Ann McMillin

Fylde College

HIST 251: Imperial Russian History

Tutor: Jon Swift

15 March 2002

“It was as though Russian Social Democracy were labouring under some diabolical curse, destined to struggle against itself indefinitely, until its discords should be settled in the flames of civil war.”[1] In this statement, J.L.H. Keep describes his interpretation of the schism which developed in the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (RSDRP) just five years after its founding. The party divided into the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks in 1903 because of differences in opinion on party policy and conflicting temperaments among the leaders. The two factions would conflict over many issues in the next decade, and the schism would only widen, aided by the opinionated and often unbending personalities of the party leadership.

The six editors of the socialist periodical Iskra (‘the Spark’) attended the second Congress of the RSDRP in 1903 with the intentions of establishing an Iskra-dominated majority from which they could influence the party’s direction. Lenin, Martov, Axelrod, Plekhanov, Potresov, and Zasulich took part in the extensive oration and debate, and eventually secured their position as the virtual party leadership against their main opposition, the Economists and the Jewish Bund.[2] However, tensions were building among Iskra’s leaders, initially, over Lenin’s proposal to cut Zasulich, Axelrod, and Potresov from the editorial board. This insulting gesture on Lenin’s behalf soon caused increasing suspicion amongst all of those involved. A move that improved the efficiency of the editorial board also made Lenin appear disloyal to some of Iskra’s founders. After so much work, rising hostility amongst fellow revolutionaries would lead to a detrimental and lasting split in the Social Democratic Labour Party.

The break up into the Bolshevik and Menshevik factions of the RSDRP became concrete over a dispute concerning party membership. Two different plans for the duties of members were presented in Lenin and Martov’s versions of the party statutes. Martov’s version called for a broad based party that allowed all of those who accepted the program, contributed monetarily, and participated from time to time. Lenin’s version on the other hand would only allow those who actively participated in a party organisation.[3] Although the difference could have been easily compromised, conflicting personalities and mutual distrust would not allow for it. Instead, both Martov and Lenin ardently supported their version, and other party leaders were quick to take sides. Lenin’s idea was accused of being an organisation of conspirators, not the working class.[4] Lenin believed Martov’s design opened the party to weakness and opportunism.[5] After subsequent voting on the issue, Lenin ultimately won out with a majority of two votes.[6] Lenin and his adherents were then known as the Bolsheviks while his opponents became the Mensheviks.

The schism, which would be associated with opposing ideas on the direction of the RSDRP and the revolution, was actually opened by the unwavering stubbornness of the individuals in the party leadership. The schism was not a product of a simple conflict over membership. Although all the editors had previously agreed on Lenin’s initial idea of party organisation as laid out in What Is To Be Done?, the schism turned it into a controversial subject. The absence of outside opposition to keep the editorial board attached ideologically caused minor differences in opinion to be exaggerated. The newfound inability to compromise initiated a trend to clash over many other issues, and two parties developed within the Party. The Bolshevik and Menshevik split was officially a permanent feature of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party, though at the time many party members wrongly believed reconciliation to be inevitable.

The primary goal of both factions of the RSDRP was to overthrow the czarist regime, not to establish a socialist society. The revolution that was to come would be ‘bourgeois-democratic,’ in Marxist terminology.[7] After the autocracy was overcome by the powers of capitalism, a democracy would be put in its place. Then, the nation would be prepared for a proletariat revolution and subsequent socialism, according to Marxism. The factions differed in their ideas of the role the party should play in the coming ‘bourgeois-democratic’ revolution. The word ‘bourgeois’ was also vague, as it could be applied to both the urban middle class and the wealthier peasants, two very separate entities.

The Bolsheviks, especially Lenin, advocated a leading role for the proletariat, who would join forces with the petty bourgeoisie, or the wealthier peasantry in this case. Lenin wrote, “Its past is autocracy, serfdom, monarchy and privilege. In the struggle against this, in the struggle against counterrevolution, a ‘single will’ off the proletariat and the peasantry is possible, for here there is unity of interests.”[8] Lenin was fully taking advantage of social realities. The peasants were strongly against the feudal order and had a stake in overthrowing the autocracy. Lenin had observed the recent agrarian unrest and equated it with the potential revolutionary force of the peasantry.[9] The Social Democrats should then aim to meet a minimum program including freedom of the person, speech, press, association, the right to form political parties, republican government, and some economic standards.[10]

The Mensheviks thought the bourgeoisie should lead the revolution, while the proletariat would put pressure on them from below. Their version of bourgeoisie was the urban middle class.[11] By the proletariat pushing the urban middle classes to the left, they would perform the role Karl Marx had in mind for them. Many of the Mensheviks, including Plekhanov, Axelrod, Potresov, and Martynov, wanted the socialists to collaborate with the liberals. ‘March apart, but strike together!’ was Plekhanov’s slogan. While the bourgeoisie led the revolution, the Menshevik idea of the role of the party was to prepare the proletariat for the subsequent struggle against capitalism.

