DORIT BAR-ON
Professor
Department of Philosophy
University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill
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DORIT BAR-ON |
Current Projects
A book manuscript, If Truth Be Told (with Keith Simmons)
A paper entitled “Externalism, Skepticism and the Recognitional Conception of Self-Knowledge"
A paper entitled “First-Person Authority: Between Dualism and Irrealism”
A paper for a volume on Jay Rosenberg’s work (with Mitchell Green)
A paper tentatively entitled “Expression, Action, and Meaning”
A paper tentatively entitled “Reasons” (with Ram Neta)
Selected Publications
Book
Speaking My Mind: Expression and Self-Knowledge, Clarendon Press, Oxford, November 2004 (464pp.)
Papers on Quine and the Indeterminacy of Translation
"Semantic Eliminativism and the ‘Theory'-Theory of Linguistic Understanding," in New Essays in Philosophy of Language and Mind, C. Viger, R. Stainton, M. Ezcurdia, (eds.) 2004.
"Indeterminacy of Translation: Theory and Practice," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LIII, No.4, December 1993, 781-810.
"Semantic Verificationism, Linguistic Behaviorism, and Translation," Philosophical Studies 66, 1992, 235-59.
"Scepticism: The External World and Meaning," Philosophical Studies 60, December 1990, 207-231.
"Semantic Indeterminacy and Scientific Underdetermination," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 67, October 1986, 245-263.
Papers on Meaning and Linguistic Knowledge
"'Natural' Semantic Facts – Between Eliminativism and Hyper-Realism,” in The Maribor Papers in Naturalized Semantics, Dunja Jutronic, ed., 1997, 99-117.
"Anti-Realism and Speaker Knowledge," Synthese 106, 1996, 139-166.
ABSTRACT. Dummettian anti-realism repudiates the realist's notion of "verification-transcendent" truth. Perhaps the most crucial element in the Dummettian attack on realist truth is the critique of so-called "realist semantics", which assigns verification-transcendent truth-conditions as the meanings of (some) sentences. The Dummettian critique charges that realist semantics cannot serve as an adequate theory of meaning for a natural language, and that, consequently, the realist conception of truth must be rejected as well. In arguing for this, Dummett and his followers have appealed to a certain conception of linguistic knowledge. This paper examines closely the appeal to speakers' knowledge of linguistic meaning, its force and limitations.
"`Meaning' Reconstructed: Grice and the Naturalization of Semantics," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, June 1995.
"Is There Such a Thing as a Language," Canadian Journal of Philosophy, June 1992 (with Mark Risjord), 163-190.
"On the Possibility of a Solitary Language," Nous 26, March 1992, 27-46.
Papers on Conceptual Relativism
"Language, Concepts and Culture: Between Pluralism and Relativism,” Facta Philosophica, 2004, 183-221.
"Conceptual Relativism and Translation," in Language, Mind and Epistemology, Preyer et al (eds.), Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994, 145-170.
Papers on Deflationism
"The Use of Force Against Deflationism: Assertion and Truth," (with Keith Simmons) in Truth and Speech Acts: Studies in the Philosophy of Language, Greimann and Siegwart, eds., Routledge, 2007.
“Deflationism,” (with Keith Simmons) in Oxford Handbook in Philosophy of Language, Ernie LePore, ed., Oxford University Press, 2006.
“Deflationism and Truth-Condition Theories of Meaning,” (with William Lycan, and Claire Horisk), reprinted with Postscript in Deflationary Truth, B. P. Armour-Garb and JC Beall (eds.), Open Court Readings in Philosophy, 2004, 321-352.
“Deflationism and Truth-Condition Theories of Meaning,” (with William Lycan, and Claire Horisk), Philosophical Studies 101, 1999, 1-28.
Papers on Expressivism and Self-knowledge
“Ethical Neo-Expressivism,” (with Matthew Chrisman) Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. V (forthcoming)
“Neo-Expressivism: Avowals’ Security and Privileged Self-Knowledge (Reply to Brueckner),” in Self-Knowledge, A. Hatzimoysis, ed., Oxford UP (forthcoming)
“Expression, Truth, and Reality: Some Variations on Themes from Wright,” in Festschrift for Crispin Wright, A. Coliva, ed., Oxford UP (forthcoming)
“Externalism and Self-Knowledge: Content, Use, and Expression,” Nous 38, 2004, 430-455.
"Knowing Selves: Expression, Truth, and Knowledge," (with Douglas Long) in Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge (Brie Gertler, ed.), Ashgate Epistemology and Mind Series, 2003, 179-212.
“Avowals and First-Person Privilege,” (with Douglas Long) Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LXII No.2, March 2001, 311-335.
“Speaking My Mind,” Philosophical Topics 28, Fall 2000, 1-34.
Reviews and Other Philosophical Publications
Review of Akeel Bilgrami, Self-Knowledge and Resentment, for Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2007.
Review of David Finkelstein, Expression and the Inner, for Nous (forthcoming)
Review of Timothy McCarthy (with Dean Pettit), Radical Interpretation and Translation for Mind Vol. 114, No. 454, April 2005, 429-435.
Review of B. Loewer and G. Rey (eds), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics, in Philosophical Psychology, 1994.
Review of Peter Strawson, Analysis and Metaphysics, in Philosophia, 1994.
Review of Christopher Hookway, Quine: Language, Experience and Reality, in International Studies in Philosophy, 1990.
Some Talks Given Recently (Please do not cite or quote)
My reply to the commentators at the "Author Meets Critics" Eastern APA session Dec 28 2007
"Troubles with Deflationism” (with Keith Simmons), “Language, Context, and Cognition” workshop, Uruguay, May 2007.
"Externalism and Skepticism: Recognition, Expression, and Self-Knowledge"
"Introspection and Avowable Self-Knowledge," Pacific APA, Portland 2006
Reviews and Critical Studies of Speaking My Mind: Expression and Self-Knowledge
Review by Anthony Brueckner of Speaking my Mind (forthcoming).
Review by Joseph Owens of Speaking my Mind for Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2007.
Review by Jordi Fernández of Speaking my Mind for The Philosophical Quarterly, 2006.
Review by Fredrik Stjernberg of Speaking my Mind for Metapsychology, Vol. 10, Issue 38, 2006.
Review by Julia Tanney of Speaking my Mind for Mind, 2007, 116: 727-732.