|Stephen J. Appold
Department of Sociology
National University of Singapore
|Dinh the Phong
Development Research and Consultancy Center
On the basis of data on the relationships between almost 60 key individuals
employed in Vietnamese heavy and light industry, this paper contrasts two
competing explanations for the poor performance of enterprises in post-socialist
economies. Each explanation has opposing implications for policy.
The first explanation, managerial control-loss, is based on asymmetric
information, the second, rent-seeking, on asymmetric dependencies.
Because each of the two mechanisms of inefficiency rests on distinct social
network patterns, we are able to assess the salience of each explanation.
The paper explores the nature of the relationships between 1) officials
in "line Ministries" and enterprise directors, 2) Ministry officials and
their co-workers, and 3) between the managers of different enterprises.
The nature of these relationships is important for understanding the past
performance of the state sector in the Vietnamese economy and is key to
understanding how to successfully restructure economies.
Economic Development and Cultural Change, 50: 47-76 (2001)
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