

Threat and Imposition of Sanctions (TIES) Data Users' Manual

Case Level Data

T. Clifton Morgan
Valentin Krustev
Navin A. Bapat

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Introduction

This manual is designed to familiarize users of the Threat and Imposition of Sanctions (TIES) data with the data features and its variables. The original codebook for the data collection is available on the project's website. The data were collected from numerous primary and secondary sources, but primarily from *Lexis-Nexis*, *Facts on File*, and *Keesing's Record of Contemporary Events*. In other cases, data were collected from both the New York Times and London Times indexes. In beginning the project, we created an initial list of candidate cases by searching *Lexis-Nexis* for words such as sanctions, embargo, trade wars, blockade, foreign aid reduction, and numerous others. Once we identified potential incidents, our coders made judgments as to whether or not each candidate fit our definition of a sanctions case (see below).

The project initially sought to collect data on each of these incidents, which we defined as sanctions episodes. An episode was considered to consist of any threat to implement sanctions or the implementation of sanctions without a threat. Each episode collected information on any threat or imposition of economic sanctions from the period from 1971-2000. After collecting each episode, the episodes were merged into cases, which represents the current format of the data. Each sanctions case may consist of one or more sanctions episodes.

Definition of a Sanctions Case

TIES defines sanctions as actions that one or more countries take to limit or end their economic relations with a target country in an effort to persuade that country to change one or more of its policies. By definition, a sanctions must:

1. Involve at least one sender state and a target state.
2. Be implemented by the sender in order to change the behavior of the target state.

Actions taken by states that restrict economic relations with countries for solely domestic reasons therefore **do not** qualify as sanctions. Sanctions may take many forms including actions such as tariffs, export controls, embargoes, import bans, travel bans, freezing assets, cutting foreign aid, and/or blockades. For the purposes of this dataset, all sanctions cases may only include one target state. If a sender(s) makes a threat against multiple targets, a new case is created for each individual target.

The sanctions cases are assumed to begin when the sender either makes a threat about the possibility of sanctions or imposes sanctions with no previous threat. A threat may or may not be specific; it must only declare that sanctions are a possibility against a target state. Threats may be initiated in several ways, such as verbal statements by government officials, drafting of legislation against a target state, or the passage of a conditional law stipulating that sanctions will be imposed if certain target behaviors are not changed.

In several instances, sanctions are imposed as a result of legislation designed to monitor the behavior of target states. Examples include yearly determinations of whether a country is engaged in nuclear proliferation, drug trafficking, or the support of terrorism. The sender conducts routine investigations of the behavior of a target on an annual basis. If this is the case, the initial passage of legislation is considered to be the start of the sanctions case for countries that are violating the conditions needed to avoid sanctions. Alternatively, in situations where countries that are in compliance in the period in which the law is passed but later violate the law, the case is considered to begin after the target violates, and the sender issues a protest or imposes sanctions.

Variable List

1. **Case Identification Number:** Each case is assigned a unique case identification number.
2. **Start:** The next three fields identify the start month, day, and year in which the case occurs. A sanctions case typically begins when a threat is made by the sender, or the sender imposes sanctions against the target.
3. **End:** The next three fields identify the start month, day, and year in which a sanctions case is considered to end. A sanctions case is considered to end if any of the following conditions are met:
 - (a) The target state acquiesces to the demands of the sender state.
 - (b) The target state changes. If at any time, the threat to or the imposition of sanctions is no longer directed at the original target state, the case is considered concluded.
 - (c) The issue directed at the target state alters. If the sender(s) threaten new sanctions against the target but are referring to a new, separate issue, a new case is considered to begin.
4. **Senders:** The next five fields represent the Correlates of War (COW) country coder for at least five of the states that either initiate threats or impose sanctions against a target state. If sanctions are initiated through an international institution, these fields are coded as missing.
5. **Primary Sender:** The country code of the state that is primarily responsible for the threatening or the imposition of sanctions against the target. If the case has multiple senders, the primary sender is coded as the state that proposes sanctions, initiates the threat, or is responsible for mobilizing other states to initiate sanctions. If only one sender is identified, this sender is coded as the primary sender. If no state holds the main responsibility for the threat or imposition of sanctions, this variable is coded as missing, or -99.
6. **Institution:** This variable is coded as 1 if the sanctions were conducted through an international institution. To determine if the sender(s) were applying sanctions as part of a multilateral effort, some evidence must exist that a motion for the application of sanctions is **considered** through an international institution. **The motion need not have been passed, but at least one member of the institution must threaten or propose that the body as a collective adopt sanctions against the target.** The threat must be specifically mentioned to qualify, and threats from the leadership of an international institution qualify as threats from the institution. Note - formal alliances are also considered international institutions.
7. **Institution Identification:** This field identifies the institution responsible for the threat/imposition of sanctions.
8. **Target State Identification:** The COW country code for the target government.
9. **Target State Institution:** If the target is part of the institution that issues a threat against it, this variable is coded as 1. Otherwise it is coded as 0, or if no institution is part of the sanctions, it is coded as -99.
10. **Issue:** These variables are intended to capture as best as possible the issue(s) involved in the threat/imposition of sanctions. The issue variable borrows heavily from Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot. The issue categories are not mutually exclusive. The following three fields list up to three separate issues that are involved in the sanctions case. If there are more than four issues, the field labeled "other issue" lists the additional issues in dispute. The issue categories are as follows:
 1. **Contain Political Influence:** Sanctions are threatened/imposed in an effort to prevent the target from exercising non-military power over a third state, a set of states, or an international institution.
 2. **Contain Military Behavior:** Sanctions are threatened alone or in conjunction with other measures for the purposes of preventing military actions by the target state or in response to target military behavior.

