. (See Worsley 1964 for a rare study by a Western social scientist which does consider the effects of colonialism; see also Magubane 1971 for a recent criticism by a Third World anthropologist of anthropological studies of change which ignore colonialism.)

Since anthropology emerged along with the expansion of Europe and the colonization of the non-Western world, anthropologists found themselves participants in the colonial system which organized relationships between Westerners and non-Westerners. It is, perhaps, more than a coincidence that a methodological stance, that of the outsider, and a methodological approach, “objectivity,” developed which in retrospect seem to have been influenced by, and in turn to have supported, the colonial system. This point of view, based on the analysis of anthropology’s role in the West, deserves elaboration, for it throws considerable light on the current distrust of anthropologists among non-Western people.

THE COLONIAL CONTEXT OF FIELDWORK

The historical setting of anthropology has been vividly described (Lévi-Strauss 1966:126) as

... the outcome of a historical process which has made the larger part of mankind subservient to the other, and during which millions of innocent human beings have had their resources plundered and their institutions and beliefs destroyed, whilst they themselves were ruthlessly killed, thrown into bondage, and contaminated by diseases they were unable to resist.

This “era of violence” produced a social system which had a pervasive effect on the relationship between the anthropologist and the people he studied. Whether he played the role of detached observer (theoretical anthropologist) or that of liaison between the dominant European and subject nonwhite groups (applied anthropologist), the roles were significantly affected by his membership in the dominant group. The anthropologist, like the other Europeans in a colony, occupied a position of economic, political, and psychological superiority vis-à-vis the subject people. From this point of view it would seem that the conditions responsible for the relationship of inequality between Westerner and non-Westerner were also those which created a need for the anthropologist and assured that the indigenous people would be accessible to him for study. (See Foster 1969:184–203 for a discussion of the development of anthropology in British colonial administration and in American administration of “dependent” people.) Economic and legal advantages accorded other Europeans in the form of better jobs, higher wages, lower taxes, and access to cheaper labor were also enjoyed by the anthropologist, who, ideally, obtained a large research grant (tax-free), paid informants a pittance, if anything, and landed a prestigious job when he returned home. All too often, little attention was paid to the fact that the benefits gained were based on exploitation of the natives. (See Memmi 1967:7–8 for a brilliant analysis of the inverse relationship between European privileges and colonized deprivation.) The psychological superiority of the anthropologist was derived from the fact that he consistently received preferential treatment, not only from other Europeans in positions of political power, but also
from the subject peoples themselves. For the most part, this special treatment was accorded, not because of superior accomplishments or contributions valued by the native people, but simply because the anthropologist was a member of the group in power.

In this context, it might seem that the anthropologist's facility in engaging in fieldwork, like that of the industrialist in obtaining cheap labor, derived from the subjugation by his own government of the people he was studying. Yet this fact went unchallenged if not unnoticed. Gough (1968:404) notes: "We tended to accept the imperialist framework as given, perhaps partly because we were influenced by the dominant ideas of our time, and partly because at the time there was little anyone could do to dismantle the empire." (See also Mair 1965:439.) Undoubtedly most anthropologists were appalled by the colonial relationship and consciously rejected it. Therein lies the paradox; for no matter how great the anthropologist's aversion to the colonial system, he was, as a fieldworker, unable to function outside of it. It was as impossible for him as for other Europeans to remain in a colony without participating in the power and privileges of the dominant group (e.g., Memmi 1967:17).

A great many anthropologists doubtless felt that their understanding of the native people placed them in the position to bargain on their behalf. Yet, as noted, these individuals rarely questioned the basic relationship of privilege and were, therefore, in the somewhat ambiguous position of many liberals in our own society, who work to reform a situation from which they themselves derive definite benefits. Nevertheless, the structure of interpersonal relationships within a social system tends to influence significantly the attitudes of the participants. As Memmi (1967:20) points out: "It is not easy to escape mentally from a concrete situation, to refuse its ideology while continuing to live with its actual relationships. . . ."

The position taken here is that the dominant political interests of the times not only blinded many anthropologists to the implications of their position, but also influenced them, apparently unconsciously, to justify the prevailing colonial social system. For example, Mair (1965:439–40) discusses the shift in attitudes toward social change of anthropologists working in Africa before and after World War II:

We all made ourselves the defenders of African custom against its critics, and against policies aimed at radical change. . . . We used to say that people should learn from the industrial revolution in Europe and so spare Africa its worst horrors. I am not sure what we meant by this. . . . This is not how people study social change today. . . . I think it is true that we now look differently at the changes taking place in independent Africa, and this fact is not unconnected with the impatience of Africa's new leaders for ever more rapid change.

In questioning why there has been a change in outlook,

she asks, "... are we such timeservers that we change views when power changes hands?" She prefers to think not.

In contrast, Maquet (1964) postulates that in their theoretical orientations anthropologists working in Africa at different periods did unconsciously support the political and administrative goals of their own countries vis-à-vis the groups studied. He attempts to show how during the colonial era, unilinear evolutionism developed an image of the "savage" which seemed to justify colonial expansion; and how, between World War I and World War II (as Mair notes above), structural-functionalism focused on the health and holistic integration of traditional cultures and the disruptive effects of industrialization, at a period when Western rule was beginning to be undermined by educated radical African urbanites advocating change. Through stressing the moral inferiority of the African at an earlier period and the dangers of rapid change at a later one and emphasizing the difference between European and African throughput, the anthropologist was providing conceptual and theoretical models which were socially useful to the existing colonial system. (Diamond [1971:172] makes the additional point that 19th-century theories about primitives were in fact projections of European man's self-image.)

While European anthropologists working in Africa seem to have been more sensitive than American anthropologists to this situation, attempts in American anthropology to investigate the interplay between theory and the dominant political-economic ideas of a period are beginning to emerge (e.g., Wolf 1970, Moore 1971; see also Mills 1959 and Myrdal 1969 for more general discussions of the social sciences from this viewpoint).

ANTHROPOLOGY AND COLONIAL RACISM

Analogous to the process whereby anthropologists who decried colonialism developed theoretical models which supported it is the tendency for anthropologists who overtly fought racism at the same time to perpetrate formulations, attitudes, and behaviors which fostered it. Racism is developed by a group to justify its privileged position (see, for example, Jordan 1968, Gossett 1963, Carmichael and Hamilton 1967). Memmi (1967:71) argues that there are three ideological bases of colonial racism: "one, the gulf between the culture of the colonialist and the colonized; two, the exploitation of these differences for the benefit of the colonialist; three, the use of these supposed differences as standards of absolute fact." The anthropologist's behavior and conceptual formulations participate in all three.

First, anthropology has contributed to the gulf between Western and non-Western culture by providing information which supports the mental constructs developed by those in power. Anthropologists, who peer at a culture from the outside, record the
differences between that culture and Western civilization. The noting of differences between two groups is not in itself racist, but it invariably acquires such a connotation in the context of colonialism. The anthropologist who conducts fieldwork in a colonial setting provides that documentation of differences which functions to support continued subjugation of the group he studies.

Secondly, anthropologists promote the exploitation of these differences for their own benefit, both personal and professional. This is demonstrated most blatantly in the attitude of most anthropologists that they have the right to exploit the people they study for their own professional advancement, without having a corresponding sense of commitment to them or their needs. They rarely feel the obligation to “do something” and, in fact, justify their inactivity through recourse to the canon of scientific “objectivity.” We shall return to a discussion of the implications of “objectivity” in a colonial context below.

Romano (1968) and Diamond (1966), among others, have dramatically described how the professional interests of the anthropologist engender an insensitivity to the personal interests of his informants. Galtung (1967:296) finds parallels between the exploitation by social scientists and that by political and economic interests within a colony. He describes the process as scientific colonialism, “a process whereby the center of gravity for the acquisition of knowledge about the nation is located outside the nation itself.” A major aspect of this process (p. 300) is “the idea of unlimited right of access to data of any kind, just as the colonial power felt it had the right to lay its hand on any product of commercial value in the territory . . . .” He finds that the parallel extends from the extraction to the processing of each kind of resource (p. 296):

. . . to export data about the country to one’s own home country for processing into “manufactured” goods, such as books and articles . . . is essentially similar to what happens when raw materials are exported at a low price and reimported as manufactured goods at a very high cost. The most important, most creative, most entrepreneurial, most rewarding and most difficult phases of the process take place abroad.

The primacy of theory building and career advancement at the expense of the real problems of those studied is best seen in the generally low esteem in which applied anthropology is held within the discipline. It has been pointed out that it is only “after an anthropologist has ‘made good’ in conventional research [that] he can enjoy the luxury of applied research without fearing for his reputation” (Foster 1969:132). Significantly, the applied field is a luxury too few feel they can afford. For example, Diamond (1966:5–6) has discussed the anthropologist’s contemporary unwillingness to get involved with difficult problems in the development of non-Western countries such as Africa, and Foster (1969:131–39) has outlined factors responsible for this reluctance such as teaching which ignores applied training and standards for conferral of status which devalue applied work. Thus, even the anthropologist who moves into the applied field finds his work constrained by his preoccupation with the demands of his professional academic career.

Anthropologists use subject people in another, more subtle way. The exploitation is perhaps less apparent, but must be considered, for it involves an attitude, described later, which contributes to the system of oppression perpetrated against non-Western people. Anthropology, in its concern with exotic cultures, has been marginal to Western culture, and anthropologists, as a group, have been somewhat alienated from their own culture. Consequently, many anthropologists go to the field looking for a kind of utopia, a place where they hope to find those things sorely lacking in the West. In condemning civilization and in looking for alternatives to it, they develop a highly romanticized view of non-Western people. Braroe and Hicks (1967) have described this attitude as part of the “mystique” of anthropology. Fieldwork undertaken in this spirit is more than a means of collecting data; it becomes virtually “an end in itself.” Regular visits to the field and preoccupation with the “primitive” enable the anthropologist to cope with his sense of alienation from his own culture, as well as to advance himself professionally.

Memmi has indicated that once differences between the dominated and dominant groups are defined and the differences exploited for the benefit of the dominant group, they are then characterized as “standards of absolute fact” or as determinative. We find anthropology equally involved in this third ideological basis of colonial racism. It may be instructive to consider the anthropologist’s reification of culture as similar in function to the racist’s utilization of biological determinism to explain social and historical differences.

It is common for some anthropologists, particularly in the applied field, to attribute a group’s behavior in a particular situation to cultural conditioning, often viewed as highly resistant to change, and to ignore extracultural factors which may be far more significant. For example, Lewis (1966) treats the culture of poverty as more deterministic of behavior and more resistant to change than the conditions which create poverty. This has supported policy which sidesteps the issue of poverty and focuses rather on trying to change a nebulous “culture of poverty” (see Valentine 1968:48–77). Bonfil Batalla (1966) has shown how the work of George Foster and Richard Adams, among others, has similarly led to a strong conservative bias in applied anthropology.

When the anthropologist combines the idealization of primitive culture with the notion of cultural determinism, the result is an attitude that is both paternalistic and hypocritical. The very qualities of primitive life which the anthropologist romanticizes and wants to see preserved are attributes which he finds unacceptable in his own culture. The personal freedom and self-determination he insists upon for himself he withholds from the “primitive” on the basis of cultural conditioning and the need for accommo-
dation of the individual within the community. He writes enthusiastically of the highly integrated life of the “primitive,” of the lack of stress experienced when there is little freedom of choice and few alternatives from which to choose; yet he defends for himself the right to make his own decisions and his own choices. “The determinism so admired in primitive society is abhorred in civilization” (Braroe and Hicks 1967:185).

