

important question—why Benin adopted a power-sharing constitution and Togo did not—Norris's puzzle highlights the potential that different types of institutional arrangements can have for processes of democratization.

Norris conceptualizes power-sharing and power-concentrating regimes on the basis of four formal institutional features—the type of electoral system, the horizontal concentration of powers in the type of executive, the vertical centralization of power in unitary or federal states, and the structure and independence of the mass media. Four detailed chapters provide descriptions of the power-sharing and power-concentrating characteristics of each institution and summarize the arguments for and against their democracy-enhancing and conflict-reducing effects. Employing cross-sectional time-series data for 191 countries for the period from 1973 to 2004, Norris tests the effects of each institution on various indicators of levels of democracy. In each instance she finds that it is the power-sharing rather than the power-concentrating versions of these institutions—e.g., proportional representation electoral systems rather than majoritarian systems, federal rather than unitary states—that are associated with higher levels of democracy. The chapter on federalism and decentralization is particularly well developed, with attention given to classifying different types of decentralization (administrative, fiscal, and political) and constitutions (federal, unitary, and mixed unions) in order better to operationalize vertical forms of power sharing. The chapter on the fourth estate, on the other hand, strikes a somewhat odd note in that Norris never makes quite clear how the media fit her definition of a power-sharing institution as one which gives “multiple political elites a stake in the decision-making process” (23).

Working within the framework of consociational theory, Norris notes at the outset of the book that she seeks to focus on the capacity of institutional reforms to facilitate democratic consolidation *and* to generate lasting peace settlements in states emerging from civil wars. Although the book thoroughly addresses the first of these issues, it misses the mark where the latter is concerned. First, the empirical tests the book employs are not designed to examine the impact that institutions have on the duration of the peace. A focus on levels of democracy, while appropriate for exploring the impact institutional reforms have on democratic consolidation, says little about the success those reforms have in stabilizing the peace following civil conflict. In light of the increasing number of scholars who claim that introducing democratic

institutions, particularly elections, in the immediate postconflict environment is likely to destabilize the peace, it would be of interest to examine the impact power-sharing and power-concentrating regimes have in this context. Doing so, however, requires the use of a different dependent variable. Second, as Norris herself notes in passing, additional types of power-sharing institutions may also be central to formulating a durable peace. Rules that call for the government and former armed adversaries to share military power, for example, arguably play as important a role in the construction of negotiated peace settlements now as the formal constitutional rules on which Norris focuses. Studies whose goal it is to examine the impact of power-sharing institutions on settlement stability increasingly take these less traditional forms of power-sharing institutions into account.

Do power-sharing institutions work? The unambiguous answer provided by this book is “yes”—they work to consolidate democracy. Students of consociational theory will find much to admire in this book. Although it sticks to a formal and traditional conception of institutions that play a role in the management of conflict, it deftly synthesizes the core assumptions and claims of consociational theory and identifies the limitations of previous research that has sought to test the performance of consociational arrangements on democracy. The scope of the book, combined with its methodological rigor, ensure that it will stand as an important contribution to the empirical study of democracy.

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*The Decline of the Death Penalty and the Discovery of Innocence.* By Frank R. Baumgartner, Suzanna L. De Boef, and Amber E. Boydston. (Cambridge University Press, 2008.)

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*The Decline of the Death Penalty and the Discovery of Innocence* is a heart-wrenching and inspirational book. I realize those are not typical adjectives used to describe a highly sophisticated piece of social science research, but in this case they apply. Baumgartner, De Boef, and Boydston explain how the debate surrounding the death penalty has changed from a morality-laden and constitutionality-based discussion to one focused on innocence. They argue that as a result of this switch public support for the death penalty has decreased as has the number of death

sentences in the United States. Throughout the book, the authors never lose sight of the fact that their research stems from actual cases of innocent people convicted of crimes they did not commit and from victims of crimes in which the guilty party was never prosecuted. Furthermore, the authors demonstrate that policy toward a powerless and unpopular group of people—convicted criminals—can be dramatically reshaped through effective issue framing.

The authors begin with an analysis of the history of the death penalty. They detail long-term trends dealing with the use of the death penalty, racial disparities in its application, and exonerations from death row. They also trace the sharp decline in death sentences since the mid-1990s and the more modest decline in public support for the death penalty during the same time period. The rest of the book is dedicated to explaining these trends in public opinion and public policy.

Baumgartner, De Boef, and Boydston argue that an innocence movement has effectively reframed the debate surrounding the death penalty. The rise of this innocence frame should be thought of as a social cascade. In their words, “the unprecedented level of attention paid to the innocence frame in recent years is the product of many independent but mutually reinforcing elements working in a positive feedback system . . . events, organizational efforts, governmental actions, and media framing have moved in unintended tandem to break the death penalty debate wide open, exposing a new dimension of innocence and redefining the debate” (49–50). The authors show that the average number of exonerations each year has increased over time, but they argue persuasively that the increased attention to innocence is not simply a function of this change in the number of exonerees. Something more is going on. An innocence movement (driven especially by legal and journalism clinics) has successfully changed the debate from one focused on moral and constitutional issues to one emphasizing the fairness of the system and claims of innocent people on death row. As the terms of the debate changed, so did the tone of the coverage. Based on a content analysis of the *New York Times* between 1960 and 2005, the authors show that coverage of the death penalty became decidedly more negative as the focus turned to the possibility of executing an innocent person.

