Christopher Gelpi	Mark Crescenzi
406 Perkins Library, Duke University	364 Hamilton Hall, University of North Carolina
Ph: 919-660-4318; Email: gelpi@duke.edu	Ph: 919-962-0401; Email: crescenzi@unc.edu
Office Hours: Thursdays 11-1	Office Hours: Thursdays 1:30-4:30

 

Objectives of the Seminar

The objectives of this course are: (1) to understand the scope and breadth of the theoretical literature that has defined the study of international relations; (2) to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the theoretical paradigms represented in that literature; (3) to define specific research questions and issues that must be addressed by future research; and (4) to prepare students for preliminary examinations in international relations.

It is, of course, impossible to provide a comprehensive review of the entire field of international relations in a single semester. The readings and discussions in this course seek to strike a balance between traditional works that define the evolution of the field and contemporary works that highlight the development of our knowledge and possible directions for future research. Some of the materials in this course rely on technical tools (such as econometrics or formal theory). Students are not expected to be familiar with these tools prior to enrolling in the course, but will become familiar with them during the semester.

 

Course Requirements

Response Papers (20% of final grade): In order to encourage active thinking about the readings and discussion in class, students will write two brief commentaries (2 pages maximum, single-spaced) on the readings for a particular week. Students should seek in these notes to engage one or more themes in the works, discuss their strengths and weaknesses, and suggest future research questions facing that area of the literature. Students will sign up for their weeks at the first class meeting of the seminar. The papers will be circulated electronically to the entire class, and will be due at 9:00 a.m. on the relevant class day. You can email the entire class through the blackboard website.

Class Participation (10% of the final grade): Students will be expected to come to class fully prepared to engage in a robust, informed discussion of the readings and the problems for the field of international relations raised by the readings.

Literature or Book Review (25% of the final grade): The readings on this syllabus can only serve as a starting point from which students will engage additional important literature. Students will therefore write a literature or book review on a topic of interest to them that relates to one of the subjects addressed by this course. A book review will generally focus intensively on one or two related books; a literature review will examine the development of a theme or problem through time and a larger number of readings. Either type of analysis should be 4,000-5,000 words. Students should consult with the instructors before selecting a review topic. Literature and book reviews that may serve as models for such forms of scholarship are listed at the end of this syllabus.

Written Final Examination (25% of the final grade): Students will take a one-day in-class examination that will be patterned on the preliminary examinations that graduate students must pass before they may advance to the dissertation stage of the PhD program.

Oral Exam Final (20% of the final grade): As with the preliminary exam process, students will be given a brief oral exam with the course instructors. The oral exam may focus on issues raised in the written exam, but any material on the syllabus may be covered during the exam.

It is important that students cite the material that they have relied upon in writing these papers. If you have questions about when you need to provide citation for a source, please see the Duke Libraries' guide on avoiding plagiarism. If you have questions about how to provide citation on your sources, please see the Duke Libraries' guide on citation formats. Use any citation format that you prefer, what is important is that you give credit to the sources you used.

 

Required Books

The following books are available for purchase at the Duke University Bookstore and are also available for purchase through various online sources.

D. Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam. The Behavioral Origins of War (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004).

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph Siverson, and James Morrow. The Logic of Political Survival (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003).

Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton 1984).

Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry (Princeton, 1994).

Powell, Robert O. 1999. In the Shadow of Power. Princeton University Press.

Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Addison-Wesley, 1979).

All other readings are available online through UNC or Duke's full-text databases or on e-reserves. Students can obtain the readings by clicking on the links below. Students must be connected to the UNC or Duke network (or through the UNC or Duke VPN client) to download and print the readings. If the link doesn't work, try using the search engines supported by your library and location.

 

Topics and Schedule

 

August 25: Organizationand Introduction

 

September 1: The Core Problem in IR—The Causes of War and the Conditions for Peace

Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam. The Behavioral Origins of War. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004).

 

September 8: Thinking Theoretically About IR

J. Ann Tickner, 2005. "What's Your Research Program? Some Feminist Answers to International Relations Methodological Questions." International Studies Quarterly 49, 1: 1-21. (UNC link to PDF) (Duke: Academic OneFile)

Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry (Princeton, 1994), chapters 1-3.

Dina Zinnes. 1980. "Three Puzzles in Search of a Researcher." International Studies Quarterly 23(3):315-42.