Some writers have suggested that behavior characterized by the anthropologists as culturally determined may, in fact, be an adaptation to situational pressures or a reaction to external political and socioeconomic factors (e.g., Lewis 1967, Liebow 1967, Valentine 1968). To ignore the importance of such adaptive processes makes of culture a straitjacket, a rationalization par excellence for the status quo.

Anthropologists, then, have developed a conceptualization, culture, which in its analytical and theoretical usages seems dangerously reflective of the viewpoint of colonial racism. Both the anthropologist and the colonizer find in the cultural uniqueness of a people justification for perpetuating things as they are. The importance of the concept of culture may help explain why anthropologists accepted so uncritically the colonial system in which they operated.

THE ANTHROPOLOGIST AS “OBJECTIVE” OUTSIDER

While the anthropologist may have played the part of colonizer unwittingly, he has occupied the role of outsider consciously. It is, in fact, the perspective of outsider which is thought to assure “objectivity,” an important methodological goal. A basic part of the training of anthropologists, along with the creation of high cultural tolerance through exposure to cultural relativity, is preparation for detachment in the field. Anthropologists-in-training are warned of the negative results which ensue when they identify too closely with the interests of those they study. There is a direct relationship between the scientific validity of a study and the degree of “objectivity” thought to be associated with the approach. This is based on the assumption that there is a single valid reality and that through proper training the fieldworker learns methods of approximating this reality. Ideally, two trained fieldworkers exposed to the same culture should, other things being equal, emerge with virtually the same description of that culture.

The anthropologist’s privileged position, his role of outsider, and his insistence on objectivity serve to reinforce one another. The assumptions fostered by the objective approach coincide with those engendered by the colonial relationship. Further, they blind the anthropologist, like the colonizer, to the validity of other than a single view of reality.

Many writers have cast strong doubts on the possibility of “scientific objectivity” (e.g., Polanyi 1959, Kuhn 1962, Seeley 1963), particularly objectivity in the social sciences (e.g., Gessing 1968, Bonfil Batalla 1966, Maquet 1964, Mills 1959). It has been suggested that “scientific objectivity” is a myth, an arbitrary construct (Roszk 1969). Writers have stressed cultural factors such as the social, political, and economic position of the investigator and the degree to which these influence the hypothesis he formulates, the approach he chooses, and the data he selects. These factors figure even more prominently for the anthropologist, who differs, not only in class or ideology, but also in the broadest and most inclusive cultural characteristics, from his objects of research. Thus it seems hardly possible for anthropology to provide an impersonal view of social reality (e.g., Maquet 1964:51).

Yet “scientific objectivity” provided a predominant intellectual approach in anthropology, an approach which was congenial to the colonial circumstances of anthropology’s beginnings. When the anthropologist assumed the role of “objective” observer, his behavior significantly affected the relationship between himself and his informants: it assured both his estrangement from, and his superordinate position in relation to, those he studied.

As Roszk (1969:217–22) has noted, the process of objectively studying others involves the treatment of those studied as things, as objects toward which there can be no (scientifically) justified sense of involvement. Since objectification of the other requires alienation from him, it requires the observer to separate his inner self from the outer world of the observed. (See Diamond 1971:167–69 for a discussion of objectification and alienation in anthropology.) This creation of two spheres, an “In-here” and an “Out-there” (Roszk 1969:220), permits the qualitative distinction between oneself and the other that Maslow (1966:49, quoted in Roszk 1969:219) describes as characteristic of the objective observer: “It means looking at something that is not you, not human, not personal, something independent of you the perceiver. . . . You the observer are, then, really alien to it, comprehending and without sympathy or identification. . . .” This alienation must occur before it is possible to acquire knowledge without involvement.

A similar process of objectification is also distinctive of the colonial relationship. Memmi (1967:86) writes that the colonized, “at the end of this stubborn effort to dehumanize him . . . is hardly a human being. He tends rapidly toward becoming an object . . . One does not have a serious obligation toward an animal or an object.” For both the colonizer and the detached observer, objectification through depersonalization devalues the individual; the individual, preoccupied with problems the observer refuses to acknowledge, is ignored (e.g., Worsley 1964:25–26). For the colonizer, the colonized “does not exist as an individual.” Similarly the anthropologist, in his concern with patterns, ethos, structures, is several levels of abstraction removed from the raw data of individual motivation, attitude, and behavior. The most acclaimed and prestigious work in the discipline deals with complex theories and models in which
individuals are lost sight of as people.

The act of detached observation, in effectively dehumanizing the observed, reduces him to an inferior position. When the observer refuses to go beyond the façade of outward behavior and become a part of the inner workings of the observed’s existence, he presumptuously assumes that his outside understanding of the observed is somehow more valid than the observed’s own involvement with life (Roszak 1969:222–23). Thus the anthropologist who insists on the role of “objective” observer in a colonial setting greatly compounds an already existing relationship of inequality. This situation engenders particular resentment in the nonwhite intellectual, for simply to be selected for study by the “science of savages” stumps one as unalterably distinct from and inferior to the European (see Maquet 1964:51).

“Objectivity” under these circumstances is considered by many nonwhite people an affront. However, few anthropologists have written about the informant’s reaction to being treated as an “object” of research. Lévi-Strauss, who seems to understand the relationship between the anthropologist’s ability to be “objective” and the inevitability of dehumanization under colonialism, alludes to the offensiveness of being “ethnografized.” He suggests (1966:125) that the anthropologist permit the tables to be turned once in a while, that the subjects be allowed to study the anthropologist so that “each in turn will get the upper hand. And since there will be no permanent privilege, nobody will have ground to feel inferior to anybody else.”

We have seen that the anthropologist as “objective” outsider has treated those studied as objects and in the process completely ignored the relationship of power and privilege in which he and they were involved. This approach flourished in a colonial system which made such treatment inevitable, and it contributed to the perpetuation of that system. It seems incongruous that the discipline should continue to accept uncritically the traditional approach in a period when the conditions which gave rise to it are so rapidly changing. For example, anthropologists still pride themselves on the presentation of an established view of reality, along with a curious estrangement from that reality, as signs of the scientific nature of their work. Most anthropologists look with disdain on applied work; research and activism stemming from explicit involvement are considered inappropriate for the anthropologist in his professional role. Yet this attitude runs counter to the realities of anthropology’s past and to the current intellectual climate which questions the existence of “disinterested” theory. If conditions of the colonial past gave rise to the methodological stance described above, what does the present suggest as a basis for an alternate approach?

THE ANTHROPOLOGIST AS INSIDER

Whether anthropology continues to exist as a separate study or merges with other fields (see Mills 1959:134), a radical transformation in social science assumptions, methodologies, and goals must take place. Formulation of a discipline relevant to the times might take as a point of departure Lévi-Strauss’s advice: “Anthropology will survive in a changing world by allowing itself to perish in order to be born again under a new guise.”

Anthropology, it can be argued, must redefine traditional roles. It should now include, on an equal footing, those who reflect the interests of the people among whom they work, along with those who represent the government in power; insiders, in addition to outsiders.

An important methodological assumption will be a multidimensional view of reality. The notion of a single valid, objective knowledge must be replaced with that of a “perspectivistic knowledge,” a knowledge which is partial and which views reality from the particular existential position occupied by the observer. This partial view of reality is not nonobjective; it only becomes so when it is accepted as the total reality (Maquet 1964:54). The notion of a perspectivistic knowledge will enable the anthropologist to approach any culture at any time with the assurance that the possibilities of understanding are infinite and closely linked with his situation and purpose. If the situation and purpose are made explicit and the data carefully collected, the varied perspectives should be complementary, although differing in focus and problem (Diamond 1964:433). (While perspectivism would be of obvious theoretical importance to anthropology, because the anthropologist has in the past been alien to the culture studied, it is also of theoretical and pragmatic importance in the social sciences in general. Mills [1959:191] recognized this when he envisioned as an important role of social scientists the offering of contrasting definitions of reality which would serve as alternatives to the establishment definition.)

Once it is accepted that the anthropologist, as outsider, attains only one of several possible perspectives on the group he studies, it must be realized that this outside viewpoint is not the only valid one and often not the most relevant one in a given situation. The outsider approaches “objectivity” in his study of another group more closely than a member of the group can; this is because the lack of common interests and sense of commitment which members of the group share permits him to turn those he studies into objects. But while he is capable of detachment as an outside observer, he is still subject to the pull of his own group’s interests and claims of commitment. Thus, the anthropologist, as outsider, is influenced by a different set of interests than those of the people he studies; but he is influenced nonetheless. He may remain unconscious of these influences as long as he plays the role of outside observer to a strange group. It is much more difficult for him to remain unaware of them when he studies his own group, where the detachment necessary for objectification may be virtually impossible to attain.

The “portraits” of a group produced by the observer as outsider and by the observer as insider will
differ, as they reflect different interests, and they will be relevant in different contexts. This awareness underlies the current cry, "You have to be one to understand one." Some view this insistence that only an insider can understand his own group as a reaction to scientific colonialism (e.g., Galtung 1967:299). However, this view is not based solely on a desire to protect oneself and one's group from intellectual exploitation and feelings of inferiority. It is based equally on the conviction that an outsider's view of one's group can be as biased, in its own way, as that of an insider, and on the assumption that an insider's view can be as valid, and as acceptable as anthropology, as that of the outsider.

This attitude is exemplified in this country by the insistence of ethnic minorities that they be included in the educational curriculum from their own perspective, not solely that of the outsider. For this reason, they frequently find the material written about them by anthropologists and others irrelevant. They are aware that the studies written about them by anthropologists have been written not for them, but for others of the anthropologist's own profession, class, or culture. Very often these studies do not reflect reality as the people studied view it. Rather, they reflect reality from an outside and differently committed perspective, one based on the class as well as professional biases and interests of the investigator.

A number of examples come to mind. One involves a person of Native American ancestry who agreed to teach a course in anthropology at a newly opened Native American community college. This individual had great difficulty finding suitable sources about Native Americans which were meaningful to them, which did not offer a biased, depersonalized outside view of their own experience. It was equally difficult to find relevant introductory anthropological texts to use among a people who were already painfully aware of the basic principle of an introductory cultural anthropology course: the existence of different cultural worlds and of variety and complexity in cultural artifacts such as language, kinship, dress, etc. The problem might also in some measure derive from the task of making anthropology appealing to those whom anthropology has helped (however unwittingly) to oppress.

Another example is my own difficulty in finding material suitable for a course in Afro-American culture. Black students reject much of the work by whites as not capturing the "black experience," the personal element of the culture. They charge that many of the books written, even by other Afro-Americans, are oriented toward explaining, in relatively abstract terms, the Negro condition to the outsider in terms of the outsider's interests. These books rarely capture the experience of the insider; they do not start with an assumption of the common bond of the committed, and then add to and build upon that. The few works black students do feel add to their understanding are usually books that many white students find confusing or vaguely intimidating. The books considered informative and useful by white students are generally those which black students find obvious and irrelevant. Thus, it is easier to reach white students with the existing material, for they are already on the outside and are simply looking for different understandings from their exterior perspective. They are the ones who "get a lot" out of such a course.