3. **Destabilize Regime:** Sanctions are threatened/imposed alone or with other measures for the purposes of overthrowing a regime in power.
 4. **Release Citizens, Property, or Material:** Sanctions are threatened/imposed in response to the seizure of citizens, property, or material by the target state. The seizure need not involve the citizens, property, or material of the sender, but the sender must declare that the sanctions are imposed as a result of the target's seizure.
 5. **Solve Territorial Dispute:** Sanctions are threatened/imposed in an effort to resolve conflicts stemming from territorial disputes between the sanctioning state and the target state, or the target state and a third party. If sanctions are used in an effort to terminate a territorial dispute, the issue is coded as 5.
 6. **Deny Strategic Materials:** The goal of the sanctioning state in threatening/imposing sanctions is to deny the target access to all or a particular set of strategic materials. For an incident to qualify under this category, the goal of the sender must be to prevent the target from enhancing its political or military capabilities through the acquisition of a certain good. Examples of strategic materials include, but are not limited to, uranium, advanced weaponry, rocket technology, or supercomputers.
 7. **Retaliate for Alliance or Alignment Choice:** Sanctions are threatened in response to the possibility or the actual joining of an alliance or alignment between the target state and a third party.
 8. **Improve Human Rights:** Sanctions are threatened in order to induce the target state to end repressive laws, policies, or actions. Sanctions may also be taken in an effort to compel the target state to respect individual rights.
 9. **End Weapons/Materials Proliferation:** Sanctions are threatened/imposed in an effort to prevent the target state from supplying weapons or materials to a third party client.
 10. **Terminate Support of Non-State Actors:** Sanctions are threatened/imposed in an effort to compel the target state to end its support for a non-state actor. Examples may include ending support for a transnational terrorist organization or ending support for a faction in a civil war.
 11. **Deter or Punish Drug Trafficking Practices:** Sanctions are threatened/imposed in an effort to compel the target to adopt alternative drug policies, stricter drug policies, stricter drug enforcement of the drug trade, or as a punishment for failing to adopt acceptable drug policies or practices.
 12. **Improve Environmental Policies:** Sanctions are threatened/imposed in an effort to compel the target to adopt more stringent environmental controls. Examples of environmental issues include, but are not limited to, protection of wildlife, reduction of emissions, adoption of cleaner technology, or control of acid rain.
 13. **Trade Practices:** Sanctions are threatened to compel the target state to alter a trade practice or to punish a target state for engaging in a particular practice. Examples may include sanctions to end protectionist measures, tariffs, trade restrictions, or devaluations. If the goal of the sender is to affect trading between the sender and the target, the issue should be coded as Trade Practices.
 14. **Implement Economic Reform:** Sanctions are threatened to compel the target state to enact specific economic reforms. Examples may include the implementation of IMF reforms, liberalize a controlled economy, or enact specific economic legislation.
 15. **Other**
11. **Threat Identity:** The following three fields identify which person(s) in the government of the sender began the sanctions incident. The variable presents a list of choices. If the choices in the list do not match the person issuing the threat or supervising the implementation of sanctions, the variable should be coded as other. Like the sanction type variable, the threat identity categories are not mutually exclusive. The coder should then type the identity of the person(s) issuing the initial threat into the bottom field. In some episodes, the threat identity meets several of the categories. If this is the case, each category in which a threat was issued should be identified. For example, if a bureaucrat and the executive make threats, both the bureaucrat and the executive variable are coded as ThreatID1 and

ThreatID2, respectively. If the threat identity repeats its threats at numerous points in the episode, the coder need not code this threat identity multiple times. For example, if a bureaucracy repeats its threat three times, the coder should not code bureaucracy in all three of the threat identity fields. The bureaucracy should only be coded in one of the threat identity fields. The identities include:

