

Collaborative Research on Lobbying

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Project Summary

This project relies on hundreds of interviews with Washington policy advocates in order to investigate how groups compete for political influence through the arguments, evidence, and issue definitions they offer to shape the policymaking process. An initial sample of approximately 100 lobbyists will be selected based on the frequency of their involvement in government lobbying. Each of these individuals will be interviewed in-person and asked to describe their advocacy efforts on the most recent policy matter of interest to their groups. Additional interviews with an average of five leading policy makers per issue will then be conducted. The purpose of these interviews will be to learn about the strategies and arguments used by the different coalitions on each of the 100 issues. Additional data about each issue will be collected from secondary sources. Since some of the issues to be chosen are likely to be small and relatively unknown to the public, interviews may be the only way to learn about the policy development process. Other issues in our sample are likely to involve extensive public debate, large-scale media attention, and a wealth of publicly available information. The result will be approximately 100 carefully collected issue-modules representing a sample of issues attracting the attention of lobbyists. Our goal is to collect as much information as possible about the public and private efforts at issue-definition, arm-twisting, public relations, and scientific arguing occurring in a random sample of policy debates. In this way, our project is distinct from previous work in that we avoid focusing only on PAC contributions, media campaigns, or any other single tactic of lobbying.

Studies of lobbying have receded from the center of political science as the field moved away from those issues that are fundamental to the democratic process. In the early post-war years, interest-group scholarship was at center stage in political science as scholars such as Key, Truman, Dahl, Mills, and Schattschneider addressed the most basic questions of power and influence. Frustrated by their conflicting findings, more recent generations of scholars have addressed more tractable, but more partial and less important, issues of group mobilization and tactics. Our project seeks to return to the big questions about how groups affect public policy and whose interests are most often heard in the halls of government but in a much more systematic way than has been done before. Indeed, we believe that our project will foster the development of a common analytical approach for understanding the role of groups in politics and policy making.

The multi-year data collection we propose will be conducted by a team of scholars working with graduate students. The resulting data bases will not only fuel our own research, but by making each of the case studies as well as a summary set of statistical indicators available over the Web, we hope to generate more interest in the study of lobbying behavior. Our

comparable and detailed case studies will allow scholars to make their own comparisons of various group lobbying activities, hopefully providing the empirical back-bone on which much further research can be based.

Project Description

We propose a large-scale project designed to bring the study of lobbying back to the center of the analysis of government. We focus on the use of information and arguments by policy advocates in a sample of 100 different issues, in order to investigate the dynamic and reactive aspects of the lobbying process. This will allow us to understand not only how lobbying affects public policy, but also to assess the sources of representation and bias in the policy process. Further, we propose a methodology to allow future researchers to use the data we collect while preserving respondent confidentiality, and to add to the data set themselves. With a potentially ever-expanding data base on lobbying activities, we hope to lay the groundwork for long-term benefits to the discipline. The proposal begins with some theoretical background before laying out our detailed plans.

Introduction

As modern, behavioral political science emerged after World War II, interest-group scholarship moved to center stage within the discipline. Interest groups were at the very foundation of democratic theory; determining which groups participated in the political process was the fundamental empirical problem addressed by researchers. The great interest-group scholars of this era—Key (1942), Truman (1951), Mills (1956), Schattschneider (1960), and Dahl (1961)—posed the central question of American political science: “How democratic is America?” They examined the distribution of power in society and tried to understand if group politics led to outcomes consistent with democratic standards. They did not reach a common conclusion. Indeed, their answers were strikingly different. The next cohort—McConnell (1966), Lowi (1969), and Lindblom (1977)—asked the same question about the relationship of interest-group participation to democratic outcomes, and reached pessimistic conclusions about the effects of groups on government.

More recent interest-group scholarship has strayed from the grand questions of politics to focus on narrower and more tractable problems. One set of scholars pursued the collective action problem first articulated by Mancur Olson (1965). Some of those following in Olson’s footsteps worked on specifying the formal model while others undertook empirical tests of his theory. The remaining set of interest-group scholars went in many disparate directions and, unsurprisingly, their work lacked any common intellectual thread. This proliferation of unconnected studies produced some important work, but its collective impact has been disappointing, especially in the development of broad theory based on large empirical studies (for a full discussion of these trends, as well as exceptions to them, see Baumgartner and Leech 1998).

There are good reasons to believe that research on groups in politics can be done in more productive ways and can address the fundamental issues of political representation. Over the past few years several prominent scholars have begun developing the ideas and methods that we believe will allow the development of a common analytical approach focusing on lobbying. More specifically, this approach advances Schattschneider’s ideas about conflict expansion and issue-definition. Groups are active in promoting certain arguments, or issue-definitions, and in producing, publicizing, or providing evidence that supports these arguments. From this perspective, resources themselves are not directly equated with political power, rather they must

be converted into the currency of political influence: appealing ideas and arguments, convincing evidence, and a demonstration that a proposed public policy will indeed serve some public purpose. Indeed, because resources are not automatically translated into political influence, many important questions about representation are overlooked if one focuses solely on the material assets and mobilizational capacity of a sector or interest. Sometimes the relatively weak come out on top because they are able to make their position resonate with some broadly held cultural value. Other times, those with economic resources dominate the policy process through a control of information, evidence, electoral clout, or by promoting broadly held values. Groups cannot directly translate an “investment” of a PAC contribution or economic weight in a district into every demand they might have on government. Rather, resources must be translated into justifications, evidence, and demonstrations that the policy of choice will indeed be effective. In different ways, many scholars, including Hall and Wayman (1990), Hansen (1991), Walker (1991), Baumgartner and Jones (1993), Heinz, Laumann, Nelson and Salisbury (1993), Vogel (1995), Kollman (1998), Leech (1998), Hojnacki and Kimball (1998, 1999) and Berry (1999), adopt some version of an interest-group model that is rooted in issue-definition and conflict-expansion. We embrace this emerging perspective in our project and focus on the conflictual and dynamic process by which groups compete for political influence through the arguments, evidence, and issue definitions they offer to shape the policymaking process.

