Navin A. Bapat
I am currently an Assistant Professor at the University of North Carolina - Chapel Hill. My research interests include political conflict, insurgency, terrorism, American foreign policy, interstate conflict, economic conflict, state building, bargaining, and the empirical testing of formal models.
Navin A. Bapat and Kanisha D. Bond. 2011. Alliances Amongst Militant Groups. British Journal of Political Science. Forthcoming.
Navin A. Bapat. 2011. Terrorism, Democratization, and U.S. Foreign Policy. Public Choice. Forthcoming.
Navin A. Bapat. 2011. Understanding State Sponsorship of Militant Groups. British Journal of Political Science. Fortcoming. Data for Replication
Navin A. Bapat. 2011. Transnational Terrorism, U.S. Military Aid, and the Incentive to Misrepresent. Journal of Peace Research 48(3): 303-318. Appendix
Navin A. Bapat. 2010. A Game Theoretic Analysis of the Afghan Surge. Foreign Policy Analysis 6(3): 217-236.
Navin A. Bapat and T. Clifton Morgan. 2009. Multilateral versus Unilateral Sanctions Reconsidered: A Test Using New Data. International Studies Quarterly 53(4):1468-2478
T. Clifton Morgan, Navin A. Bapat, and Valentin Krustev. 2009. The Threat and Imposition of Sanctions 1971-2000. Conflict Management and Peace Science 26(1): 92-110.
Navin A. Bapat. 2007. The Internationalization of Terrorist Campaigns. Conflict Management and Peace Science 24(4): 265-280.
Navin A. Bapat. 2006. State Bargaining with Transnational Terrorist Groups. International Studies Quarterly 50(2): 215-232
Navin A. Bapat. 2005. Insurgency and the Opening of Peace Processes. Journal of Peace Research 42(6): 699-717.
T. Clifton Morgan and Navin A. Bapat. 2003. Imposing Sanctions: States, Firms, and Economic Coercion. International Studies Review 5(4): 65-79.
Works Under Construction
Explaining "Wars on Terrorism": Militant Groups and U.S. Military Force.
The Politics of Freedom Fighters: U.S. Support for Rebel Movements and the Problem of Moral Hazard.
Understanding the Early Dynamics of Terrorist Campaigns: An Empirical Test of an Agent Based Simulation (with Scott Bennett).
Explaining Paramilitary Violence: States, Commitment Problems, and the Incentive to Misrepresent.
Insurgencies and the Internal Commitment Problem (with Rebecca Best).
When are Sanctions Effective? A Bargaining and Enforcement Framework (with Bo Ram Kwon).
Determinants of Sanctions Effectiveness: Sensitivity Analysis Using New Data (with Tobias Heinrich, Yoshi Kobayashi, and Cliff Morgan).
Simulating the Dynamics of Insurgency (with Scott Bennett)
The Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions (with T. Clifton Morgan) TIES WEBSITE AND DATA