1. **Bureaucracy:** A case will be coded as bureaucracy if the threat is issued by a bureaucracy or an employee of a federal level foreign-service oriented bureaucracy. Foreign Service requires that the bureaucracy handle an issue that is related to international diplomacy, international trade, or international security. Examples of bureaucracy include but are not limited to, Ministries of Trade, Ministries of Port Control, Commerce Departments, and Customs Agencies.
 2. **Individual Legislator:** The threat is coded as individual legislator if the threat is issued solely by a member of the legislative branch. The threat of the legislator must not be formally supported by other members of the legislature. If the threat is formally supported, whether through a committee approval or general approval, the threat should be coded as Legislature instead of Individual Legislator.
 3. **Legislature:** The threat is considered to emanate from a legislature if a legislative body considers some resolution, in committee or on the floor, calling for the imposition of sanctions against the target state. The resolution must be formal and debated/considered by at least some part of the voting body.
 4. **Executive Staff Member:** This variable should be coded if a member of the state executive's staff makes a threat of possible economic sanctions. The staff member must be a current member of the executive's staff.
 5. **Executive:** This variable should be coded as if the executive of a state personally makes a threat. For example, if the Chancellor of Germany makes a threat, this variable should be coded.
 6. **Government:** If the information available indicates that a state threatened sanctions, but gives no further information, the variable should be coded as 6. For example, if an article states that United States threatens to impose sanctions on Cuba, but gives no further information, the variable should be coded as State.
 7. **Head of International Institution:** This variable should be coded as 1 if the head of an international institution personally oversees the implementation of sanctions.
 8. **International Institution:** This variable should be coded as 1 if an international institution collectively institutes sanctions against a target. For this variable to be coded as 1, all states within the institution must adopt the resolution to implement sanctions against the target state.
 - 99. **Unknown:** If the identity of the person(s) issuing the threat is unknown, choose unknown and fill in the blank field at the bottom of the identity of the identity.
12. **Sender Commitment:** This variable is intended to gauge the commitment of the sender to imposing sanctions. The sender's commitment is measured by examining the specificity of the threats made by the sender. For example, a sanctions threat from the sender indicating that sanctions are being considered indicates a weak level of commitment. On the other hand, a statement that sanctions will definitely be imposed if the target fails to change its behavior signals high levels of commitment on the part of the sender. Coders should as best as possible fit the threat of the sender(s) into one of the following categories. If no threat is issued, the variable should be coded as -99 or left blank.
1. **Weak:** A statement qualifies as weak if the sender's threat indicates that if the target state fails to alter a certain behavior, the sender will consider numerous possible options, including sanctions. An example of a very weak commitment is as follows, "French trade policy is unacceptable. Germany will consider study various political and economic courses of actions to address this problem."
 2. **Moderate:** A statement qualifies as moderate if the sender's threat indicates that if the target state fails to alter a certain behavior, the sender will consider sanctions as a possibility. For a commitment to be considered moderate, some form of sanctions must be specifically mentioned as a possible response. An example of a moderate commitment is as follows, "French trade policy is unacceptable. Germany will consider increasing tariffs to address this problem."

3. **Strong:** A statement qualifies as strong if an “if...then” statement can be identified. An “if...then” statement means that the sender is explicit that if a certain behavior is not altered, then a form of economic sanctions will be imposed. An example is a strong commitment is as follows, “French trade policy is unacceptable. If such policies continue, Germany will increase tariffs to address this problem.”
- 99. **Not applicable:** No threat issued.
13. **Offending Behavior Specificity:** This variable is intended to gauge how specific the sender is in terms of what actions must be taken by the target state to avoid the imposition of sanctions. The sender’s clarity is measured by examining the specificity of the threats made by sender. Coders should best as possible fit the threat of the sender(s) into one of the following categories. If no threat is issued, the variable should be coded as -99 or left blank.
 1. **Ambiguous:** A statement qualifies as ambiguous if the sender makes a statement referring to a broad area of target policy area that requires revision to avoid sanctions. An example of an ambiguous statement is as follows: “For Afghanistan to avoid the imposition of sanctions by the United Nations, Afghanistan must stop its support of international terrorism.”
 2. **Clear:** A statement qualifies as clear if the sender makes a statement listing the all of the offending behavior of the target government that must be changed to avoid sanctions. An example of a specified statement is as follows: “For Afghanistan to avoid the imposition of sanctions by the United Nations, Afghanistan must close each of its terrorist camps, seal its border with Pakistan to prevent terrorists from cross border raids, and share intelligence about terrorists with the international community.”
 14. **Sanction Type Threatened:** This variable presents several categories of sanctions types threatened by the sender. Using the definitions provided, choose the type of sanction that best fits the threat issued in the episode in the case. If the sanctions imposed by the sender(s) does not match any of the categories, fill in the blank field with the type of sanction that was imposed.
 1. **Unspecific:** Sender threatens to impose sanctions on the target state, but does not specifically mention what type of sanctions the target state will face.
 2. **Total Economic Embargo:** The sender(s) stop the flow of all economic exchange to and from the target state.
 3. **Partial Economic Embargo:** The sender(s) stop the flow of certain commodities or services to and from the target state. For example, a sender may ban all exchanges in military goods to and from a target. For a case to qualify as a partial embargo, some exchange must still be allowed while a sector’s trade must be frozen.
 4. **Import Restriction:** The sender(s) refuses to allow or places a restriction on a certain good or set of goods to be imported from the target state. Import restrictions differ from partial embargoes in that import restrictions only restrict the flow of goods into the sender(s). While the sender does not restrict the flow of goods to the target, the sender may prevent target commodities from being traded in its home markets or impose tariffs or duties on target commodities.
 5. **Export Restriction:** The sender(s) refuses to allow certain goods or services to be exported to the target state. Export restrictions differ from partial embargoes in that export restrictions only restrict the flow of goods to the target from the sender(s). Although the sender places no restriction on goods from the target for import, the sender does not allow a certain good or set of goods to flow out of the sender(s) firms to the target. An example of such a restriction is an export control on dual use technology.
 6. **Blockade:** The sender(s) threatens to prevent all states from engaging in economic transactions with the target state. Such a threat may be enforced physically by the sender(s) military. An alternative is for the sender to threaten any state that engages in transactions with the target with similar economic sanctions.

