

## **A Minority at Home: The surprising openness of Singapore an Muslim Society**

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Abstract

[very preliminary draft]

Muslim minorities are frequently held to be resistant to assimilation. Ethnicity, language use, and ideologies along with distinctive cultural beliefs and practices that spill over into everyday patterns of behaving and socializing are held to separate Muslims from other social groups. In primarily Muslim countries, factional divisions are sometimes said to split the society. Singapore, where Muslims were originally in the majority but slowly shrunk as a proportion of the population, would seem to be no exception. Religion, language, social class, a strong state-sanctioned ideologies would seem to reinforce group boundaries. Building on a careful analysis of Singapore Census data and of purpose-collected survey of the social networks of 1143 Singaporeans, including 235 Muslims, and their 7400 named alters, we find that although Muslims meet many of the demographic criteria for social isolation, the social networks of Muslims are comparatively open to “out-group” members, suggesting Muslims are defined by Islam but not confined by it.

## **A Minority at Home: The surprising openness of Singaporean Muslim Society**

[very preliminary draft]

This paper is directed toward explaining two paradoxes. First, despite their seemingly minor representation at 15 percent of the resident population, a careful analysis of demographic data shows that Muslims constitute the second largest effective social group in Singapore. Second, despite meeting many of the pre-conditions of social isolation, original data on the social networks of Singaporeans indicates that Muslims are remarkably open to social contact with those of other social groups. This contact does not originate in Singapore's highly integrated neighborhoods but, surprisingly, in Singapore's segregated workplaces. The key to the first paradox is the pattern of multiple identities that reinforce Muslim, especially Malay, solidarity. The key to the second is the size of the non-Muslim population.

Singapore is not usually thought of as a Muslim society. The Singapore government sometimes discusses the country as a small dot of (Chinese) red in a sea of (Islamic) green. Chinese, the large majority of whom are not Muslim, predominate at 78 percent of the population. Even when the heavy representation of Bangladeshis and Indonesians among the temporary residents is included, Muslims comprise possibly as much as one-third of those living in Singapore. Nevertheless, other ethnic groups, including the Chinese, are split by language and religious differences that are salient identity markers. Muslims, Malays in particular, may constitute, if not the foremost then, certainly the second-largest effective "ethnic" group, partially because ethnicity, religion, and language tend to reinforce group boundaries, creating a coherent group while the more numerous Chinese splinter into divided groups.

It is therefore surprising to find that, despite a degree of endophily, the social networks of Muslims are relatively open to “out-group” members. Although often held to have distinctive social patterns, preliminary analysis indicates that Muslim social networks and social participation are much like those of other groups in Singapore (and internationally). The analysis suggests that income is a stronger influence than culture on the nature of social worlds.

In this paper, we will document the importance of Muslims in Singapore society by examining historical and contemporary demographic data. As suggested above, we find Muslims to have a surprisingly large social importance despite initial appearances. We will then document the public involvement of Muslims in business and civil society in Singapore. Muslims are, in several ways, under-represented in the official world. Therefore, we will describe the immediate social worlds of Singaporean Muslims, comparing them to the social worlds of non-Muslim Singaporeans. Despite, or perhaps because of, the government attention paid to Muslims, Muslim social life takes place through mainly informal channels.

Our interests are twofold. We are primarily concerned with systematically documenting the nature of Muslim life in Southeast Asia, specifically Singapore. Southeast Asia is frequently overlooked in discussions of Islam yet the region (combined with active migration feeder countries, including Bangladesh, China, and India but not Pakistan) contains approximately one-third of the Muslim population of the world. The region is home to the largest Islamic country in the world and Singapore, despite its small size, is itself home to more Muslims than Israel. Moreover, Muslims are rarely discussed in Singapore without being construed as a social problem. Secondly, Singapore, and its

larger sister, Malaysia, are pluralistic societies. Much is made of the advent of the “minority majority” in the U.S. A minority-majority situation has existed in Singapore, originally predominantly Muslim, since 1830. The characteristics of those countries have value in the comparative analysis of societies.

### **The Singaporean context**

Singapore is a multi-ethnic community, just slightly smaller than the Atlanta metropolitan area, with a relatively high degree of social peace and inter-group amicability. The extent of social ties and their closeness across ethnic groups is, nevertheless, a major concern in a diverse society such as Singapore. Approximately 77 percent of the Singaporean resident population (citizens and permanent residents) are Chinese, 14 percent are Malay, 8 percent are Indian, and 1 percent are “other.” Objective measurement is difficult but it is probably fair to say that Singapore is heavily racialized (behaviors and characteristics are routinely imputed to ethnic background) but not excessively racist (expressions of out-group disdain are modest).