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, "Toward a Scientific Understanding of International Conflict: A Personal View, in Symposium: Methodological Foundations of the Study of International Conflict, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 2. (Jun., 1985), pp. 121-136. 

 

September 15: The (Neo)Realist Perspective

Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 79-128, 161-193.

Stephen Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," International Security, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Spring, 1985), pp. 3-43

John A. Vasquez, "The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative versus Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz's Balancing Proposition" The American Political Science Review , Vol. 91, No. 4. (Dec., 1997), pp. 899-912.

Kenneth Waltz, "Evaluating Theories," The American Political Science Review , 91, No. 4. (Dec., 1997), pp. 913-917

Robert Gilpin, "The Politics of Transnational Economic Relations," International Organization 25 (Summer 1971), pp. 398-419.

Stephen Krasner, "State Power and the Structure of International Trade," World Politics 28 (April l976), pp. 317-347.

 

September 22: The International Institutionalist Perspective

Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, 1984), chapters 5-6.

Joseph Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," International Organization , Vol. 42, No. 3. (Summer, 1988), pp. 485-507.

Duncan Snidal. 1991. "Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation." American Political Science Review 85(3):701-726.

George Downs, David Rocke, and Peter Barsoom, "Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about Cooperation," International Organization 50 (Summer 1996), pp. 379-406

Beth Simmons, "International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs," American Political Science Review 94, 4 (2000). pp. 819-35.

Jana Von Stein, "Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance." American Political Science Review 99 (2005), pp. 611-622.

Beth Simmons and Dan Hopkins, "The Constraining Power of International Treaties: Theory and Methods." American Political Science Review 99 (2005), pp. 623-631.

 

Septebmer 29: The Constructivist Perspective

Alexander Wendt. 1987. The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory." International Organization 41:335-370

Alexander Wendt. 1992. "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics." International Organization 46:391-425.

John Gerard Ruggie, "What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge," International Organization , 52, 4(1998), pp. 855-886.

Richard Price, "Reversing the Gun Sights:  Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines," International Organization 52 (Summer 1998), pp. 613-644. 

Nina Tannenwald, "Stigmatizing the Bomb:  Origins of the Nuclear Taboo," International Security 29 (Spring 2005), pp. 5-49.

Chaim Kaufmann and Robert Pape, "Explaining Costly International Moral Action: Britain's Sixty-Year Campaign against the Atlantic Slave Trade," International Organization, Vol. 53 (Autumn, 1999), pp. 631-668.

 

October 6: Duke University Fall Break - NO CLASS

 

October 13: The Rational Choice Perspective on International Relations

Thomas Schelling. 1960. The Strategy of Conflict. (New Haven: Yale University Press). Chapter 2 (An Essay on Bargaining).

James Fearon. 1995. "Rationalist Explanations for War. International Organization 49(3):379-414.

David Lake and Robert Powell, eds. 1999. Strategic Choice and International Relations. Chapters 1-4.

 

October 20: Deterrence, Reputation, and Crisis Bargaining

Paul Huth, "Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War," American Political Science Review, 82, (1988).

Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Stein, "Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent Variable," World Politics , Vol. 42, No. 3. (Apr., 1990), pp. 336-369.

Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, "Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigor Makes a Difference," World Politics," Vol. 42, No. 4. (Jul., 1990), pp. 466-501.

James D. Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model," The Journal of Conflict Resolution , Vol. 38, No. 2, Arms, Alliances, and Cooperation: Formal Models and Empirical Tests. (1994), pp. 236-269.

Daryl Press. 2004/2005. "The Credibility of Power: Assessing Threats During the 'Appeasement' Crises of the 1930's." International Security 29(3):136-169.

Mark Crescenzi. 2007. "Reputation and Interstate Conflict." American Journal of Political Science 51(2):382-396.

 

October 27: Power, Bargaining and War (Part I)

Dahl, Robert. "The Concept of Power." Behavioral Science 2 (2) : 201-215. (BF1.B5)

Powell, Robert. In the Shadow of Power, Ch. 1-2

Lake, David A. 2007. "Escape from the State of Nature: Authority and Hierarchy in World Politics." International Security 32 (1): 47-79.

MacDonald, Paul K., and David A. Lake. 2008. "Correspondence: The Role of Hierarchy in International Politics." International Security 32 (4): 171-180.

 

November 3: Power, Bargaining and War (Part II)

Powell, Robert. In the Shadow of Power Chs 3-4

Wagner, R. Harrison. 2000. "Bargaining and War." American Journal of Political Science 44 (3): 469-484.