Our emphasis on these elements of the advocacy process differs in many ways from most previous interest-group studies. First, it shifts the focus from inherent resources controlled by groups (e.g., money, presence of a membership, activism of members and supporters, the skills and experience of organizational staff, the status of the organization or its members) to ask how those resources are used. In contrast to the classic groups literature cited above, we make no assumptions about the role of elites, the structural advantages of business, or continuing patterns of access and privilege. Rather, we direct our research at the actual mobilization of resources and the conversion of resources into the tools of political advocacy. Increasingly, scholars have noted how the various contexts of policymaking affect group influence: a group that appears powerful in one setting may find its resources less helpful when the issue is considered in another venue or in a subsequent stage of policy development. Further, our affluent postindustrial society features substantial mobilization around such noneconomic values as environmentalism, equality, civil rights, abortion, religion, and traditional family values. Economic power often leads to political power, but not in all circumstances. Probably most importantly, economic power does not always translate into an ability to dominate the framing of important policy debates (Mucciaroni 1995). Timber companies, with plenty of economic muscle, do not always win their battles with environmentalists. Why is it that over time the press and policymakers begin to talk more about the problem of “saving trees and wilderness” rather than the problem of “saving jobs and promoting exports”? In our project, we consider the conditions of group influence and the contextual nature of group strategies; group impact is seen to vary from issue to issue and from time to time. Whether or not a group is “powerful” depends on the issue, the venue, and on the ability of rivals to reframe the debate.

The second important way in which our project differs from most previous group studies is that we emphasize the links that bind the substance of policy to processes and outcomes. Aside from those conducting case studies, scholars have made little effort to understand the impact of policy domain or of the substance of the policy issue on interest-group influence. Both pluralists, who studied democracy across domains, and those who saw business dominant regardless of

domain, ignored policy as an independent variable. Robert Salisbury and his coauthors, in their massive and influential study (Heinz et al. 1993), are unusual in that they base their empirical project on scores of individual cases of policy advocacy from four policy domains. This allows them to focus on the process by which resources translate into evidence and policy advocacy. (Their finding, that they could not find a link between resources and power, suggests that the relationship is highly variable across issues, a question we hope to explore further here.) Without attention to substance, a researcher cannot document how generic resources are (or are not) translated into arguments and evidence useful in a particular policy debate. Sometimes scientific evidence is crucial; at other times public relations campaigns play a greater role. In order to understand the role of evidence and persuasion in the public debate, we need to understand the substance of policy disputes.

Third, our study of lobbying is dynamic. Schattschneider's (1960) logic of conflict expansion may lead some policy advocates to focus on certain issue-definitions in their efforts to politicize a conflict, but there is no reason to expect the opponents to allow this to occur without a fight (see Cobb and Ross 1997 on "agenda-denial"). In the face of a rival coalition that expands a conflict, policy advocates must be prepared to react. Many interest-group strategies are chosen out of necessity, therefore, in reaction to the efforts of a rival. Many previous studies of lobbying took it for granted that groups initiated their lobbying activities. We will stress the degree to which groups must also react to a dynamic process that may often be out of their own control. More generally, we recognize that lobbying is a process that unfolds over time, involving different venues, targets, and advocates.

Fourth, we recognize that almost all issues are potentially multi-dimensional and that policy change can often be associated with increased attention to previously ignored issue-dimensions. Baumgartner and Jones (1993) discussed the rise of new dimensions in explaining dramatic shifts in public policy towards a number of issues (see also Stone 1988; Baumgartner 1989; Majone 1989; Riker 1986, 1996; McKissick 1995; West and Loomis 1999). The NAFTA debate would swing in one direction if it were seen to concern free trade, but potentially in another if attention focused on labor concerns or environmental implications. Cigarettes can be seen as an economic engine vital to the well being of the agricultural economy and promoting a massive trade surplus benefiting the American economy. At the same time, the same industry can be seen as a threat to the health of our children and as a cause of deficits in the state Medicaid programs. Increasingly, scholars recognize that lobbying fundamentally involves attempts to focus the debate on certain dimensions of the underlying issue rather than others. Up to now, efforts at strategic manipulations of issue dimensions have only rarely been the subject of systematic study, and never on the scale we propose here.

Fifth, we recognize that lobbying is collaborative, often involving partnerships between government officials and outside lobbyists. Rather than modeling the activities of lobbyists as though they were entirely outside of government seeking to influence a unitary governmental actor, we recognize the existence of coalitions combining those inside and outside of government (see Arnold 1990; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Browne 1995; Ainsworth 1998). Groups sometimes work in concert with other groups and with government officials, and they often work against the efforts of similar coalitions favoring other policy outcomes. Government officials can do some things that outside groups cannot, such as structure bills, introduce amendments, or manipulate congressional procedures; therefore the ability to enlist the support of those with

institutional powers is an important element of interest-group power (see especially Arnold 1990). At the same time, groups can do many things that government officials cannot do, such as initiate and pay for public relations campaigns aimed at affecting public opinion.

Finally, we bring lobbying back into interest-group studies. Much of the early scholarship on interest groups (e.g., Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1963; Milbrath 1963) and some recent projects (e.g. Schlozman and Tierney 1986) have looked in detail at the work of lobbyists. However, the growing emphasis on the inherent advantages of business or the impact of money in the political process suggests that the individual work of lobbyists is only of peripheral importance. What difference does it make which law firms use which tactics if political power is a function of large-scale concentration of capital? If votes, access, and participation in legislative debates can be purchased with PAC contributions, why study the substance and tactics of lobbying? In a competitive and dynamic environment, however, there is little reason to believe that important views will naturally be taken into account. Certainly businesses and political activists believe that lobbying makes a difference, since they support a growing government affairs and public relations industry in Washington. With tens of thousands lobbyists in Washington and highly limited space on the congressional agenda, lobbying matters. We propose to study the skills and resources that lobbyists bring to the policy process.

Overall, our project refocuses attention in interest-group studies empirically, partly by returning to the root questions at the core of the field. In Robert Dahl's definition of democracy, the crucial question is whether all groups are "heard" (1956, 145). In one way or another, all interest-group scholarship still asks, "who is being heard by government?" The research proposed here is no different. We, too, are concerned with whose voices are being heard and with differentials in access across economic sectors and within policy domains. But we also want know "what" the government is hearing. We believe that the conversion of interest-group resources into policy arguments is a significant step in the policy process. We seek to study the process by which groups and other advocates translate their resources (staff, research capability, official status, public respect, popular support, large memberships) into effective evidence, compelling arguments, telling sound-bites, and impressive displays of public support. We plan to examine how the use of arguments and evidence shape, and are shaped by, the scope of participation in an issue debate, the venues of decision making, and the development and outcomes of the policy debate. By centering our study of lobbying on the substance of the advocacy process, we think we can return the study of lobbying to where it belongs: at the core of any understanding of policy change and of political representation in a democracy.