Singapore supports a large foreign-born population. Approximately one-third of the total present population was not born in Singapore and many of the recent migrants are working age adults who came to fill Singapore’s labor force needs (Department of Statistics, 2001). Some of these migrants are “non-residents” (approximately 19 percent of the total population) but many are permanent residents or citizens.

Residential mobility among those occupying public and private housing has been quite high (HDB, 2000a). Approximately 60 percent of household heads changed residence between 1990 and 2000 (either by moving or creating a new household). Due

to the nature of the Singaporean housing market, many of these movements imply a change in neighborhood and Singapore suburbanized to a great extent (still largely in apartment blocks) during the 1990s. A shift away from mid-rise “slab blocks” with a dozen or more apartments per floor connected by an external gallery to newer high-rise “point blocks” with 4-6 apartments per floor might remove much of the physical focus for socializing. Indeed, the Housing Development Board (2000b) has registered a marked decline in neighboring which has (again) touched off concerns about community and the level of social integration.

Singapore is arguably an essentially Muslim society. Malay Muslims were the original occupants of Singapore Island. Many Singaporeans, who were born overseas, originate in Muslim countries, especially Malaysia, acculturating them to Muslim social and cultural practices. Malay is the national language and, before, English gained as much currency as an international language as it now has, Malay was the language of cross-group communication. Malay words are still essential to everyday conversation in Singapore and the Malay-language national anthem is broadcast daily by radio and television stations. That importance is not confined to an older generation. When the leader of a hip-hop/urban grunge band claims that green is his favorite color, the teens and young adults in the audience do not need to wait for the explanation, before beginning to cheer.

The state acknowledges Islam in several unique ways. Muslims in Singapore are exempt from critical portions of state law. The state supports key portions of the Islamic religious hierarchy (no other religion enjoys such state acknowledgement) and the

government includes a Minister-in-Charge of Muslim Affairs (no other religious group enjoys such attention).

### **The Creation of Identity through Activities and Interaction**

“Muslim” – like any other categorization – is essentially a social construct. Ideologies about “racial,” religious, and language differences permeate Singapore society. These real and imagined divisions cross-cut and coincide in ways that create two large, reasonably coherent “ethnic groups” that are recognized in the social practices of Singaporeans: the Chinese-educated and Muslims, among a spray of several others.<sup>1</sup> Despite their size, both, particularly the latter, may be under-represented in the public arena of social life.

Hewitt (2000) asserts that to have a social identity is to identify with some set of people with whom one feels an affinity. This set of people resemble one another and share a sense of attachment. Such common identity is a pre-requisite of society. Stryker (1994) argues that identity is situated in social contexts. Identities exist insofar as persons are participants in structured social relationships and identity theory investigates the relationships between concepts of self, social relations, and role performance (activity). Although there can be much discussion about the direction of causality between the elements of identity theory, a) sentiment, b) social interaction, and c) activity are linked.

To give an everyday example, it is the common activities with colleagues or family that leads to the social interaction which creates the feeling of “we-ness” at work

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<sup>1</sup> Almost all students are educated in English language state-sanctioned schools. “Chinese-educated” has a historical meaning that carries over into contemporary cultural allegiances.

or within a family. It is the common activity that enacts the family and without that activity and interaction, an identity as a family member would have little significance. Daily activity with colleagues creates a university. Similarly, when a person visits a national shrine – a museum or a site of national pride – that person can communicate the experience to others and thereby symbolically assert membership in the nation. Focused activity leads to social interaction and the development of sentiment (Feld, 1981; Homans, 1951). Commitment to an identity implies interactional commitment (relationships) and affective commitment (Stryker, 1994).

The basic understanding of identity just outlined is a good, common sense starting point but, as Kluckhohn and Murray (1948) have argued, “Every man is in certain respects, a) like all other men, b) like some other men, and c) like no other man.” That is, identity is intrinsically associated with all the joinings and departures of social life. To have an identity is to join with some and depart from others (Stone, 1962). Much of the time, discussions of identity focus on the “joinings” and place the “departures” in the background. Calhoun (1994) felt a need to assert, “Plurality is basic to the human condition. We are distinct from each other, and often strive to distinguish ourselves further.”

