

# Risk Sharing for the Long-Run

## A General Equilibrium Approach to International Finance with Recursive Preferences and Long-Run Risks

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# Motivation

- We would like to explain:
  - 1 The forward premium anomaly: the tendency of high interest rate currencies to appreciate
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- A general equilibrium model: quantities (consumption, NX,...) and prices (assets' returns, FX,...) are outcome of utility maximization problem
- The model should be consistent with:
  - low int'l correlation of consumption and output
  - smoothness of exchange rates
  - large int'l equity risk premia
  - large int'l correlation of returns
  - volatility of Net Exports
  - ...

# Roadmap of the talk

- 1 Setup of the model
  - Preferences
  - Endowments
- 2 Market structures
  - Complete Markets
  - Portfolio Autarky
- 3 Calibration
- 4 Results

# Preferences

- Two countries: home ( $h$ ) and foreign ( $f$ )
- Agents have risk-sensitive preferences

$$U_{i,t} = (1 - \delta) \log C_{i,t} + \delta \theta \log E_t \exp \left\{ \frac{U_{i,t+1}}{\theta} \right\}, \quad \forall i \in \{h, f\}$$

where  $\theta = 1 / (1 - \gamma)$ .

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$$U_{i,t} \approx (1 - \delta) \log C_{i,t} + \delta E_t[U_{i,t+1}] + \frac{\delta}{2\theta} V_t[U_{i,t+1}], \quad \forall i \in \{h, f\}$$

where  $\theta = 1/(1 - \gamma)$ . **Conditional Variance matters.**

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- Preferences are defined over the consumption aggregate

$$C_{h,t} = (x_{h,t})^\alpha (y_{h,t})^{1-\alpha} \quad \text{and} \quad C_{f,t} = (x_{f,t})^{1-\alpha} (y_{f,t})^\alpha$$

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- Consumption bias:  $\alpha > 1/2$ .

# Endowments

- Endowments' growth is *almost* i.i.d.

$$\Delta \log X_t = \mu_x + z_{1,t-1} + \varepsilon_{x,t}$$

$$\Delta \log Y_t = \mu_y + z_{2,t-1} + \varepsilon_{y,t}$$

where  $z_{1,t}$  and  $z_{2,t}$  are small, predictable components

$$z_{1,t} = \rho_1 z_{1,t-1} + \varepsilon_{1,t}$$

$$z_{2,t} = \rho_2 z_{2,t-1} + \varepsilon_{2,t}$$

- Shocks are homoskedastic.

# Markets

- *Home* is endowed with good  $X$ ;
- *Foreign* is endowed with good  $Y$ ;
- Complete set of one period ahead state contingent securities;
- Budget constraints:

$$x_{h,t} + p_t y_{h,t} + \sum_{s_{t+1}} Q_{t+1}(s_{t+1}) A_{t+1}(s_{t+1}) \leq X_t + A_t \quad [\textit{Home}]$$

$$x_{f,t} + p_t y_{f,t} - \sum_{s_{t+1}} Q_{t+1}(s_{t+1}) A_{t+1}(s_{t+1}) \leq p_t Y_t - p_t A_t \quad [\textit{Foreign}]$$

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- We shall solve the Pareto problem first...

## Planner's problem

Efficient allocations are the solution to the planner's problem

$$\begin{array}{ll} \text{choose} & \{x_{h,t}, x_{f,t}, y_{h,t}, y_{f,t}\}_{t=0}^{+\infty} \\ \text{to max} & Q = \mu_h U_{h,0} + \mu_f U_{f,0} \\ \text{s.t.} & x_{h,t} + x_{f,t} = X_t \\ & y_{h,t} + y_{f,t} = Y_t, \quad \forall t \geq 0 \end{array}$$

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- $\mu_h$  and  $\mu_f$  correspond to an initial distribution of assets.
- Notation:  $S = \mu_h / \mu_f$ .

# Allocations

## Time Additive Preferences

Let  $k = \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}$ :

$$\begin{aligned}x_t^h &= \frac{kS}{1+kS} X_t, & x_t^f &= \frac{1}{1+kS} X_t \\y_t^h &= \frac{S}{k+S} Y_t, & y_t^f &= \frac{k}{k+S} Y_t\end{aligned}$$

where

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# Allocations

## Risk Sensitive Preferences

Let  $k = \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}$ :

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where

$$S_t = S_{t-1} \cdot \frac{\delta \exp\{U_{h,t}/\theta\}}{E_{t-1} \exp\{U_{h,t}/\theta\}} \bigg/ \frac{\delta \exp\{U_{f,t}/\theta\}}{E_{t-1} \exp\{U_{f,t}/\theta\}}$$

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- 1 What is  $S_t$ ?
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
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- $S_t \downarrow$ , when home receives good (short- or long-run) news.
- Equivalently, countries export more in good times.


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
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


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Trade-off between Expected Utility and Utility Variance

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- Agents are willing to trade-off lower consumption today for smoother future utility profiles.
- Volatilities are high in bad times and low in good time.