In the following section, we lay out our research questions and data-gathering approach in general terms. Subsequent sections review each part of the research proposal in greater detail.

Research Questions

In a primer for lobbyists entitled "How to Win in Washington" the first piece of advice to the would-be advocate is: "Define the issue" (Wittenberg and Wittenberg 1994, 13). From a variety of scholarly sources, we know that the rise of new issue-definitions can lead to dramatic reversals in public policy. Baumgartner and Jones (1993) document the process in a variety of cases, but do not link it to the efforts of individual lobbyists or policy entrepreneurs. Riker (1986) gives a number of examples of what he terms heresthetic maneuvers, many of which

involve issue-definition. For example, Senator Warren Magnuson, faced with a Defense Department proposal to store deadly nerve gas in his state, raised the fact that the Senate had not been properly involved in a change in the status of a treaty relationship. When seen as a question of “which state gets the bad news?” the outcome was predictably bad for the unlucky state chosen. When seen as a question of the constitutional prerogatives of the “world’s greatest legislative body,” the outcome would be expected to be quite different (see Riker 1986, 110).

Many scholars have noted the importance of issue-definition in explaining policy change, but few have studied how it is done. Our collective knowledge about the interrelationships among lobbying, issue-definition, and policy change is sparse. As is appropriate in such a circumstance, our project casts a very wide net in the search for information about the importance of evidence and argument in the lobbying process. Generally, we will use interviews, documents, and the public record to map out the relative attention paid to each argument and piece of technical or political evidence in a sample of issues facing the government during the period of research. In all, we expect to interview hundreds of policy advocates across scores of issues, some of which may be highly visible public controversies, others of which will likely be relatively low-level lobbying events. Our resulting data sets will allow the systematic comparison of the use of evidence and arguments in the lobbying process across both groups and issues.

Given the broad scope of our data collection effort, and our general interest in the representative character of the policy process, we expect the proposed project to generate a great number of studies over the next several years. Therefore, it is difficult to specify a short list of hypotheses that reflect accurately and completely the proposed research. Here we outline some of the questions we will examine and the systematic comparisons we will address.

At the core of our proposed study is a set of questions about the number and type of arguments and evidence put forth on an issue, the sources and targets of those arguments, and changes in the substance and tactics of issue advocacy over time. At the issue level, we will identify the number and type of arguments discussed, determine which arguments are dominant, outline the range of evidence being put forth to support or refute the arguments, and describe whether the arguments and evidence offered change over time and by target. We will also identify the number and type of policy advocates active, document which advocates are central and peripheral players, and trace any changes in the number of advocates or their roles over time. At the level of individual policy advocates, we will focus on the types of arguments and evidence offered as these relate to goals and resources. The resources we will be exploring include the expertise of individual advocates, the research capacity of the advocate’s organization, the advocate’s experience, the financial strength of the organization, the status of the organization, the advocate’s involvement in coalitions, the reputation of the group or coalition, and their institutional position. Some organizations work hard to develop reputations for producing scientifically convincing evidence, where others are known for their electoral power. Of course, considering that groups often work in alliances, different members can play different roles. Government officials in particular can be crucial allies, offering the legitimacy that official status confers, especially in the production of technical evidence. Legislative leaders can be particularly useful allies in a lobbying coalition, since they can affect procedural matters in congressional debate (Arnold 1990). In general, we expect that the quality and quantity of advocates’ resources will be key to their abilities to promote certain issue-definitions (Smith 1984).

Our simultaneous consideration of both issues and advocates will allow us to investigate a number of ideas that were previously considered only in case studies. For instance, we anticipate that the roster of advocates participating in a policy debate will vary over time as certain arguments become more or less prominent. That is, some advocates are likely to take an interest in an issue only to the extent that a particular dimension becomes salient. This is where Schattschneider meets Riker. Strategic lobbyists may use arguments and evidence to expand or restrict the scope of participation in the debate, and they may be very specific in their efforts to target certain new participants. For example, the National Taxpayer's Union (NTU) was unlikely to take an interest in the debate over the issue of tobacco regulation until that issue was characterized as a tax on a segment of the population. As the debate has evolved to have much to do with tax issues, the NTU has become more active. (One of the few powerful arguments on behalf of the tobacco companies is that most policies designed to punish them amount to huge new taxes, and often quite regressive ones at that.) Advocates are likely to raise new dimensions in an attempt to recruit new allies or to demobilize potential opponents. We will investigate to what extent groups may attempt to expand or restrict the conflict strategically by showing the arguments they present that an issue has implications for a new constituency. Participation, we expect, is likely to be tightly linked to the dimensions of debate.

Another set of questions central to our investigation relates to advocates' use of arguments and evidence over time, from venue to venue, and across audiences. Clearly, issues are being framed during the agenda-setting stage and during the preliminary legislative stages (see Hall and Wayman 1990; Hall 1996; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998). Focusing attention on lobbying only at the stage of the final vote or floor action is not likely to illuminate all parts of the lobbying process. We hope to show how debates become structured through arguments designed to appeal to certain potential audiences. Specifically, we will examine whether and how the arguments and evidence advocates use vary over the course of an issue debate (e.g., as a proposal is considered within a community of experts, as it moves onto the public agenda, through the legislative process, and from the legislative to the regulatory arenas). Related to this, we also anticipate that arguments will vary when advocates "speak" to different audiences. For example, we hypothesize that in the early stages of an issue debate (e.g., when an issue is being considered in a congressional committee), advocates are likely to use a narrow set of arguments that are relatively technical in nature, such as an emphasis on cost/benefit analyses or feasibility studies. Arguments, here, are tailored to an elite audience that has in-depth knowledge of an issue. Later in a debate, particularly one that becomes targeted toward the public, arguments and evidence are likely to change. Arguments are likely to be directed at engaging the public and, therefore, especially likely to reflect social values, the social and geographic distribution of costs and benefits, ideology, fairness, and emotionally charged words and symbols. If the policy process necessarily involves both stages of consideration, and there is a substantial risk that the issue may become salient as it moves through the process, the ability to be effective in both arenas may be one of the most difficult hurdles for most lobbyists to negotiate. Often, the skills and resources necessary to work well in one venue differ from those needed in another. We want to know how common it is for an issue to require both public and private styles of advocacy, and how arguments and evidence are adopted for these various settings.