Ethnic minorities not only reject being studied by outsiders and reading books about themselves written by outsiders, but find it intolerable any longer to be taught about themselves by outsiders. For example, while blacks, among themselves, exhibit a variety of opinions and impressions, such differences generally fall within the perimeters of a common experience. Since an outsider lacks the experience, his views more often fall outside these perimeters, no matter how sympathetic or well-intentioned the attempt. Similarly, in a number of educational projects initiated within the black community, Afro-Americans with advanced educational degrees are barred as teachers, for it is believed that the more exposed they have been to white, middle-class, scientific bias, the more deculturized they have become and therefore the less capable they are of teaching effectively about their traditional and contemporary culture from the inside.

The argument is not, as some would interpret it, that the inside view is the only valid one. For example, the sociologist Robert Merton has reportedly questioned the doctrine that "only blacks can understand blacks," noting that "there are certain truths that can only be learned from a stranger" (as quoted in the San Francisco Examiner, January 6, 1970). He points out that black militants who support this doctrine are ignoring the perceptive observations made by Afro-Americans on the workings of white society. Obviously, the perspectives of both outsider and insider reveal "certain truths," and in any situation the goal or purpose will dictate the appropriate perspective. Each perspective has its advantages and disadvantages, both intellectual and practical.

The obvious disadvantage of studying a group to which you belong is that your participation in the group often blinds you to elements that are readily apparent to the outsider. The pressures of everyday life, the emotional and behavioral demands on your energies, may make it impossible to quickly perceive alternatives or to adjudge the best long-term solution to a problem. An outsider can perceive things that are so deeply ingrained they escape the insider; he can stand back and delineate alternatives simply because he is not involved. The very involvement of the insider, however, which in some instances blinds him, in other instances makes it possible for him.

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5 An important consideration in the classroom, for example, is the type of student enrolled; if the students are white, you might attempt to explain, and create empathy for, black life and culture; if the enrollment is black, you would need to probe further into an experience already internalized which now needs externalization and clearer definition. The difference is not unlike that between a freshman and senior class for anthropology majors. If the class is mixed, and more sophisticated, you might grapple with techniques of cross-cultural communication between insider and outsider.
to grasp the inner workings of the group to a degree that is impossible for the outsider. More important, the outsider’s lack of involvement may pose a grave threat to the group. This point was raised above in the discussion of scientific colonialism, but it must be reiterated because a good deal of the contemporary distrust of anthropologists can be understood in these terms. There is a growing fear that the information collected by an outsider, someone not constrained by group values and interests, will expose the group to outside manipulation and control. Thus, anthropologists and other outside researchers are considered akin to intelligence agents, even though they play that role unwittingly. The insider, on the other hand, is accountable; he must remain in the community and take responsibility for his actions. Thus, he is forced through self-interest to exercise discretion.

The same involvement and accountability make it difficult for the insider to ignore problems perceived by the community as crucial. His work tends to be more pragmatically problem-oriented. Involvement spurs one to action, to the utilization of one’s skills for change. The outsider, who does not feel the pressures toward realization of the group’s goals, can justify—on the basis of the right to know, the priority of pure science, or cultural relativism—his interest in exotica and in the refinement of theory and his disdain for the solving of immediate human problems.

THE EUROPEAN NATIVE ETHNOGRAPHER: A PARTIAL MODEL

American anthropology, especially under the influence of Boas, has not ignored the importance of the insider’s view of a culture (see Rohner 1969 and works such as Radin 1920 and Lurie 1961). Insider anthropology has been peripheral to outsider anthropology, however, and has focused on training non-Westerners to study their own cultures (e.g., Koentjaraningrat 1964, Uchendu 1965). It has rarely turned the American anthropologist inward within his own culture. I feel, along with a number of other Third World anthropologists, that the time has come for the study of culture from the inside, by the insider, as a dominant approach in the discipline.

There is, for both Third World and Euro-American anthropologists, something to be learned in this effort from the European native ethnographer. It has been suggested that American fieldworkers, unlike their European counterparts, have commonly focused on simpler peoples and have paid only passing attention to complex societies (Hultkrantz 1968:293, 295). It is only relatively recently, with the growing fear that the discipline will disappear with the extinction of simpler societies, that American anthropologists have turned to the study of complex societies. (For two recent surveys of these studies, see Hsu 1969 and Kushner 1970.) Few, however, have assumed the role of inside observer of their own cultures. (Some recent notable examples are Clark and Anderson 1967, Schneider 1968, Oswald 1970.) The study of culture from the outside, a position thought to assure a degree of objectivity, is still considered by many to be the most acceptable approach. Yet European ethnographers, in their critical appraisal of American anthropology, challenge the assumption that the anthropologist can study only other societies (Hofst 1968:312). Their work demonstrates the possibilities of utilizing the theoretical and methodological principles of anthropology in an analysis of one’s own people.

Differences in style and emphasis between European insiders and American outsiders, both of whom have studied European peasant and postpeasant villages, have been likened to the difference between humanist and natural scientist (Hofst 1968:314). For the outsider, “objectivity,” theory and the formulation of laws, is the primary goal; for the insider, the discovery, definition, and celebration of cultural uniqueness is uppermost. The different perspectives of native ethnographer and outsider anthropologist have resulted in strikingly different portraits of the European peasant. American studies have painted a depressing picture of societal breakdown and underdevelopment, while ethnographers have focused on the dynamic complexity and richness of indigenous cultural forms and processes. Obviously native ethnographer and European anthropologist have explored and highlighted different facets of European peasant life, and these differences reflect the unique biases and expectations which each has brought to the study. The ethnographers deplore what they consider the single-minded focus, the emphasis on backwardness, of the American studies (Hofst 1968:315). They resent the fact that the outsider, “peoples and cultures are only limited cases and arguments in his search for laws” (Hofst 1968:314). Their attitude is not unlike that of Third World peoples, which has resulted in distrust and the barring of anthropologists from new nations and from minority communities in the United States.

European ethnography began with the emergence in the 19th century of new national cultures. It was a response to the need for a new identity and new consciousness and, as such, was an integral “part of the revitalization movement” (Hofst 1968:312). Independent Third World nations and ethnic minorities in the United States now face similar circumstances. Like the European nations of an earlier period, they are struggling to assert a new concept of self and of national or ethnic culture.

Once a people perceives the possibility of liberation, in reference to a former experience of subjugation, it is imperative that the right to observe and define their culture be theirs alone. Understood in the context of the anthropologist’s role as colonizer, this right, as Lévi-Strauss (1966:125) notes, is of primary symbolic importance. Memmi (1969:181) summarizes cogently the significance of self-definition and self-study: “For the oppressed to be finally free, he must go beyond revolt, by another path, he must begin in other ways, conceive of himself and reconstruct himself independently of the master.”

Yet, as we have seen, insider anthropology, for many Third World anthropologists, can never be
purely celebrative or purely theoretical, for "there is a feeling of urgency in connection with national problems, a feeling that scarce resources for research should be allocated to studies that could foster socio-economic development" (Galtung 1967:309). Thus, the cry for an anthropology relevant to the needs and interests of Third World people is for a discipline that will lead not only to self-discovery, but also to the pragmatic solution of pressing human problems.

This is not to deny the validity of the outsider's perspective or its importance to the development of theory and models for change. The issue here is that the formerly colonized will now exercise the right to study their own culture, as well as to establish the terms under which outsiders will be permitted to do so.⁴

**ACTIVIST ANTHROPOLOGY**

While there is no assurance that a Third World anthropologist working with his own people will be nonexploitative or have a deeper sense of commitment to his own group than an outsider, there would probably be a marked tendency in that direction. This is true both because of the greater pressures for accountability that can be brought by a group on one of its own and because of the nonwhite anthropologist's own self-identification as a member of an oppressed group. Given these factors, the development of an insider perspective should lead to a different ordering of priorities in anthropology. Thus, a shift from an emphasis on theory, at the expense of development, to a focus on theory developing out of the solution of practical problems seems inevitable. Similarly, a radical change in the way in which problems are selected and formulated should occur so that the people themselves assume an important role in determining problems to be studied in terms of their own interests as they perceive them. (See Caulfield 1972:7-8 and Stavenhagen 1971:337-39 for suggestions about specific types of roles anthropologists can play in such situations.) Group involvement in problem formulation helps assure that the anthropologist will stand in an egalitarian rather than a privileged relationship to the people he studies. (See Jones 1971a:348-49 for a Third World viewpoint on the elitism which is characteristic of many liberal and radical applied anthropologists at present.) These considerations bring us to a crucial point. If anthropology is to meet the real needs and interests of the people studied rather than the personal and professional interests of the discipline and its practitioners, it must on some level be an explicitly activist

and involved discipline, one that produces social scientists committed to radical change (see Moore 1971, who uses the term "partisan" anthropology).

A distinction should be made between activist and conventional applied anthropology. For Third World anthropologists, the traditional division between pure and applied anthropology is overshadowed by the fact that many applied anthropologists were and are among those most obviously involved in the perpetuation of colonial and neocolonial systems. (See Foster 1969:177, 194-96, for a description of the attack on Nadel in the 1940s and the growing disillusionment of British anthropologists with applied anthropology for this reason.) This involvement, more than anything else, probably accounts for what has been termed applied anthropology's great failure, "the inability to produce a sound theory of social change" (Cochrane 1971:111). There seems to be an unalterable contradiction between an anthropology rooted in academia and an applied anthropology committed to development and change (Cochrane 1971).

From this viewpoint, insider anthropology employed by the developing nations to further independently defined goals is in keeping with the historical role of anthropology in the West. There seems to be little pragmatic difference between the trained Third World investigator, whose studies of his own culture are chosen to further the interests of his people for greater self-awareness as well as the solution of immediate practical problems, and the Western anthropologist, whose preoccupation with abstract theories in the past was a response to Western man's search for self-understanding and the pursuit of empire building. In the one instance, the goals and interests will be explicit. In the other, they generally were not.

**INSIDER ANTHROPOLOGY FOR THIRD WORLD AND WESTERN ANTHROPOLOGISTS**

Just as the existential situation of white and nonwhite anthropologists differs, so initially will the implications of insider anthropology for their work. It is possible to offer just a few suggestions here.

Euro-American anthropologists who turn their methods and insights to an analysis of their own society may find much-needed answers to some of the ethical and methodological questions currently discussed in the discipline. The anthropologist who is forced to study his own culture will find it more difficult to objectify and dehumanize his own people. It is not as easy in the context of one's own society to maintain that a "professional" is exempt from values and has no responsibility for the solution of pressing problems. It would take a highly unresponsive researcher to continue to focus on long-range theoretical problems when he is forced to consider, as both social scientist and citizen, that his own world seems to be falling apart around him. He could no longer justify a lack of commitment while deriving

⁴ Some of the newly independent African countries have clearly defined these conditions. For example, research proposals must be submitted to the host government for approval; approval is contingent on the priority given problems dealing with development; once accepted, the investigator is usually bound to fulfill certain professional commitments to the host country's academic community; etc. Similar conditions will probably be established for American anthropologists working in ethnic enclaves in their own country.
professional benefits from his research among people who are in a position to make enforceable demands on his sense of responsibility to them. The experience of working within one’s own culture might render obsolete the problem of whether the anthropologist has the right to impose his values on someone else. Instead, the crucial question might well be “How can anthropology be used for explicitly humanistic rather than implicitly oppressive ends?”