Kluckhohn and Murray’s formulation implies a multiplicity of identities. Multiple identities – each linked with different sets of individuals who are not all tied to each other – create the individual in the modern sense (Simmel, 1971). Individuals emerged as personal social relations became progressively less immersed in a single set of people.

It may sometimes be possible to arrange these multiple identities in a hierarchy of salience. Some identities may be mobilized only in very specific situations; others may be more broadly relevant. Stryker (1994) asserts that the greater the commitment premised on an identity, the more extensive and/or intensive the network of relationships into which one enters by virtue of a given identity will be. The stronger the social relationships, the higher that identity will be in the salience hierarchy.

An example of the varying salience of identities emerges from the research on localism, nationalism, and cosmopolitanism (Deutsch, 1966). Figure One illustrates a stylized representation of identity salience for an individual. Since identities are supported by interaction and mutual activities, a salient identity, such as implied by Point C in the figure, implies a high level of both. A less salient identity, such as implied by Point B, would imply less interaction. The degree to which identity salience declines could be dramatic or gradual. A salient identity implies a firm boundary of inclusion and exclusion in activities and interaction; a salient national identity implies the relative absence of internal parochialisms and a low level of trans-national affiliations.

(Figure One here)

The symbolic interactionist dictum that the “self is a mirror of society” implies that the existence of multiple identities could lead to tension within individuals – much as there are sometimes tensions within society. Not only the content but the pattern of intersection between the multiple identities is important in creating and straining national identity. In extreme cases, the multiple identities could either completely coincide or they could cross-cut. Much of the discussion about identity focuses on the individual.

But, given the multiplicity of identities and all that implies for individuals, what do multiple identities mean for collectivities?

Relying on a literature that has been developing across disciplines at least since Evans-Pritchard (1940), we suggest that the ways in which those multiple identities intersect is more important than the salience and strength of an over-arching identity in creating a social group. The more racial, religious, and language divisions coincide, the greater the societal segmentation and the more salient group boundaries will be. Lipset and Rokkan (1967), for example, found that the degree to which ethnic and other societal fault lines, such as class, coincided was more important than the magnitude of the ethnic divide per se in understanding whether party oppositions developed over issues of cultural identity.

### **The Importance of Muslims as an “Ethnic Group”**

Language is an important factor in group formation. To a large extent, it determines which television shows will be watched, which music will be listened to, and which people will be spoken to. Singaporeans are frequently categorized by ethnic group and are required to learn a “mother tongue” which is linked to the group in school.

(Table One here)

Table One shows language use by ethnic group among the resident population (citizens and permanent residents) in 2000. Ethnic group (termed race in local discussions) is a commonly discussed dimension of social difference held to make national unity problematic. Almost every Singaporean is literate in at least one language. Many are bilingually literate. Among the Chinese, 51.6 percent are bilingual. Among

the Malays, 78.2 percent are and among Indians, 69.6 percent are bilingual. The combination of languages is almost always “mother tongue” plus English. Almost all Malays speak Malay. (Many Chinese and Indian cannot speak their “mother tongue.”) Thirty-eight percent of Malay university graduates speak English in the home.

Language reinforces the ethnic identity of Malays; almost all Malays are literate in Malay. No other ethnic group shares such a high level of literacy in a common language. Such a coincidence of social divisions tends to accentuate group boundaries. Chinese are split. Substantial numbers of Chinese do not share a language. The Chinese are sub-divided into dialect groups and clans. The salience of such identities seems uneven with Cantonese being held to be the group most attached to their dialect. The terms English-educated and Chinese-educated remain meaningful today and the diversity of language use tends to reduce the salience of ethnic boundaries for Chinese compared to what it would be if they all spoke a common language.

While few Singaporeans were active in religiously-based voluntary service, a large majority identify with a religion. Table Two shows information on the religious affiliation of Singaporean citizens and permanent residents aged 15 and above. The upper panel of the table indicates that there is no majority religion, preventing the emergence of a de facto national religion, but that Buddhism is the largest single identification. Islam is the second largest religion. As with language, religion and ethnicity almost completely coincide for Malays but a diversity of religious affiliations work against the emergence of strong ethnic identities for Indians and Chinese. Almost all of those claiming no religion are Chinese.

(Table Two here)

The second panel of the table shows how religion and language groups intersect. Although Christianity is the main religion of the English-speaking population, other language communities are also represented. Similarly Buddhism has an appeal to members of several language groups and not all adherents of Hinduism are Tamil speakers. Even Islam claims a small number of non-Malay speakers. Such cross-cutting attenuates the sharp religious factionalization found in some countries.