We also are convinced by developments in game theoretic work and elsewhere in political science that questions about the dimensionality of issues are important (for examples in comparative politics, international relations, media studies, and public opinion, see Hall 1989;

Iyengar 1991; Gamson 1992; Goldstein 1993; Jacobson 1995; Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997; Bleich 1998a,b; Richards 1998). From the earliest work on Arrow's paradox and the various solutions to it (Shepsle's structure-induced equilibrium, for example), it has been clear to game theorists that fundamental changes in policy outcomes could result from the rise of new issue-dimensions. Riker followed these ideas the furthest, and others have been active in the area, including Jones (1994). So far, formal work confirms the importance of dimensionality, but we have seen few empirical tests of the impact of multidimensionality in the policy process, or even of the prevalence of various dimensional structures in policy debates. In their recent edited volume reviewing the interest-group field, Cigler and Loomis observe that Washington interest groups "have begun to spend more time shaping perceptions of problems and political agendas. In addition, they are devoting more and more attention to earlier stages of policy formulation, especially the fundamental defining and redefining of issues. Indeed, successfully defining conditions as problems (such as smog, learning disabilities, or global warming) often represents the single most important step in changing policies" (1998, 395). Poole and Rosenthal's consistent finding of the low-dimensionality of congressional voting (1985, 1987, 1991, 1997) stands in stark contrast with the largely unstructured set of issues in the public agenda.

One objective, then, is simply to document how many dimensions are typically present in a sample of lobbying issues. We will then compare issues with few dimensions and those with many dimensions in terms of the numbers of participants, level of conflict, degree of salience, amount of public and media attention, degree of policy change enacted or considered, stability of lobbying coalitions and targets, importance and effectiveness of lobbyists, number of governmental venues engaged in the debate, level of partisanship, and emphasis in arguments on technical evidence and social values. Among the hypotheses we will test are whether lobbyists with technical as opposed to political expertise are more important on issues with fewer dimensions, and whether lobbying coalitions and lobbying targets on issues with fewer dimensions are relatively more stable, predictable and routine over time.

Two additional examples of the type of questions we will pursue stem from previous work. One of the areas we stressed above is that of resources and how effectively they are converted into the currency of political influence. In *The New Liberalism* (forthcoming 1999) Berry compares the political effectiveness of liberal and conservative citizen groups. Liberal citizen groups, especially those pursuing environmental, consumer, and "rights" causes, turn out to be strikingly more effective than conservative citizen groups like the Christian right lobbies. Working back from this unexpected finding, making inferences from some indirect indicators in the data set, and drawing on secondary sources, he argues that one of the most significant reasons the liberal citizen lobbies do so much better is that they allocate a high proportion of their resources to the development of policy expertise. They have large Washington-based staffs of lobbyists and researchers, their lobbyists and researchers work assiduously over long periods of time with legislative staffers, and their public relations focus is on spinning stories to print and TV journalists. In comparison, conservative groups tend to have small Washington staffs, concentrate their lobbying on the Republican leadership, and focus their public relations efforts outside of the Beltway.

Since his study was not designed to measure some of these factors, and since the Christian right may be unusual in the degree to which it eschews policy-related research, much more needs to be done to see if Berry's explanation holds up. One of the reasons for his counter-

intuitive finding may be that the liberal groups are better able to marshal a broader range of arguments and evidence. In particular, by placing more emphasis on their own research capacity, and by linking this research effort with sustained public relations campaigns designed to promote the issue-definitions they favor, the liberal groups have been more successful across a greater range of issues facing Congress than the Conservative groups, in spite of those groups' highly publicized close relationships with the Republican Party leadership. We plan to study research capacity, coalition formation, and the relative focus on technical versus political evidence in a systematic way in this project, and we hope to show the conditions under which each is essential to lobbying success.

A second example, also drawn from *The New Liberalism*, shows the importance of our theme of dimensionality. In 1991 a normally routine reauthorization of the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) erupted into conflict over a proposal to raise grazing fees on public lands. Environmental groups like the Wilderness Society and the National Wildlife Federation pushed for the grazing fee rate hike because of the continuing degradation to the environment from the cattle that pasture on such lands. The National Cattlemen's Association led the fight against the grazing fees and the cattle groups prevailed in that Congress. With the arrival of the Clinton administration, Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt imposed the grazing fees through administrative rulemaking. Western state legislators sympathetic to the cattle ranchers tried to overturn Interior's regulation through a statutory change but were defeated. The environmental lobbies won because they kept working on the issue, because they expended resources to gain press coverage of the environmental problem caused by grazing, and because they amassed a wealth of scientific evidence on their side. In short, the environmentalists altered the dimensionality of the issue. Once they accomplished this, the cattle ranchers were put on the defensive and their position was severely weakened. But changing the dimensionality of an issue does not just happen because a set of groups wants it to. For many years the cattle ranchers' arguments carried the day. An accumulation of scientific evidence, developed over the years, led to a new consensus among experts that there was an important element of the debate that needed to be addressed. Of course, this was not accepted without debate by those opposed to the policy change, but at the end of the day the environmentalists won not because of their political ties alone, or because of their philosophical arguments alone, but because of their ability to bring scientific and technical evidence to support their point of view. A range of skills, resources, and strategies were needed.

Our challenge in this research project is to determine how the strategic allocation of resources by groups can lead to policy change. The other side of the coin is to understand the limits to interest-group efforts to change or expand the arguments at hand. The incentives for changing dimensionality are clear. What it takes to do so is a much murkier research question. Berry has raised a number of these issues in his forthcoming book, but his project was not designed to address them systematically, and so his findings cannot necessarily be generalized. Our strategy in this project is to study a large enough number of cases so that we can show co-variation in policy outcome, group resources, and lobbying strategies in a systematic manner.

Sampling, Interviews, and Data Collection

Our plan is quite simple even if our scope is ambitious. We will select a sample of lobbyists and ask them about the issue on which they have most recently been active. From this initial sample of issues, we will use snowball sampling techniques to interview additional policy advocates both within and outside of government. Each issue will become the subject of a data collection “module.” In addition to interviews, we will collect information from public records, media coverage, and from documents supplied by our respondents in order to have a complete understanding of the arguments used, the actors involved, the evidence brought to the table, and the outcome of the debate. We expect that in three years of field work we will complete approximately 100 modules and 500 interviews (plus follow-ups).