Anthropologists who study their own societies will also add immeasurably to their theoretical understanding of mankind. It has been suggested that lack of fieldwork in the anthropologist’s own society is a measure of the anthropologist’s “dissociation” from his own culture and has probably led to distortion in his abilities to grasp another culture (Braroe and Hicks 1967:186). The American anthropologist’s research into his own culture would, ideally, correct the situation referred to by Hofer (1968:312): “It is almost symbolic that in the Smithsonian Institute, collections from all human cultures are housed in the Museum of Natural History with the exception of the culture of the ‘White Man in America’ which is displayed in the Museum of History and Technology.” We do not know to what extent the anthropologist’s lack of understanding of, and involvement in, his own culture has affected the development of theory and method in the discipline, but it may turn out that this social ignorance has seriously skewed perspective on other cultures.

For Third World anthropologists, it is obviously crucial, as noted above, to redefine the traditional view of themselves presented to them by Western scholars. This is necessary in order to identify the internal strengths and positive factors, as well as the weaknesses (see Murray 1971, Barbour 1970), so that the resources needed for far-reaching change can be effectively mobilized. Secondly, since much of the “objectivity” and anti-humanism of the past stemmed from the Western anthropologist’s unwillingness or inability to consider the allocation of power and how this affected the lives of the people studied, it is essential that Third World anthropologists have a clear understanding of the relationship between their own people and those with power who impinge upon them. It is not only unrealistic for Third World anthropologists to treat their own groups in isolation as did Western anthropologists in the past, but also exceedingly dangerous. Obviously, as noted above, the same anthropologist can function as both insider and outsider in different situations and in terms of different problems, or Third World and other anthropologists can collaborate on insider understanding of interlocking social systems, where this is feasible.5

Development of a methodology whereby insiders study their own culture, whether Euro-American or Third World, should help bring about the “decolonization” of the social sciences now being urged by radical social scientists (e.g., Stavenhagen 1971). It should also facilitate acceptance of perspectivism as a critical methodological assumption and of activism as a valid social scientific goal through offering a legitimization of contrasting views of reality and ends of research. It should lead to an understanding of the limits and dangers, as well as the possibilities, of “objectivity,” and it should sharpen awareness of personal and group interests and their influence on theory and action. Finally, a discipline developing out of such varied interests should help create conditions for a thoroughgoing and realistic understanding of processes of culture change.

CONCLUSION

Colonialism structured the relationship between anthropologists and non-Western peoples in the past. Fieldworkers conducted their studies as a form of privilege, one of many they exercised through membership in the dominant group. Their work was pursued in the interest of the colonizers in terms of the concepts and theories they developed as well as the roles they played.

The traditional anthropologist’s syndrome, defined by the roles of colonizer, outsider, and “objective” observer, was adaptive to an era now fading. The era of Western colonization and white supremacy is currently being challenged by revolutionary wars of liberation and revolutionary modes of thinking. The peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America and the ethnic minorities in North America are currently questioning the integrity of the anthropologist, forcing him to look critically at himself and reconsider some of his assumptions. The questions may be posed: Is anthropology a truly universal discipline? Can it be utilized for explicit self-study and self-knowledge by all peoples? Is it able to meet the challenge of oppressed people who seek solutions to their problems? Or is it useful only in providing information about powerless peoples to those in power? Is it to remain an adjunct to Western exploitation and manipulation of Third World peoples?

If anthropology is to adapt to the realities of the modern world, it will be necessary to approach the study of all men through a multiplicity of perspectives as these are influenced by different interests and needs. The views of both insider and outsider must be accepted as legitimate attempts to understand the nature of culture.

A view of man broadened by a perspectivistic knowledge must be defined by commitment to change and the solution of practical problems. As such it would expose those anthropologists who use objectivity and cultural relativism as a shield for self-interest and moral paralysis, and inhibit those who focus on theory at the expense of people and their real problems. The newly developed “primitives,” who were formerly fair game, are advising the anthropologist that he now has an obligation to them as well as to his discipline, and that the former must take priority. Soon, this will be the only condition under which fieldwork will be permitted.

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5 I am indebted to Charles Valentine (personal communication, 1971) for bringing this point to my attention.
The position taken here is that anthropology, because of its unfortunate colonialist history, has a serious responsibility to its former subjects. Its core of knowledge and insight, built out of exploitation of nonwhite and non-Western peoples, can no longer remain the sole preserve of the West. Anthropology, along with other social sciences, must develop a rationale which operates, in theory and in fact, in the interests of all peoples.

Abstract

Anthropology emerged from the colonial expansion of Europe. Colonialism structured the relationship between anthropologists and the people they studied and had an effect on methodological and conceptual formulations in the discipline. For example, the role of “objective outsider” with its resultant professional exploitation of subject matter can be viewed as an academic manifestation of colonialism. Some of the biases inherent in this role are examined.

With the liberation of formerly colonized peoples, the traditional role of the anthropologist has been undermined. This has resulted in an impasse between anthropologists and many of the people they formerly studied. The postcolonial era clearly calls for new roles for anthropologists and a more relevant set of methodologies and concepts. In the search for alternatives, consideration is given to the “native ethnography” of Europe and the insights springing from current educational innovations among Third World people in the United States. In this context, the advantages of a “native anthropology” are examined as one possible alternative.

Comments

by Xavier Albó

La Paz, Bolivia. 10 v 73

Besides the factors already mentioned by Lewis, another possible reason for the lack of awareness of colonialism among many anthropologists comes from their methodological insistence on small communities as self-contained entities. In recent years many authors have broadened their perspective, but this narrowness is still common. By the same token, many fail to see that what they call “cultures” are in fact merely deculturized subcultures oppressed by and hence dependent upon other, usually Western, groups and cultures (see Ribeiro 1970). Conversely, this insistence on the small community might be an indirect concession to colonial or neocolonial rule: in this microperspective, it is not necessary to come to grips with the risky yet crucial topic of colonialism.

I must also stress with Lewis that the primary commitment of anthropologists to their “academic community” is a potential source of colonialism if not of bias. From the viewpoint of the people studied, this means that “those foreigners come to study us as if we were insects, but they do not really care about us.” That is, the ethnologist may look like an entomologist. In the eyes of these people—or the more aware among them—the complaint of some anthropologists against ethnocide may look like fear of not having any more odd insects to study, rather than real concern. From the viewpoint of the local researcher, this means that most research is not locally available or even translated into the main local languages. (Think of the data gathered by huge field projects such as those in Chiapas or Vicos.) Not long ago, I suggested to a representative of a strong American foundation that translating foreign research into the language of the country studied would be a good and nonimperialistic service to that country. Apparently this is not feasible, perhaps because underneath the scientific colonialism there is an economic colonialism which is still harder to break. The result is one-sided research which is not acknowledged as such and which cannot be challenged from the inside perspective because it is simply unavailable. Since the main goal of many outsiders is “theory building and career advancement,” few anthropologists are really bothered by the lack of confrontation with local people and their real problems.

At least in Latin America, local researchers are often tied to the same sort of research colonialism. Many of our ethnic groups are either minorities or oppressed majorities within a given state. Most of them still lack conscious inside-elves such as those emerging among the Euro-American ethnic minorities or in the new African states. These groups are therefore studied by outsiders, including local people who belong to dominant groups and tend to have the perspective of such groups. These local researchers may be very sensitive to colonial aggression from foreign scientists and at the same time may have, probably unconsciously, the perspective of the internal colonialist. In a situation like this, a real inside anthropology is more difficult. The lower the prestige of a given culture (or subculture) within the state-country, the more difficult it is to find individuals willing to study their own heritage. They will rather try to imitate the ways of the dominant groups. Under these conditions, inside anthropology has to be somehow stimulated from outside. But even then, the starting point must be related to the actual expectations and needs of the ethnic group.

For all these reasons I endorse the suggestion of a perspectivistic inside approach to anthropology. The positivistic claim of complete outside objectiveness has been challenged, with good reason, in all the social sciences (see, for instance, Carr 1961). We must give credit to the former objective approach for the refinement it has pushed in the sciences which claim to interpret society. This is a goal and a method which must not be forgotten. Yet, if we cannot be 100% objective, being aware of our concrete conditions we become more objective; unaware of them, we are blind victims of our own subjectivism. Lewis suggests also the need for an activist anthropology “committed to radical change.” I agree. But this implies that the researcher has a given ideology which must be made explicit. If he is committed to change, he has to explain what his conception of change looks like and why. Then anthropological theory becomes praxis. Given the social condition of most groups studied by anthropologists, the most creative activist anthropology will probably emerge when the perspective is that which Wachtel (1971; cf. León-Portilla 1959) calls “la vision des vaincus.”

by Gerald Berthoud

Montreal, Canada. 10 v 73

One of the qualities of Lewis's paper is to be provocative. Any anthropologist, whatever his theoretical and
ideological-political positions, must be concerned. Given limited space, I will simply insist on what I regard as an important shortcoming of this paper.

Lewis is right in diagnosing a state of crisis in anthropology. Most often, however, she does not go beyond this; the essential underlying causes are neglected, if not ignored. Thus, methodology and theory are predominantly viewed by Lewis as a passive result of economic and political conditions. I would, rather, postulate that a critical anthropology must be based on a theoretical radicalism.

Lewis's paper is a good product of a developing movement in the United States, among anthropologists keenly conscious of their social responsibilities, which could be termed a humanistic or ethical approach. However, humanism, to be of some impact, must be linked with a theory within a dialectical framework. By raising such relevant questions as the so-called objectivity and neutrality of observers as outsiders, Lewis expresses some of the main problems in the production of anthropological knowledge, but does not explain them.

For instance, the Piagetian opposition between "objectivity" and "realism" seems to me more useful than the view that "objectivity" tends to turn people into objects (Piaget, quoted in Battro 1966:122, translation mine):1

"Objectivity consists in knowing so well the thousand intrusions which derive from it—illusions of the senses, language, points of view, values, etc.—that, to be allowed to judge, one starts to get free from the obstacles of oneself. Realism, on the contrary, consists in ignoring the existence of oneself and, consequently, in taking one's own view for immediately objective and absolute.

The "objectivity" described by Lewis results precisely from an illusory certitude and serves, consciously or not, as a "scientific" justification of the political and ideological status quo.

A lack of epistemological knowledge leads Lewis to various idealistic statements. There is a certain naiveté in believing that the simple change from outsider to insider will make all the difference. How, for example, are we to discriminate rigorously between "inside" and "outside" in an African context? The mere black-white opposition cannot account for the ethnic complexity of this continent. Moreover, insider anthropologists, like outsiders, are members of societies which are more and more diversified and thus marked by increasing inequality. What may be more important than a simplistic "insider-outsider" dichotomy are the political, ideological, and social positions of anthropologists.

Advocating that anthropologists work "in the interests of all peoples" by refusing to exploit nonwhite and non-Western peoples is an idealistic view which does not correspond to the actual collusion between the dominant classes of peripheral countries and highly developed capitalist centers at the expense of the laborers and peasants of Africa, Latin America, and elsewhere. How are we to understand this kind of internal colonialism? Why should an "insider" elite be so disdainful of the colonized so-called pagan, rural people?

Ethics and humanism are no more than value judgments unless they are articulated with a sound theoretical domain whose objective is precisely to warn researchers, insider or outsider, of the insidious attraction of ideology, which gives a distorted knowledge of any present social situation (i.e., imperialism, neocolonialism, "underdevelopment," poverty, etc.).

by DAVID BROKENSHA
Santa Barbara, Calif., U.S.A. 10 v 73
Lewis weakens her case by attacking too many targets: she deals with several important dilemmas in contemporary anthropology, but obscures the real danger by her scattergun tactics. I single out some major themes for comment.