Trotsky agreed with the Bolsheviks that the Russian bourgeoisie was not capable of revolutionary leadership, and the proletariat should accept that role. However, Trotsky took this one step further by saying the proletariat could use its political power to carry the revolution straight from the bourgeois to the socialist phase. He called this theory ‘permanent revolution.’[12] Although neither faction adopted Trotsky’s theory, it did influence the thoughts of Mensheviks and Bolsheviks. Trotsky remained non-aligned in the schism, but would often agree with one faction or the other.

The semi-revolution of 1905 brought a host of new issues to the party’s attention. Both the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks realized the revolutionary capabilities of the masses, though there was some disagreement as to what those capabilities actually were. The activities that took place on ‘Bloody Sunday’ proved to both factions the possibility of unorganised revolutionary zeal amongst the masses, and both Lenin and Martov believed the revolution had begun. The Mensheviks saw in this event the power of a discontented proletarian mass. Such an uprising was just the sort of pressure on the bourgeoisie the Mensheviks had in mind. They did not think a further insurrection could be planned and wanted to leave it to the workers to further their cause. “It is not the function of Social Democracy to appoint a rising according to some predetermined plan but to lead the rising once it has started,” wrote a Menshevik supporter in 1905. The Bolsheviks preferred to remain attentive to men prepared to participate in an insurrection. They also continued to emphasize their idea of the importance of centralized planning and direction, even to promote further insurrection.[13]

The issue of trade unions also became relevant at this time. Lenin had put forth his opinion on trade unions quite explicitly in What Is To Be Done? He did believe that unions would help the party raise the political consciousness of the worker, but he also distinguished between trade unionist and social-democratic politics.[14] The Bolsheviks remained true to Lenin’s plans. They wanted unions’ interests to be solely focused on economic matters, not political. They continued to promote the necessity of strong party control and would only support clandestine activities taking place in trade union by professional revolutionaries from the party. The Mensheviks, still holding true to their want of a broad-based workers’ party, wanted trade unions to become actively involved in politics, instead of just being confined to advancing their economic needs. They still saw the party’s political position as above and unconnected to the unions, but wanted to keep them as their allies.[15] The Menshevik faction was influential in many unions and organisations of unions throughout the decade, and would provide leadership to soviets, such as the St. Petersburg Soviet.

In the aftermath of 1905, when armed uprisings subsided and the possibility of continued revolution looked unlikely, some Mensheviks became disillusioned with the clandestine operations of the party and became ‘liquidators.’ Lenin originally coined the term in a condescending, name-calling manner.[16] After the tsar conceded to the Russian people a representative Duma, members of the ‘liquidator’ school of thought wanted the party to come out politically. They wanted to move away from the secret, underground business of the party to more open work in the form of trade unions, cooperatives, and other mass organizations.[17] They were optimistically hoping to form a true labour party in Russia that would attract the masses, like those found in Europe, but the existing social and political situation made that hope completely unrealistic. To work only out in the open would confine the party to the limits that the autocracy and police would allow them.

Some Menshevik leaders, like Plekhanov and Martov, opposed the liquidators, convinced of the need of clandestine activity in the party.[18] Plekhanov thought the liquidators were totally giving up the idea of revolution and leaning toward the Economist way of thinking. He even urged other Mensheviks to ostracize the liquidators. Lenin was obviously strongly opposed to the liquidators, but did believe in the need to combine the party’s clandestine activities with more public work in trade unions. His position on trade unions changed around 1907, and he began to encourage trade unions to affiliate themselves with the party.[19]

The Bolsheviks also had an ‘extreme’ group in their ranks. As the Mensheviks had the liquidators, the Bolsheviks had the boycotters, who boycotted the existing open social and political institutions. Also known as the recallists, they denounced all forms of legal activity as opportunism.[20] In January of 1910 leaders of the factions met in Paris for a final attempt at reuniting. They both agreed to get rid of their ‘extremist’ parts, the liquidators and boycotters. Lenin had no problems with this but the Mensheviks found the task easier said than done. The liquidator attitude had become too prevalent in their faction and to purge them from the party would be stalling Menshevik influence. The Mensheviks claimed there should be room for dissent but Lenin steadfastly held that ‘opponents of clandestine work could not be effective clandestine workers.’[21] He did not oppose the idea of freedom of dissent within the party but found that the need for clandestine work was too great to allow party members to disagree with it. The liquidator debate prevented any further attempt at reunification.

The Bolshevik ‘expropriations’ more than likely had a large part in liquidator disagreement with clandestine activities. Expropriations could be otherwise titled ‘robberies’ or ‘raids,’ and they became a feature of the Russian scene after 1905. Party finances were a problem because of the reduced assistance from bourgeois sympathizers and meagre membership dues, and thus encouraged a move towards terrorism directed at official institutions and private business enterprises.[22] For example, in 1906 the Social Democrats robbed the government of 875,000 roubles in Moscow and then another 316,000 roubles just a few days later in Tiflis. (289) Lenin enjoyed the proceeds his faction received from these ‘expropriations’ and therefore saw nothing wrong with them.

