Reducing the Cost of Meeting Regional
Water Demand through Risk-based Transfer Agreements
(This project served as the basis for Reed Palmer's masters research,
and a manuscript based on this work is currently in review with the Journal of Environmental Management
(see abstract below). This work continues and is currently the
subject of Casey Caldwell's research)
Abstract
Transfers of treated water among inter-connected utilities is becoming
more common as the cost of developing new supplies grows, and transfer
agreements require well developed rules describing when and how much
water will be transferred. The nature of the decision rules
governing an agreement must also be coordinated with respect to the
treatment and conveyance capacity required to execute the
transfers. This study explores different combinations of
infrastructure and agreement type that define three different transfer
programs, describing the frequency and volume of transfers associated
with each, as well as its costs. The agreements are described in
terms of the type of decision rule employed: Take-or-Pay, with the
timing and quantity of transfers fixed; Days of Supply Remaining (DSR),
which uses a static hydrologic indicator to trigger transfers; and
Risk-of-Failure, a probability-based decision rule that involves
consideration of both supply and demand. The analysis is applied
to the Research Triangle area of North Carolina (USA), a rapidly
growing area that is beginning to approach the practical limits of
water resource development. The Risk-of-Failure agreement
reduces the average volume of transfers by over 80% compared to a
Take-or-Pay agreement and by roughly half relative to the DSR
agreement, leading to significant cost reductions. A utility’s
willingness to accept something less than guaranteed access to a
specified quantity of water (i.e. an interruption) also has a
significant impact on cost. Interruptions do not necessarily lead
to lower reliability, but rather to the purchasing utility acquiring
more water during off-peak periods when the seller has excess treatment
capacity available, and the lowest cost guaranteed agreement is 40% to
50% more expensive than the lowest cost interruptible contract.
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