7. **Asset Freeze:** The sender(s) threatens to partially or completely seize all assets of the target state under the sender(s)' jurisdiction. The sender cannot threaten to seize assets outside of its territorial reach. For example, if Country A threatens B with sanctions, A cannot threaten to seize B's assets in Country C.
 8. **Termination of Foreign Aid:** The sender(s) threaten to reduce or end foreign aid or loans if the target state does not comply with the sender(s) demands.
 9. **Travel Ban:** The sender(s) threaten to cease allowing an individual, group, or citizenry of the target country to enter the territory of the sender(s).
 10. **Suspension of Economic Agreement/Protocol:** The sender(s) threaten to partially or completely cancel or void previous economic arrangements or contracts between the sender(s) and the target state.
 - 99. **Not Applicable:** No threat
15. **Carrots:** If a sender state offered no positive inducements to the target in exchange for altering its behavior, this variable should be coded as 0. However, if the sender offered concessions during the threat stage, the variable should be coded as one of the following categories. If multiple carrots are offered, the coder should fill in each field in which a type of carrot was offered as 1. If the carrot offer does not fit into any of the listed categories, the variable should be coded as other. The coder should then fill in the blank field as to what type of carrot was offered:
1. **Economic Payments or Aid:** If the sender(s) offered the target foreign aid or increases in economic outflows to the target state in exchange for a change in behavior, the variable should be coded as 1.
 2. **Trade Concessions:** If the sender(s) offered the target increased access to the home markets of the sender(s) in the form of trade concessions, decreased tariffs, access to trading institutions, the variable should be coded as 1.
 3. **Removal of Previous Sanctions:** If in exchange for a change in target behavior, the sender(s) offer the removal of previous sanctions imposed on the target, this variable should be coded as 1.
 4. **Military Aid:** If in exchange for a change in target behavior, the sender(s) offer military support in the form of weapons, training, or the deployment of troops, the variable should be coded as 1.
 5. **Political Concessions:** If in exchange for a change in target behavior, the sender(s) offer some form of political concessions, such as diplomatic recognition, the variable should be coded as 1.
- 99. **Unlisted**
16. **Diplomatic Sanctions:** This variable is intended to capture whether or not the sender(s) threatened diplomatic sanctions. The variable lists several types of diplomatic sanctions. If diplomatic sanctions were not part of the episode, the field should be coded as -99. If diplomatic sanctions were threatened in addition to or instead of economic sanctions, the coder should indicate what action was taken by the sender(s) against the target government:
1. **Expulsion of Ambassador:** The sender(s) order a diplomat or a set of diplomats from the target country to leave the territory of the sender government(s).
 2. **Recall of Ambassador:** The sender(s) order their own diplomats to return from the target country.
 3. **Temporary Closing of Embassies:** The sender(s) order all diplomatic personnel to leave the territory of the target state.
 4. **Ending Diplomatic Contact:** The sender(s) permanently end all diplomatic contact with the target state.
17. **Anticipated Target Economic Costs:** This variable is intended to measure the anticipated impact of sanctions imposition. The goal of the variable is to capture the potential costs of sanctions on the target regardless of whether a monetary figure is available or not. Coders should examine the narratives for evidence as to the costs of the sanctions threat. Coders should attempt to fit their response into one of the following categories. If no information is available or the coders are unable to determine the potential impact, the field should be coded as -99.