1. Is it true that "[the anthropologist] rarely questioned or studied the process of confrontation"? Despite the widely held belief that anthropologists ignored colonialism, specific examples introduce some questions. Fortes and Evans-Pritchard (1940:15) say: "[These societies] would not acquiesce in [European rule] if the threat of force were withdrawn." And nearly all the contributors to their book, in analysing traditional African political systems, deal explicitly with effects of colonial rule (pp. 46-55, 65-68, 112-20, 162, 180-81, 240).

Busia (1951), Fallers (1956), Gluckman (1958), Richards (1960), and Wilson (1936) have all examined, in considerable detail and in forthright terms, the effects of colonial rule on chiefs and farmers. While these books were published during the colonial period, other important books dealing with the same topic have appeared in recent years—

e.g., Beattie (1971:chaps. 4 and 10), Crowder and Ikime (1970), and Turnberry (1971). Further references on anthropologists and applied anthropology may be found in Brokensha (1966), Firth (1947), and Mair (1960). Anthropologists did not turn away from the facts of colonialism: indeed it is ironic that such frank and critical studies of administration would not be tolerated in many contemporary independent nations that succeeded the colonial territories.

Many well-known monographs contain only passing references to colonial rule. This is not surprising when one considers that anthropologists concentrated—for reasons that at the time seemed compelling, and still appear valid to me—on the more remote regions, where colonial rule was generally intermittent and weak. Whether the studies were more democratic, romantic escapism or salvage anthropology, most studies of kinship, witchcraft, or village agriculture did not need to stress colonialism. I know from my own experience in East, Central, and West Africa that some areas were relatively little affected by colonial rule, while others suffered traumatic changes. Colonialism was not a uniform and monolithic process.

2. "People have a right to state the terms on which they will be studied." (I shall ignore Lewis's more extreme suggestion that "the right to observe and define their culture be theirs alone."). The problem here is who is to determine these terms, especially when Lewis explicitly advocates activism. What happens when there are competing factions, or when a change of government seems the only hope for change? To whom does the anthropologist turn for directions?

3. Lewis rightly stresses the need for insider-outsider cooperation. For many years I have worked closely in the field with African high-school and university students, as well as with African scholars: for example, I recently edited a book with contributions from nine Ghanaian and nine expatriate scholars (Brokensha 1972). Cooperation can concentrate on peaceful scholarly tasks, although a man of conscience will in addition find himself involved in countless "real-life" situations with his hosts—and those situations can, and should, continue long after the fieldwork is over.

4. Colonialism did not abruptly stop at national independence. Colonial attitudes unfortunately often persist in Third World leaders and students, many of whom display a depressing elitism; insiders are not necessarily more concerned about the welfare of the people than are outsiders. Surely
we must recognize, in these sorts of discussions, that, where anthropologists are rejected, it is not simply because of hostility and suspicion arising from their colonial role. Many nations exclude anthropologists through fear of accurate social analyses of the new sorts of discrimination and the widening gulf between ruler and ruled. While we can, fortunately, still practice our craft in many countries, we should not ignore the widespread instances where arbitrary and oppressive governments manipulate information for their own purposes.

Finally, I draw attention to Firth's (1972:26-27) statement that "anthropology is not the bastard of colonialism but the legitimate offspring of the Enlightenment." Firth suggests that "despite their failings, social anthropologists have on the whole been at least as competent and perceptive as factory inspectors" [from whom "Marx drew so heavily for his generalizations on the capitalist system"]—"and perhaps have worked harder and suffered more."

by RICHARD FUCHT
Edmonton, Canada. 18 v 73

This paper is the latest in a recent spate of anthropological self-criticisms occasioned by the anticapitalist and anticolonial sentiments and activities that have finally reached our discipline. Of all the disciplines which deal with humankind, anthropology seems to be caught in an unresolved contradiction. The traditional ethnographic basis is being challenged within and without the discipline, the subjects of ethnography resist becoming objectified and encapsulated, and increasingly students and teachers alike are reconsidering the traditional roles of the discipline. Lewis proposes a solution to this contradiction: perspectivistic knowledge. This is, however, only a partial solution, and not the first step towards a resolution of our dilemma. Given the colonial and imperial conditions under which anthropology developed and continues to exist today, anthropologists will be caught not only in the contradiction of insider versus outsider, but in the graver conflict between exploited and exploiter. Is it really true that the greatest contribution of our discipline to science is the corpus of ethnography, or is it time that we began to question integrity and validity of ethnographies done outside the context of domination and exploitation? The problems Lewis and others recognize will perhaps only be overcome in a world devoid of the inequalities of power, production, and consumption that exist today as part of the system of capitalist imperialism.

by EDWARD M. BRUNER
 Urbana, Ill., U.S.A. 18 iv 73

Unless we train more Third World anthropologists to study in Third World countries, we shall never have the opportunity to test Lewis's ideas. In Indonesia, for example, a nation of 120 million people, forming approximately 300 different ethnolinguistic groups, there was until the early 1970s only one Indonesian Ph.D. in anthropology. The situation is slowly being corrected, as a second anthropologist has returned to Indonesia after receiving his doctorate in Australia, a third has just passed his preliminary examinations at Illinois, and others are in various stages of training.

The Euro-American anthropologist is beginning to recognize the colonial context within which he has operated in the past, he acknowledges the exploitive nature of his relationship to his informants, and he realizes the implicit racism and the invidious comparison involved in such distinctions as primitive-civilized and traditional-modern. What to do? He can retreat to the study of his own culture, and the difficulties of obtaining funding for overseas research may force many to do so. Another alternative is to continue to train Third World anthropologists, but to do so creatively, by involving himself and his students in cooperative investigations of problems relevant to the Third World countries themselves. The Euro-American anthropologist can, in my opinion, work jointly with Third World anthropologists on terms acceptable to both parties. Although all of us are less optimistic and more beset by doubts than we were a decade ago, I believe with Koentjaraningrat (1964:295) that "despite its original Euro-American bias, . . . anthropology [is] the most suitable of all the social sciences for providing the basic scientific discipline for studying social processes in the new Asian and African countries."

by HELMUTH FUCHS
Toronto, Canada. 16 iv 73

From an idealistic point of view Lewis's article is a magnificent piece of work. It invokes "the realities of the modern world," yet it does not bring us into the Third World. Two opposing sets of terms are used to depict the covert political reality of anthropology and colonialism. On the one side, there are United States, West, Europe, America, colonizer, developed, white, and Euro-American. On the other side, there are Third World, non-Western, black, underdeveloped, Africa, poverty, primitive, ethnic minorities in the United States, colonized, Asia, and Latin America. Concepts like East, rich, corrupt, empire are kept out of the discussion.

Today nobody is misled by geographical, developmental, and racial terms, since most newspaper-reading anthropologists know the political realities very well. The acknowledgments of this hurting anthropologist and anthropologist dissertations show clearly from which of the two sets the financial and human resources of anthropology are coming and where the benefits are going. It is then only a small step to find out where supporting foundations invest their monies in order to provide for research. Further, it is easy to discover how high finance generates the wealth which supplies the foundations. This is the growth-ridden system in which some anthropologists are left with the bitter aftertaste of having either helped to betray native peoples' neo-systems or, by refusing to do so, terribly disappointed their own administration (Fuchs 1972a). It is therefore not surprising that those peoples who, despite the anthropologist's immense financial resources (as compared to theirs), offer hospitality and information will sooner or later be induced to pay in one form or another the entire cost of both the
research project and its consequences (Fuchs 1972b). But, what is an academic expected to do, if he depends on a system in which the same group of persons sits simultaneously on the boards of banks, communication media, corporations, churches, universities, research foundations, and in government?

Lewis's conclusion that "anthropology, along with other social sciences, must develop a rationale which operates, in theory and in fact, in the interests of all peoples" sounds like political hogwash. It is as futile as committees on ethics in anthropology or ethics in acquisitions of collections, which function only within and for the system in which they originated. Would Lewis have been able to publish this article otherwise? Would I, otherwise, have been in a position to write this comment?

If there is any real conflict between anthropology and the system which allows it to thrive, the solution will have to come from outside of both, and neither of them will find it acceptable.

by Jiřka Junková

Prague, Czechoslovakia. 19 VI 73

The problem of anthropology or ethnography (in my view) is much wider than mentioned by the author; it does not merely concern the relations between the so-called native inhabitants of the "non-Western" world and the "white" scholars doing their research in that field. Some tension will always be present between the anthropologist and the person studied, but in my opinion fewer problems arise, as the interest in the given problem is predominantly scientific.

The description of data is most important in present-day anthropology. But every anthropologist—after some time—begins to combine with his description his own critical evaluation, and in fact collects data in terms of his method, which also often involves interpretation. Perhaps that is the main reason that the student, working only in a narrow sphere, records data without the necessary critical evaluation; this can be achieved only by experience. "Nonwhite" scholars who treat the theme of their native culture may also have this problem. In the first phase of education, there is usually a departure from one's own native culture and an attachment to the culture of a higher civilizational level. In the second phase, the anthropologist tries to find his way back by critical evaluation of the historical development of his own homeland. In this direction lies the future of anthropology conducted by "nonwhite" anthropologists. Otherwise, the results of the research may be restricted to historical studies, etc., for anthropology must have its firm basis in comparative method. Maybe this is also one of the reasons that anthropology so far has been mainly the domain of the "whites," who in their studies of a particular country may assert their own ambitions, defend colonialism, and racism, and sometimes even unconsciously serve tendencies they themselves deny.

The process of acquiring knowledge about man is among the most complex and most complicated of human endeavours; therefore it is necessary to take into account the fact that there will be, on the one hand, anthropologists who will make of colonial research only a profit-making business and, on the other hand, those who in their romantic approach pay too little attention to negative features of the area investigated. Even those of us who study the culture of our own countries have had to go through a period of romantic glorification. We can compare this situation to the historical development of thinking in Europe: after the critical attitude of the Enlightenment towards popular cultures, Romanticism began to glorify some that were not always very valuable.

by Gilbert Kushner

Tampa, Fla., U.S.A. 3 V 73

I'm not sure if I write this as an insider or outsider, and I think at least part of my uncertainty (a failing from which Lewis, happily for her, seems not to suffer) arises from ambiguities in Lewis's extremely relevant paper. This may suggest that it is not so much anthropology which is in crisis, but rather some anthropologists, perhaps especially those who rationalize that they were "forced to pose" as something else (are there really any such?). Lewis's apparent need to speak in terms of highly generalized categories such as "the anthropologist" doesn't make her argument more convincing. Of course some anthropologists have been and are now colonialists, but that does not demonstrate or even suggest that "objectivity" and "outsiderism" are related in any way to colonialism. And one need not reify culture in order to argue that people in poverty must change their culture rather than the larger sociocultural context that causes it to arise and be maintained. Indeed, one may even be a political radical, as Oscar Lewis was, and still uphold a culture-of-poverty point of view. To blame this and other sorts of social ills on the culture concept, or on the notion of cultural relativism, is itself the height of reification.

As Lewis seems to suggest, one may be an observer, or a participant observer, and never become an activist. I don't doubt that one might even be an activist, but in causes other than those Lewis would espouse, and therefore be ruled out of the trade. Similarly, I would argue, adopting Maquet's "perspectivist knowledge" position does not guarantee that one's activity, as insider or outsider, would be satisfactory to Lewis. And I'm not convinced that being an insider necessarily means that one becomes accountable to the community or that one is thereby "forced through self-interest to exercise discretion," or that one automatically becomes more insightful than an outsider, or that one's work becomes "more pragmatically problem-oriented." There is a vast difference between ideological adherence to these and other principles or perspectives and the real activities of individual anthropologists. One must still, I suspect, become an activist insider of a certain persuasion to satisfy Lewis.

