

McDowell, for example) and in “continental” philosophy (in the many challenges to the position of Hegel, for example), where both lines can be traced back to concerns raised by Kant’s distinction between intuitions and concepts, and how each plays a role in judgment. Allard does great service in showing how Bradley can be fitted into this continuing debate, by showing how it is the issue that animates *The Principles of Logic*; and now that Bradley’s relevance has been established in this way, what remains is to provide some sort of critical assessment of how valuable Bradley’s particular contribution might turn out to be.

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*Philosophical Review*, Vol. 117, No. 2, 2008

DOI 10.1215/00318108-2007-039

Dorit Bar-On, *Speaking My Mind: Expression and Self-Knowledge*.  
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. xiii + 449 pp.

First-person utterances raise philosophical problems. Basically, first-person utterances, especially those expressing mental states, seem to be largely true, not grounded on evidence, and immune to epistemic challenge. These features are puzzling, and since Wittgenstein, analytic philosophers have paid much attention to them. *Speaking My Mind* engages almost all the philosophical problems gravitating around these puzzles and covers a lot of ground. The author tries to make sense of the prima facie epistemic security, or their removal from epistemic requirements, of what she calls avowals—first-person, present tense utterances about one’s occurrent states of mind and/or thoughts. Her take on these issues brings a fresh breeze into an old house, and her book is both interesting and stimulating. The picture she introduces also shows why exploring that domain is as fascinating as it is difficult. She clearly distinguishes ontological, semantic, and epistemic issues and addresses first and foremost the epistemic security of avowals. How can they express knowledge about himself/herself? She adopts a divide-and-conquer strategy. Consider a typical avowal, an utterance of ‘I am hungry’ and distinguish ‘I’ and the property of being hungry. Since Descartes, the fact that ‘I’ cannot but refer to an existing individual and that the speaker cannot be wrong about that individual has been much discussed. The term ‘I’ has an epistemic security in that the speaker of that term cannot be wrong about the referent. Bar-On

relies on the semantics of 'I' to explain the data: the impossibility of error through misidentification of the referent. Using 'I' does not require identification of the referent in the first place, and there is no epistemic requirement connected to 'I' because the semantics of that term picks out a referent. In addition, no real ontological issue is raised because 'I' refers to the utterer—what Bar-On cautiously calls the origin—and there is no reason to go further into metaphysics (chap. 3). Bar-On clears the epistemic and ontological fog around 'I'. However, she severs the link between the semantics of 'I' and epistemic aspects of its use. Her view does not explain on what ground a speaker utters an 'I' sentence, and it remains silent on the mental life connected to 'I'. What about the property of being hungry? She argues that it is immune to error in self-ascription. She also rejects epistemic approaches that rely on inner perception or any epistemic procedure used for gaining knowledge that assume a "distance" between the state ascribed and the ascriber (chap. 4). Using an analogy with 'I', she contends that the self-ascription of the state of being hungry does not require any epistemic intermediary and is as foreign to epistemology as is the use of 'I' to refer to oneself. However, the semantics of 'be hungry' is different from the semantics of 'I', and thus the analogy is limited. She goes one step further: when self-ascribing the property of being hungry, the speaker is just expressing her mental state (chap. 6). Her notion of expressing is nonsemantic in nature. It also carries a very heavy load. Bar-On explores that notion thoroughly. However, this notion is hardly strong enough to support the positions she builds around it. 'Expressing' is a very flexible term, and her theory overuses that flexibility and also isolates utterances from epistemic issues. Reestablishing bridges proves challenging.

On the proposed view, avowals are not reports of mental states. Avowals do not imply judgment and are basically "pieces of expressive behavior, similar in certain ways to bits of behavior that naturally express subjects' states" (227). Bar-On distinguishes expressing as act and as product. Expressing a state is not reporting that state; it is more like expressing enthusiasm. For that very reason, it has no more epistemic requirement than uttering "Hourra!" Of course, that utterance is neither true nor false, whereas an utterance of 'I am hungry' conveys something true or false. Remember that the state is expressed, and that the sentence used for the utterance, the product of the expression, or the proposition conveyed by the utterance, is true or false. The utterance can both express a mental state and be used to make a false statement. It is unclear to me that expressing as act, being nonsemantic in nature, is specific enough to capture the state conveyed by an utterance of 'I am hungry' while not at the same time capturing the state an utterance of a non-first-person sentence, like 'Heavy people generally have health problems', would express. *Prima facie*, given the different nature of expression and sentences, expression can fit self-ascriptive as well as non-self-ascriptive

sentences (295). The net has meshes large enough to let utterances of any sentence express, in Bar-On's sense, a mental state and thus be an avowal. Maybe one can specify a relevant sense of expression and single out a first-person sentence utterance. But then we are back to square one: what is so specific about first-person sentences as far as expression is concerned? Moreover, in the absence of a sentence, what is specific about first-person thoughts, not containing the indexical 'I', and unable to rely on semantics to target the speaker or thinker?