The third, and last, panel of Table Three shows the adherents of each religion by housing class. Housing is a frequently used proxy for income and social class in Singapore. With roughly equal representation in each category, Buddhism is the least class-based religion in Singapore. Christianity approaches Islam's level of class relatedness – but in the opposite direction. The representation of Christians among private sector dwellings is five times as high as it is among residents of one and two-room HDB flats. With a representation among residents of one and two-room HDB flats eight times as high as the representation among private sector dwellings, Islam is the religion most associated with class. Buddhism acts as a class-spanning force in Singapore while Islam and Christianity tend to reinforce class divisions. While Christians tend to share some characteristics with those of other religions, Moslems tend to be differentiated by ethnicity, class, and mother tongue.

#### *Muslims in the Singapore elite*

Educational and occupational statistics are not released by the Singapore government by religion. We use information about Malays in the 2000 Census as the best possible proxy. Informal evidence suggests that Indian Muslims are similar to

Malays in terms of education, occupation, and earnings. Malays are significantly less well-educated and significantly less-likely to be in the more highly-paid occupations than the average Singaporean. 11.7 percent of all Singapore residents hold a university degree while two percent of Malays do. 17.9 percent of all residents hold some sort of tertiary certificate; 4.9 percent of Malays do. 14.3 percent of Singapore residents occupy administrative and managerial positions; 2.9 percent of Malays do. 10.1 percent of Singapore residents occupy professional positions; 4 percent of Malays do. Malay households earn 64 percent as much as the average Singapore household and their relative earnings are declining despite rising levels of education.

We compiled a list of more than 3,000 officers, directors, and top executives of the largest private and government-linked firms in Singapore from the available directories. Despite the relatively large size of the Muslim “ethnic group” in Singapore only two percent of the business elite are identifiably Muslim. A portion of the five percent who could not be unambiguously assigned to a religious/ethnic group might, in fact, be Muslim, but even if all of those were Muslim, they would still be under-represented in the business elite. Overall, the multiple identities of Singapore Muslims reinforce boundaries and works towards social exclusion.

### **The Social Worlds of Singapore Muslims**

Residential segregation in Singapore is relatively low with an index of dissimilarity of 23.4 in 2000 for the two major ethnic groups, Chinese and Malays comprising roughly 77 percent and 14 percent of the total resident population respectively. (Using districts averaging 95,977 each; using sub-districts averaging

23,819 each, the measure is 26.9. Eight percent are Indian, and 1 percent is “other.”) Although the spatial units used are not comparable, the index of dissimilarity for blacks and whites in Atlanta was 68.8. (Atlanta’s index of dissimilarity is itself moderate by American standards which range from a high of 87.9 for Gary IN down to 31.7 for Jacksonville NC.) Singapore’s low level of residential segregation has been achieved, in part, because 88 percent of the resident population lives in high-rise public housing that mandates ethnic integration, sometimes down to the level of the housing block. Singapore differs from many U.S. cities in that walking in neighborhoods to do shopping or run other errands is common. The use of public transportation is common. Residential proximity therefore implies opportunity for social contact to a far greater degree in Singapore than it would in the United States. Moreover, local residence committees frequently organize neighborhood events promoting ethnic integration.

Nevertheless, ethnic groups remain remarkably separated despite the physical proximity of persons in the various ethnic groups. Table Three shows a significant degree of in-group preference in the social networks of all groups surveyed (the sample and data collection are described in the Appendix). Over 98 percent of the persons named in reply to a series of name-generating questions (the sample and data are described below) by ethnic Chinese respondents were also ethnic Chinese. For Muslims, 91 percent of those named in response to those questions were also Muslim.

(Table Three about here)

Despite sharing a common language of business and a common education system, as Table Four shows, ethnic groups are segregated (but not to the same degree) in the workplace with all groups sorting themselves out into sometimes ethnically homogenous

social worlds. We gathered data on the ethnic composition of the respondent's immediate work groups. The degree of over-representation compared to a random allocation baseline is highlighted in the table. Singaporeans appear to live in interpenetrating but separate and possibly unequal worlds despite occupying the same physical space.

(Table Four about here)

Despite the degree of segregation 59 percent of Malays can name people from other ethnic groups when asked to. Only 39 percent of Chinese can. Muslims are more connected across ethnic groups than Chinese are.