The history of man is unfortunately replete with situations in which insiders objectified and dehumanized their "own peoples" and in which insiders and outsiders have been quick to define "explicitly humanistic... ends" for others; ends over which these others have little, if any, control (see, e.g., Kushner 1973). Why will anthropologists and anthropology, judged guilty of supporting colonialism by Lewis, suddenly change course simply through individuals' doing fieldwork among their own people? Who are one's own people anyway? Probably not European peasant villagers studied by urbanite European ethnologists. Must I be examined by Lewis first, identified by whatever measures she has in mind, and then be set loose on my "own people"? Is allegiance to and identification with the species permissible?

I insist on the freedom to make my own mistakes (Tax 1956), appeals to humanitarian interests of all peoples and other ambiguous verities notwithstanding.

by Khalil Nakhleh

Collegeville, Minn., U.S.A. 25 IV 73

I felt an affinity for Lewis's article for two reasons: first, some of her views here parallel mine (see Nakhleh 1973); second, I am a native anthropologist who is at present carrying out research in his own culture.

The genesis of anthropology and its intimate connection with colonialistic schemes have been documented more than once, and Lewis's article is an
excellent addition to that body of literature. Since the problems this kind of intimacy creates have been recognized by the practitioners themselves, a scheme for action is already overdue.

Colonialism means exploitation of resources, be they in the ground or in the heads of men. It also means dichotomization between superiors and inferiors. The seminal question for anthropology, therefore, is how to prevent the creation of the potential for exploitation while studying people. Shifting the traditional orientation to the "perspectivistic" approach, as Lewis suggests, is an imperative and admirable tack, but it should not be the ultimate goal. This is but a transitional stage, during which the potential of exploitation may still threaten. My premise makes sense if one keeps in mind that the description of cultural systems at a frozen moment in time, which ultimately leads to structural stereotypes, is another form of exploitation.

To reduce the potential for exploitation, the traditional domain of anthropology, i.e., the study of non-Western cultures (by the Westerners), should be redefined. A moratorium should be imposed on crossing cultural bounds to study a culture. A distinction has to be made here between two goals: (1) describing a given culture with the nebulous aim of understanding human nature in general and (2) action anthropology—studying a given group in order to help it delineate a specific set of problems and find possible solutions. Although Goal 1 is methodologically possible for the outsider anthropologist, it is doubtful whether the discipline can afford the luxury. Goal 2 cannot and should not be approached by outsider anthropologists. I am convinced that if anthropologists are to consider the welfare of the "subjects" of their studies as paramount, thus eliminating exploitation, they have to be motivated by more than a professional degree; they have to share in the problems of those "subjects."

by XTO G. OKOJE

Irrua, Nigeria. 8 v 73

Lewis's "Anthropology and Colonialism" is a brilliant study, and I find myself agreeing with almost every sentence she has used in describing a sordid and vexing subject. Indeed, there is a crisis; this is not surprising, nor are the causes far to seek. Anthropological fieldworkers, ethnographers, foreign newspaper reporters, etc., have cut a sorry figure in the developing world. Often they went round to the remotest villages taking disparaging photographs to show barbarism and stressing the moral and cultural inferiority of the African. Whatever materials white scholars got were invariably coloured to suit the "white taste" so that they would be read. Both the missionaries who went ahead of the colonial masters to "soften" the minds of the subject races and white writers described our religion as pagan, to the extent that no Westernized native of the Third World will appear at an ancestral shrine—the repository of our oral traditions and way of life! The more these elite natives drifted from their native culture, the more ridiculous they became—neither Europeans nor Africans! Further, by virtue of the anthropologists' belonging to the group in power, they could get into societies which to a native enquirer would be forever barred and get all the information they wanted.

There were three main sources of errors in what these early workers collected: (1) Being members of the governed race, the Africans often agreed with or were swayed to the anthropologists' line of thought. (2) In the early 50s when some educated radical informants had started to recognize and resent these preferential treatments, they taught their people either to give evasive answers or to "cook up" something after "deliberations with our elders" (Okojie 1960:8). Thomas (1910:138), obliquely and in the language of the group in power, supported these first two sources of errors when he wrote:

It is frequently asserted that the chief characteristic of the savage is, his readiness to tell you what he thinks you want to know, regardless whether the information thus supplied corresponds to the facts or not. . . He does however, realise in all probability, that the questioner does not understand what he is talking about.

(3) How often have we heard how all-powerful editors put articles in a way that would excite interest in the home country of the anthropologist! For instance, any talk on Africa not laced with phrases like "witch doctor," "natives in their grass skirts," etc., would be unnatural. A situation that engenders more resentment in the African intellectual is hard to imagine. We in Africa have always found an underlying political innuendo in most writings of white workers. A few months ago a Canadian journalist, after visiting Nigeria, wrote of its capital, Lagos, as the "city where nothing works." If Lagos, the capital of Black Africa's giant Nigeria, is a city in chaos, smaller African countries boasting of independence must be farcical! Con-

sistenty, the portrait white anthropologists who conduct fieldwork in a political setting have always painted is not only of the African as a primitive but also of the society to which he belongs as politically, socially, and economically inferior. Black American rejection of the work by whites is akin to African rejection of the history of African countries written by whites during colonial days. Even the few books written by early African intellectuals had to be written in the same vein in order to get a publisher. The mind of present-day Africans and the extent of the crisis Lewis speaks of are aptly illustrated by a recent statement by Nigeria Federal Commissioner for Health Alhaji Aminu Kano (Daily Times, May 2, 1973):

The Federal Commissioner for Health Alhaji Aminu Kano, regretted that the disunity now known in the Country originated from deliberately twisted history of Nigeria written by Colonial Authors and only dished out to Nigerian Scholars who had no opportunity of verifying such history. Those authors who came to Nigeria in the guise of Missionaries wrote the "so-called" history of Nigeria to satisfy their Colonial selfish ends, thereby creating room for suspicion and hatred among Nigerians.

by MAXWELL OWUSU

Sacramento, Calif., U.S.A. 18 v 73

Lewis's stimulating article follows a very long and continuing tradition of scholarly debate concerning the grounds—notably the sociology—of knowledge and the nature of sociocultural reality. The general and intricate problem of "objectivity" in social research, the relationship between ideas and interests, the constant search for socially "useful" knowledge, particularly in periods of rapid social change or political upheaval, transcend the rather brief historical, albeit dehumanising and shattering, experience of "natives" associated with Euro-colonialism. The symbiotic relationship between Western scholarship, including science and technology, and Western control and domination of non-Western peoples is now well established.

I share with many concerned anthropologists the basic views presented with unusual candour and sympathy by Lewis. I have, indeed, addressed myself (Owusu 1971 a, b, n.d., 1972) to the fundamental issues raised by the study of "natives" of Africa and the Americas by white "outsiders." My primary interest has been with the validity of anthropology's traditional claims to be scientific, based not so much on

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the obviously mistaken methodological assumption that "there is a single valid objective" and complete knowledge, the search for which is the principal aim of anthropology, as on the crucial consideration that anthropological statements and conclusions either must follow from the definitions of the terms—are logically and analytically true—or, as empirical statements, must be verifiable or falsifiable in the Popperian sense. The verification rule (the free application of the regular procedures of scientific investigation: accuracy of observation, controlled comparison, the correctness of reasoning, etc.) pertains eventually to the further claim of anthropology to be "objective" and a branch of natural science (Naturwissenschaften). The idealists (humanists) fiercely challenge this view and, instead, see anthropology as a branch of history, philosophy, or art (Geisteswissenschaften).

We all know the great difficulty, even after first-class anthropological training, in attempting to describe and analyse systematically and unambiguously human societies, particularly alien ones, and the dangers inherent in naive empiricism and uncontrolled "subjectivism." In studying human societies, we are really studying ourselves, and the anthropologist invariably finds himself having to fall back on his own personal genius, integrity, judgment, imagination, and experience, based always on community (both academic and nonacademic) values and pressures and often implicitly on absolute ethical judgments.

All anthropology has always been done from a particular value position, a discoloured perspective, subject to the so-called Michelson-Morley effect by which what is observed changes with the position of the observer. All our accounts are necessarily incomplete, mostly time- and situation-bound, a little distorted, and—provided the canons of logic and common sense are not grossly infringed—more or less valid or true. As Firth puts it, "ethnographic facts may be irrelevant—it does not matter whether [if incidents] get the facts wrong so long as they can argue the theories logically" (1970:vii).

Nevertheless, it is not so much facts (often indistinguishable from fantasies) as popular, taken-for-granted, circular theories, e.g., the natural superiority of Europeans, that significantly shape our world views and behaviour toward others. Thus, the "multidimensional view of reality" or "perspectivistic knowledge" recommended by Lewis as part of the solution to the current anthropological crisis is really part of an age-old methodological problem; nor does the mere appeal to anthropologists to be more committed to radical change (which may be in the service of the status quo) and the solution of practical problems of Third World peoples, however commendable, go far enough. At a recent college-wide symposium on my present campus, after the panel of largely concerned Third World professors had detailed the case against Western exploitation and oppression of non-European peoples, an equally concerned, elderly black man from the audience stood up and, angrily and in the most obscene terms, stressed that poor and oppressed peoples did not need well-off college professors to remind them of their misery. To him, the primary functions of anthropology—the search for and the dissemination of truth about all peoples and consciousness raising—are only remotely important. There are only two proven weapons against colonialism—imperialism, organised political unity and armed struggle.

Mair once said (1934:288, italics added): "The position of the person who sets up to know what is good for somebody else is not an enviable one: his motives are always suspect. It is embarrassing to find oneself uttering, in all honesty, one of the texts which are most frequently cited by the devil for his purpose." However, anthropologists qua anthropologists sincerely interested in doing something about the welfare of underprivileged peoples might begin with a massive assault on the twin theoretical pillars of popular and academic racism: the Enlightenment belief in the inevitable progress of mankind headed and controlled by the "white master race" and the organic theory of evolution, with its still dominant sociopolitical versions—Social Darwinism and Social-Imperialism—Cultural-Relativism—which in giving birth to modern anthropology divorced mankind into two hostile, mutually exclusive groups: congenitally "inferior" nonwhites and naturally "superior" whites, one of the events which have occurred to anthropologists that the basic terms, e.g. "tribes," "primitive," "simple," or "uncivilized" societies as opposed to "civilized" or "national" societies, which inform the academic curriculum are not primarily cognitive scientific categories but invidious and propagandist in intent. Lewis's "perspectivistic knowledge" might provide an answer to such terminological and other "scientific" problems in anthropology. As W. E. B. DuBois once said, until the lions have their own historians (anthropologists), the tales will continu
The position of the intellectual in modern industrial society is very labile. The intelligentsia is neither a class nor even a social stratum. It is only a set of individuals of a certain degree of education who do mostly intellectual work (creation, extension, and application of values). The feeling of group solidarity is rather weak, i.e., the possibilities of pressure are limited to individual protests, which can easily be hushed up. A well-organized strike of workers in a branch producing values destined for immediate consumption can quickly break the resistance of employers or politicians. The intelligentsia has no such possibilities, the values it creates being too abstract or consumed after too long a time. Also, a deep-rooted elitism deprives the intelligentsia of its natural allies. Therefore the intelligentsia is the most, and most often, afflicted category of citizens.