The Bolsheviks were digressing from what most Marxists saw as permissible behaviour by taking part in the undercover theft. The cautious party leadership thought such actions would take away from the opinion of outside observers regarding the party and the working class. The Mensheviks strongly condemned the terrorism of the ‘expropriations’ at a 1907 congress in London. Lenin, however, had no intentions of cutting off his finance source by stopping the raids.[23] Expropriations were an example of the clandestine activities Lenin and the Bolsheviks thought necessary in furthering the interests of the party and promoting revolution. It was impossible for the RSDRP to work towards revolution if they had no finances to continue their operations. In Lenin’s eyes, the continuation of this illegal monetary supply would quicken the outbreak of the revolution.

The liquidationist tendency among the Mensheviks and the Bolshevik practice of expropriations were upsetting the fragile balance of the Social Democratic Party. While the party remained whole, intense struggles for control and power continued.[24] The tsar’s inability to respect the Duma he created, Stolypin’s agrarian reforms, and the return of the army from the Far East made the possibility of revolution seem farther and farther away. Many became disillusioned and demoralized with the revolutionary aims of the party.

In 1912, Lenin announced at a conference in Prague that the Bolshevik faction was the true Social Democratic Party. The schism had been beyond repair for some time but now it was finalized permanently. In August, Trotsky convinced other leaders to convene in Vienna a conference for all Social Democrats, hoping for the possibility of reconciliation. Lenin, however, was secure with the Bolsheviks’ stable position and did not attend. The Mensheviks at the time were weak and disconnected, giving the Bolsheviks room to do as they wished. The Mensheviks attended the conference, finding it convenient to blame the split on Lenin and the Bolsheviks, but actually agreeing with them that the split was desirable.[25]

Now two separate parties, the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks would again clash over their stances regarding the outbreak of World War I. Traditionally, Marxists believed that war was wrong because it would prevent an international socialist order. With the start of the war, the socialists in Russia fell into three main groups: those who supported the war effort, those who were against the war effort, and those who wanted to use the war to bring the proletariat to power. The Mensheviks occupied the first two of these groups. Plekhanov belonged to the ‘defensists,’ as he supported the war effort as it was. He defended the state because he was against an overthrow that would bring unplanned and unwanted results. He even believed that it was the duty of the workers to assist in national defence, thereby conceding to the workers a share in the nation’s current well being, going directly against the Marx’s proclamation in the Communist Manifesto, “The workingmen have no fatherland!” The other Menshevik stance on the war was that of pacifism. Martov promoted an immediate negotiated peace in order to non-violently continue proletarian internationalism.[26]

Lenin and the Bolsheviks became ‘defeatists,’ believing the war was an expression of capitalist imperialism, fought by the ruling classes, and against the interests of the masses. He wanted the proletariat of all the belligerent countries to turn the war into a conflict against the imperialist ruling classes. Russia’s military defeat could be a catalyst for revolutionary change.[27] Although Lenin’s war strategy is completely different than Martov’s, their ideas are somewhat similar. They both agreed that the war was one of the ruling classes and could in no way be beneficial to the masses. Martov and the Menshevik left simply opted for a more humanitarian, pacifist strategy. Instead of turning the war into a class struggle, they would rather stop the war and return to a more normal mode of revolution promotion.

The war issue was the last major Bolshevik-Menshevik dispute before the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. Since 1903, the two factions were at odds, only agreeing on the need for a bourgeois-democratic revolution, and the desire for Russia to eventually be a purely social-democratic state. The Bolshevik and Menshevik perceptions of how the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party should be shaped, and how it should operate, were fundamentally different. Lenin and the Bolsheviks wanted the party to be only a small militant elite, dedicated to the revolution and willing to perform clandestine acts. The Mensheviks wanted an open worker’s party, involved in the available social and political institutions, and concerned with only limited underground activities.

Even though the Social Democratic Party was characterized by the persistent conflict of its two factions, it still played a momentous part in the overthrow of the autocracy and the revolution of 1917. Both the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks played roles in getting the socialist movement to that point, so the name Bolshevik Revolution does not do much justice to the fourteen previous years of party activity. Through the incessant debate, a movement was borne, leading to the revolution desired by all.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Baron, Samuel. Plekhanov: The Father of Russian Marxism (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1963)

Deutscher, Isaac. The Prophet Armed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979)

Keep, J.L.H. The Rise of Social Democracy in Russia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963)

Lane, David. The Roots of Russian Communism (London: Martin Robertson and Co. Ltd., 1975)

Lenin, Vladimir Il’ich. What Is To Be Done? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963)

Service, Robert. Lenin: A Political Life (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1985)

[1] Lane, David. The Roots of Russian Communism (London: Martin Robertson and Co, Ltd., 1975) p. 287

[2] Deutscher, Isaac. The Prophet Armed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979) p. 78

[3] Keep, J.L.H. The Rise of Social Democracy in Russia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963) p. 127

[5] Baron, Samuel. Plekhanov: The Father of Russian Marxism (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1963) p. 238

[14] Lenin, Vladimir Il’ich. What Is To Be Done? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963) p. 120

[19] Service, Robert. Lenin: A Political Life, Vol. 1 (London: MacMillan Press Ltd, 1985) pp. 184-185