Many questions also remain when expressing as product is taken into consideration. She contends that avowals replace "natural expressions of sensations, emotions, and intentional states" (286). The state that 'Hourra' expresses *prima facie* lacks the sophistication of the state an utterance of 'I am bewildered' expresses, and it lacks the structure of the state an utterance of 'I believe that Bush knows that Powell does not really want to go to war in Iraq' expresses. Avowals are doing more than replacing natural expressions with more sophisticated linguistic tools. She tries to connect the act of expression, which is apparently very primitive, and the content articulated by the product of the expression, a first-person sentence, which can be very sophisticated. Her argument relies on the idea of transparency to the self of the semantically articulated content to account for that connection. This seems to be the old privileged access under a new name.

In the last chapter of the book, an account is offered of why a speaker expressing a mental state knows the mental state he or she is expressing. The idea is that a speaker making an avowal has a belief and is "entitled by default to the relevant belief" (384). That view remains sketchy and seems to name rather than solve the problem. In addition, she contends that the speakers' avowals let hearers "perceive their (the speakers) being in the relevant state of mind" (278). This is a very strong, perplexing view. Finally, her picture does not prevent her from examining those states, and she comes back to ontological issues in the final chapter of the book. However, she simply explores, without taking a stand, different options in the philosophy of mind.

Bar-On does herself a disservice in frequently portraying her view, Neo-Expressivism, in negative terms—"no reason, no epistemic ground" (226) rather than straightforwardly presenting it as a new way of approaching self-knowledge. She first ignores as irrelevant the certainty of avowals and puts them in a nonepistemic field. Nonetheless, Bar-On wants to leave room for self-knowledge, and epistemic problems raise their head again as she tries to account for it. In distinguishing the act of avowal and the product—a sentence—it seems to me that she divorces the epistemic/metaphysical problems connected to first-person utterances and the semantics of first-person sentences. She also adds an extra layer, expressing, adding new problems to an already tricky issue. The proposed approach shows how complex the

problem of self-knowledge is. Despite these reservations, *Speaking My Mind* should be widely read. Bar-On presents a new map of the domain and opens a path deserving further exploration. Her examination of the topic, and her views, are well worth following.

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*Philosophical Review*, Vol. 117, No. 2, 2008  
 DOI 10.1215/00318108-2007-040

Jody Azzouni, *Tracking Reason: Proof, Consequence, and Truth*.  
 New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. vi + 248 pp.

In many ways, *Tracking Reason* resembles Jody Azzouni's previous book, *Deflating Existential Consequence*. The subject matter of each lies at the interface of metaphysics, logic, philosophy of mathematics, and philosophy of language. The style is both entertaining and clear. The positions he argues for are so controversial as to sound almost insane. And yet the arguments he provides are illuminating and manage to make the positions seem almost like common sense. Both books are worth reading both for specialists and those interested in a clarifying (if idiosyncratic) take on these issues.

In the previous book, Azzouni argued for a type of fictionalism about mathematics. But rather than following Hartry Field in denying the indispensability of mathematics, he simply argues that the indispensability of a form of discourse (and even the truth of existentially quantified sentences!) is not a sign of ontological commitment. This position helps motivate some of the positions in the current book, but I think it isn't necessary.

*Tracking Reason* advances several separate, but related positions in its three parts. However, for some reason, the subtitle has them in the wrong order—part 1 argues for a special deflationary account of truth (and deals at length with the semantics and regimentation of natural language); part 2 argues that the role of mathematical proof is to “indicate” a derivation in some mechanical deduction system; and part 3 argues that these two positions are (despite appearances) compatible with a nonsyntactic view of consequence as a type of truth-preservation. Parts 1 and 2 are relatively independent and I think can profitably be read on their own. Part 3 depends more on both of the others. In particular, I think those working on formal semantics might want to read part 1, even if they have no broader interest in logic and truth,