1. **Minor:** An episode should be coded as minor if no evidence exists that the health of the target's economy will be impacted by the actions of the sender.
 2. **Major:** An episode should be coded as major if evidence exists that the sender's sanctions will impose significant macroeconomic difficulties on the health of the target economy. Evidence of major effects may include abnormal changes (increases of over 5%) in the inflation or unemployment rate of the target economy or drastic reductions in trade relationships.
 3. **Severe:** An episode should be coded as severe if evidence exists that the sender's sanctions have the potential to halt the ability of the target's economy to function. Evidence of a severe threats include reports that a country may lose the ability to obtain critical supplies (such as food, water, electricity, oil), increases the mortality rate, or completely loses the ability to trade with foreign governments.
18. **Anticipated Target Economic Costs Figure:** If an estimate for the monetary value of the economic cost of sanctions prior to sanctions imposition can be located, the coder should fill in this estimate here. In the first field, the coder should list the numerical amount of damages (ex. 1,000,000). In the second field, the coder should indicate what currency the estimate is in (i.e. dollars, pounds, yen, etc.) In the third field, the coder should indicate the type of currency – is the estimate in 1985 dollars or 1992 dollars, etc. In the fourth field, the coder should indicate the year in which the estimate was made. For example, if a coder finds that a 1996 source gives an estimate of the cost of sanctions, 1996 should be listed in the fourth field. In many instances, this information will either be only partially available or not be available. If any of the information is missing, the fields should be coded as -99.
19. **Anticipated Sender Economic Costs:** This variable is intended to measure the anticipated costs to the sender for sanctions imposition. The goal of the variable is to capture the potential costs of sanctions on the target regardless of whether a monetary figure is available or not. Coders should examine the narratives for evidence as to the costs of the sanctions threat. Coders should attempt to fit their response into one of the following categories. If no information is available or the coders are unable to determine the potential impact, the field should be coded as -99.
1. **Minor:** An episode should be coded as minor if no evidence exists that the health of the sender's economy will be impacted by the actions of the sender.
 2. **Major:** An episode should be coded as major if evidence exists that the sender's sanctions will impose significant macroeconomic difficulties on the health of the sender's economy. Evidence of major effects may include abnormal changes (increases of over 5%) in the inflation or unemployment rate of the target economy or drastic reductions in trade relationships.
 3. **Severe:** An episode should be coded as severe if evidence exists that the sender's sanctions have the potential to halt the ability of the sender's economy to function. Evidence of a severe threats include reports that a country may lose the ability to obtain critical supplies (such as food, water, electricity, oil), increases the mortality rate, or completely loses the ability to trade with foreign governments.
20. **Anticipated Sender Economic Costs Figure:** If an estimate for the monetary value of the economic cost of sanctions prior to sanctions imposition can be located, the coder should fill in this estimate here. In the first field, the coder should list the numerical amount of damages (ex. 1,000,000). In the second field, the coder should indicate what currency the estimate is in (i.e. dollars, pounds, yen, etc.) In the third field, the coder should indicate the type of currency – is the estimate in 1985 dollars or 1992 dollars, etc. In the fourth field, the coder should indicate the year in which the estimate was made. For example, if a coder finds that a 1996 source gives an estimate of the cost of sanctions, 1996 should be listed in the fourth field. In many instances, this information will either be only partially available or not be available. If any of the information is missing, the fields should be coded as -99.
21. **Threatened Targeted Interest:** This variable is intended to capture whether or not the sender(s) attempted to gear its sanctions to impose costs on a particular interests within the target government. In several instances, sanctions from the sender may be designed to affect multiple groups within a society. In these cases, the coder should mark the primary group that was targeted and fill in the other group in the Other Threatened Interest field. This variable is only intended to capture which

interests the sender(s) intended to impose costs upon. It is not intended to capture the actual effects of the sanction following sanctions imposition. For example, suppose the sender imposes a sanction that prevents the target from exporting oil to hurt the target's oil companies. However, the effect of the sanctions is to deprive the entire population of needed revenue and goods. In this case, the targeted interest should be coded as business interest, even though the actual effects of the sanctions were general. If the coder is unable to match the target interest with the categories provided, the coder should mark the field other and fill in what group is target by the sanction. If the sanctions are general and are not targeted at a specific interest within the target, the coder should indicate that the sanction is aimed at the general population.