Baumgartner, De Boef, and Boydston develop a new methodological technique, evolutionary factor analysis, to gauge the power of the innocence frame over time. The analysis is complex, but their conclusions are straightforward: the innocence frame

dominates current discourse surrounding the death penalty and encompasses a variety of fairness arguments, none of which touch on the morality of the issue. Finally, the authors assess how the tone of death penalty coverage affects public opinion and public policy across time while controlling for other explanatory variables. They demonstrate that as coverage of the death penalty became more negative in tone, support for the death penalty declined. Similarly, a negative tone led to fewer death sentences handed out by juries.

This book has many strengths, including its theoretical account of the issue framing process; its attention to the journalists, lawyers, scholars, students, activists, and politicians who have worked tirelessly to identify and free innocent people on death row, thus promoting the innocence frame; its longitudinal analysis of media coverage of the death penalty; and its persuasive analysis linking shifts in the tone of death penalty coverage to both decreased public support for the policy and to the decline in the number of death sentences meted out by juries. Despite the book’s many virtues, I do want to raise a couple of critiques. First, the innocence frame identified by the authors is driven heavily by rhetoric about the fairness of the death penalty. The discourse focuses on fairness in a variety of ways, including—but not limited to—whether the person on death row is guilty or innocent. Because the authors have argued so convincingly that issue definition matters, it makes me wonder whether they might interpret their data differently if the frame had been labeled a fairness frame rather than an innocence frame. Indeed, the authors initially refer to a “fairness dimension” when they examine their descriptive data of death penalty media coverage (Chap. 4), but then discuss an innocence frame based on the results of their evolutionary factor analysis (Chap. 5). From a practical perspective, it seems important for anti-death penalty activists to know whether they should frame their arguments broadly in terms of fairness or focus more specifically on the unfairness of putting innocent people to death. Second, instead of assessing the impact of the innocence frame on public opinion and public policy, the authors analyze the effects of the tone of the coverage. The tone is a function of the particular frames prominent at the time to be sure, but it would be informative to see the pure effect of the innocence frame on public opinion and public policy.

Overall, this book is an excellent piece of scholarship and a fascinating read. Baumgartner, De Boef, and Boydston provide a gripping account of the

death penalty and the discovery of innocence. Scholars interested in the framing of issues or in the death penalty will be especially interested in this book; it will also be of use to those scholars interested generally in political communication, public opinion, or public policy. In addition, I recommend the book for a much wider audience, including graduate students, advanced undergraduates, and political practitioners.

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*Righting Feminism: Conservative Women and American Politics.* By Ronnee Schreiber. (Oxford University Press, 2008.)

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When conservative women's groups first grew as a backlash to the success of the feminist movement, their activism was often dismissed as inconsequential and they were frequently referred to as "pod feminists." Pod feminists are considered to be fake or robotic women, similar to the fake humans or pod people in 1970s science fiction thriller, *Invasion of the Body Snatchers*. In this noteworthy study, Ronnee Schreiber shows that pod feminists are not fake women nor are they inconsequential. Her systematic analysis of two prominent conservative women's groups clearly explains their rise over the past thirty years, their relationship to the conservative movement, their success in shaping public opinion, the mechanisms by which they change the debate about women's issues, and their importance to American politics and to feminism.

Schreiber shows us that far from being pod women or "political pawns and victims of false consciousness" (127), conservative women see themselves as better representatives of women's interests than feminists. In a series of interviews with members of the groups Concerned Women for America (CWA) and the International Women's Forum (IWF), Schreiber notes that these activists see feminists as inadequate representatives of women and that it is the feminists who function under a false consciousness. Students of gender politics, feminist theory, social movements, and interest groups will find this book to be eye-opening in unexpected ways. Not only does the book demonstrate the power and importance of conservative women's groups to the broader conservative cause, but it finally helps us to understand the grand paradox or the irony behind their very existence. For many it is hard to understand how groups opposed to gender identity politics

or government involvement in the private sphere can actively advocate for women and mothers. This book explains that paradox and introduces another tantalizing one for readers to consider—that the very existence of conservative women's groups is ironically a testament to the success of the feminist movement.

After providing a brief history and a comparison of the CWA and the IWF in Chapter 2, from their founding in 1979 and 1992 respectively, Schreiber begins her empirical analysis of these two groups using the case study method. In an appendix, she explains how she conducted twenty semistructured interviews with the leaders and professional staff over a five-year period, coding the interviews with qualitative data analysis programs. Further, she systematically reviewed each organization's periodicals, Web pages, press releases, amicus briefs, pamphlets, and special reports between 1981 and 2004. This comprehensive methodological approach provides a reader with confidence that Schreiber has indeed identified how these groups "act to legitimate themselves as representatives of women's interests" (8) and how they "artfully link or juxtapose their messages, producing comprehensive narratives that mediate conservative values through feminist language" (9).

To "position themselves as credible arbiters of women's interests" (39), Schreiber argues that the CWA and IWF use representational strategies and issue frames that present the groups as legitimate representatives for women. In the first part of the book, Schreiber shows that the groups use three specific frames to mobilize women to support conservative causes: "anti-feminist," "women's interest" and "social/economic conservative" (9). Antifeminist frames chastise feminists for misleading women about their choices; "women's interests" frames work to shift feminist definitions of issues like child-care, motherhood, and domestic violence; and, the social/economic frames tie group rhetoric to conservative causes, with the CWA invoking socially conservative language and the IWF invoking economic conservative language.

In the first three chapters of the book, there are several notable contributions to our understanding of the paradox women's conservative groups negotiate as they frame their argument against feminist policy. For example, in Chapter 3, Schreiber uses Gaytri Spivak's concept "strategic essentialism" (*Outside in the Teaching Tree* 1993, xi) to explain how the CWA and IWF justify using their own gender identity when they criticize feminists for making claims for all women. Although the structure of their publicly operated and well staffed political organization "belie