# Consumption growth

## Time Additive Preferences

$$\Delta c_t^h = \alpha \Delta x_t + (1 - \alpha) \Delta y_t$$

$$\Delta c_t^f = (1 - \alpha) \Delta x_t + \alpha \Delta y_t$$

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## Risk Sensitive Preferences

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- 1 Additional endogenous predictive component

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- 2 Contemporaneous response to long-run shocks

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Exchange rates are functions of relative supplies of the two goods

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- Agents are extremely sensitive to long-run news
- Long-run risks should be very correlated to replicate FX volatility



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

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

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→ Short-run shock to  $X$ : home country is happy!

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

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

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

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
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

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→ Home currency depreciates:  $corr(\Delta c^h - \Delta c^f, \Delta e)$  is positive

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
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

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

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

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

The quest for  $corr(\Delta c^h - \Delta c^f, \Delta e) \approx 0$



→ Home consumption falls to restore equilibrium.

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

The quest for  $\text{corr}(\Delta c^h - \Delta c^f, \Delta e) \approx 0$



→ Home currency depreciates

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

The quest for  $corr(\Delta c^h - \Delta c^f, \Delta e) \approx 0$



→ Home currency depreciates:  $corr(\Delta c^h - \Delta c^f, \Delta e)$  is negative



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The quest for  $\text{corr}(\Delta c^h - \Delta c^f, \Delta e) \approx 0$



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# Forward Premium Anomaly

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Why do high interest rate currency have the tendency to appreciate?

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## Interest rate differential

$$\uparrow r_{t-1}^h - r_{t-1}^f \approx \uparrow E_{t-1} [\Delta c_t^h - \Delta c_t^f] + \frac{1}{2} (V_{t-1} [\Delta c_t^f] - V_{t-1} [\Delta c_t^h]) \uparrow$$

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# Calibration

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**Pre-1970**

**Post-1970**

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# Calibration

	<b>Pre-1970</b>	<b>Post-1970</b>
Financial Regime	Portfolio Autarky	Complete Markets

# Calibration

		Pre-1970	Post-1970
Financial Regime		Portfolio Autarky	Complete Markets
$\mu$	Mean Output growth		0.165%
$\sigma$	Std. dev. of idiosyncratic output growth		0.540%
$\sigma_x$	Std. dev. of long-run output growth		4% $\cdot\sigma$
$\alpha$	Degree of consumption home bias		0.980
$\delta$	Subjective discount factor		0.998
$\gamma$	Risk Aversion		7
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$\rho$	Persistence of long-run risks		0.988
$\rho_{12}$	Correlation of long-run risks	0.5	.9
$\rho_{xy}$	Correlation of short-run risks	-0.5	0.05


# Correlation of Long-Run Risks: methodology

## Methodology:

- Define GDP as sum of consumption and Net Export
- For each country: regress  $\Delta GDP$  on lagged  $\Delta c$ ,  $pd$ ,  $cy$
- Use projection as measure of long-run risks
- Apply to US and UK


# Long-Run Risks

→ Using all NX




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
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## Results: quantities

	Pre-1970		Post-1970	
	Model	Data	Model	Data
	(Portfolio Autarky)	(US,UK)	(Complete Markets)	(US,UK)
$Std[\Delta y^h]$				
$ACF_1[\Delta y^h]$				
$Std[\Delta c^h]$				
$ACF_1[\Delta c^h]$				
$corr[\Delta y_t^h, \Delta y_t^f]$				
$corr[\Delta c_t^h, \Delta c_t^f]$				
$Std[NX^h / Y^h]$				
$ACF_1[NX^h / Y^h]$				

## Results: quantities

	Pre-1970		Post-1970	
	Model (Portfolio Autarky)	Data (US,UK)	Model (Complete Markets)	Data (US,UK)
$Std[\Delta y^h]$	1.920	2.483	1.920	1.865
$ACF_1[\Delta y^h]$	0.430	0.064	0.431	0.023
$Std[\Delta c^h]$	1.880	1.405	1.780	1.705
$ACF_1[\Delta c^h]$	0.430	0.283	0.463	0.396

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$corr[\Delta c_t^h, \Delta c_t^f]$	-0.070	0.021	0.639	0.584
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$Std[r_f^h]$	1.210	0.884	1.210	1.200
$corr[r_{f,t}^h, r_{f,t}^f]$	0.500	0.512	0.870	0.672
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# Epstein and Zin Preferences

- Risk Sensitive preferences are a special case of Epstein and Zin preferences.
- What happens when the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is different from 1?
- Main results are confirmed, larger equity risk premium...

## Epstein and Zin Preferences: Results

$\Psi$	<b>1.5</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0.66</b>
$\gamma$	10	10	10
$Std(\Delta e)$	18.02	18.14	27.57
$E[r_c - r_f^f]$	3.24	0.28	-1.27
$E[r_f]$	1.48	3.6	5.27
$Std(r_f)$	0.85	1.47	2.06
$corr(r_f^h, r_f^f)$	0.86	0.93	0.95
$corr(\Delta c^h - \Delta c^f, \Delta e)$	-0.13	0	0.63
$\beta_{UIP}$	-2.56	-2.65	-3.29

# Concluding Remarks

A two-countries model with:

- complete markets
  - two goods
  - long-run risks in the endowments
  - recursive preferences
- 
- 1 generates
    - dynamic risk-sharing scheme
    - endogenously time varying second moments
  - 2 replicates a number of international finance facts
  - 3 **introduce frictions and investments**