1. **General:** The costs of the sanction will be absorbed the entire target state on a roughly equal basis.
2. **Regime Leadership:** The sanction is designed to impose costs only on the leaders of the target currently in power. The sanction does not affect those citizens within the target state that are not a member of the target's governmental apparatus.
3. **Business Interest:** The sanction is designed to target a particular industry or industries of the target state. While the sanction imposes costs on this industry, the sender's sanctions will not affect other industries, political groups, or the general population within the target state.
4. **Political Interest:** The sanction is designed to target a particular political interest group or set of interest groups in the target state. While the sanction imposes costs on this group or groups, the sender's sanctions will not affect other interest groups, industries, or the population in general.
5. **Military:** The sanction is designed to impose costs on the military of the target state. The sanction will deny the military weapons, funds, spare parts, or other necessary equipment. While the sanction could impose costs on the military, it does not impose costs on other economic or political interests nor does it harm the target's population in general.
6. **Other.**

Sanction Characteristics

This set of variables is intended to capture the nature of the sanction imposed by the sender against the target state. In some cases, the dispute is settled in the threat stage. If this is the case, sanctions are not imposed. If sanctions are not implemented, the coder should answer each of the following fields as -99, or no sanctions imposed. If sanctions are imposed by the sender, the coder should answer each of the questions in the following section.

22. **Sanction Identity:** This variable identifies the part of the sender that is responsible for the imposition of sanctions. The variable presents a list of choices. If the choices in the list do not match the person supervising the imposition of sanctions, the variable should be coded as other. Coders should indicate as best as possible the primary part of government that is responsible for implementation. The identities include:
 1. **Bureaucratic:** Sanctions are imposed by a bureaucracy or administration that has been delegated authority to address the particular issue. An example of bureaucratic sanctions might come from a department of fisheries, which is responsible for certifying that targets do not violate environmental regulations and imposing surcharges if the target does so.
 2. **Legislative:** Sanctions are imposed by the sender's legislature. Legislatures typically impose sanctions by adopting resolutions or passing laws.
 3. **Judicial:** Sanctions are imposed by a judiciary if sanctions are imposed as the result of a decision by a federal level court.
 4. **Executive:** Sanctions are imposed by the executive personally or by any member of the executive's staff.
 5. **Government:** Sanctions should be coded as Government if the information from the sources state only that State X imposes sanctions on State Y. For example, if a source indicates, "The United States imposes sanctions on Cuba," the variable should be coded as Government.

6. **International Institution:** Sanctions should be coded as international institution if such an institution is responsible for the implementation of sanctions.
- 99. **Missing.**
23. **Sanction Type:** This variable presents several categories of sanctions types. Using the definitions provided, choose the type of sanction that best fits the incident in the case. If the sanctions imposed by the sender(s) does not match any of the categories, choose other and fill in the blank field with the type of sanction that was imposed.
1. **Total Economic Embargo:** The sender(s) stop the flow of all economic exchange to and from the target state.
 2. **Partial Economic Embargo:** The sender(s) stop the flow of certain commodities or services to and from the target state. For example, a sender may ban all exchanges in military goods to and from a target. For a case to qualify as a partial embargo, some exchange must still be allowed while a sector's trade must be frozen.
 3. **Import Restriction:** The sender(s) refuses to allow or places a restriction on a certain good or set of goods to be imported from the target state. Import restrictions differ from partial embargoes in that import restrictions only restrict the flow of goods into the sender(s). While the sender does not restrict the flow of goods to the target, the sender may prevent target commodities from being traded in its home markets or impose tariffs or duties on target commodities.
 4. **Export Restriction:** The sender(s) refuses to allow certain goods or services to be exported to the target state. Export restrictions differ from partial embargoes in that export restrictions only restrict the flow of goods to the target from the sender(s). Although the sender places no restriction on goods from the target for import, the sender does not allow a certain good or set of goods to flow out of the sender(s) firms to the target. An example of such a restriction is an export control on dual use technology.
 5. **Blockade:** The sender(s) attempts to physically prevent all states from engaging in economic transactions with the target state. Such actions may be enforced physically by the sender(s) military. An alternative is for the sender to threaten any state that engages in transactions with the target with similar economic sanctions.
 6. **Asset Freeze:** The sender(s) partially or completely seize all assets of the target state under the sender(s)' jurisdiction.
 7. **Termination of Foreign Aid:** The sender(s) reduces or ends foreign aid or loans if the target state does not comply with the sender(s) demands.
 8. **Travel Ban:** The sender(s) ceases allowing an individual, group, or citizenry of the target country to enter the territory of the sender(s).
 9. **Suspension of Economic Agreement:** The sender(s) threaten to partially or completely cancel or void previous economic arrangements or contracts between the sender(s) and the target state.
 10. **Other.**
- 99. **Not Applicable : No sanctions imposed.**
24. **Carrots:** If a sender state offered no positive inducements to the target in exchange for altering its behavior, this variable should be coded as 0. However, if the sender offered concessions during the period in which sanctions were imposed, the variable should be coded as one of the following categories. If multiple carrots are offered, the coder should fill in each field in which a type of carrot was offered as 1. If the carrot offer does not fit into any of the listed categories, the variable should be coded as other. The coder should then fill in the blank field as to what type of carrot was offered:
1. **Economic Payments or Aid:** If the sender(s) offered the target foreign aid or increases in economic outflows to the target state in exchange for a change in behavior, the variable should be coded as 1.
 2. **Trade Concessions:** If the sender(s) offered the target increased access to the home markets of the sender(s) in the form of trade concessions, decreased tariffs, access to trading institutions, the variable should be coded as 1.