That connection is achieved despite the overlapping identities discussed above and a pattern of socializing that does not necessarily lend itself toward cosmopolitanism. Muslim social networks are more gender-segregated than non-Muslim networks – but not by much. Same gender ties occur 4.9 times more frequently than chance among Muslims but 4.6 times more frequently among Chinese and 4.3 times more frequently among Indians. Same gender ties occur 4.7 times more frequently than chance among the sample as a whole.

Analysis also shows that the sources of social alters among Muslims differs only slightly – almost imperceptibly – from non-Muslims. That is, Muslims are no more, and no less, family oriented than others in Singapore.

## **Conclusion**

The coincident nature of identities based on religion, ethnicity, and language but also capturing class among Muslims, particularly Malays, and the cross-cutting character

of such identities among other segments of the population give Muslims a coherence that creates a group that is the second-largest in Singapore. That potential weight and influence is not felt because Muslims control few of the “commanding heights” of the country, making them a minority in their own home.

Muslim society in Singapore then needs to be sought in the private worlds of personal social networks. Preliminary analysis shows that, at least in their general parameters, Muslim social networks differ only slightly from non-Muslim networks. That analysis shows both an in-group preference among Muslims with a slight divide between Indian and Malay Muslims and a degree of openness to out-group members that exceeds that of other ethnic groups in Singapore. Further analysis (completed in time for the presentation) will reveal the texture of Muslim social relations in Singapore by examining the nature of key social relationships in detail and comparing these to the analogous relationships among non-Muslims.

### **Appendix: The survey sample and the measurement of social networks**

A stratified random sample of 1,143 working age adult Singaporeans between the ages of 25 and 55 was asked about their social relationships in face-to-face interviews. The sample is approximately evenly split between males and females and approximates the age and class structure of the resident population as measured by education, occupation, income, and housing. Minority groups (Malays, Indians, and immigrants) were over-sampled to yield sufficient number of cases in those population categories, allowing a focus on the inter-ethnic integration between the two major ethnic groups and between the native-born and immigrants. The lower age bound was chosen because by then almost everyone has completed schooling and assumed an adult role. Approximately, 35 percent of young Singaporeans (25-34) have post-secondary education and since males need to perform 2½ years of National Service, it's not unusual for undergraduates to be in their mid-20s. The upper bound was chosen because after that age, some people enter retirement (until very recently, 55 was the official retirement

age in Singapore) and their personal concerns and socializing patterns change accordingly. Among the 30-34 age-group, 40 percent of males and 26 percent of the females are unmarried. Since many adults live with their parents (approximately 88 percent of the population lives in public housing [HDB] and single adults below the age of 35 are barred from purchasing those homes), a Kish grid system was used to select the adult in each sampled household to interview. Approximately four-fifths of the sample were “attached” and approximately 70 percent had at least one child.

The measurement of social networks is critically influenced by the character of the questions used to generate the names of those with whom the survey respondents have a relationship (Ferligoj and Hlebec, 1999; Straits, 2000). Networks of intimates, e.g., core discussion networks (Marsden, 1987) or “best friends” (Laumann, 1973), tend to be fairly homogenous. Homogenous networks of intimates do not imply an absence of real social integration because intimates typically differ markedly from the nearly 1,000 names many can name as being in their social network (Boissevain, 1974).

A technique has been developed for capturing relationships that are of moderate strength and closeness across several domains of social life (Hannerz, 1980). Name-generating questions designed to tap relationships centered on work/career, family, and hobby (Fischer, 1982) and those intended to measure the extent of social support (Wellman, 1979) were supplemented by position-generating questions (Lin and Dumin, 1986) in order to gather information on relationships that are not so intimate as to be immediately volunteered. (This strategy is often used on market research questionnaires: “Tell me your three favorite brands” ... followed by “Have you ever used ...” and a list of the brands not named.) The characteristics of the persons and relationships resulting from the probing, position-generating questions (e.g., “Do you know any Malays?”) can then be compared to those resulting from the name-generating questions (e.g., “Who would you ask to look after the house while you were away?”). While time consuming, this methodology produces richer information than other techniques of measuring inter-group friendship (e.g., Smith, 2002). A list of the name- and position-generating questions used in the survey is contained in an appendix. For most of the analyses in this paper, the network alters (except for the results of the ethnic probe) have been aggregated.

Inter-ethnic ties are unlikely to be as close as those with immediate family but moderately-strong ties are nonetheless significant. By comparing the degree of homophily between respondent and named alters along several dimensions and the characteristics of the relationships among ethnic in-group members and out-group members, the research will more completely assess the degree of social separation between ethnic groups.