Drawing the initial sample. We propose to draw a sample of lobbyists weighted by their previous level of congressional lobbying activity. Baumgartner and Leech have already collected all the data from the complete set of approximately 11,000 Lobby Disclosure Reports filed with the U.S. Senate for 1996. These forms request information on amount of money spent and on the particular issues on which the organization lobbied. We propose to weight our sample by the number of distinct issues on which the organization lobbied in 1996. The more active lobbyists will be given greater weight because we want our initial sample to be representative of the lobbyists most likely to contact federal officials in a typical day (and thus of the arguments being presented to government in a given period). A group that lobbied on 15 issues would have a higher probability of falling into our sample than one that lobbied on only a single issue. Starting with a list of lobbyists, therefore, and weighting by the number of issues on which each one lobbied, we would draw a random sample large enough to produce approximately 100 initial respondents. Interviews would be conducted with these initial respondents according to the protocol below. (Depending on the progress of the House and Senate in implementing their planned web-based distribution of the Lobby Disclosure Reports and the state of the Center for Responsive Politics web site, we may be able to base our sample on a more recent year. Currently, however, it is impossible using these sources to weight by the number of issues on which the group lobbied.)

The substance of the interviews. Below is a draft of the interviews we would conduct with the initial respondent for each case. Subsequent interviews with others involved in the same issue would be similar and we do not include those here. This initial draft is for illustrative purposes. Beginning in February 1999, Hojnacki will be doing extensive interviews with health care advocates as part of the research she completes during her two-year Robert Wood Johnson Fellowship. We expect to revise our interview protocol in light of her experience.

CORE INTERVIEW:

1. I wonder if I could get you to talk a little bit about yourself. Tell me about your background and how you came to work here?
2. Let me move from your background to how you actually do your job. If you don't mind, take the most recent issue you've been spending time on and describe what you've been doing and what you're trying to accomplish.

[Note: the issue need not be the subject of current action by Congress or by an agency, nor must it be the subject of media attention. Whatever R or his office spent any significant amount of time on, as long as it involves the federal government.]

[If R wanders off or describes an inappropriate case]: What other issues have you been working on?

[Probes, if necessary, for specific lobbying activities and targets.]

3. So you've [recapitulate, drawing the narrative down to this path:]. Who [else] is involved in this issue, both inside and outside of government?

3a *[Probe:]* Anyone else?

3b *[If appropriate:]* You mentioned some organizations you're working with as allies. Is there a formal coalition, or is it better described as informal communication?

3b-alternative. *[If appropriate:]* You didn't mention if you were working with any other groups or organizations. Are you going it pretty much alone, or are you part of some kind of coalition?

[If necessary, probe for whether formal or informal.]

3c *[If appropriate:]* And you mentioned some [you didn't mention] people in government. Who else [who are] you talking to there? *[Probe for specifics.]*

4. You've touched on this in telling me who you talked to but I want to make sure I have this straight. You're talking to these people about [this issue] and about why it's necessary to move forward on this. In your own words, what is the fundamental argument or strategy you're using to try to convince people to move along these lines?

[If necessary, probe for secondary arguments, evidence, partisan differences, and targeting.]

5. So you have a strategy built around [synthesize argument]. I'm wondering about how this approach came about. Was it something you worked out with other organizations working in this area, was it something you developed out of your own experience, was it based on research that was done by your organization; where did it come from?

6. [You touched upon this before.] Let's talk [some more] about your opponents on this issue and others who are involved. Who is standing in your way and what are the arguments and strategies they're using?

[Probe for complete set of arguments and for leaders of the different coalitions.]

7. When political scientists have studied organizations like yours they've found a difference in the way they operate in terms of their communications with government. Some organizations emphasize research and try to supply their lobbyists and leaders with a steady stream of original research and data to be used in their presentations to government officials and aides. Other organizations believe that if they need research they can get it from universities, think tanks, or consulting firms, and allocate their own scarce resources to other priorities. How would you describe the orientation of this organization, is there an emphasis on in-house research or a belief you can get what you need elsewhere?

[If necessary, probe for examples.]

8. Along the same lines of trying to understand how organizations differ, I want learn a little more about yours. In terms of the parts of the organization that are involved in public affairs and public policy, such as working with people in government, media outreach, policy research, and so on, could you describe [how you're organized here], [how this office and the headquarters are organized in these areas]?

- 8a. And so about how many people is that, working in all these areas?
- 8b. Now let me follow up a bit on that, addressing the skills and strengths that your organization brings to the table. If I were interviewing someone outside your organization about what your group does better than others, what would he or she likely say? What are the outstanding skills that you or your organization is known for?
9. [*Visibly shut notebook demonstrating that the interview is over, but linger.*] I'm going to get out of your hair and let you go back to work.... Maybe I should ask you if there's something I should have been questioning you about. [*Do not take notes but record afterwards*]
10. [*For selected respondents*] I have one more favor to ask. I wonder if it would be ok if I called you in about six months just to follow up on the issues we discussed. We'd just like to see how things have progressed. I'll be back in [home city] so it would be over the phone. It will only take about 10 minutes since I now have all this background.
11. [*At door, if appropriate*] By the way, earlier you mentioned [specify document]. Is that something that's available? Could I get a copy?

Clearly, our ability to code usable data from our interviews will depend on two things: the willingness of the respondent to provide the information, and our ability as interviewers to keep the respondent on target through the use of probes and reactions to their statements. From our own experience in previous research projects, we have found that a conversational style of interviewing generates responses that are both candid and expansive. The protocol above and the others to be used for the follow-up interviews rely on this approach. To the extent possible, we will allow respondents to describe things in their own terms. Our probes and reactions will be designed only to make sure the respondent covers the appropriate topics, such as providing a complete list of actors involved, rather than directing them towards any particular response.

Selecting subsequent respondents. Part of the task in the initial interview would be to obtain a roster of advocates representing the various positions on an issue. Subsequent interviews would be conducted with the main actors in each of the main coalitions. Therefore, some issues would involve many interviews whereas other issues might involve only a few. We would expect a mean of 5 interviews per issue, with a range of between 3 and 15. A single interviewer will conduct all the interviews for a given issue, so that person will develop the knowledge necessary to engage the respondent.

Follow-up interviews. We plan to follow up our personal interviews with short phone interviews with at least one respondent per case periodically during the subsequent 18 months or so. On average, we would expect to conduct 3 such short interviews for each module, though again we expect significant range. These short discussions would center on any changes or developments that may have occurred since our interview, with particular attention to passage or definitive rejection of the policy proposal, and any changes in the arguments, evidence, and participants in the debate. We build here on the methodology used by John Kingdon (1984) to study agenda-setting in national politics. He began with a relatively short list of questions in the first round of interviews and then followed with both the initial subjects and a snowball sample of respondents over many subsequent interviews.