I do not want my contribution to end pessimistically. The present crisis of industrial society is only a sign of the scientific-technical revolution, of a transition to a higher degree of civilization. The developed postindustrial society will have another social structure, other problems and ways of working. If we want to lead anthropology out of the blind alley, we must seek ways that correspond to the epoch of the scientific-technical revolution and try to get financial independence, ideological nonalignment, and political immunity for our discipline. We must work hard to overcome boundaries and barriers, which have no business in science. Last but not least, we must be aware, always and everywhere, that there is only one mankind.

by HUBERT REYNOLDS

Dumaguete City, Philippines. 15 VII 73

Isn’t it better to limit the so-called crisis in anthropology to the Third World? As part of the Third World here in the Philippines, I prefer not to overstate the case.

Some of the “protest” content of Lewis’s position paper is understandable and should receive sympathetic support—but why weaken the case by utilizing the old card-stacking technique? Where are references to anthropologists like Oscar Lewis and to the whole development approach in the field? And why contrast “objectivity” with “involvement”? While in the process of field research all biases must be under control and limited for understanding the culture from the cultural premises of the insider, then, after the data has been processed for valid conclusions, values may enter in projects of applied anthropology, with the involvement of both outsider and insider.

There is, however, a positive constructive suggestion in perspectivistic approaches to field research and to commitment to the solving of practical problems. In the developing countries there is a great need for just such approaches. Lewis deserves to be congratulated for shouting attention to it.

Anthropology has many affinities with other disciplines. In the applied field, I am convinced, developmental social work has much to offer in practical techniques for assisting in solving practical problems. Particular attention should be drawn to the “new community organization” of Arthur Dunham of the University of Michigan. Tasks goals need the process goals of participation and the relationship goals of overcoming the old paternalism and overdependency if neocolonialism is to be avoided.

by TAKAO SOFUE

Tokyo, Japan. 8 v 73

I am glad that this fundamental problem of anthropologists’ ethics is now being discussed in CA. For several years this has been a very popular subject of discussion in Japan, too, even among the general public. Kawasaki Honda, an anthropologically oriented news reporter, visited Negro communities and Indian tribes of the United States in 1969 and wrote an article in a Japanese newspaper (reprinted in Honda 1970) on their very unhappy situation. In this article, he quotes an Indian as saying that the anthropologists who visited the reservation were only interested in writing Ph.D. theses and did not do any research really useful for Indians (Honda 1970:241). This article and his subsequent discussions on anthropologists’ roles toward “powerless” natives (Honda 1971a:188–208; 1971b: 59–76) aroused various reactions in Japan from intellectuals and anthropologists as well (e.g., Konishi 1972). The relationship between Japanese anthropologists and the Ainus of Hokkaido had been criticized by the Ainus themselves and by some graduate students of anthropology, who pointed out the danger that Japanese anthropology might help possible Japanese imperialism in the future. All these problems have been the subject of long disputes, and the content of these discussions is largely the same as pointed out in Lewis’s paper. I also agree with the author that the dominant political interests of the times may influence the anthropologists’ own viewpoints.

However, I cannot agree with Lewis in her emphasis on the possibility of anthropologists’ analyzing their own cultures. In Japan, the study of customs in Japanese villages has been conducted by members of the Japanese Folklore Society since the 1930s, under the influence of similar studies in Europe. After the World War II, rural sociologists and anthropologists joined this trend, and I myself have mostly been engaged in this kind of research. In my own experience, however, the study of one’s own culture has a very clear limitation. As I have said elsewhere (Sofue 1960:312), everyone has his own “cultural blind spots,” and many important phases of his own culture strike him as too commonplace to note and are not observed closely. Especially when he deals with psychological aspects, the task is similar to analyzing his own personality, and hence he may consciously or unconsciously avoid noticing some very basic characteristics. Therefore, it is often the case that these features can only be discovered by observers from the outside. Ruth Benedict’s The Chrysanthemum and the Sword, published in 1946, is well accepted and widely read among the Japanese general public even today because it points out many basic traits of the national culture and personality which the Japanese themselves had never been aware of. Therefore, I believe that only collaboration between the inside observer and the outside observer can produce satisfactory results.

by MILAN STUCHLIK

Temuco, Chile. 15 v 73

I agree with Lewis’s diagnosis. She has taken one important step: the majority of discussions dealing with involvement, commitment, value-free versus value-laden approaches, etc., treat the problem as a problem in normative ethics. Anthropologists, it is said, should not side, consciously or unconsciously, with colonialism and should feel committed to the interests of the groups they are studying. This commitment is usually seen as opposed to scientific objectivity; we should do what is morally right, even if it means lowering the standards of objectivity.

Lewis points out that this is just not so: however hostile or sympathetic an anthropologist may be to the interests of the group he is studying, he is basically an outsider. As such, he is
collecting data, analysing them, and drawing explanatory conclusions according to canons and procedures which may be (and usually are) totally alien to the reality of that group. This, in itself, is understandable and not invalid: it becomes so, however, if (as normally happens) the conclusions are presented as the objective interpretation of reality. In such a case, objectivity becomes largely a myth. While studying myths and beliefs and their behavioural and cognitive consequences among native peoples, we consistently refuse to examine the cognitive consequences of our own myths. I think Lewis makes this abundantly clear.

Agreeing as I do with Lewis’s diagnosis, however, I find it somewhat difficult to agree with her prognosis, basically for two reasons. First, it is permissible to present outsider anthropologists as a homogeneous unity, since the possible internal heterogeneity of their sociocultural environment is largely irrelevant; they personify a general “outside” for the group they study. I doubt that it is permissible to present insider anthropologists as equally homogeneous. Upon closer examination they will be seen as committed not to their society as a whole, but to some specific power or pressure group within it; and in their case the internal heterogeneity of their sociocultural environment becomes very relevant. The outsider-insider difference may be not so much a dichotomy as a continuum.

My second reason has to do with what Lewis calls the perspectivistic approach. Since the outsider lacks the perception of the internal reality of the group he is studying, and since he lacks the detachment necessary for reporting cold facts, we should take both views as necessary components of a complete explanation. Isn’t this a somewhat jigsaw-puzzle conception of objectivity? Perhaps, instead of trying to construe a complex picture by combining opposing particularistic interpretations, we should try to study more consistently what makes them particularistic.

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by Renate von Gizycki
Kassel-Wilhelmshöhe, Germany. 14 v 73
Indeed, “anthropology is in a state of crisis.” Recent examples from Thailand (see, e.g., Jones 1971) have shown the possible misuse of anthropological knowledge, and Wounded Knee has again demonstrated that anthropology can do to help minorities even within a country where it is held in high esteem, well represented at universities, and well funded. Anthropology is by no means a “science for the people.” As professional and academic ambition is now almost daily confronted with the “natural” (which I prefer to call social and political) limitations of our field, this problem will have to be faced even by the advocates of “value-free research” and “pure science”: their “objects” are simply disappearing, either by extermination—as in many parts of Latin America (see the Declaration of Barbados)—or by an emancipation to which few researchers have lent a helping hand. Much as I appreciate sound conceptualization, I doubt whether the relations between colonialism (or, for that matter, imperialism) and anthropology can adequately be discussed on an abstract and a historical basis (e.g., Horvath 1972). Some questions I would like to discuss in more detail

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by Arthur J. Vidich
New York, N.Y., U.S.A. 15 v 73
Anthropology, for most of its history, has been relatively free of criticism from both the primitives it has studied and dissident colleagues within its ranks (Vidich 1966). Within the past few years, a dramatic reversal has occurred, and “anthropology” has been accused of monstrous misbehavior with respect to its politics, humanity, morals, ethics, and scientific objectivity. The crisis of anthropology, say its new critics, requires no less than the rethinking, reinventing, or rebirth of the discipline. Lewis’s eschatology casts her in the double role of moririan for the old, coopted anthropology and midwife for the new anthropology. The question is how this new anthropology differs from the old.

The idea that anthropology may be of instrumental value is not new and runs through all of Western social science. Instrumentalism in anthropology has been expressed as a claim to be both the synthesizing science that would embrace all of mankind and a policy science capable of solving mankind’s problems. It has been assumed that the anthropologist himself is free of the biases, self-interest, and instrumental values associated with the ordinary mortals he studies and advises. While Lewis serves the useful purpose of exposing these claims as false, it is not clear how the new anthropology solves the problem of defining a new set of values for anthropology.

There is nothing in anthropology as such that can guarantee that its values are independent of itself and its practitioners. While this idea has come relatively late to anthropology, Lewis recognizes it and uses it as the basis for her criticism and as the grounds for reconceiving anthropology in terms of another set of values known as “perspectivistic knowledge.” According to Lewis, perspectivistic knowledge “views reality from the particular existential position occupied by the observer.” In addition, perspectivistic knowledge means “that the possibilities of understanding are infinite and closely linked with [the anthropologist’s] position.”

By definition all anthropologists, past and present, have viewed their realities from their particular existential positions. It is also true that there are many forms of understanding and that these are relative to the observer’s situation and purpose. Perspectivistic knowledge thus appears to be constrained only by the purposes of the investigator. Since investigators may have many different purposes, anthropology embraces all these purposes without intrinsic ethical or moral limitations. Lewis’s substitution of values is not a solution to the problem and may in fact lead to deeper forms of corruption and opportunism than already exist within the professional ranks.

Lewis conceives of anthropology as an instrumental value that can serve her own purposes and values. In this respect, she is no different from many of those whom she criticizes, and perspectivistic knowledge amounts to nothing new except that it offers a new basis for claims to legitimacy.

In the past, social science, including anthropology, has made its claim for the right to exist on the grounds that freedom of inquiry was itself an instrumental value. Western society has accepted this claim for several centuries, but, as Bensman and Lilienfeld (1972:152) have noted, “if the logic of the need for freedom for science is consistent, then there is nothing in science, per se, that requires freedom for anyone else except the scientist, or even the scientist of one particular school of thought within the discipline.” In anthropology, this means that investigators may gain their freedom at the expense of their subjects. It may also mean that anthropologists may lose their freedom to colleagues who proclaim themselves to be the newly legitimate philosopher-kings of professional and political affairs.

To this observer, who still places credence in the idea of free inquiry, it would appear to be immoral and unethical to be both an anthropologist and a revolutionary, for to attempt to be both at once simultaneously corrupts two otherwise independently honorably professions.
with the author: Will permitting "the tables to be turned" really contribute much to ending the dehumanizing process of objectification? The myth of "objectivity" needs dismantling, I agree; but will a "perspectivist" approach really be sufficient to cope with it? Doesn't it, rather, allow the ideal of "objective truth" (see, e.g., Myrdal 1969) to return somehow through the back door? And how many perspectives add up to the full picture? Too little attention might still be paid to historical and socioeconomic dimensions, including the colonial or imperialistic structure of relationship between the observer and his "object."