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Figure One

# Boundary-mediated identity trade-off



Source: Cederman (2001)

Table One

Literacy by ethnic group

	Total	Chinese	Malay	Indian	Others
Language					
English	70.9	67.6	79.7	87	90.4
Chinese	64.7	82.2	0.3	0.7	5.9
Malay	16.8	2.8	97.3	24.9	26.8
Tamil	3.8	0	0.1	51.3	0.3

Source: "Literacy and language." Advanced Data Release, No. 2, Singapore Census of Population, 2000.

Table Two

Resident population by religion and ethnic group  
(aged 15 and over)

	Total	Buddhism	Islam	Christianity	Taoism	Hinduism	Other Religions	No Religion
Number	2,494,630	1,060,662	371,660	364,087	212,344	99,904	15,879	370,094
Per Cent	100	42.5	14.9	14.6	8.5	4	0.6	14.8
Chinese		53.6		16.5	10.8		0.5	18.6
Malays			99.6				0.4	
Indians			25.6	12.1		55.4	6.3	0.6

Religion of Singaporean Residents  
(by language group)

		Buddhism	Islam	Christianity	Taoism	Hinduism	Other Religions	No Religion
English	100	24.8	7.1	39.8	2.2	5.4	1.5	19.2
Mandarin	100	60		8.3	11.2		0.2	20.3
Chinese Dialects	99.9	61		9.9	15.5		0.2	13.3
Malay	99.9	0.2	98.8	0.7		0.1		0.1
Tamil	100	0.1	17.9	6.7		75	0.1	0.2
Others	100	10.3	16.3	11.1	0.5	43.6	14.7	3.5

Religion of Singaporean Residents  
(by housing type)

		Buddhism	Islam	Christianity	Taoism	Hinduism	Other Religions	No Religion
HDB 1-2 Rooms		41.8	23.7	6.8	11.8	5.2	0.4	10.5
HDB 3 Rooms		46.3	16.7	9.7	10.5	3.9	0.5	12.5
HDB 4 Rooms		46.3	17.4	10.2	9.8	3.9	0.5	11.9
HDB 5 Rooms or Executive		39.5	14.3	17.4	6.4	4.2	0.8	17.4
Private Flats & Houses		30.1	2.8	34.3	4.2	3.6	0.9	24.2

Source: "Religion." Advanced Data Release, No. 2, Singapore Census of Population, 2000.

Table Three Ethnic group / nationality of network alters chosen in response to a set of name-generating questions by the ethnic group / nationality of the respondent

Respondent's ethnic group		Total	Alter's ethnic group				
			Muslim	Chinese	Indian	Other	
Muslim	number chosen	1301	number chosen	1181	82	25	6
	percent of alters		percent chosen	90.78	6.3	1.92	0.46
			degree of over-representation	<b>4.85</b>	0.09	0.21	0.85
Chinese	number chosen	4652	number chosen	29	4564	28	25
	percent of alters		percent chosen	0.62	98.11	0.6	0.54
			degree of over-representation	0.03	<b>1.37</b>	0.07	1.00
Indian	number chosen	676	number chosen	30	92	546	5
	percent of alters		percent chosen	4.44	13.61	80.77	0.74
			degree of over-representation	0.24	0.19	<b>8.93</b>	1.37
Combined	number chosen	6629	number chosen	1240	4738	599	36
	percent of alters	100	percent of alters	18.71	71.47	9.04	0.54

tentative results

Table Four Ethnic composition of immediate co-workers by ethnic group of the respondent

Respondent's ethnic group			Ethnic composition of immediate work group						
			Singaporen			Foreign-born			
			Chinese	Malay	Indian	Chinese	Indian	Other	
All	# of respondents	701							
	mean # enumerated	10.421	proportion of work group	0.631	0.118	0.063	0.037	0.025	0.125
Chinese	# of respondents	510	degree of over-representation	<b>1.109</b>	0.486	0.355	1.164	0.829	1.249
	mean # enumerated	10.671	proportion of work group	0.700	0.058	0.022	0.044	0.021	0.156
Malay	# of respondents	110	degree of over-representation	0.736	<b>2.998</b>	1.228	0.735	1.126	0.380
	mean # enumerated	9.682	proportion of work group	0.465	0.355	0.077	0.027	0.028	0.047
Indian	# of respondents	83	degree of over-representation	0.685	1.495	<b>4.648</b>	0.350	1.880	0.300
	mean # enumerated	9.867	proportion of work group	0.433	0.177	0.293	0.013	0.047	0.038

Tentative results