Powell, Robert. 2002. "Bargaining Theory and International Conflict." Annual Review of Political Science 5: 1-30.

Powell, Robert. 2004. "The Inefficient Use of Power: Costly Conflict with Complete Information." American Political Science Review 98 (2): 231-241.

 

November 10: Psychological Perspectives on the Study of War

Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976). Chapter 4.

Barbara Farnham, "Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis: Insights from Prospect Theory," Political Psychology, 13, 2:205-235

Chaim Kaufmann, "Out of the Labs and Into the Archives: A Method for Testing Psychological Explanations of Political Decision Making," International Studies Quarterly, 38, 4, (1994).

Michael Horowitz, Rose McDermott, and Allan C. Stam, "Leader Age, Regime Type, and Violent International Relations," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49, 5:661-685.

Rose McDermott, Dominic Johnson, Jonathan Cowden, and Stephen Rosen, "Testosterone and Aggression in a Simulated Crisis Game," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 614:15-34.

 

November 17: The Domestic Institutionalist Perspective—Liberal Democratic Peace Theory

Bruce Russett and Zeev Maoz, "Normative and Structural Causes of the Democratic Peace, 1946‑1986," American Political Science Review, 87 (1993), pp. 624‑638.  

James Fearon. 1994. "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes." The American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 3 (Sep., 1994), pp. 577-592

Henry Farber and Joanne Gowa, "Polities and Peace," International Security20 (Fall 1995), pp. 123‑146.  

Ido Oren, "The Subjectivity of the Democratic Peace," International Security 20, No. 2 (Fall 1995), pp. 147‑184.  

Kenneth Schultz. 1999. "Do Democratic Political Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War." International Organization53:233-266.

 

November 24:  Liberalism, International Economic Interdependence, and the Prospects for Peace

Katherine Barbieri. 1996. "Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of Interstate Conflict?" Journal of Peace Research 33(1):29-49.

John Oneal and Bruce Russett, "Assessing the Liberal Peace with Alternative Specifications: Trade Still Reduces Conflict," Journal of Peace Research 36 (July 1999), pp. 423-442.

Erik Gartzke. 2007. "The Capitalist Peace." American Journal of Political Science 51(1): 166-191.

Michael Ward, Randolph Siverson, and Xun Cao. 2007. "Disputes, Democracies and Dependencies: A Re-examination of the Kantian Peace."  American Journal of Political Science 51(3)583-601.

Christopher Gelpi and Joseph M. Grieco. 2008. "Democracy, Interdependence, and the Sources of the Liberal Peace," Journal of Peace Research 45,1:17-37.

Mark Crescenzi. 2003. "Economic Exit, Interdependence, and Conflict." Journal of Politics 65(3): 809-832.

 

December 1:  Integrating Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James Morrow, Alistair Smith, and Randolph Siverson. 2003. The Logic of Political Survival.

 

Special Section:  Model Book and Literature Reviews

 

Book Reviews

Peter Gourevitch, "The Second Image Reversed," International Organization 32 (Autumn 1978), pp. 881-912.

Theda Skocpol, "A Critical Review of Barrington Moore's Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy," Politics and Society 4 (Fall 1973), pp. 1-34.

John Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis," World Politics 35 (April 1983), pp. 261-285.

John A. Vasquez, "The Realist Paradign and Degenerative versus Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz's Balancing Proposition," American Political Science Review 91 (December 1997), pp. 899-912.

Douglas Porch, "Military "Culture" and the Fall of France in 1940: A Review Essay," International Security 24 (Spring 2000), pp. 157-180.

Thomas Schwartz, review of Ballots and Bullets: The Elusive Democratic Peace, in Comparative Political Studies 33 (June 2000).

Richard Rosecrance:  "War and Peace," [review of John Mearsheimer's Tragedy of Great Power Politics] World Politics 55 (October 2002), pp. 137-166.

 

Literature Reviews

Jack S. Levy, "Theories of General War," World Politics 37 (Apr., 1985), pp. 344-374.

Jack Levy, "Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War," World Politics 40 (October 1987), pp. 82-107.

Jack Levy, "Domestic Politics and War," Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18 (Spring, 1988), pp. 653-673.  

Robert Jervis, "War and Misperception," Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18 (Spring, 1988), pp. 675-700.

Jack Levy, "Learning and Foreign Policy:  Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield," International Organization 48 (Spring 1994): 279-312.

John Mearsheimer,"The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security 19 (Winter 1994/95).