Additional data collection. As indicated in the interview protocol, we hope to be guided to documentary sources by our respondents to some extent, and to collect a range of documents while we do our interviews. However we will also review such records as congressional hearings, press releases by those involved in the debate, CQ stories, on-line media data bases, other published accounts, and public opinion polls where applicable. For those issues that involve congressional lobbying, we will review the subsequent filings of the Lobby Disclosure Reports with the House and Senate in order to identify each group involved (thus allowing a further indicator of participation as well as a check on the validity of that data source). In addition, we will code our cases by topic so that they can be put in the context of the Baumgartner-Jones policy agendas project. This will allow us to compare issues by such things as the complexity of the congressional committee jurisdictions in the area, the amount of media and congressional attention to the general topic area, and other contextual factors. Clearly, this additional data collection will vary dramatically in scope from case to case. Some cases will be the subject of little published material whereas others will be the subject of voluminous written material. Our graduate assistants will work largely in creating and maintaining these documentary records.

Using Interview Data. Interviewing is a traditional approach to the study of interest groups, though it is a difficult method to take advantage of because of the logistical difficulties of getting to Washington. It is relatively easy to arrange interviews with lobbyists. For one project, Berry (1977) contacted approximately 100 lobbyists and had an estimated 97 percent success rate in interviewing those he approached. The collective experience of the five principals in this project includes hundreds of interviews with lobbyists and policy makers. We have found them not only accessible, but also open to a range of questioning and quite voluble in addressing the issues we raise. Indeed, in the past we have asked them far more intrusive questions than the ones we propose here and came away with good results. The accessibility of lobbyists is critical because the research design is built around a sample of lobbyists who, in turn, will provide a representative sample of issues that, on any given day, are being worked on by advocacy organizations.

Questions may arise as to what we might not be able to ascertain from these interviews. Interviews asking lobbyists about what they are working on may seem destined to yield a lot of self-serving exaggeration of each respondent's prowess in getting government to listen to them. At the same time, lobbyists may not be terribly eager to share stories of their failure to get the issues they are pushing onto the agenda. The first of these issues is a concern; the second should not be a problem. The tendency for respondents to provide some self-serving information is a generic problem in elite interviewing. This is one of the reasons we are going to use a snowballing interview strategy in which the initial interviews are supplemented with follow-ups with other lobbyists, congressional staffers, and agency officials. Snowball sampling is a widely used tactic in any kind of network-related research and needs little elaboration here. Moreover, along with our graduate research assistants, we will be acquiring contextual information on each module, as discussed above.

We are not concerned about lobbyists downplaying or hiding their lack of success in getting their problems defined as political issues and taken up by policymakers. It has been our experience in interviewing lobbyists that they are all too frank in talking about what they have not been able to move forward. Analogous to Kingdon's (1989) finding of a congratulation-

rationalization phenomenon among candidates for office, lobbyists speak freely of what they do not control: the actions of others.

Another feature of our approach is that we will use our interviews to develop a set of informants. Since we cannot judge argumentation with a one-shot study, we will be going back several times to update each module. Although pioneered by Lewis Anthony Dexter in the 1950's, interest-group research has not made much use of informants as a basic research strategy. Bill Browne's recent work (1995) reminds us of the potential for this kind of work. Although there will be inevitable attrition from the first stage, we should have a small list of elites for each issue area and, thus, our work should not be seriously harmed by withdrawals or failures to locate.

Coding, Dissemination, and Analysis

For each module, we will have a team of graduate student coders working closely with the senior staff who conducted the interviews to code a set of variables concerning the number and types of different arguments used, the evidence, the amount and type of media coverage, the participants, and the outcomes of the policy debate. We will produce a summary set of indicators in the form of a narrative case study as well as a data base allowing the systematic comparison of all the issues in our sample. The case studies will be written to avoid revealing any of our respondents, and will be made available on a web site to any researcher. (Raw interview notes will not be released; only case summaries and public documents.) The data base summarizing comparisons across all the cases will similarly be made available when it is complete.

Our most important coding task will be to assemble a list of the arguments and evidence being presented for each issue and to document whether these arguments vary over time, across audiences, and from venue to venue. We will also attempt to identify the sources of the arguments and evidence. Our attention will focus on assessing the degree to which a given issue is characterized by a single dimension of debate or by many. We expect to measure the levels of attention to each different argument and bit of evidence through our interviews and through examination of the written record (e.g., testimony from hearings, the Congressional Record, news stories). We will of course have to wait to see exactly what sorts of arguments we observe before we can specify exactly the details of our coding plan but we can identify three important types of arguments and evidence: Social Values, Technical Evidence, and Political Evidence. Each of these may be either disputed or uncontested.

Social Values include economic growth, saving the environment, protecting freedom, ensuring equality and rights, ending poverty and hunger, ensuring educational opportunities, or other ends towards which society might strive. Of course, some social values are disputed: gun control is seen as good by some, bad by others. The goal of a lobbyist is often to link their preferred policy to an uncontested social value. These are the touchstones of political rhetoric.

Technical Evidence typically concerns questions of means. While values can be contested, we expect that debate more often centers on the technical questions of whether a given policy really is the most effective means of attaining that end. Evidence of this type includes scientific studies, program evaluations, experiments, estimates of the severity of the problem, comparisons of the effectiveness of potential solutions or policies, cost estimates, studies of

adverse side-effects or unintended consequences, feasibility issues, and any other evidence concerning the effectiveness of the means, as opposed to the desirability of the ends. Technical evidence can be disputed or uncontested, as rivals may either call into question the validity of a given study, or they may choose instead to show unrelated evidence on a different dimension.

Political Evidence concerns such issues as the degree of constituency support, potential electoral impacts, the likelihood of bill passage, presidential support, and other “inside-the-beltway” considerations. This type of information may likewise either be accepted or disputed.

