Current Projects

Selected Publications

Book

Speaking My Mind: Expression and Self-Knowledge, Clarendon Press, Oxford, November 2004 (464pp.)

Papers on Quine and the Indeterminacy of Translation

"Semantic Eliminativism and the ‘Theory'-Theory of Linguistic Understanding," in New Essays in Philosophy of Language and Mind, C. Viger, R. Stainton, M. Ezcurdia, (eds.) 2004.

"Indeterminacy of Translation: Theory and Practice," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LIII, No.4, December 1993, 781-810.

"Semantic Verificationism, Linguistic Behaviorism, and Translation," Philosophical Studies 66, 1992, 235-59.

"Scepticism: The External World and Meaning," Philosophical Studies 60, December 1990, 207-231.

"Semantic Indeterminacy and Scientific Underdetermination," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 67, October 1986, 245-263.

Papers on Meaning and Linguistic Knowledge

"'Natural' Semantic Facts – Between Eliminativism and Hyper-Realism,” in The Maribor Papers in Naturalized Semantics, Dunja Jutronic, ed., 1997, 99-117.

"Anti-Realism and Speaker Knowledge," Synthese 106, 1996, 139-166.

ABSTRACT. Dummettian anti-realism repudiates the realist's notion of "verification-transcendent" truth. Perhaps the most crucial element in the Dummettian attack on realist truth is the critique of so-called "realist semantics", which assigns verification-transcendent truth-conditions as the meanings of (some) sentences. The Dummettian critique charges that realist semantics cannot serve as an adequate theory of meaning for a natural language, and that, consequently, the realist conception of truth must be rejected as well. In arguing for this, Dummett and his followers have appealed to a certain conception of linguistic knowledge. This paper examines closely the appeal to speakers' knowledge of linguistic meaning, its force and limitations.

"`Meaning' Reconstructed: Grice and the Naturalization of Semantics," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, June 1995.

"Is There Such a Thing as a Language," Canadian Journal of Philosophy, June 1992 (with Mark Risjord), 163-190.

"On the Possibility of a Solitary Language," Nous 26, March 1992, 27-46.

Papers on Conceptual Relativism

"Language, Concepts and Culture: Between Pluralism and Relativism,” Facta Philosophica, 2004, 183-221.

"Conceptual Relativism and Translation," in Language, Mind and Epistemology, Preyer et al (eds.), Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994, 145-170.

Papers on Deflationism

"The Use of Force Against Deflationism: Assertion and Truth," (with Keith Simmons) in Truth and Speech Acts: Studies in the Philosophy of Language, Greimann and Siegwart, eds., Routledge, 2007.

“Deflationism,” (with Keith Simmons) in Oxford Handbook in Philosophy of Language, Ernie LePore, ed., Oxford University Press, 2006.

“Deflationism, Meaning and Truth Conditions,” with postscript (with William Lycan, and Claire Horisk), reprinted with Postscript in Deflationary Truth, B. P. Armour-Garb and JC Beall, eds., Open Court Readings in Philosophy, 2004, 321-352.

“Deflationism, Meaning and Truth Conditions,” (with William Lycan, and Claire Horisk), Philosophical Studies 101, 1999, 1-28.

Papers on Expressivism and Self-knowledge

Externalism and Skepticism: Recognition, Expression, and Self-Knowledge in Self-Knowledge and the Self, A. Coliva, ed., Oxford University Press (forthcoming)

First-Person Authority: Dualism, Constitutivism, and Neo-Expressivism in Erkenntnis volume on First-Person Authority (forthcoming)

What I call "Rorty’s Dilemma"" has us caught between the Scylla of Cartesian Dualism and the Charybdis of eliminativism about the mental. Proper recognition of what is distinctively mental requires accommodating incorrigibility about our mental states, something Rorty thinks materialists cannot do. So we must either countenance mental states over and above physical states in our ontology, or else give up altogether on the mental as a distinct category. In section 2 I review reasons for being dissatisfied with materialist introspectionism as a way out of the dilemma. In section 3, I outline two constitutivist alternatives to materialist introspectionism. In section 4, I offer my neo-expressivist view (defended in Bar-On (2004)), according to which the distinctive status of mental self-ascriptions is to be explained by appeal to the expressive character of acts of issuing them (in speech or in thought). This view, I argue, allows us to stay clear of eliminativism without committing to Cartesian substance dualism, thereby offering a viable way of slipping between the horns of Rorty’s dilemma.

“Ethical Neo-Expressivism,” (with Matthew Chrisman) Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. V (forthcoming)

“Neo-Expressivism: Avowals’ Security and Privileged Self-Knowledge (Reply to Brueckner),” in Self-Knowledge, A. Hatzimoysis, ed., Oxford University Press (forthcoming)

“Expression, Truth, and Reality: Some Variations on Themes from Wright,” in Festschrift for Crispin Wright, A. Coliva, ed., Oxford University Press (forthcoming)

“Externalism and Self-Knowledge: Content, Use, and Expression,” Nous 38, 2004, 430-455.

"Knowing Selves: Expression, Truth, and Knowledge," (with Douglas Long) in Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge (Brie Gertler, ed.), Ashgate Epistemology and Mind Series, 2003, 179-212.

“Avowals and First-Person Privilege,” (with Douglas Long) Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LXII No.2, March 2001, 311-335.

“Speaking My Mind,” Philosophical Topics 28, Fall 2000, 1-34.

Reviews and Other Philosophical Publications

Review of Akeel Bilgrami, Self-Knowledge and Resentment, for Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2007.

Review of David Finkelstein, Expression and the Inner, for Nous (forthcoming)

Review of Timothy McCarthy (with Dean Pettit), Radical Interpretation and Translation for Mind Vol. 114, No. 454, April 2005, 429-435.

Review of B. Loewer and G. Rey (eds), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics, in Philosophical Psychology, 1994.

Review of Peter Strawson, Analysis and Metaphysics, in Philosophia, 1994.

Review of Christopher Hookway, Quine: Language, Experience and Reality, in International Studies in Philosophy, 1990.

Some Talks Given Recently (Please do not cite or quote)

Lionspeak: Communication, Expression, and Meaning with Mitchell Green, presented at "Self, Language, and World: Themes in the Philosophy of Jay F. Rosenberg," September 2008.

My reply to the commentators at the "Author Meets Critics" Eastern APA session Dec 28 2007

"Troubles with Deflationism” (with Keith Simmons), “Language, Context, and Cognition” workshop, Uruguay, May 2007.

"Introspection and Avowable Self-Knowledge," Pacific APA, Portland 2006

Reviews and Critical Studies of Speaking My Mind: Expression and Self-Knowledge

Review by Richard Vallée of Speaking My Mind for Philosophical Review, April 2008

Review by Anthony Brueckner of Speaking my Mind (forthcoming).

Review by Joseph Owens of Speaking my Mind for Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2007.

Review by Jordi Fernández of Speaking my Mind for The Philosophical Quarterly, 2006.

Review by Fredrik Stjernberg of Speaking my Mind for Metapsychology, Vol. 10, Issue 38, 2006.

Review by Julia Tanney of Speaking my Mind for Mind, 2007, 116: 727-732.