3. **Removal of Previous Sanctions:** If in exchange for a change in target behavior, the sender(s) offer the removal of previous sanctions imposed on the target, this variable should be coded as 1.
 4. **Military Aid:** If in exchange for a change in target behavior, the sender(s) offer military support in the form of weapons, training, or the deployment of troops, the variable should be coded as 1.
 5. **Political Concessions:** If in exchange for a change in target behavior, the sender(s) offer some form of political concessions, such as diplomatic recognition, the variable should be coded as 1.
- 99. **Unlisted.**
25. **Carrot Value:** If an estimate for the monetary value of the carrot can be located, the coder should fill in this estimate here. In the first field, the coder should list the estimated numerical amount of the carrot. In the second field, the coder should indicate the type of currency the estimate is in (i.e. dollars, pounds, yen, etc.). In the third field, the coder should indicate the year of the currency— is the estimate in 1985 dollars or 1992 dollars, etc. In the fourth field, the coder should indicate the year in which the estimate was made. For example, if a coder finds that a 1996 source gives an estimate of the cost of sanctions, 1996 should be listed in the third field. In many instances, this information will either be only partially available or not be available. If any of the information is missing, the fields should be coded as -99.
 26. **Diplomatic Sanctions:** This variable is intended to capture several types of diplomatic sanctions. If diplomatic sanctions were not part of the episode, the field should be coded as -99. If diplomatic sanctions were taken in addition to or instead of economic sanctions, the coder should indicate what action was taken by the sender(s) against the target government:
 1. **Expulsion of Ambassador:** The sender(s) order a diplomat or a set of diplomats from the target country to leave the territory of the sender government(s).
 2. **Recall of Ambassador:** The sender(s) order their own diplomats to return from the target country.
 3. **Temporary Closing of Embassies:** The sender(s) order all diplomatic personnel to leave the territory of the target state.
 4. **Ending Diplomatic Contact:** The sender(s) permanently end all diplomatic contact with the target state.
 27. **Target Economic Costs:** This variable is intended to measure the impact of sanctions imposition ex post. The goal of the variable is to capture the costs of sanctions on the target regardless of whether a monetary figure is available or not. Coders should examine the narratives for evidence as to the costs of the sanctions ex post. Coders should attempt to fit their response into one of the following categories. If no information is available or the coders are unable to determine the potential impact, the field should be coded as -99.
 1. **Minor:** An episode should be coded as minor if no evidence exists that the health of the target's economy was impacted by the actions of the sender.
 2. **Major:** An episode should be coded as major if evidence exists that the sender's sanctions resulted in significant macroeconomic difficulties on the health of the target economy. Evidence of major effects may include abnormal changes (increases of over 5%) in the inflation or unemployment rate of the target economy or drastic reductions in trade relationships.
 3. **Severe:** An episode should be coded as severe if evidence exists that the sender's sanctions halted the ability of the target's economy to function. Evidence of a severe threats include reports that a country may lose the ability to obtain critical supplies (such as food, water, electricity, oil), increases the mortality rate, or completely loses the ability to trade with foreign governments.
 28. **Monetary Cost to the Target Figure:** If an estimate for the monetary value of the economic cost of sanctions can be located, the coder should fill in this estimate here. In the first field, the coder should list the numerical amount of damages (ex. 1,000,000). In the second field, the coder should indicate what currency the estimate is in (i.e. dollars, pounds, yen, etc.) In the third field, the coder

should indicate the type of currency – is the estimate in 1985 dollars or 1992 dollars, etc. In the fourth field, the coder should indicate the year in which the estimate was made. For example, if a coder finds that a 1996 source gives an estimate of the cost of sanctions, 1996 should be listed in the fourth field. In many instances, this information will either be only partially available or not be available. If any of the information is missing, the fields should be coded as -99.