We will list and compare the amount of attention paid to each argument and bit of evidence. This means that each case study and our resulting database will have a summary of: every social value mentioned (and the proportion of total attention paid to each); every bit of technical evidence mentioned (and the proportion); and every bit of political evidence mentioned (again by proportion of total). Further, where appropriate, we will document how the distribution of arguments and evidence changed as the issue progressed (for example, before and after a bill is first considered outside of committee). We should note that there may be cases with dozens of social values mentioned at some point by some of the respondents or in some of the written documents. Similarly, a great number of distinct bits of technical or political evidence may be mentioned. Because we will consider systematically the amount of attention paid to each argument and bit of evidence, we will be able to characterize each issue by its dimensionality. Some issues are likely to show coherent debate along a single dimension, with competing bits of technical evidence. Others issues may exhibit what Baumgartner and Jones (1993) called “non-contradictory argumentation.” This is where one side mentions technical evidence relating to one uncontested social value (timber harvesting supports jobs and the economy) and the other side responds not by contesting the validity of their evidence, but by raising a different dimension of debate (the mystical value of old-growth forests). By tracking separately the amount of attention to technical studies and reference to social values, we plan to estimate the prevalence and effectiveness of both types of strategies and to see how political leaders react to debates that often oppose uncontested social values. (We anticipate that some of our chosen issues will be the subject of so much written material, congressional debate, and media attention, that we will sample rather than code all of it. Most issues, however, are unlikely to generate so much coverage.)

Measuring Dimensionality. Few have looked systematically at dimensionality in policy making. Typically, issues have been scaled on the basis of voting patterns in order to determine whether they are treated as part of a single dimension or not. Our approach is more direct. We simply take the debate on its own terms and enumerate all the distinct arguments and references to evidence. Obviously this requires some judgment about whether one argument is distinct from another, or just an element of it. However, we have been successful in doing similar work in the past (for example see Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Jones, Baumgartner, and Talbert 1994). Since then, others including MacLeod (1998) and McKissick (1995), in dissertation projects, have successfully used similar methods of content analysis to enumerate the distinct arguments and to measure the relative attention paid to each one. For each case we will have a list of the distinct arguments, the points of technical evidence that are mentioned, and the political arguments. We will be able to compare those debates where all the evidence concerns a single social value to those where many competing social values are in play. Similarly, we will note the impact of political evidence, and we will be able to judge if different lobbyists tend to focus on

different arguments depending on the target or if the prevalence of different arguments changes during the policy process.

Documenting the number of different social values discussed and linking these values to the use of political and technical evidence are straightforward, if time consuming, coding tasks. A content-based measure of dimensionality is necessary because we want to observe how these many-faceted issues are reduced to a smaller set of cleavages that are apparent in congressional voting. Our measure of dimensionality must therefore be completely distinct from voting patterns. (Further, since some of our issues may well not involve any distinct and recorded votes, these data will not be available in every case.)

In addition to the coding of the dimensions of policy discussion, our two most important coding issues will have to do with the outcomes, or degree of policy change considered or enacted in the lobbying process; and the list of participants involved (and whether participants changed over time). Not only do we want to document who was involved, but we also want to note which actors proposed which arguments and supported it with which kinds of evidence. In particular, we hope to document the sources of influential pieces of evidence, and how technical evidence supporting a particular outcome is brought into the policy process. Therefore, for each argument, we expect to mention if the argument or bit of evidence could be traced to any particular source or lobbying coalition.

Our resulting case studies are likely to be quite detailed and will record in sequence each of the items listed above. Each will also have a complete set of citations to publicly available sources for further information on the issue. Our quantitative data base is likely to be more highly aggregated, listing such variables as: number of participants; number of each of several types of participants (trade group, business, executive agencies, citizen groups, etc.); number of social values mentioned pro and con; a measure of dimensionality based on the weighted attention to the various dimensions; levels of attention to each of the bits of technical evidence; political arguments; degree of policy change; number and size of coalitions involved; the resources controlled by the coalitions; and other factors mentioned above.

We would stress the potential usefulness of the resulting data sets to the scholarly community, in particular as it relates to two issues. One is the flexibility of the concept of the module. The issues that we select for study are likely to be quite diverse—some will be the subject of little public knowledge, but others will likely be the subject of massive public and media campaigns. Accordingly, our case studies are likely to be variable in size, depth, and content. For some issues there may be extensive public information including such items as public opinion surveys, extensive congressional action (with votes), media coverage, and records of the use of publicity and grass-roots lobbying campaigns. We expect to gather as much information as we can about each of our cases and to make it available subject only to confidentiality concerns. The resulting data set will not only be of interest to researchers, but should be an excellent teaching tool. Most importantly, it should allow any one interested in comparing lobbying across types of issues to construct their own tests of a great variety of theories. In this way, we propose to make an open and comprehensive data base that can be used by others, not just by ourselves.

Second, we hope to be able to maintain our data base and to add to it, perhaps by additional samples of issues in future years, conducted either by us or by others. The result should be an ever-increasing data base on lobbying and public policy, hopefully laying the groundwork for a great variety of more systematic and generalizable studies of public policy than has been possible up to now.

Timeline

Our schedule for completing the project-related tasks we describe here is as follows:

Spring Term 1999: Hojnacki will be in Washington frequently to complete interviews with policy advocates active on health-related issues as part of her Robert Wood Johnson fellowship. Initial interviews and data collection techniques will be finalized during this period even while the proposal is being reviewed.

Summer 1999 (grant begins): Hojnacki, Leech, Berry continue interviews. Graduate students recruited and trained for coding tasks in State College.

Fall Term 1999, Spring 2000: Hojnacki continues with her DC interviews; commuting to bi-weekly seminars in Ann Arbor. Other investigators continue with occasional visits to Washington. Coders active in State College completing case studies through document searches. Web based case distribution set up with initial case material.

Summer 2000: Interviews by all the principal investigators. One graduate assistant also comes to Washington for interviews.

Fall 2000, Spring 2001: One graduate assistant remains in Washington for the year, conducting interviews and gathering documentary sources. Another student remains in State College focusing on coding. Cases added to web site throughout the project as they are completed.

Summer 2001: Interviews by all involved. Coding continues in State College

Fall 2001: Baumgartner remains in DC on leave from teaching; interviews go throughout the fall. Coding continues. Occasional interviews and follow-ups by others.

Spring 2002: Coding, writing, follow-up phone interviews.

Summer 2002: Case studies complete, term of grant ends. Writing continues. Data posted on web for all cases.

Summary: Academic responsibilities preclude most of us from spending our time in Washington during the school year. However, once initial interviews are conducted we expect to follow up with our respondents through phone, email, and fax. Further, through Hojnacki's Robert Wood Johnson fellowship (for 1999-2000), the use of a graduate student interviewer (in 2000-01), and Baumgartner's research leave (summer and fall 2001), we will have a permanent

Washington presence for the entire research period. Summers will allow for many more interviews, during a period when many respondents may have additional time for interviews.