Another methodological point: Where and when is the anthropologist an insider? What about class and language barriers, the "elaborated code" of science? The problem of identification and of reference group remains to be solved. These questions may possibly be summarized thus: Will anthropology in the end become, and have to become, just another social science? Still, with Diamond (1964), I would believe in certain contributions of anthropology to man's knowledge about himself, provided anthropologists are ready to "objectify" not only dependent and small peoples from distant cultures but the norms of their own societies, among others the ideology of anthropology. Just as I cannot quite accept the inside-outside alternative, I doubt whether theory and practice are of mutually exclusive importance. You cannot really do without a comprehensive conceptual framework if you wish to tackle relevant problems, for instance, the survival not just of anthropology but of its "objects." An interesting report from North Vietnam (Le Van Hao 1972) deals, from an ethnographic point of view, with the practical problem of integrating hill-tribe minorities and involves a theory of culture and national identity as well as socioeconomic development in this society. The ethnologist is interested in the traditions of the village people and at the same time is engaged in developing conditions of life, much in the way Caulfield (1972) has suggested, as a "partisan participant." As a socialist cadre, he identifies with the needs of the people, they being part of his society. Obviously, a more comprehensive theory (see, e.g., Ribeiro 1971) of integration and participation or, for that matter, partial autonomy (see, e.g., Fall 1960) is needed for decisions as to how and to what extent this process should be influenced. In this case unprejudiced use is even being made of earlier French colonial research data; ingroup and outgroup perspective are thus interrelated, not in the sense that necessarily different people have to represent them, but by a social and political theory (in this case Marxist) which does not stop at "middle-range." Perhaps on first sight this looks rather like the Thaiiland example; however, the Mien in Vietnam, for example, have apparently been "offered" neither reservations, camps, nor jobs as mercenaries or plantation coolies. Does this model work? That would be worthwhile studying; but who would fund it? This again turns our attention to the social conditions of our own anthropological work, another worthy research project for committed scholars. Should we invite Africans to help us with it? Or would this, as the author, in a very subtle analysis of racism under the cover of idealization, shows, imply just a more refined form of colonialism?

Reply

by Diane K. Lewis

Santa Cruz, Calif., U.S.A. 20 VII 73

I agree with those who stress the complexities of the issues raised in this paper and will attempt to clarify some of them. The proposals for insider anthropology and for perspectivism have been critically appraised. With regard to the first, Berthoud, Kushner, Stuchlik and Von Gisycki ask, "How does one define the insider?" and Albö, Berthoud, Brokensha, Frucht, Kushner, and, by implication, Fuchs ask, "How is one assured that the insider, once identified, is any less exploitative than the outsider?"

Insider anthropology, in which "insider" at present is synonymous with the traditional objects of anthropological research, is offered as a possible corrective for the human suffering and theoretical biases concomitant with much outsider anthropology. The status of insider is situationally and operationally defined by the individual in the context of and in interaction with a particular group. The individual has a conscious sense of self which the group he/she wishes to work with either recognizes or does not. The fact that many attributes make up one's sense of identity and others' evaluation of that identity may complicate the matter, but certain attributes are more determinative in a particular situation than others. Thus, among North American minorities at present, ethnicity is a strong unifying force with high salience; there is probably little difficulty in arriving at consensus as to who is an insider in ethnic terms, though there may be, considering intragroup political and socioeconomic differences, some difficulty in defining an insider in ideological terms. In a complex new African nation with hierarchically arranged ethnic groups, mutual agreement regarding insider status would probably accord importance to ethnic, class, and ideological considerations.

Stuchlik's point that outsider-insider distinctions may be better viewed as a continuum than as a dichotomy seems appropriate. I would add that as a group's circumstances and consciousness change, the basis for validation of insider status may also shift, i.e., from ethnic or class to primarily ideological considerations.

Brokensha's observation that Third World leaders may reject Western social scientists because they fear outside criticism of their governments brings to mind those who opposed the end of colonialism in Africa with the argument "If we whites leave, it will only mean that Africans will oppress one another." This argument is disturbingly extended by intellectuals who feel it is their mission to expose the problems of Third World countries (to show they were better off under colonialism?). The critical spirit Brokensha advocates is admirable but more appropriately applied by us North Americans to issues of political power and morality closer to home.

I would offer somewhat the same response to those who charge that in many Third World countries governments are no less elitist, colonialist, and oppressive in their relations to their own people than were European outsiders. I doubt whether outsiders are in the best position to understand the struggles of Third World countries to establish themselves after centuries of European political domination, particularly in view of present-day outsider interference and deliberately created divisiveness. An assumption is that, since people act in terms of self-interest, social scientists who identify with the interests of the groups with which they work and must live with the results of their actions will be more apt to conduct themselves so as to further the groups' interests. Since
insiders are more likely to be in this position than outsiders, insider anthropology may help curb intellectual exploitation and academic colonialism. On the other hand, there is nothing intrinsic to the role of insider that assures commitment to one's own people. Thus, to answer Berthoud's rhetorical question of how we justify insider oppression, the answer is, we do not.

I concur with all who point out that perspectivism does not solve the problems of exploitation raised in the paper. As Albó, Berthoud, Frucht, Gjessing, Stuchlik, Nakleh, Owusu, and Von Gизycki indicate and as Vidich states, perspectivism serves as many purposes as there are anthropologists and does so without ethical or moral limitations. Being philosophically, theoretically, and ideologically neutral, it can only initiate, not form the basis of, a new critical anthropology.

In the context of traditional anthropology, perspectivism simply legitimates the point of view of anthropology's subjects. Okojie's comments clearly show that this outlook has heretofore not been adequately represented. Moreover, as Okojie, Raczyńska, and Fuchs note, the problems of Third World people have been not only ignored but exacerbated by many traditional anthropologists through the processes and products of research formulated in the outsider's interest. Thus, perspectivism is inseparable from insider anthropology. Together they constitute a methodological basis for formulation of problems and presentation of knowledge distinct from those of objective, outsider anthropology.

It should be clear that perspectivism and insider anthropology do, as Vidich charges, have an instrumental value. Unlike traditional anthropologists, who were unaware of or unwilling to admit the self-serving nature of their work, the insider anthropologist makes it explicit. This stance is found in other disciplines as well; minorities are frankly rewriting history, psychology, and sociology in terms of their own perspectives and interests. The point is that these new insider approaches are no less legitimate in terms of the reality they disclose than the work of outsiders.

Albó, Berthoud, and Von Gизycki note rightly that the paper should have been more explicit regarding the need for new conceptual frameworks and radical theories of change and development. Frucht and Berthoud warn that theoretical radicalism must expose the biases of current theories, and I would argue that it must make explicit the interests which underlie the new ones. Thus, explicit ideologies are needed to form the basis of the new theories, as old ideologies formed the basis of traditional theories. Charles Valentine (personal communication, 1971) has noted that without such ideological commitment, insider practitioners can be coopted and manipulated for the oppression of their people. Furthermore, isolation can be fostered so as to make them intellectually and pragmatically incapable of dealing with the wider context of oppression.

Thus, in the long run, a theoretical radicalism requires the collaboration of both insider and outsider and an understanding of both the oppressors and the oppressed. Whether, as Nakleh suggests, the potential for exploitation continues to be so great that a moratorium is necessary on crossing cultural boundaries and whether, as Gjessing suggests, it will be possible eventually for radical anthropologists to combine within themselves the two perspectives are matters for continued debate.

Like the majority of my colleagues, I am not yet able to specify the content of future radical theories. However, perspectivism and insider anthropology may offer a needed vantage point for their development. That the new theories will probably be initiated, tested, and refined under highly pragmatic circumstances is attested to most interestingly by Von Gизycki's description of the work of a North Vietnamese ethnologist.

The need for perspectivism in social science is apparent when we realize the difficulty of assuring equal voice for those who have been silent objects of study in the past. This is demonstrated by Vidich, who feels that freedom of the formerly oppressed to challenge traditional theories and perspectives is linked to loss of freedom of outsider anthropologists to pursue their own work. This would be true only insofar as their work continues to oppress and limit the freedom of the objects of study. Vidich realizes this, for he recognizes that freedom of inquiry may be gained at the expense of one's subjects. His response to the notion that former objects have a right to conduct studies in their own interest is much like that of many Euro-American liberals in the past to the idea of Black Power. Rather than recognizing it as an expression of people's desire for control over their own lives, liberals saw only that it undermined their own privileges vis-à-vis the oppressed.

To clear up doubts on this point, the paper advocates truly free and meaningful inquiry for all and an end to the inequities and exploitation which interfered with true freedom of inquiry in the past. If, in the future, traditional, outsider anthropology finds its studies curtailed, it may be because the people themselves, the subjects, will no longer permit them. Similarly, if the development of a radical insider anthropology is opposed, it will probably be because it threatens the interests of those who benefit from present inequities.

Berthoud calls the insistence that anthropologists refuse to continue to exploit the Third World naive in that it ignores the neocolonialism which makes such exploitation inevitable. Frucht argues that no anthropology is possible in the present political climate. Fuchs also sees the situation of the academic as hopeless, given the realities of the power relationships within which anthropology exists. These views are defeatist and as pernicious of the status quo as those of traditional, conservative social science. It is because of worldwide oppression and exploitation that a radical, activist social science is needed and is emerging. In these circumstances, should we sit silently and helplessly or attempt to contribute in some way to the revolution in consciousness which is making change possible? It is assumed by these commentators that the discipline is of a single mind, and in reality, it is composed of diverse groups, among which are many no less appalled than they, but willing to work toward meaningful change. To argue that a relevant anthropology is only possible when worldwide inequalities are ended is to ignore the potential and obligation of the social scientist to help bring about the creative changes necessary. After all, who needs radical, activist social scientists in Utopia?

I wonder whether Bruner, who sees the collaboration of insider and outsider as a possibility for the study of Third World countries, would not consider the study of one's own people a creative challenge rather than a "retreat." It has been noted that anthropologists, because of their outsider role in other cultures, bring a unique perspective to work within their own society.

It is interesting that Sofue finds that only collaboration between insider and outsider produces satisfactory results in Japan. While collaboration may be the answer in many situations at present, when the study involves an oppressed or formerly oppressed group, it would seem that the terms should be decided upon by the insider group. Moreover, if the group to be studied is in a sensitive situation, it is highly
I also dispute Brokensha's claim that anthropologists have studied colonialism. While there were studies stimulated by colonial interests to look into politics, land tenure, native law, and the like, studies related to specific matters of colonial policy or critical of that policy, these studies seemed clearly in the interest of perpetuating the empire. Where in anthropology did we have, as Albó notes, the macroanalysis that puts the study of traditional cultures in proper perspective or the consideration of the meaning of colonialism for the natives themselves in terms of their own interests? In my opinion, there is considerable difference between the interest of some early anthropologists in cultural factors impinging on colonial policy and a current of the theoretical and methodological implications of the structure of inequality for the peoples studied and for the discipline. It is true that with the breakdown of colonial empire and with the rising voice of Third World intellectuals, the effect of the colonial process can no longer be ignored by Western social scientists. I wonder whether Firth's remark, cited by Brokensha, is meant to imply that anthropology could not perhaps have been a product of both the Enlightenment and colonialism. This paper has not meant to impugn the dedication and perseverance of anthropologists or to deny that there are those who have worked as honestly and ethically as they could given the circumstances. It has attempted to point out the unacknowledged effect of colonialism on anthropology. In the same way, others have demonstrated the relationship between scientific racism and the development of anthropological thought. Recognition of this interplay between dominant intellectual and political forces and anthropology does not make every anthropologist a colonialist or a racist unless we are willing to accept the notion that we are all passive pawns of our own history and culture. This paper was written on the assumption that anthropologists can influence the course of the discipline. It is only when we can look at our own past from the viewpoint of the oppressed and gauge thereby the depth of contemporary disaffection that we can begin to consider realistic possibilities for the future.

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