29. **Sender Economic Costs:** This variable is intended to measure the costs to the sender for sanctions imposition ex post. The goal of the variable is to capture the potential costs of sanctions on the target regardless of whether a monetary figure is available or not. Coders should examine the narratives for evidence as to the costs of the sanctions to the sender. Coders should attempt to fit their response into one of the following categories. If no information is available or the coders are unable to determine the potential impact, the field should be coded as -99.
1. **Minor:** An episode should be coded as minor if no evidence exists that the health of the sender's economy was impacted by the actions of the sender.
 2. **Major:** An episode should be coded as major if evidence exists that the sender's sanctions resulted in significant macroeconomic difficulties on the health of the sender's economy. Evidence of major effects may include abnormal changes (increases of over 5%) in the inflation or unemployment rate of the target economy or drastic reductions in trade relationships.
 3. **Severe:** An episode should be coded as severe if evidence exists that the sender's sanctions halted the ability of the sender's economy to function. Evidence of a severe threats include reports that a country may lose the ability to obtain critical supplies (such as food, water, electricity, oil), increases the mortality rate, or completely loses the ability to trade with foreign governments.
30. **Monetary Cost to the Sender Figure:** If an estimate for the monetary value of the economic cost of sanctions can be located, the coder should fill in this estimate here. In the first field, the coder should list the numerical amount of damages (ex. 1,000,000). In the second field, the coder should indicate what currency the estimate is in (i.e. dollars, pounds, yen, etc.) In the third field, the coder should indicate the type of currency – is the estimate in 1985 dollars or 1992 dollars, etc. In the fourth field, the coder should indicate the year in which the estimate was made. For example, if a coder finds that a 1996 source gives an estimate of the cost of sanctions, 1996 should be listed in the fourth field. In many instances, this information will either be only partially available or not be available. If any of the information is missing, the fields should be coded as -99.
31. **Final Outcome:** This variable is designed to capture the nature of the termination of the sanctions incident. The coder should choose from among the categories listed. If the outcome does not match the categories listed, the coder should code the variable as other and fill in the outcome in the blank field at the bottom. The categories are:
1. **Partial Acquiescence by Target to threat:** The target state agrees to some of the demands of the sender(s) and adjusts only these behaviors accordingly while continuing the engage in some of the offensive behavior prior to imposition of sanctions.
 2. **Complete Acquiescence by Target to threat:** The target state agrees to all of the demands of the sender(s) and adjusts its behavior accordingly prior to the imposition of sanctions
 3. **Capitulation by the Sender(s) in threat stage:** Although the sender threatens sanctions, the sender refuses to impose sanctions despite the refusal of the target to alter its behavior.
 4. **Stalemate in the Threat Stage:** Although the issue remains unresolved following the sender's threat, the target does not alter its behavior and the sender does not impose sanctions.
 5. **Negotiated Settlement:** The target state agrees to alter some of its behavior in exchange for actions taken by the sender(s) prior to the imposition of sanctions. The sender(s) must perform some action in exchange for the target state's compliance for this variable to be coded as 1.
 6. **Partial Acquiescence by the Target State following sanctions imposition:** The target state agrees to some of the demands of the sender(s) and adjusts only these behaviors accordingly while continuing the engage in some of the offensive behavior after sanctions are imposed.

7. **Total Acquiescence by Target State following sanctions imposition:** The target state agrees to all of the demands of the sender(s) and adjusts its behavior accordingly after sanctions are imposed.
 8. **Capitulation by Sender after Imposition:** The sender state removes sanctions despite the refusal of the target to alter its behavior.
 9. **Stalemate after Sanctions Imposition:** Sanctions are imposed by the sender(s), but the target does not alter its behavior.
 10. **Negotiated Settlement following sanctions imposition:** The target state agrees to alter some of its behavior in exchange for actions taken by the sender(s) following the imposition of sanctions. The sender(s) must perform some action in exchange for the target state's compliance for this variable to be coded as 1.
 - 99. **Unknown:** If the settlement type does not match any of the eight categories, choose unknown and fill in the bottom field with the settlement type.
32. **Settlement Nature for Sender state:** This variable is designed to capture how the sanctions episode was settled. On a scale of 1-10, how did the sender fare as a result of the threat/imposition of sanctions? The scale ranges from 0 to 10, with 10 representing the best possible outcome for the settlement.. As best as possible, coders should assign a number between 0 and 10 to approximate the nature of the settlement. For example, in a case where the U.S. threatens China with trade sanctions, the coder may believe that the U.S. and China had a roughly equally favorable outcome, but slightly favoring the U.S. The coder may indicate that the settlement nature is 6 for the U.S., indicating the nature of this particular outcome. Several episodes may have no settlements. In cases in which there are no settlements, coders should code the variable as -9, or no settlement. If the coder does not believe that enough information is available to make a judgment, the coder should code the case as -99 to indicate that the information is missing.
33. **Settlement Nature for Target state:** This variable is designed to capture how the sanctions episode was settled. The following scale represents the degree to which the target accomplished its policy objectives.¹

¹Tests of reliability for the sender settlement and target settlement measures indicate that these measurements are somewhat questionable. However, if one assumes that the higher score of the sender and the target equates prevailing in the sanctions case, the measure can be reliable in this way.