Feasibility and Qualifications of the Research Team

Our proposal involves a broad range of tasks, the most important of which is to create a usable set of materials from a great diversity of sources, including interviews and documents. A combination of field work, archival scouring, interviewing, and quantitative data base management skills are clearly called for. The five of us have had extensive experience in each of these tasks:

Baumgartner is co-author of *Basic Interests* (Princeton, 1998, with Beth L. Leech), which reviews the state of the field in interest-group studies and suggests many of the strategies put into practice here. His previous book, *Agendas and Instability in American Politics* (Chicago, 1993, with Bryan Jones), developed the ideas of venue-shopping and issue-definition as causes for dramatic policy change. His first book, *Conflict and Rhetoric in French Policymaking* (Pittsburgh, 1989), used an interview strategy based on snowball sampling for a sample of 30 cases and over 110 interviews with a range of policymakers in France very similar to that proposed here. With Bryan Jones, he is co-director of the Policy Agendas Project, supported by NSF and currently making available a wealth of data on congressional hearings, CQ stories, public laws, New York Times stories, and the federal budget. The two projects with Jones have involved the creation of very large data bases and the supervision of graduate students in a series of tasks similar to those necessary for the completion of this project.

Berry is the author or co-author of *To Enact a Law* (Praeger, 1972), *Lobbying for the People* (Princeton, 1977), *The Interest Group Society* (3rd ed., Longman, 1997), *Feeding Hungry People* (Rutgers, 1984), and *The Challenge of Democracy* (6th ed., Houghton Mifflin, 1999). His last book, *The Rebirth of Urban Democracy* (Brookings, 1993), won the APSA's Gladys Kammerer Award for the best book on American politics and the Urban Politics Section's Best Book Award. His forthcoming book, *The New Liberalism: The Rising Power of Citizen Groups* will be published by the Brookings Institution in early 1999. He has extensive experience in conducting field research and has conducted hundreds of elite interviews.

Hojnacki is assistant professor of political science at Penn State University, and Robert Wood Johnson Health Policy Fellow at the University of Michigan (1998-2000). She has conducted two large scale mail surveys and many elite interviews to investigate the strategies and tactics organizations use to advocate their policy preferences. Her recent research with David Kimball uses data from a mail survey of over 600 organizations active on one of four different policy issues along with data from several in-person interviews to explain whom groups work through in Congress to affect legislative policy, and how organizations communicate different types of information to committee members to affect the content of policy proposals, to expand and maintain their coalitions of support in committee, and to achieve both of these legislative objectives. One article from this project recently appeared in the *American Political Science Review* and another is forthcoming in the *Journal of Politics*. In another project, she used data from a mail survey of about 400 organizations with interests in one of five different policy issues along with data from a series of in-person interviews to study interest-group coalitions. Her articles on this topic (*American Journal of Political Science* 1997; *Political Research Quarterly*

1998) illustrate what types of interests are less equipped to act successfully on their own as advocates, what types of issues are likely to facilitate collective action by organizations, and how a group's dependence on collective advocacy affects its interactions with other organizations.

Leech is co-author of *Basic Interests*, and a former professional journalist with extensive experience in interviewing elites. Her dissertation, *Lobbying Strategies of American Interest Groups*, was based on a mail survey of 800 interest-group lobbyists based in Washington, D.C. In that project, interest-group strategies were analyzed in the context of particular issues using an issue-selection mechanism similar to that laid out in the current proposal.

Kimball has had experience in designing and implementing large-scale surveys mentioned above with Hojnacki. His other work on voting and public opinion has appeared in such journals as the *American Political Science Review* and the *Journal of Politics*. He brings to the research project considerable statistical and methodological skills as well as experience in survey research.

Conclusion

Our proposal is very simple. We want to contribute to the field of public policy and policy making what election studies, international conflict, and other areas of the discipline have long had: A common set of high-quality indicators of the most theoretically important behaviors related to lobbying and government advocacy. Hopefully, our large project would stimulate a wide range of studies of lobbying behavior, allowing the field to move well beyond its focus on case studies, PAC contributions, roll-call voting studies, or any other partial approach. The scope of what we propose is much greater than what has typically been done by interest-group specialists, but our analysis of the literature indicates that the smaller empirical scope and more partial theoretical focus of most previous studies have seriously impeded theoretical advance. We cast our net quite broadly here but we have no doubt that the systematic comparison of lobbying behavior in scores of randomly selected policy issues is the right way to push the field forward. Even though our scope is great, our project remains feasible because of its open-ended nature. Any single one of our cases could be expanded for a more detailed look at such issues as the role of public opinion, media campaigns, campaign contributions, or any other particular item of interest to a researcher. By providing a common core set of information about a large number of issues, we provide the foundation for progress for an entire subfield in the discipline.

Results from Prior NSF Support

Baumgartner: "Policy Agendas in the United States since 1945." National Science Foundation grant # SBR-9320922 for \$245,000 covering the period from Spring 1994 to Spring 1998, with Bryan D. Jones, with Research Opportunities for Undergraduate supplements in 1994 and 1995. This project led to seven completed dissertations at Texas A&M (Talbert, MacLeod, Vallabhan, True, Liu, McGonagle, Krutz) and on-going at the University of Washington (Feeley, Hunt); a number of conference papers and published articles (see Baumgartner's CV, attached to this proposal). Work continues on analysis of the project data and writing. The data bases themselves, including a complete set of congressional hearings (approx. 70,000 hearings); a sample of articles from the New York Times Index (approx. 40,000 stories, or about 800 per

year), a record of all laws (18,000), every story in the Congressional Quarterly Almanac (13,000), and a consistent time series of the federal budget (3,000 observations) covering the period 1947 to 1995, are available: <http://weber.u.washington.edu/~ampol/agendasproject.html>. Dissertations and other research projects are on-going at many universities using the policy agendas data.

Baumgartner and Leech: “Lobbying Strategies of American Interest Groups.” National Science Foundation dissertation award, # SBR–9631232, \$8,476, July 15, 1996 to June 30, 1998. Dissertation completed based on mail survey of 800 interest groups. “Lobbying Friends and Foes in Government” (In *Interest Group Politics*, 5th ed., Allan J. Cigler and Burdett A. Loomis, eds. CQ Press, 1998) based on data from this survey. Additional articles and book manuscript by Leech also in progress.

Berry: No previous NSF support

Hojnacki: No previous NSF support

Kimball: No previous NSF support

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